.-»NGE  AND 
THE  WORLD  WAR 

.JAJOR  GENERAL 

WILLIAM  CROZIER 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE 
WORLD  WAR 


ORDNANCE  AND 
THE  WORLD  WAR 


A  Contribution  to  the  History 
of  American    Preparedness 


BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL 

WILLIAM  CROZIER 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
7920 


COPYRIGHT,  1920,  BY 
CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

Published  May,  1920 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DEDICATED  TO 
THE    ORDNANCE    OFFICERS 

WHOSE   DEVOTED  SERVICES  MADE  THE   RECORD 

WHICH    IS   HEREIN   ONLY   PARTIALLY 

SET  FORTH 


INTRODUCTORY 

THIS  BOOK  is  written  in  the  belief  that  there  is  a 
public  in  the  United  States  which  would  wish  to 
know  something  of  the  method  by  which  its  great 
army  was  prepared  to  play  its  part  in  the  World 
War.  Everybody  now  knows  that  we  entered  the 
war  with  a  very  small  army  and  a  wholly  inade- 
quate supply  of  arms,  ammunition  and  other  equip- 
ment ;  but  there  are  some  who  do  not  know  why  it 
took  so  long  a  time  to  raise  the  war  army  and  trans- 
port it  to  Europe,  or  why  its  supply  with  certain 
American-made  munitions  was  so  much  delayed; 
and  there  are  even  some  who,  puzzled  by  sugges- 
tions from  sources  claiming  to  be  well  informed, 
do  not  know  why  we  were  not  better  prepared 
originally,  at  least  in  the  matter  of  war  equipment. 
Official  reports  have  made  known  that  we  did  not 
send  to  Europe  artillery  of  the  two  most  important 
calibers  in  time  to  have  any  of  it  get  into  use  at 
the  front  before  hostilities  ceased.  And  the  same 
fact  has  developed  concerning  gas  shell.  The  funds 
which  were  made  available  for  supplying  equip- 
ment were  prodigious  in  amount,  and  the  citizen 
who  is  in  the  habit  of  thinking  that  America  is  a 
master  of  manufacture  is  naturally  receptive  of  the 
criticism  that  such  delay  must  necessarily  imply 
incompetence  of  personnel  or  clumsiness  of  method, 
or  both. 

I  shall  try  herein  to  show  where  the  principal 
trouble  lay  with  regard  to  the  fighting  equipment 

Tii 


Vlll 


INTRODUCTORY 


which  Is  furnished  by  the  Ordnance  Department, 
and  in  doing  so  I  shall  tell  something  of  the  organi- 
zation of  that  department,  in  order  that  an  idea 
may  be  formed  as  to  its  fitness  for  its  task,  and  as 
to  the  necessity  for  a  substitute  organization,  which 
was  suggested,  with  strong  backing,  for  taking  over 
that  portion  of  the  Ordnance  Department's  work 
which  had  to  do  with  the  procurement  of  munitions 
by  contract  with  private  manufacturers.  I  shall 
then  illustrate  the  course  of  the  Department's  per- 
formance by  giving  some  prominent  instances  in 
which  intense  dissatisfaction  was  expressed  popu- 
larly, and  also  in  certain  high  official  quarters,  with 
the  progress  which  was  made  in  the  supply  of  im- 
portant equipment  during  the  early  months  of  the 
war,  and  shall  try  to  make  it  appear  whether  the 
Ordnance  Department  met  its  responsibilities  well, 
or  better  action  could  have  been  taken  under  the 
circumstances.  I  shall  do  this  in  the  hope  that  the 
interested  reader  may  thereby  be  enabled  to  form 
a  judgment  as  to  where  his  efforts  should  be  di- 
rected in  order  that  we  may  not  again  enter  a 
war  under  conditions  requiring  so  much  time  for 
their  correction,  and  so  much  protection  by  other 
forces  while  we  are  making  our  own  ready  to  en- 
force the  nation's  will. 

I  should  add  that,  having  retired  from  active  serv- 
ice, I  am  no  longer  a  part  of  the  "War  Department  or 
of  the  Army  with  the  Colors.  I  therefore  speak 
without  official  authority,  and  with  something  of  the 
freedom  of  any  other  citizen. 

APRIL  13,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTORY vii 

I 

ORDNANCE    DEPARTMENT 

General  duties — Provision  for  their  performance  in  foreign  coun- 
tries— Early  methods  in  the  United  States — Appointment  of 
ordnance  officers  —  Qualifications  —  Necessity  for  incentive  — 
Change  in  method  of  recruitment  after  Spanish  War — Disad- 
vantages of  the  change — Modifications  of  method — Shortage 
of  personnel — Great  expansion  in  the  World  War — Organiza- 
tion of  the  Ordnance  Office — Cost-plus  contracts.  Pages  1-19 


II 

EMBARRASSMENTS 

Inadequacy  of  appropriations  for  preparation — Other  handicaps — 
Discouragement  of  training  of  private  manufacturers — Dif- 
ficulty of  expanding  clerical  force — Difficulty  of  increasing 
office  space — Legal  obstacles  to  expansion  of  plant — Delay  in 
war  appropriations — Restrictions  in  expenditure  of  appropria- 
tions— Unnecessary  limitations  of  discretion.  Pages  20-37 


III 

OVERHEAD    ORGANIZATION 

Task  of  huge  expenditure — Adequacy  of  existing  organizations — 
Aid  required — Changes  suggested — Creation  of  General  Muni- 
tions Board — Substitution  of  War  Industries  Board — Proposed 
Department  of  Munitions — Division  of  Purchase,  Storage  and 
Traffic.  Pages  38-50 

ix 


CONTENTS 


IV 


CEITICISMS 

Adjournment  of  Extra  Session  of  Congress  in  1917 — Investigation 
of  War  Department  at  first  regular  Session — Spirit  of  investi- 
gators— Special  subjects  of  criticism — Scheme  of  reply. 

Pages  51-55 


RIFLES 

Importance  of  weapon — Supply  of  Springfields — Manufacture  of 
Enfields — Questions  of  caliber  and  interchangeability  of  parts 
— Decision  of  the  questions — Criticism  of  the  decision — Ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  of  the  course  pursued — Testimony 
of  manufacturers — Margin  of  time — Satisfactory  outcome. 

Pages  56-73 

VI 

MACHINE   GUNS 

Great  development  of  use — Light  and  heavy  types — Insufficiency 
of  supply — Tests  before  the  war — Appearance  of  the  Lewis 
gun — Difference  of  opinion  between  testing  boards  and  inven- 
tor— Lewis  guns  on  the  Mexican  border — First  large  appro- 
priation— Program  for  its  expenditure — Tests  of  April  and 
May,  1917 — Views  of  testing  board — Appearance  of  Browning 
gun  —  American  machine  gun  output  —  Charge  of  prejudice 
against  Lewis  gun — Testimony  of  Col.  Lewis — Plattsburg  test 
of  June,  1916 — Col.  Lewis'  claim  of  free  offer  to  Government 
— Confirmation  by  Gen.  Wood — Col.  Lewis'  claim  of  free  offer 
of  range  finders — His  further  charge  of  prejudice — Correspond- 
ence on  this  subject — Col.  Lewis'  return  of  royalties — News- 
paper charges — Investigation  by  Inspector-General — Public 
endorsement  by  Secretary  of  War  of  Inspector  General 's  con- 
clusions— Failure  of  efforts  for  court  of  inquiry — Criticisms  by 
Senators  Chamberlain  and  Wadsworth — Assistance  from  the 
French.  Pages  74-203 


CONTENTS 


VII 

FIELD   ARTILLERY 

Criticism  of  shortage — Previous  efforts  of  Chief  of  Ordnance  to 
avoid  it — Responsibility  of  the  people — Allied  assistance — 
Subject  of  dies,  jigs  and  gauges — French  and  American  75  mm. 
guns  —  Difficulty  of  manufacturing  French  model  —  Senator 
Wadsworth's  criticisms — Reply  thereto.  Pages  204-243 


VIII 

SMOKELESS   POWDER 

Initial  manufacturing  capacity — Estimated  needs — Allied  situation 
— Plans  for  enlarging  the  output — Disapproval  by  War  De- 
partment— Attitude  of  War  Industries  Board — Construction 
of  plants  at  Nitro,  W.  Va.,  and  at  Nashville,  Tenn. — Experi- 
ence with  the  two  plants — Comparison  of  cost  of  powder. 

Pages  244-268 

IX 

RESPONSIBILITY 

Military  efficiency  of  form  of  government — Senator  Chamberlain's 
New  York  criticism — Reply  of  Representative  Glass — Appre- 
ciation by  public  men  of  cause  of  unpreparedness. 

Pages  269-283 


CONCLUSION 

Purpose   of  this  volume — Congressional   investigation — Immediate 
effect — Duty  of  the  citizen.  Pages  284-292 


Ordnance  and  the  World  War 


THE  ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT 

THE  Ordnance  Department  has  the  duty  of  design- 
ing, procuring  by  manufacture  or  purchase,  sup- 
plying to  the  service  and  maintaining  in  repair  the 
artillery,  small  arms,  ammunition,  pyrotechnics, 
grenades  and  trench  warfare  weapons  for  the  fixed 
defenses  and  mobile  armies  of  the  United  States  and 
its  insular  possessions,  and  supplies  also  the  small 
arms  for  the  Navy  and  the  Marine  Corps.  Until 
the  latter  part  of  the  World  War  it  supplied  the 
personal  equipment  of  the  men,  that  is,  their  pack 
carriers,  cartridge  belts,  mess  kits,  etc.,  the  horse 
equipments  for  the  cavalry,  and  the  harness  for  the 
artillery ;  but  these  last  were  taken  over  by  the  newly 
created  division  of  Purchase,  Storage  and  Traffic, 
leaving  to  the  Ordnance  Department  the  technical 
supplies  generally  comprised  in  the  terms  arms  and 
ammunition. 

Military  nations  have  adopted  different  methods 
for  providing  an  organization  to  attend  to  the  above 
mentioned  duties.  The  common  practice  has  been 
to  confide  the  task  to  a  bodv  of  officers  selected  from 


2      .-\  :(JI|1»ST:A5:C!E  l\NDvrHE  WORLD  WAR 

the  artillery  service,  and  in  European  industrial 
countries  great  reliance  has  been  placed  upon  pri- 
vate manufacturing  establishments  for  the  designs 
and  the  experimental  work  preliminary  to  the  in- 
troduction of  new  types  of  weapons.  The  Krupp 
establishment  in  Germany,  the  Skoda  in  Austria,  the 
Ansaldo  in  Italy,  the  Creusot  in  France  and  the 
Vickers  in  England  are  well  known  examples  of 
private  manufactories  which  have  contributed  nota- 
bly to  the  munition  making  of  the  world.  Such 
establishments,  with  their  expensive  staffs  and  spe- 
cial facilities,  must,  of  course,  be  sustained  on  a 
money-making  basis.  This  has  been  possible  both 
by  reason  of  the  encouragement  of  the  respective 
governments,  and  also  because  of  the  markets  af- 
forded for  the  military  output  of  the  factories  by 
the  backward  industrial  countries  of  the  Orient  and 
of  the  new  world,  in  the  supply  of  which  markets 
the  home  governments  have  often  given  very  ma- 
terial assistance  to  the  home  factories.  At  each  of 
these  establishments  a  corps  of  engineering  design- 
ers has  been  maintained,  largely  recruited  from  the 
military  services. 

The  United  States  has  never  had  such  establish- 
ments to  rely  upon,  and  therefore,  from  the  begin- 
ning of  its  existence,  has  followed  the  method  of 
providing  a  special  governmental  organization  for 
attending  to  the  design  and  the  supply  of  arms  and 
ammunition,  the  fighting  munitions  of  war.  In  the 
Continental  Congress  a  special  committee  known  as 
the  " Board  of  War  and  Ordnance"  was  charged 
with  the  duty  of  supplying  the  revolutionary  forces 


THE    ORDNANCE    DEPARTMENT  8 

with  war  material,  in  so  far  as  this  was  done  by  the 
central  government.  The  committee  was  composed 
of  five  members  of  the  Congress,  but  was  soon  en- 
larged by  the  addition  of  persons  not  members  of 
Congress,  and  was  shortly  again  changed  so  as  to 
exclude  the  members  of  Congress  and  reduce  the 
board  to  three  members.  This  was  in  primitive 
form  the  beginning  of  the  War  Department,  which 
was  thereafter  evolved  as  the  special  branch  of  the 
government  for  the  control  of  the  military  forces. 
The  name  was  changed  to  the  " Board  of  War,"  but 
its  functions  continued  to  include  the  supply  of  the 
forces  with  ordnance  material.  The  board  had 
under  it  a  body  of  officers  known  as  Commissaries 
General  of  Military  Stores,  for  the  care  of  the  mu- 
nitions procured  by  the  Board  of  War  and  their 
issue  to  the  service. 

In  1781  the  office  of  Secretary  of  War  was  cre- 
ated, and  in  1794  there  was  created  the  office  of 
Superintendent  of  Military  Stores,  who  was  given 
charge  of  the  custody  of  these  stores,  but  not  of 
their  procurement.  As  yet  there  was  no  Ordnance 
Department,  and  the  duties  which  were  afterwards 
assigned  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  were  distributed 
between  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
the  Commissary  of  Military  Stores  and  his  assis- 
tants. In  1812  the  Ordnance  Department  was  cre- 
ated and  placed  under  an  officer  with  the  rank  of 
colonel,  and  the  title  of  Commissary-General  of  Ord- 
nance. This  officer  was  given  assistants  with  titles 
like  his  own  and  appropriate  military  rank,  and  the 
whole  department  was  placed  under  the  Secretary 


ORDNANi 


WORLD  WAR 


of  War.  In  1815  the  title  of  Commissary  was  dis- 
carded and  the  officers  were  designated  as  colonels, 
lieut.-eolonels,  etc.  In  these  early  years  the  actual 
work  of  manufacturing  arms  and  ammunition  was 
performed  by  artisans  who  were  first  employed  and 
later  enlisted  in  the  Ordnance  Department.  Again, 
in  still  later  years  and  up  to  the  present  time,  these 
enlisted  men  formed  the  guards  and  caretakers  of 
the  ordnance  establishments  and  the  field  force  for 
issue  and  repair  of  ordnance  stores,  and  the  work  of 
manufacture  at  these  establishments  was  performed 
by  employees. 

During  the  early  years  of  its  existence  the  officers 
of  the  Ordnance  Department  were  appointed  from 
the  rest  of  the  Army  or  from  civil  life.  For  eleven 
years,  from  1821  to  1832,  they  were  obtained  by  de- 
tail from  the  Artillery,  with  which  the  department 
was  merged.  But  this  arrangement  not  provin'g  sat- 
isfactory, the  department  was  re-established  by  the 
Act  of  April  5, 1832.  After  its  creation  the  Military 
Academy  at  West  Point  became  a  source  of  supply 
of  ordnance  officers,  as  of  other  officers  of  the  Army ; 
and  for  a  number  of  years  the  practice  was  to  ap- 
point to  the  Engineer  Corps  the  highest  graduates  of 
each  class,  and  to  the  Ordnance  Department  the  next 
following.  From  the  early  days  of  the  existence  of 
the  department  solicitude  was  displayed  by  Congress 
as  to  the  qualifications  of  ordnance  officers.  When 
it  was  to  be  enlarged  examinations  were  prescribed 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  transfer  of  officers 
from  other  branches  of  the  Army,  and  in  1863  an 
examination  was  instituted  by  law  as  a  condition  of 


THE   ORDNANCE    DEPARTMENT  5 

promotion,  some  twenty-seven  years  before  this  re- 
quirement was  prescribed  for  officers  of  the  Army 
at  large.  In  1869,  following  a  reduction  in  the 
strength  of  the  Army,  appointments  and  promo- 
tions in  the  Ordnance  Department  were  suspended 
for  several  years;  and  during  this  period  of  sus- 
pension much  consideration  was  given  to  the  best 
method  of  securing  officers  for  taking  charge  of  the 
design  and  procurement  of  the  nation's  munitions, 
for  which  there  was  no  other  body  of  citizens  who 
could  be  called  upon. 

The  designing  and  constructing  ordnance  officer 
must  be  a  mechanical  engineer,  since  no  character- 
istic of  this  mechanical  age  is  more  pronounced 
than  the  complete  entry  of  its  spirit  into  the  pro- 
duction of  implements  and  engines  of  war.  The 
ordnance  officer's  knowledge  of  engineering  subjects 
must  not  be  merely  that  of  the  liberally  educated 
man,  understanding  the  general  principles  of  all 
professions,  but  that  of  the  expert  with  details  at 
his  finger  ends,  and  he  must  have  a  specially  sound 
mastery  of  principles,  since  he  must  oftentimes  de- 
duce the  methods  of  their  application  to  his  art 
without  the  aid  of  the  many  handbooks  and  practi- 
cal treatises  which  are  available  in  the  civil  practice 
of  the  engineering  profession.  Progressive  develop- 
ment of  arms  and  armament  requires  strenuous  pry- 
ing, with  stimulated  imagination,  in  advance  of  the 

own;  for  war  is  competition,  and  there  is  no 
standard  of  excellence  for  anything.  It  does  not 
suffice  to  have  good  soldiers,  good  officers,  and  good 
rmament,  if  the  enemy  has  better  soldiers,  better 


6     ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

officers,  and  better  armament.  The  intense  appli- 
cation and  close  work  required  of  an  ordnance  offi- 
cer are  not  attractive  to  one  without  special  apti- 
tude, and  do  not  of  themselves  tempt  line  officers 
to  laborious  preparation  for  entry  into  the  Ord- 
nance Department  from  a  life  which  certainly  offers 
a  more  agreeable  combination  of  indoor  and  out- 
door occupation  than  does  that  of  the  technical  staff 
officer.  The  necessity  for  some  incentive  for  serv- 
ice in  the  Ordnance  Department  was  therefore 
recognized. 

In  1873  the  Corps  was  reopened  with  a  new  scheme 
for  the  recruitment  of  officer  personnel.  The  low- 
est grade  in  the  corps  was  made  that  of  1st  lieu- 
tenant, and  transfer  to  the  corps  was  to  be  pre- 
ceded by  an  examination  satisfactory  to  a  board  of 
ordnance  officers.  The  examination  was  not  re- 
quired by  law  to  be  competitive,  but  the  practice  of 
the  department  soon  made  it  so  that  the  stimulus  of 
an  advance  in  grade  for  the  successful  2nd  lieutenant 
of  the  line,  and  of  permanent  transfer  to  a  corps 
of  which  he  liked  the  duties  and  in  which  subsequent 
promotion  was  faster  than  in  the  line,  being  suffi- 
cient to  secure  a  number  of  competitors  for  each 
vacancy.  This  system  was  quite  successful,  and 
furnished  excellent  officers  for  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment. It  lacked  the  advantage  of  an  easy  way 
to  disembarrass  the  department  of  officers  who  did 
not  fulfill  their  early  promise  and  it  thus  failed  to 
keep  up  the  stimulus  of  competition  after  entry  into 
the  department,  but  it  was  probably  better  than  was 
enjoyed  by  any  other  branch  of  the  service,  and  it 


THE    ORDNANCE    DEPARTMENT  7 

lasted  until  the  reorganization  of  the  Army  after 
the  Spanish  War. 

In  the  temporary  interest  in  the  Service  which 
always  follows  war  there  was  the  usual  scrutiny  of 
the  military  machine  after  the  Spanish  War,  and 
among  the  criticisms  of  organization  and  methods 
probably  the  most  severe  were  directed  against  the 
staff  departments  as  being  too  completely  divorced 
from  the  line,  and  consequently  lacking  both  in 
knowledge  of  line  requirements  and  in  sympathetic 
concern  in  meeting  them.  There  was  no  doubt  of 
the  harsh  things  said  of  the  staff  by  line  officers, 
and  whether  these  charges  were  justified  or  not,  it 
was  part  of  good  organization  to  try  to  remove  their 
cause,  and  produce  harmony  between  the  mutually 
essential  components  of  the  military  force.  The 
cause  was  diagnosed  as  the  completeness  of  the  sep- 
aration of  the  staff  officer  when  he  was  permanently 
transferred  from  the  line;  and  the  cure,  as  applied 
in  the  Act  of  February  2,  1901,  was  to  place  all 
the  staff  departments,  except  the  Judge  Advocate 
General's,  the  Medical  Department  and  the  Engi- 
neers, under  a  detail  system,  in  which  their  officers 
were  detached  from  the  line  for  tours  of  four  years, 
with  compulsory  interval  of  two  years  between  suc- 
cessive details  in  grades  below  that  of  lieut.-colonel. 
The  new  system  was  not  made  to  apply  to  officers 
already  in  the  staff  departments,  who  continued  on 
therein,  but  with  no  more  permanent  transfers,  and 
it  prevailed  up  to  the  time  of  our  entry  into  the 
European  War,  without  important  modification  ex- 
cept as  to  the  Ordnance  Department. 


8     ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  detail  to  the  staff  was  accompanied  by  no  in- 
crease of  rank,  being  made  from  the  same  grade  in 
the  line  as  that  in  the  staff  department  which  was 
filled  by  the  detail;  and  as  promotion  took  place  in 
the  line  only,  there  was  no  special  incentive  to  seek 
service  in  a  staff  department,  except  a  liking  for 
the  work  of  the  department.  This  incentive  was 
not  sufficient  to  secure  officers  for  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment, which  had  kept  up  its  standard  of  quali- 
fications by  continuing  the  examination  as  a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  detail,  as  it  had  before  been  a 
condition  precedent  to  permanent  transfer.  The 
diminution  of  incentive  was  such  that  not  only  was 
it  impossible  to  secure  competition  for  detail  to  the 
department,  but  there  were  not  enough  applicants 
for  detail  to  fill  the  vacancies,  and  oftentimes  there 
were  no  applicants  at  all.  Officers  would  not  under- 
take the  labor  of  preparation  for  examination,  and 
incur  the  risk  of  failure,  for  the  sake  of  entering 
upon  the  laborious  duties  which  would  follow  suc- 
cess. In  1906,  therefore,  after  five  years  of  strong 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  an  act 
was  passed  authorizing  the  ^detail  to  the  Ordnance 
Department  of  officers  from  the  same  grade  in  other 
branches  of  the  service,  or  from  the  grade  below; 
decreasing  the  compulsory  interval  between  succes- 
sive details  from  two  years  to  one,  and  lowering  the 
grade  at  which  the  compulsory  interval  should  cease 
from  lieut.-colonel  to  major.  These  slight  changes 
in  the  law,  involving  no  increase  of  expense,  were 
of  great  significance,  since  they  placed  the  officers 
of  the  Ordnance  Department  upon  a  competitive 


THE   ORDNANCE   DEPARTMENT  9 

basis  of  merit  both  for  entry  into  the  department 
and  for  service  afterward  therein,  with  the  strong 
incentive  of  advancement  in  rank  either  upon  origi- 
nal detail  or  upon  some  subsequent  one.  In  case 
an  officer  failed  to  make  good  all  that  was  necessary 
was  to  refrain  from  redetailing  him,  after  any  four- 
year  tour.  The  method  remained  in  successful  prac- 
tice until  our  entry  into  the  European  War. 

With  the  keen  and  interested  personnel  produced 
by  this  method  of  recruitment  the  best  results 
attended  the  theoretical  course  established  for 
young  ordnance  officers,  at  the  Sandy  Hook  Proving 
Ground,  for  one  year's  study,  under  guidance,  of 
the  application  of  their  student  courses  to  the  de- 
sign of  the  artillery  and  other  armament  furnished 
by  the  Ordnance  Department ;  and  equal  success  was 
experienced  at  the  Watertown  Arsenal,  where  these 
officers  were  given  a  year's  practical  work  in  the 
foundry,  the  machine  shop,  the  forge  shop  and  the 
chemical  laboratory,  making  the  same  hours  as  the 
other  workmen.  At  the  end  of  the  year  they  were 
not  only  fair  artisans  but  they  had  an  increased 
capacity  for  understanding  the  workman's  point  of 
view. 

Incidentally,  it  may  be  here  stated  that  in  the 
bills  for  the  organization  of  the  Army  now — in  the 
spring  of  1920 — before  the  two  Houses  of  Congress 
the  incentive  for  service  in  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment is  removed;  and  if  either  the  Senate  bill  or 
the  House  bill  shall  become  a  law,  without  modifica- 
ion  in  this  respect,  there  will  thereafter  be  lacking 
stimulus  for  tho  special  kind  of  service  herein- 


10    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

before  described  which  the  Department  has  enjoyed 
practically  since  its  first  creation. 

In  common  with  the  rest  of  the  military  establish- 
ment, the  Ordnance  Department  was  hampered 
greatly  in  its  preparations  for  war  by  shortage  of 
personnel.  The  Act  of  February  2,  1901,  after 
the  Spanish  War,  fixed  the  number  of  officers  of  the 
department  at  seventy-one;  the  Act  of  1906,  which 
changed  the  conditions  of  detail,  increased  the  num- 
ber to  eighty-five,  and  the  National  Defense  Act  of 
1916  further  increased  it  to  one  hundred  and  forty- 
two;  but  the  last  Act  prescribed  that  the  increase 
should  take  place  over  an  interval  of  five  years,  so 
that  upon  our  entry  into  the  war  only  ninety-seven 
officers  were  in  the  department.  Not  only  was  this 
number  entirely  inadequate  for  the  performance  of 
the  multitudinous  duties  of  the  Department,  but  a 
considerable  proportion  of  the  ninety-seven  officers 
were  young  men  with  little  experience  in  their 
duties,  and  some  of  them  were  under  instruction  as 
student  officers,  giving  no  aid  in  carrying  on  the 
work  of  the  department,  and  requiring  the  atten- 
tion of  more  experienced  officers  for  their  instruc- 
tion. This  condition,  of  course,  always  obtains  to 
an  extent  in  a  going  organization  of  professional 
people,  but  it  was  accentuated  in  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment by  the  lateness  of  congressional  apprecia- 
tion of  the  necessity  for  increasing  its  personnel, 
and  by  circumstances  which  attended  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  in  Europe. 

When  the  nations  which  afterwards  became  our 
associates  in  the  war  turned  to  the  United  States 


THE  ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT     11 

for  the  manufacture  of  munitions,  the  absence  of 
civilian  engineers  skilled  in  the  design  and  produc- 
tion of  weapons  of  war  became  at  once  acutely  felt, 
and  the  organizations  which  had  secured  foreign 
contracts  turned  to  the  only  reservoir  in  the  country 
of  the  kind  of  skill  which  was  necessary  for  them 
and  drew  from  the  Ordnance  Department  a  number 
of  its  most  expert  officers,  who  resigned  from  the 
Army  to  accept  positions  of  responsibility  in  their 
plants. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  with  regard  to  the 
personnel  of  the  Ordnance  Department  when  the 
war  drew  us  into  its  whirlpool  in  April,  1917.  A 
system  of  providing  a  reserve  of  ordnance  officers 
for  an  emergency  had  been  authorized  by  the  Na- 
tional Defense  Act  of  June  3,  1916,  and  a  few  offi- 
cers had  been  listed  in  consequence;  but,  as  with 
many  other  features  of  that  Act,  there  had  been  no 
time  for  effective  realization  of  its  purpose.  Upon 
the  breaking  of  relations  with  Germany,  when  it  be- 
came apparent  that  we  would  soon  be  in  the  war, 
a  special  division  was  created  in  the  office  of  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance  and  placed  in  charge  of  the  then 
Lieut.-Col.  C.  C.  Williams,  who  afterwards  became 
Chief  of  Ordnance,  for  taking  charge  of  the  essen- 
tially important  subject  of  the  recruitment  of  offi- 
cers from  the  numerous  volunteers  whom  the  acute 
conditions  then  stimulated  to  offer  their  services. 
The  division  soon  grew  to  five  officers  and  some 
twenty  clerks,  of  whom  all  but  one  officer  were  them- 
selves new  recruits  in  the  department,  enrolled  since 
our  entry  into  the  war.  The  one  experienced  officer 


12 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


was  Major  James  L.  Walsh,  who  succeeded  Lieut.- 
Col.  Williams  when  the  latter  went  to  France  with 
General  Pershing,  as  Chief  Ordnance  Officer  of  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force.  The  department 
had  at  its  ten  Arsenals  in  the  United  States  boards 
of  officers  examining  local  candidates  for  commis- 
sions, of  which  the  proceedings  were  all  reviewed 
and  the  qualifications  of  the  candidates  summarized 
for  presentation  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  by  the 
Personnel  Division  of  the  Ordnance  office.  The 
division  worked  days  and  nights  and  Sundays  at 
its  tremendous  task,  upon  whose  performance  de- 
pended all  the  other  work  of  the  department;  for 
without  officers  the  department,  of  course,  could  not 
function. 

A  few  words  as  to  the  numbers  involved  in  this 
expansion  of  the  personnel.  After  the  war  had 
proceeded  a  few  months,  during  which  a  large  num- 
ber of  new  officers  had  been  inducted  into  the  de- 
partment, a  survey  was  made  of  the  requirements 
in  commissioned  personnel  for  the  fiscal  year  to 
end  June  30,  1918,  as  indicated  by  the  experience 
and  outlook  at  the  time  of  the  survey.  The  number 
arrived  at  was  5,373.  Of  course,  not  many  of  these 
were  required  to  be  designing  engineers  of  ord- 
nance, but  their  duties  included  administration  and 
executive  work,  inspection  of  manufacture  and  of 
finished  material,  supervision  of  mechanical  instal- 
lations, including  metallurgical  and  chemical  plants, 
the  negotiative  and  legal  work  of  contract  making, 
the  custody  and  issue  of  munitions,,  the  repair  of 
arms  and  material  in  the  field,  and  watchfulness 


THE  ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT     13 

over  the  supply  of  troops  as  ordnance  officers  of 
tactical  organizations.  For  all  these  kinds  of  work 
the  department  needed  and  obtained  from  civil  life 
mechanical,  electrical  and  chemical  engineers,  metal- 
lurgists, professors  of  various  sciences,  business 
managers,  financiers,  lawyers,  and  men  of  some 
training  or  aptitude  in  the  handling  of  bodies  of 
other  men.  In  recruiting  for  these  requirements, 
the  Ordnance  Department  received  substantial  help 
from  the  American  Society  of  Mechanical  Engi- 
neers, the  American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers,  the 
Western  Society  of  Engineers,  the  Engineers  Club 
of  Philadelphia,  the  American  Chemical  Society, 
and  various  other  engineering  and  technical  asso- 
ciations ;  and  also  from  the  Massachusetts  Institute 
of  Technology,  the  Stevens  Institute,  Columbia  Uni- 
versity, Lehigh  University,  the  University  of  Michi- 
gan and  other  technical  institutions  of  learning. 
Assistance  was  also  received  from  efficiency  en- 
gineers with  wide  professional  acquaintance,  and 
from  the  heads  of  large  industrial  and  manufactur- 
ing establishments  employing  engineering  talent. 
The  examining  boards  of  the  arsenals  were  supple- 
mented by  others  convened  in  several  of  the  large 
manufacturing  centers. 

By  the  end  of  the  year  1917,  the  number  of  ord- 
nance officers  had  increased  to  about  3,000.  A  large 
number  of  applications  for  commissions  had  been 
received,  and  the  carefulness  of  the  scrutiny  of  the 
examining  boards  may  be  estimated  from  the  num- 
ber passing  satisfactorily,  which  did  not  exceed  15 
per  cent  of  the  applicants.  The  directive  and  ad- 


14    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ministrative  work  of  the  department  centered  in 
the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  at  Washington, 
and  the  expansion  there  was  in  even  greater  per- 
centage than  in  the  department  at  large.  Upon 
our  entry  into  the  war  10  officers  were  on  duty  in 
the  Ordnance  Office,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  and  his 
assistants.  By  the  middle  of  December  following 
there  were  950,  representing  an  increase  of  9,500 
per  cent.  Those  of  the  community  who  have  had 
any  experience  in  the  expansion  of  industrial  or- 
ganizations can  appreciate  the  task  of  the  Ord- 
nance Department  in  adjusting  itself  to  an  amount 
of  business  represented  by  this  augmentation  of 
superior  personnel  of  the  officer  class.  The  work 
of  indicating  to  those  best  equipped  where  their 
field  of  endeavor  lay,  of  assigning  the  assistants, 
and  of  fitting  the  multitudes  of  juniors  into  the 
places  where  the  need  for  them  developed  with 
startling  rapidity,  had  to  be  carried  on  by  the  small 
permanent  personnel  concurrently  with  the  direc- 
tion of  the  country's  vast  manufacturing  resources 
into  the  line  of  military  manufacture,  and  the  prepa- 
ration of  estimates  of  further  needs  of  the  depart- 
ment for  presentation  to  Congress.  These  last 
duties  would  have  constituted  a  great  task  even 
for  an  originally  adequate  personnel. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  Ordnance  Bureau 
in  Washington  was  arranged  in  divisions,  each 
charged  with  the  provision  of  a  particular  class  of 
materiel.  There  was  a  Gun  Division  for  cannon 
and  their  ammunition;  a  Carriage  Division,  for 
artillery  carriages;  a  Small  Arms  Division,  for 


THE  ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT     15 

riflos,  pistols,  and  their  ammunition ;  an  Equipment 
Division,  for  cartridge  belts,  pack  carriers,  saddles, 
bridles,  and  other  articles  of  personal  and  horse 
equipment;  and  some  others.  There  were  also  a 
few  divisions  not  relating  directly  to  materiel,  such 
as  the  Personnel  Division,  the  Finance  Division,  etc. 
Each  division  having  charge  of  materiel  occupied 
itself  with  all  the  principal  functions  attending  the 
provision  of  its  particular  class.  That  is,  it  was 
responsible  for  the  design,  including  the  drawings 
and  specifications;  for  the  procurement  through  or- 
ders to  manufacturers  and  contracts;  for  the  pro- 
duction, which  meant  watchfulness  over  the  course 
of  manufacture  and  the  facilitation  of  its  progress ; 
and  for  inspection  of  the  product,  to  determine  its 
acceptability  for  use  in  the  service.  Information 
concerning  any  stage  in  the  provision  of  a  particular 
article  was  to  be  sought  in  a  single  division;  and 
the  divisions  were  prevented  from  attempting  to 
use  the  same  manufacturing  facilities,  and  other- 
wise kept  out  of  one  another's  way,  by  the  Chief 
of  Ordnance  and  his  assistants  who  were  close 
enough  to  him  to  be,  in  a  way,  a  part  of  himself. 

When  the  war  was  about  nine  months  old  a  change 
was  made  in  the  above  arrangement,  and  the  divi- 
sions were  separated  along  the  lines  of  function, 
instead  of  along  the  lines  of  classes  of  munitions 
to  be  provided.  That  is,  one  division,  called  the 
Engineering  Division,  took  over  the  function  of 
design  of  all  the  fighting  materiel  provided  by  the 
department;  guns,  carriages,  small  arms,  and  all 
the  rest.  Another,  the  Procurement  Division,  placed 


16 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


the  orders  and  made  contracts  for  everything.  The 
Production  Division  supervised  the  processes  of 
manufacture  in  all  factories;  and  the  Inspection 
Division  passed  upon  the  quality  of  all  materiel 
and  workmanship.  Each  division  had  a  chief  and 
staff,  and  the  new  arrangement,  in  giving  each  only 
one  kind  of  function,  was  supposed  to  make  for  sim- 
plicity of  organization. 

The  arguments  for  this  kind  of  segregation  of 
duties  are  quite  obvious,  but  a  little  consideration 
will  show  that  it  is  possible  to  carry  it  too  far.  No 
one  would  advocate  the  consolidation  in  a  single 
division  of  all  designing  for  the  Army,  the  Navy 
and  the  Shipping  Board;  and  no  one  would  seek  to 
promote  comprehensiveness  of  grasp  of  government 
work  by  requiring  all  the  orders  and  contracts  for 
the  War  Department  and  the  Treasury  Department 
to  be  placed  by  one  office.  Which  is  to  say,  that 
when  any  business  becomes  very  large  it  is  best  to 
keep  the  various  functions  required  to  prosecute  it 
in  relations  with  each  other,  and  not  to  detach  them 
from  such  relations,  and  unite  them  with  similar 
functions  of  other  business.  Just  where  the  line 
should  be  drawn  would  depend  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  a  particular  case.  In  the  Ordnance 
Bureau  there  had  been  no  difficulty  in  attending  to 
all  the  functions  of  providing  gun  carriages  of  dif- 
ferent types  in  the  single  Carriage  Division;  but  it 
would  have  been  undesirable  to  spread  the  functions 
of  design,  procurement,  production  and  inspection 
for  the  Ordnance  Department  over  the  Aviatiori 
Service,  for  example,  although  both  were  in  the 


THE  ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT     17 

War  Department.  The  old  divisions  of  the  Ord- 
nance Department  had  each  been  considered  to 
embody  a  business  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  include 
in  itself  all  the  principal  functions,  and  the  war 
brought  a  tremendous  expansion  in  them.  It  would, 
therefore,  have  been  more  in  accord  with  previous 
experience  to  subdivide  the  divisions,  and  retain  for 
each  the  various  functions,  but  over  a  restricted 
class  of  material,  than  to  expand  each  function  to 
cover  all  classes  of  material,  as  was  done. 

Difficulties  were  encountered  with  the  new  ar- 
rangement. Kesponsibility  for  backwardness  of 
output  became  obscure,  and  was  almost  impossible 
to  locate.  And  after  several  months  of  trial  the 
arrangement  was  abandoned,  and  the  old  one,  in 
principle,  restored,  with  some  changes  of  assign- 
ment of  work  between  divisions,  and  some  creation 
of  new  divisions  to  meet  enlarged  duties ;  also  with 
soine  arrangements  for  coordination  between  divi- 
sions, which,  in  peace  time,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
had  been  able  to  attend  to  himself. 

The  distribution  of  duties  in  the  Ordnance  Office 
has  been  dwelt  upon  somewhat  because  the  change 
was  commented  upon  as  one  of  excellence  which  had 
been  forced  upon  the  Department  by  pressure  from 
the  outside.  It  had,  however,  often  been  considered 
and  discussed  within  the  organization  and  with 
various  efficiency  engineers,  but  through  the  years 
had  failed  to  carry  conviction  of  its  desirability. 
Its  final  abandonment  after  trial  will  probably  be 
conclusive  as  between  the  two  methods. 

A  now  section  became  necessary  because  of  the 


18 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


uncertain  conditions  in  regard  to  the  cost  of  labor 
and  material.  Nobody  could  tell  from  week  to  week 
what  the  prices  of  commodities  were  going  to  be, 
and  nobody  could  say  what  changes  were  going  to 
take  place  in  the  labor  market.  All  kinds  of  prices 
were  rising  rapidly.  It  was  extremely  difficult  for 
private  manufacturers  to  take  contracts  at  fixed 
prices  for  such  articles  as  guns,  carriages  or  am- 
munition, and  it  would  generally  have  been  useless 
to  ask  them  to  do  so,  and  take  the  risk  of  an  under- 
estimate through  changing  conditions,  because  the 
transactions  were  so  large  they  would  have  been  im- 
able  to  carry  the  resulting  loss  and  could  not  have 
completed  their  contracts.  The  only  practicable 
method,  in  many  cases,  was  to  have  the  manufac- 
turer do  the  work  and  charge  to  the  Government  the 
actual  cost  plus  a  sum  as  compensation  for  the  ser- 
vices of  himself  and  his  establishment;  which  sum 
was  sometimes  agreed  upon  as  a  percentage  of  the 
cost,  and  sometimes  was  made  a  fixed  amount  per 
article  manufactured. 

This  method  of  contracting,  commonly  called  the 
"cost  plus  method/'  required  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment to  go  into  the  works  of  manufacturers  and 
supervise  effectively  the  process  of  keeping  account 
of  the  cost  of  work  done  for  the  Government,  which 
had  never  before  been  done,  and  necessitated  the 
establishment  in  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
of  a  cost  accounting  section  as  a  part  of  the  Finance 
Division.  Mr.  Lester  W.  Blyth,  a  member  of  the 
accounting  firm  of  Messrs.  Ernst  &  Ernst,  of  Cleve- 
land, Ohio,  Avas  invited  to  accept  a  commission  in  the 


THE  ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT     19 

Ordnance  Department  and  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  new  section,  which  he  organized  and  carried 
through  the  war.  The  section  employed  and  trained 
some  1,200  accountants  during  the  war,  and  its  per- 
sonnel reached  the  number  of  13  officers,  58  enlisted 
men,  and  1,990  civilians. 

The  writer  of  these  pages  had  the  advantage  of 
long  enough  service  at  the  head  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  to  realize  the  results  of  a  consistent 
policy.  Appointed  Chief  of  Ordnance  in  1901,  and 
successively  reappointed  in  1905,  1909,  1913  and 
1917,  he  was  able  to  hold  to  his  plans  long  enough 
to  test  them,  notwithstanding  that  it  took  the  first 
five  years  of  his  incumbency  of  office  to  secure  the 
improved  method  of  recruitment  of  officer  personnel. 
He  continued  in  charge  of  the  department  until  we 
were  about  half  way  through  the  World  War,  when 
the  officers  who  had  come  into  the  department  under 
the  merit  system  of  1873,  and  those  who  had  come 
in  under  the  merit  system  of  1906,  were  carrying 
great  burdens  of  technical  and  administrative  re- 
sponsibility; some  in  the  department,  and  a  few  in 
private  munitions  factories  in  which  they  had  taken 
positions  after  having  resigned  from  the  Ordnance 
Department  before  we  came  into  the  war.  They 
formed  a  small  but  invaluable  nucleus  for  the  able 
assistance  which  came  to  them  from  civil  life. 


n 


EMBARRASSMENTS 

THE  failure  of  the  country  during  the  long  peri< 
of  peace  to  give  attention  to  military  preparation 
in  matters  of  personnel,  which  was  naturally  re- 
flected in  a  similar  failure  by  Congress,  was  accom- 
panied by  equal  neglect  in  the  matter  of  material. 
The  military  material  most  characteristic  of  war 
is  that  supplied  by  the  Ordnance  Department;  and 
for  the  reason  that  it  is  characteristic  only  of  war, 
it  is  not  naturally  produced  in  time  of  peace,  and 
the  agencies  for  its  production  do  not  arise  unless 
artificially  stimulated.  The  rate  of  preparation  in 
Ordnance  material  after  the  Spanish  War  was 
measured  by  annual  appropriations  of  about  $10,- 
000,000  until  the  year  1916,  when,  in  accordance  with 
the  program  of  the  National  Defense  Act,  the  ap- 
propriation rose  to  about  $100,000,000.  As  late  as 
1913,  however,  it  was  only  $8,138,000.  The  adequacy 
of  these  sums  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  during 
our  nineteen  months  of  war  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment expended  over  $4,000,000,000.  The  refusal  to 
make  larger  appropriations  was  in  the  face  of  fre- 
quent representations  by  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  and 
indeed  by  all  other  military  officers  in  position  to 
make  recommendations,  both  as  to  the  necessity  for 

20 


EMBARRASSMENTS  21 

making  more  substantial  provision  and  as  to  the 
time  which  would  be  required  to  produce  the  weap- 
ons of  modern  warfare  in  adequate  amount,  for  a 
considerable  conflict,  even  after  the  funds  should  be 
furnished. 

In  a  subsequent  chapter,  on  Artillery,  I  cite  cer- 
tain particular  statements  to  Committees  of  Con- 
gress, in  connection  with  which  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  all  other  preparations,  both  in  organ- 
ization, personnel  and  materiel,  can  take  place 
faster  than  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion, which  therefore  sets  the  pace  at  which  the 
country  can  make  ready  to  wage  war. 

But  meagerness  of  appropriations  was  not  the 
only  handicap  under  which  such  departments  as  the 
Ordnance  had  to  struggle  in  the  effort  to  be  fore- 
handed on  the  material  side  of  readiness  for  war. 
Here  are  a  few  of  the  others: 

Manufacturing  Arsenals  could,  of  course,  turn  out 
only  a  small  proportion  of  the  munitions  needed  in 
a  war  of  any  magnitude.  There  were  six  of  these 
Arsenals :  Watertown,  Mass.,  where  the  product  was 
sea  coast  gun  carriages  and  armor  piercing  projec- 
tiles ;  Springfield,  Mass.,  manufacturing,  before  the 
war,  rifles,  pistols  and  machine  guns;  Watervliet, 
N.  Y.,  making  cannon,  large  and  small;  Frankford, 
Penn.,  making  small  arms  ammunition,  artillery 
ammunition  and  fire  control  instruments ;  Picatinny, 
N.  J.,  making  smokeless  powder  and  high  explo- 
sives, and  Kock  Island,  HI.,  making  field  gun  car- 
riages and  other  vehicles,  artillery  harness,  personal 
and  horse  equipments,  targets  and  rifles.  The  main- 


22 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


tenance  of  these  establishments  served  several  pur- 
poses. They  afforded  opportunity  for  the  determi- 
nation of  standards  of  workmanship,  so  that  these 
might  be  embodied  in  specifications  for  the  govern- 
ment of  private  manufacturers  without  giving  just 
grounds  for  complaint  of  undue  severity ;  they  pro- 
duced the  intimate  acquaintance  of  ordnance  officers 
with  the  materiel  designed  and  furnished  by  the  de- 
partment, which  can  only  come  from  actually  making 
at  least  a  part  of  it,  and  they  gave  rise  to  knowledge 
of  the  cost  of  manufacture  which  permitted  the  de- 
partment to  exercise  a  reasonable  control  over  the 
prices  charged  by  private  parties  for  manufactur- 
ing in  accordance  with  its  designs  and  specifications. 
Properly  used,  they  formed  an  agency  of  the  Ord- 
nance Department  of  the  first  importance,  but  they 
were  not  always  used  with  the  best  of  judgment.  They 
should  have  been  employed  at  such  capacity  as  to  re- 
quire their  operation  for  a  single  eight-hour  shift 
only  in  the  twenty-four  hours,  and  such  materiel  as 
they  could  not  produce  when  operated  to  this  extent 
should  have  been  procured  by  contract  with  private 
manufacturers,  to  the  amount  permitted  by  available 
appropriations.  There  would  thus  have  been  avail- 
able for  the  increased  requirements  of  the  war,  not 
only  the  expansibility  of  the  Arsenals  to  double-shift 
capacity,  or  greater,  but  also  the  facilities  of  private 
factories,  with  their  own  possibility  of  expansion, 
which  would  have  been  familiarized  with  the  manu- 
facture of  war  materiel  for  the  Government  in  time 
of  peace.  But  the  efforts  of  the  Department  to  pro- 
mote economy  of  manufacture  in  its  Arsenals  had 


EMBARRASSMENTS  23 

been  so  successful  as  to  interfere  with  its  purpose 
of  training  private  establishments  for  supplying  its 
emergency  needs. 

The  Government  has  certain  advantages  in  cost 
of  manufacture  over  the  commercial  plant.  It  can 
in  ordinary  times  write  an  interest  charge  of  only 
3  per  cent,  against  about  twice  that  amount  for  the 
private  party.  It  has  to  support  only  actual  fire 
losses,  which  are  not  much  more  than  half  the  cost 
of  insurance.  Its  superintendence  by  officers  costs 
much  less  than  the  civilian  superintendence  of  pri- 
vate establishments.  For  example,  the  Command- 
ing Officer  of  none  of  the  Arsenals  costs  the  Govern- 
ment more  than  $7,000  per  annum.  His  actual  pay 
is  not  over  $5,000,  and  his  quarters  and  other  allow- 
ances do  not  exceed  the  difference  between  these 
two  sums.  A  civilian  superintendent  for  an  estab- 
lishment of  corresponding  magnitude  could  not  be 
obtained  for  twice  the  amount.  In  addition,  the 
Government  has  no  selling  costs,  no  costs  of  financ- 
ing, and  makes  no  profit.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Government  has  a  handicap  in  its  labor  cost.  It  has 
for  a  number  of  years  practised  the  eight-hour  day, 
as  against  nine  hours  or  ten  hours  in  the  private 
factory.  This  may  or  may  not  be  a  handicap,  since 
there  is  evidence  to  the  effect  that  workmen  will 
do  as  much  in  an  eight-hour  day  as  in  one  of  longer 
duration ;  but  however  this  may  be,  the  Government 
pays  for  a  considerable  amount  of  time  during 
which  it  receives  no  return  at  all  in  work.  It  pays 
its  employees  for  seven  national  holidays,  for  thirty 
working  days  of  leave,  and  for  thirteen  Saturday 


24    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

afternoons  in  summer  time,  which  amount  to  a  total 
of  forty-three  and  a  half  days;  about  16  per  cent 
of  the  two  hundred  and  seventy  remaining  working 
days  of  the  year,  not  counting  Sundays.  The  Gov- 
ernment's advantages  probably  overbalance  this 
disadvantage,  and,  coupled  with  special  attention  to 
efficiency  of  methods,  produced,  in  the  years  before 
the  war,  such  economy  of  manufacture  at  the  Ar- 
senals, in  comparison  with  the  prices  for  which 
private  establishments  would  do  the  same  work  for 
the  Government  as  to  influence  Congress  to  require 
that  appropriations  made  for  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment should  be  expended  in  manufacture  at 
the  Arsenals,  up  to  the  full  capacity  of  these  institu- 
tions. This  policy  prevented  the  use  of  public  funds 
for  the  peace  time  training  and  encouragement  of 
private  manufactures  as  a  reliance  for  emergency. 
The  disadvantage  of  the  policy  was  earnestly  and 
repeatedly  pointed  out  by  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  in 
hearings  before  the  committees  of  Congress,  when 
it  was  stated  that  the  difference  in  cost  was  no 
more  than  necessary  insurance  for  maintaining  the 
availability  of  private  plants  to  come  to  the  help  of 
the  Government  in  time  of  need;  but  the  fear  of 
profiteering  overrode  the  consideration  of  prepared- 
ness, and  the  restrictions  could  not  be  removed. 

Another  hindrance  related  to  clerical  service. 
Upon  the  advent  of  a  great  emergency  calling  for 
the  immediate  expansion  of  the  operations  of  such 
an  organization  as  the  Ordnance  Department,  the 
very  first  requisite  is  the  multiplication  of  the  means 
of  communication.  Multitudes  of  letters  and  tele- 


EMBARRASSMENTS  25 

grams  must  be  written  and  received,  and  must  be 
properly  entered  upon  the  records  in  order  that 
they  may  not  speedily  resolve  themselves  into  a 
confused  mass  of  papers.  Such  funds  as  may  be 
available  must  be  quickly  allotted  to  manufacturing 
orders,  and  estimates  for  new  funds  must  be  made 
up,  arranged,  tabulated  and  recorded,  for  submis- 
sion to  Congress.  All  of  which,  and  much  that  is 
similar,  requires  the  immediate  services  of  many 
clerks.  The  headquarters  is  a  nerve  center  whose 
impulses  must  go  out  to  the  rest  of  the  organization, 
and  to  the  agencies  which  are  to  be  brought  into 
operation,  over  the  desks  of  clerks.  Now,  there  is  a 
law  (22  Statutes,  255)  which  forbids  the  hiring  in 
AVashington  of  employees  other  than  those  spe- 
cifically authorized,  in  number  and  salary,  by  law. 
The  appropriations  for  expenditure  outside  Wash- 
ington, as  for  manufacture  at  the  Arsenals,  for  in- 
stance, do  not  limit  the  proportion  of  the  funds 
appropriated  which  can  be  expended  for  labor, 
either  clerical  or  any  other  kind;  but  in  order  to 
employ  additional  people  in  any  capacity  in  the 
departments  in  Washington  it  is  necessary  to  sub- 
mit, for  the  funds  required,  estimates  which  must 
be  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  by 
the  15th  of  October,  with  explanation  of  the  neces- 
sity for  the  employees  required,  who,  if  the  explana- 
tions are  satisfactory  to  Congress  and  the  funds  are 
appropriated,  may  be  employed  on  the  first  of  the 
following  July.  The  jealousy  with  which  this  re- 
striction is  guarded  by  Congress  may  be  appre- 
ciated from  the  fact  that  in  one  of  the  years  shortly 


ORDNANCE  AJ 


WORLD  WAR 


preceding  our  entry  into  the  war,  I  submitted  an 
estimate  for  an  increase  of  nine  in  the  force  of 
about  one  hundred  clerks  of  the  Ordnance  office, 
and  appeared  before  the  appropriate  committees  in 
argument  for  the  authorization.  I  secured  author- 
ity to  employ  six  of  the  nine  whom  I  had  asked  for. 
When  we  came  into  the  war  the  number  of  pieces  of 
mail,  incoming  and  outgoing,  handled  by  the  clerical 
force  of  the  Ordnance  Office  was  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  five  hundred  per  week;  by  December  of  the 
same  year  pieces  of  outgoing  mail  alone  had  risen 
to  more  than  one  thousand  per  day.  The  office  was 
greatly  embarrassed  in  the  early  part  of  the  war 
by  lack  of  authority  to  increase  its  clerical  force, 
which  was  sought  earnestly  from  Congress  but  was 
granted  only  grudgingly  and  after  much  delay  and 
inconvenience.  The  extent  to  which  additional  force 
was  required  is  shown  by  the  increase  from  about 
two  hundred  at  the  declaration  of  war  to  about 
forty-five  hundred  in  the  following  December. 

Office  space  was  another  trouble.  For  the  accom- 
modation of  the  additional  officers  and  clerks  there 
was,  of  course,  needed  at  once  additional  office  room. 
The  space  in  the  War  Department  building  was 
filled  to  overflowing,  and  room  for  expansion  could 
only  be  secured  by  renting  buildings  about  the  city. 
But  there  is  a  law  (19  Statutes,  370)  which  pro- 
hibits the  renting  of  office  room  in  Washington, 
unless  authorized  by  an  appropriation  for  the  spe- 
cific purpose.  The  same  process  of  estimating  and 
explaining  as  in  the  case  of  employees  is  therefore 
necessary.  We  were,  in  consequence,  up  against 


EMBARRASSMENTS  27 

the  same  kind  of  embarrassment,  notwithstanding 
strong  representation  to  Congress,  as  in  the  other 
matter,  the  extent  of  the  embarrassment  being 
apparent  from  the  comparison  of  the  floor  space 
occupied  by  the  Ordnance  Department  when  we  en- 
tered the  war,  some  fifteen  thousand  square  feet, 
with  that  occupied  at  the  end  of  the  year,  which 
was  about  six  hundred  and  ten  thousand  square  feet. 
Congress  had  not  failed  to  pay  some  attention  to 
the  statement  of  needs,  and  made  appropriations 
for  large  temporary  buildings;  but  this  was  not 
until  June,  and  the  buildings  were  not  ready  until 
the  end  of  the  year;  and,  in  the  meantime,  the 
authority  of  the  Department  to  help  itself  as  best 
it  might  was  quite  inadequate.  In  December  of 
1917  the  Ordnance  Office  was  scattered  about  Wash- 
ington in  fifteen  different  buildings;  during  the 
painful  acquisition  of  which  there  were  frequent 
intervals  when  clerks  had  to  use  their  typewriting 
machines  on  window-sills  or  take  them  to  their 
lodgings  to  perform  their  work,  and  at  one  time  of 
special  congestion  a  number  of  officers  clubbed  to- 
gether and  with  their  own  funds  hired  a  loft  over 
a  garage,  and  fitted  it  up  with  temporary  divisions 
as  office  room  for  themselves  and  their  clerks. 
These  officers  had  recently  joined  the  department 
from  civil  life,  and  their  action  was  illustrative  of 
the  fine  spirit  wrhich  prevailed  in  the  department's 
personnel. 

In  putting  into  hasty  operation  an  immense  pro- 
gram of  manufacture  of  articles  not  theretofore  pro- 
duced in  large  numbers,  as  in  the  case  of  artillery, 


28    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


it  was  often  necessary  to  provide  for  the  radical 
extension  of  existing  plants  or  for  the  construction 
of  new  plants.  Here  a  whole  series  of  legal  ob- 
stacles was  encountered.  Plant  almost  invariably 
involves  buildings  and  machinery,  and  it  had  been 
the  practice  of  Congress  to  provide  for  machinery 
by  special  appropriation,  or  by  special  wording  in 
an  appropriation  for  the  procurement  of  manufac- 
tured articles.  For  example,  there  would  be  an 
appropriation  of  a  specific  sum  for  artillery  ammu- 
nition, with  the  words  added  "and  for  the  machinery 
necessary  for  its  manufacture  at  the  Arsenals." 
With  this  wording  the  Department  was  free  to  use 
such  proportion  of  the  appropriation  as  it  thought 
proper  in  purchasing  and  installing  machinery,  pro- 
vided the  machinery  was  to  be  used  at  an  Arsenal. 
But  some  of  the  appropriations  did  not  have  this 
wording,  and  Congress  would  not  add  it  in  all  cases ; 
and  besides,  the  usual  case  which  arose  in  our  war 
proceedings  was  one  in  which  machinery  was  to  be 
purchased  for  use  elsewhere  than  in  an  Arsenal,  as 
in  a  private  plant  whose  construction  or  enlarge- 
ment was  financed  by  the  Government.  As  no  pro- 
hibiting statute  could  be  found  covering  this  point, 
however,  we  secured  a  legal  opinion  that  the  pre- 
ceding practice  did  not  have  the  effect  of  law,  and 
that  appropriations  for  procurement  could  be  lawful- 
ly expended  for  machinery  required  in  manufacture. 
But  with  buildings  it  was  different.  There  is  a 
law  (Revised  Statutes  1136)  which  states  that 
"buildings  and  structures  of  a  permanent  nature 
shall  not  be  constructed  unless  detailed  estimates 


EMBARRASSMENTS  29 

shall  have  been  previously  submitted  to  Congress, 
and  approved  by  a  special  appropriation  for  the 
same,  except  when  constructed  by  the  troops;  and 
no  such  structures,  the  cost  of  which  shall  exceed 
$20,000,  shall  be  erected  unless  by  special  authority 
of  Congress/'  And  there  is  another  law  (Revised 
Statutes  355)  which  prohibits  the  expenditure  even 
of  funds  which  may  be  specially  appropriated  for 
the  purpose,  upon  any  land  purchased  for  the  erec- 
tion thereon  of  public  buildings,  of  any  kind  what- 
ever, until  the  written  opinion  of  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral shall  be  had  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the  title, 
and  until  the  consent  of  the  legislature  of  the  State 
in  which  the  land  is  situated  has  been  given.  And 
there  is  still  another  law  which  prohibits  the  pur- 
chase of  land  except  in  pursuance  of  an  appropria- 
tion specially  made  for  the  purpose.  By  these  laws, 
although  we  had  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars 
for  the  procurement  of  war  material,  we  were  em- 
barrassed in  the  expenditure  of  the  funds  for  the 
plants  essential  to  its  production.  We  met  the 
obstacle  as  to  the  use  of  the  appropriations  for  the 
erection  of  buildings  by  deciding  not  to  put  up  any 
of  a  "  permanent  nature, "  and  thereafter  large  sums 
were  expended  for  temporary  structures.  Although 
these  were  to  house  power  plants  and  other  great 
groups  of  machinery,  they  had  to  possess  the 
strength  required  to  support  enormous  traveling 
cranes,  and  necessarily  involved  the  use  of  a  great 
deal  of  concrete  and  other  masonry  in  their  con- 
struction, there  was  so  much  use  of  steel  shapes  that 
it  was  possible  to  take  them  apart  and  remove  them, 


30 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


which  was  construed  as  bringing  them  within  the 
definition  of  the  term  "temporary,"  and  thus  as 
permitting  their  erection  without  specific  appro- 
priation, and  upon  leased  land  not  belonging  to  the 
United  States. 

But  these  constructions  of  the  laws,  perhaps  some- 
what strained,  did  not  relieve  us  from  the  prohibi- 
tion to  expend  funds  upon  any  kind  of  public  build- 
ings whatever,  which  were  to  go  upon  purchased 
land,  until  after  the  inadmissible  delay  required  to 
secure  the  opinion  of  the  Attorney-General  upon  the 
title,  and  the  action  of  the  state  legislature.  An  Act 
had  been  approved  on  July  2,  1917,  relieving  the 
department  from  the  operation  of  this  prohibition 
with  reference  to  land  purchased  for  works  of  forti- 
fications, coast  defenses  and  military  camps;  and 
the  War  Department  sent  communications  to  Con- 
gress requesting  that  the  relief  be  extended  so 
as  to  cover  the  class  of  cases  mentioned  above ;  but 
no  action  could  be  secured  upon  the  request  until, 
on  the  last  day  of  the  special  session  of  Congress 
of  1917,  the  Hon.  Swagar  Sherley,  of  the  Committee 
of  Appropriations  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
personally  took  up  the  matter,  and  through  his  inti- 
mate knowledge  of  congressional  methods  and  his 
high  personal  standing  with  the  leaders  of  both 
Houses  secured  the  passage  of  a  joint  resolution 
relieving  the  Ordnance  Department  from  the  re- 
striction of  this  law. 

Of  course,  these  hampering  laws  were  not  enacted 
in  mere  wantonness.  They  were  designed  usually 
to  correct  some  abuse,  and  for  reasons  which,  in 


EMBARRASSMENTS  31 

most  cases,  would  probably  have  been  considered 
good ;  but  they  took  no  account  of  the  interference 
which  they  occasioned  with  effective  preparation 
for  war,  which  always  had  to  give  place  to  con- 
siderations of  economy  or  political  expediency.  On 
many  occasions  I  represented  to  Committees  of  Con- 
gress not  only  the  current  embarrassment  which 
these  restrictions  were  causing  in  the  operations  of 
the  Ordnance  Department,  but  the  tremendous 
handicap  which  they  would  cause  if  the  Department 
should  suddenly  be  called  upon  to  act  with  maximum 
energy  in  order  to  meet  a  great  emergency;  and  in 
this  I  was  not  alone,  but  I  imagine  that  I  was  sup- 
ported by  every  other  bureau  chief  of  the  War 
Department.  My  representations  did  not  prevail, 
and  no  one  of  the  restrictions  mentioned  was  lifted 
until  after  we  got  into  the  war.  Thereafter  relief 
was  so  slow  and  partial  that  it  was  not  until  the  end 
of  the  year  that,  by  legal  construction  and  by  con- 
gressional action,  we  got  the  obstacles  so  smoothed 
out  or  circumvented  that  necessary  measures  could 
be  taken  without  much  loss  of  time  in  devising  ways 
of  doing  business  without  violating  the  law. 

These  legislative  hindrances,  and  others  which 
I  do  not  mention,  make  part  of  the  long  list  of  every- 
thing else  than  making  ready  for  war  which  had 
been  piled  upon  the  departments  in  peace  time. 
They  consumed  an  inordinate  amount  of  the  time 
of  administrative  officers  at  a  period  when  they  had 
far  too  little  time  to  attend  to  other  phases  of  their 
multiplied  duties.  Their  removal  was  one  of  the 
slowost  mobilizations  of  the  war. 


32    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Another  cause  of  delay  was  the  slowness  with 
which  appropriations  were  made  for  prosecuting 
the  war,  after  we  entered  it,  although  estimates  were 
promptly  submitted.  It  will  be  remembered  that  a 
military  program  was  adopted  by  the  Act  of  June 
3,  1916,  in  accordance  with  which  an  armed  and 
equipped  force  of  about  a  million  men,  regulars  and 
auxiliaries,  was  to  be  brought  into  existence  in  five 
annual  installments.  The  equipment  of  the  first 
installment  had  been  provided  for  by  appropriations 
made  in  the  summer  of  1916 ;  that  of  the  second  was 
embodied  in  estimates  which  were  before  Congress 
for  action  in  the  winter  of  1916  and  1917,  but  the 
larger  part  failed  of  consideration  because  of  a  fili- 
buster in  the  Senate  over  the  Shipping  Bill  which 
lasted  until  the  end  of  the  session  on  March  4, 1917. 
They  were  taken  up  at  the  extra  session  called  April 
1st,  upon  severance  of  the  relations  with  Germany, 
and  were  passed  on  May  12th.  These  estimates 
were  in  the  form  in  which  they  were  usually  re- 
quired to  be  submitted ;  that  is,  they  specified  in  con- 
siderable detail  the  different  classes  of  objects  for 
which  funds  were  needed,  such  as  small  arms,  field 
artillery,  machine  guns,  etc.,  and  the  amounts  re- 
quired for  each;  and,  of  course,  their  preparation 
required  considerable  time.  Therefore,  when  the 
war  came  upon  us,  and  it  was  necessary  to  send  in 
quickly  estimates  for  arming  and  equipping  a  large 
force,  the  best  course  was  to  compress  into  one  the 
estimates  which  had  already  been  made  for  the  re- 
maining increments  under  the  five-year  plan,  and 
isend  them  to  Congress  immediately.  This  was 


EMBARRASSMENTS  33 

done,  and  the  estimates  reached  that  body  on  April 
5th,  the  day  before  the  declaration  of  war. 

But  when  appropriations  are  made  after  the 
itemized  manner  mentioned  above,  the  sums  appro- 
priated for  one  class  of  object  are  not  available  for 
any  other  class,  notwithstanding  any  shortage  or 
surplus  which  may  arise  as  between  classes;  so  in 
sending  in  this  large  estimate  for  the  first  great 
sums  for  prosecuting  the  war,  the  War  Department 
did  not  itemize  them,  but  asked  for  a  lump  sum  of 
about  $3,000,000,000  for  all  purposes  involved  in 
carrying  on  the  war;  this  for  the  reason  of  avoid- 
ing a  failure  of  funds  for  any  necessary  purpose 
which  might  have  been  overlooked,  or  have  been 
inadequately  provided  for.  But  this  was  too  great 
a  departure  from  the  usual  methods  for  acceptance 
by  Congress,  and  the  Committee  in  charge  of  the 
measure  required  from  the  chiefs  of  bureaus  which 
had  made  up  the  estimates,  information  upon  the 
various  items  making  up  the  total,  so  that  they 
might  be  separated  in  the  appropriation  act  into  the 
usual  classes,  with  the  judgment  of  Congress  sepa- 
rately exercised  as  to  the  amount  required  for  each, 
and  the  discretion  of  the  War  Department  as  to 
expenditures  between  classes,  or  for  objects  not 
mentioned,  denied.  With  respect  to  the  Ordnance 
Department,  I  endeavored  to  secure  a  limited  dis- 
cretion by  requesting  the  committee  to  authorize 
the  expenditure  of  as  much  as  10  per  cent  of  the 
amount  appropriated  under  any  heading,  for  any 
purpose  necessary  in  the  judgment  of  the  Secretary 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war;  but  although  the 


34    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

committee  was  liberal  in  recommending  the  appro- 
priation of  the  full  amount  asked  for  in  each  case — 
and  Congress  afterward  granted  the  sum — the  lati- 
tude required  in  expenditure  was  not  allowed. 

The  time  required  for  the  explanation  of  the 
items  of  the  great  bill  was  such  that  it  did  not 
become  law,  and  make  the  funds  available  for  use, 
until  the  15th  of  June.  It  could  scarcely  have  been 
expected  sooner  in  view  of  the  number  of  items 
which,  in  accordance  with  the  method  pursued  by 
the  committee,  required  separate  examination. 
Samples  of  these  items  were :  Clerical  Force,  $900,- 
000;  Military  Observers,  $85,000;  Signal  Service  of 
the  Army,  $47,267,766;  Court  Martial  Expenses, 
$190,000;  Mileage  of  Commissioned  Officers  and 
Field  Clerks,  $510,000;  Subsistence,  $133,000,000; 
Small  Arms  Ammunition,  $131,048,000;  Machine 
Guns,  $65,900,000;  Field  Artillery,  $195,000,000; 
Field  Artillery  Ammunition,  $367,000,000;  Proving 
Ground  Expenses,  $600,000.  These  were  some  of 
the  items,  for  which,  as  stated  above,  the  appropria- 
tions were  not  available  for  any  other  purpose  than 
the  one  specified,  either  as  between  the  items  them- 
selves or  for  others  whose  need  was  .not  foreseen. 
The  absence  of  appropriations  during  the  time  the 
bill  was  in  Congress  was  met  to  a  certain  extent 
by  the  assumption  of  responsibility  by  administra- 
tive officers,  who  placed  orders  without  authority 
and  in  direct  violation  of  law.  These  orders  were 
accepted  by  manufacturers  and  others  in  faith  that 
the  officers  would  be  sustained  by  the  action  of  Con- 
gress and  that  the  orders  would  be  made  good.  But 


EMBARRASSMENTS  35 

no  money  could  be  paid  out  of  the  Treasury  pursu- 
ant to  these  orders  in  advance  of  an  appropriation, 
and  no  contract  based  upon  them  could  be  entered 
into ;  the  parties  who  undertook  them  therefore  had 
to  furnish  their  own  finances  for  an  indeterminate 
period,  which  was  the  more  difficult  for  them  to  do 
in  that  they  had  no  contracts  with  the  Government 
upon  the  strength  of  which  they  could  borrow  money 
from  the  banks.  Of  course,  all  these  matters  were 
ultimately  straightened  out,  but  they  made  for  delay 
and  embarrassment  in  the  first  months  of  the  war, 
when  the  officers  of  the  War  Department  were  en- 
gaged in  their  hardest  struggle  to  get  the  wheels  in 
motion. 

Before  the  first  large  Appropriation  Bill  became 
a  law,  the  need  for  additional  expenditures  had 
become  apparent.  It  was  evident  to  the  Ordnance 
Department,  for  example,  that  the  amount  of  Field 
Artillery  which  its  first  estimates  contemplated — 
appropriate  for  an  army  of  about  1,000,000  men — 
would  not  be  sufficient  for  the  much  larger  army 
which  it  was  already  seen  it  would  be  necessary  to 
put  in  the  field.  Estimates  were  therefore  prepared 
in  the  Ordnance  Department  for  the  artillery  for  a 
second  million  men ;  and  as  it  was  necessary  to  com- 
mence as  soon  as  possible  the  arrangement  for  its 
manufacture,  and  even  so  it  could  not  be  ready  as 
soon  as  the  men  would  be,  it  was  desirable  to  have 
the  estimate  acted  upon  at  the  earliest  practicable 
date.  As  soon  therefore  as  the  estimates  were  ready, 
which  was  in  the  early  part  of  June,  I  requested  an 
interview  with  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Chief 


36    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  Staff  together  and  submitted  them,  explaining 
their  necessity.  This  was  at  once  understood  by 
these  officers,  and  the  estimates  were  sent  to  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  with  instructions  for  the  proper  officers 
of  that  body  to  consult  with  me,  and  prepare  to  in- 
clude the  estimates  with  others  for  transmission  to 
Congress  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  officers 
came  promptly  to  my  office  and  we  had  a  harmonious 
consultation;  after  which  they  returned  to  their 
associates  of  the  General  Staff  and  put  the  estimates 
into  the  shape  which  they  considered  appropriate 
for  the  action  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  courteously 
sending  me  a  copy.  But  it  appeared  that  there  had 
not  been  entire  mutual  comprehension  between  their 
office  and  mine,  and  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  send 
an  officer  to  the  office  of  the  General  Staff  in  order 
to  clear  up  the  misapprehensions.  This  was  done 
without  friction,  and  the  estimates  were  finally  per- 
fected in  form  and  amount.  This  process,  however, 
took  such  a  long  time,  together  with  that  required 
by  other  somewhat  similar  processes  for  the  Ord- 
nance Department  and  the  other  bureaus  of  the  War 
Department,  that  the  estimates  did  not  reach  Con- 
gress before  August  2nd. 

I  mention  these  details  as  another  illustration  of 
defects  in  our  governmental  methods,  under  which 
there  is  so  much  checking  of  one  agency  by  another, 
and  so  much  review  of  discretion  which  ought  to  be 
final,  under  responsibility,  that  prompt  action  in 
emergency  is  impossible.  In  this  example  a  press- 
ing estimate  which  was  ready  in  the  department  in 
direct  charge  of  the  subject  in  the  early  part  of 


EMBARRASSMENTS  37 

June,  did  not  reach  Congress  until  nearly  two 
months  later,  notwithstanding  the  best  of  good  will 
and  the  absence  of  strong  difference  of  judgment 
on  the  part  of  all  concerned.  The  system  called  for 
the  review  of  the  judgment  of  the  Chief  of  Ord- 
nance, wrho  knew  perfectly  well  what  was  required, 
by  the  General  Staff,  who  undoubtedly  worked  as 
diligently  at  its  task  as  any  set  of  men  could ;  and  in 
the  end  it  formed  no  better  agency  to  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  results  than  did  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment. The  estimates  were  subjected  in  Congress  to 
the  same  detailed  scrutiny  which  had  been  bestowed 
upon  those  submitted  at  the  declaration  of  war,  and 
the  Appropriation  Bill  was  not  passed  until  October 
6th.  It  carried  about  five  and  a  half  billion  dollars, 
of  which  about  three  and  three-quarter  billion  were 
for  the  Ordnance  Department. 


m 


OVERHEAD  ORGANIZATION 

WE  have  become  somewhat  accustomed  to  the  men- 
tion of  the  great  sums  of  money  which  have  been 
used  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war;  but  their  like 
have  never  before  figured  in  the  transactions  of 
mankind.  The  first  large  Appropriation  Bills  car- 
ried, as  has  been  stated,  something  over  eight  and  a 
half  billion  dollars,  and  of  this  sum  over  four  and  a 
half  billion  dollars  were  for  the  use  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  alone.  The  mention  of  the  amount  con- 
veys little  significance  as  to  the  effort  involved  in 
its  utilization,  and  the  labor  and  thought  required 
for  its  useful  expenditure.  For  a  series  of  years 
before  our  entry  into  the  World  War,  the  annual 
expenditure  of  the  whole  United  States  Government 
had  been  about  one  billion  dollars.  To  properly 
direct  the  activities  set  in  motion  in  expending  this 
sum  required  the  services  of  the  numerous  well 
trained  and  competently  headed  departments  of 
the  Government,  including  the  State  Department, 
the  Treasury  Department,  the  War  Department,  the 
Department  of  Justice,  the  Post  Office  Department, 
the  Navy  Department,  the  Department  of  the  In- 
terior, the  Department  of  Agriculture,  the  Depart- 

38 


OVERHEAD    ORGANIZATION  39 

ment  of  Commerce,  the  Department  of  Labor,  each 
with  its  cabinet  officers  and  assistant  secretaries; 
and  various  other  money-spending  agencies,  such  as 
the  Smithsonian  Institute,  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  and  the  Houses  of  Congress  themselves. 
The  mere  enumeration  of  these  organizations  brings 
to  mind  an  array  of  distinguished  names  of  men 
engaged,  with  staffs  of  sub-directors  of  all  kinds, 
in  the  proper  expenditure  in  the  course  of  a  year 
of  a  billion  dollars.  We  realized  that  the  busi- 
ness was  immense,  and  were  proud  of  the  Govern- 
ment whose  greatness  was  illustrated  by  it.  Now  in 
six  months  there  was  thrown  upon  the  Ordnance 
Department  a  task  of  directing  and  controlling 
human  energies  which  was  pecuniarily  measured  by 
four  times  the  entire  Government's  measure  of  its 
yearly  accomplishment ;  and  it  had  to  be  carried  out 
as  a  breathless  race  against  time,  while  concurrently 
expanding  the  organization  for  performing  the  task 
from  a  size  appropriate  to  one  of  about  a  five  hun- 
dredth of  the  magnitude.  And  the  Ordnance  Office 
was  a  single  bureau  of  a  single  department. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  therefore,  the  Govern- 
ment was  confronted  with  an  immense  question  of 
overhead  organization  for  carrying  it  on,  and  it  was 
a  very  reasonable  inquiry  whether  our  governmental 
organization,  which  had  been  developed  to  meet  the 
country's  peace  time  needs,  would  answer  for  the 
very  different  war  time  needs.  We  had  before  us 
the  example  of  the  British  Empire,  whose  two  and 
a  half  years'  experience  had  led  it  to  at  least  two 
very  great  changes  in  its  governmental  machinery. 


40    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

One  of  these  changes  was  the  creation  of  a  War 
Cabinet,  consisting  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  six 
additional  members,  only  one  of  whom,  the  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Exchequer,  had  the  portfolio  of  an 
executive  minister.  The  others  had  no  departmental 
work  to  perform,  and  were  free  to  give  all  of  their 
time  to  what  might  be  called  matters  of  policy. 
When  the  affairs  of  any  one  of  the  administrative 
departments  were  under  consideration  by  the  War 
Cabinet,  the  minister  at  the  head  of  that  department 
sat  with  it ;  otherwise  the  ministers  attended  only  to 
the  affairs  of  their  own  departments.  Thus  the 
War  Cabinet  relieved  the  ministers  heading  execu- 
tive departments  of  the  collective  responsibility 
which  they  had  theretofore  exercised  in  carrying  on 
the  government. 

Another  great  change  was  the  creation  of  several 
new  executive  departments.  Of  these  there  were 
nine,  namely,  the  Ministry  of  Munitions  of  War, 
the  Ministry  of  Labor,  the  Ministry  of  Pensions,  the 
Ministry  of  National  Service,  the  Ministry  of  Eecon- 
struction,  the  Ministry  of  Blockade,  the  Shipping 
Comptroller,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Air,  and  the 
Food  Comptroller.  The  greatest  of  these  new  de- 
partments was  the  Ministry  of  Munitions. 

The  great  change  of  conditions  upon  our  passage 
into  a  state  of  war,  which  rendered  the  contempla- 
tion of  some  such  agency  as  a  Ministry  of  Munitions 
necessary,  was  the  transition  from  a  state  in  which 
the  various  supply  departments  of  the  Army  and 
the  Navy  had  been  going  into  an  abundant  market 
and  drawing  from  it  their  necessaries,  limited  by 


OVERHEAD    ORGANIZATION  41 

small  appropriations,  to  a  state  in  which  these 
departments  had  to  be  kept  out  of  one  another's  way 
when  pressing  for  the  supply  of  enormously  in- 
creased necessaries  in  a  market  which  had  become 
entirely  inadequate.  The  Ordnance  Departments  of 
the  Army  and  Xavy  were  the  only  agencies  avail- 
able, or  which  could  be  expected,  to  say  what  the 
Government  wanted  in  the  way  of  munitions,  to 
describe  them  in  specifications  and  to  state  the 
amounts.  These  departments  in  peace  time  had  at 
their  disposal  in  the  Government  factories  and  in 
private  plants  abundant  capacity  for  supplying  their 
needs,  and  for  insuring  fair  prices  by  competition. 
The  departments,  however,  had  had  no  experience 
in  searching  out  manufacturing  facilities,  in  bar- 
gaining for  just  prices,  or  in  allocating  to  one  an- 
other, in  accordance  with  the  pressure  of  their 
respective  needs,  a  limited  capacity  for  production. 
For  these  purposes,  therefore,  they  had  need  of  a 
general  coordinating  and  supporting  agency  outside 
themselves.  The  support  was  especially  needed  for 
assuring  the  public  that  prices  paid  would  be  rea- 
sonable, in  the  necessary  abandonment  of  the  com- 
petitive basis,  resulting  from  there  being  more  than 
enough  work  for  everybody  with  a  plant. 

There  had  been  created  by  law  before  the  war  a 
Council  of  National  Defense,  for  the  consideration 
of  Governmental  policies  relating  to  military  prep- 
aration; and  an  Advisory  Committee  and  other 
subordinate  bodies  had  been  provided  for  as  aides 
to  the  Council.  Subsequently,  after  we  had  been 
something  over  a  year  at  war,  there  was  enacted 


42    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

what  had  been  known  as  the  Overman  Bill,  giving 
to  the  President  the  authority  to  create  new  execu- 
tive agencies  for  carrying  on  the  war,  and  to  re- 
distribute the  duties  of  those  which  were  existing. 
Under  the  earlier  statutory  authority  there  was 
created  a  General  Munitions  Board  of  the  Coun- 
cil, which  was  superseded  on  July  12,  1917,  by  the 
War  Industries  Board,  created  by  the  Council  with 
the  authority  of  the  President  for  performing,  in 
connection  with  the  supply  departments  of  the 
Army  and  Navy,  such  duties  as  are  indicated 
above,  in  which  the  departments  required  outside 
assistance. 

It  does  not  require  much  demonstration  to  show 
that  the  situation  with  reference  to  the  method  of 
procurement  of  the  armament  and  other  supply  of 
the  forces  was  a  dangerous  one.  Owing  to  long 
national  neglect  of  military  preparation  the  problem 
was  immense,  and  the  necessity  for  some  changes 
and  additions  in  the  means  of  meeting  it  was  appar- 
ent. The  great  governing  powers  of  the  country 
had  given  little  thought  to  such  a  subject;  and  the 
point  at  which  paralyzing  conservatism  adhering 
closely  to  antiquated  methods  and  inadequate  mech- 
anism, and  dangerous  radicalism  urging  the  sub- 
stitution of  new  and  untried  agencies  for  the  estab- 
lished governmental  departments  which  had  well  in 
hand  an  unknown  capacity  for  dealing  with  the  sit- 
uation, would  meet  in  compromise,  was  entirely 
problematical.  Shifting  of  the  point  too  far  either 
way  might  easily  result  in  disaster.  In  the  excite- 
ment of  a  tremendously  stirring  situation,  radical- 


OVERHEAD    ORGANIZATION  43 

ism  had  a  great  call,  and  there  was  strong  pressure 
for  the  substitution  of  new  bodies,  of  civilian  mem- 
bership, for  taking  over  the  procurement  of  muni- 
tions and  other  military  supplies. 

Into  this  turbulent  situation,  to  the  great  good 
fortune  of  the  Government,  there  came  a  man  of 
sanity,  to  a  highly  important  position,  Mr.  Frank  A. 
Scott,  a  manufacturer,  of  Cleveland,  Ohio,  who  was 
appointed  Chairman  of  the  General  Munitions 
Board.  After  consultation  with  the  heads  of  the 
departments  to  which  his  body  would  have  to  give 
assistance,  he  clearly  perceived  the  lines  along  which 
this  assistance  would  be  appropriate  and  helpful, 
and  stuck  to  these  lines  during  the  formative  months 
of  the  munitions  policy.  His  experience  enabled 
him  to  realize  that  the  departments  of  the  Gov- 
ernment whose  organizations  had  been  developed 
through  long  practice  in  the  design,  purchase,  manu- 
facture, custody,  issue,  use  in  the  service,  and  main- 
tenance in  repair  of  munitions  of  war,  must  of  neces- 
sity be  better  qualified  to  carry  on  these  functions 
in  an  enormously  enlarged  degree  than  any  new 
organizations  which  could  be  created  by  a  lot  of 
people  with  power,  who  knew  very  little  about  the 
subject,  and  he  addressed  himself  to  the  difficult 
task  of  holding  to  these  organizations  the  functions 
to  which  they  were  accustomed.  He  did  not  fail  to 
appreciate,  however,  that  the  Government  bureaus 
needed  a  great  deal  of  assistance  for  which  the 
acquired  knowledge  and  the  unremitting  industry  of 
a  large  number  of  civilian  business  men  would  be 
necessary. 


44    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  assistance  needed  was  divided  into  three 
general  classes : 

(1)  Finding  and  presenting  to  the  supply  bureaus 
capacity,  in  plant  and  organization,  for  meeting  their 
needs. 

(2)  Allocating  among  the  different  bureaus  the 
productive  capacity  found,  in  order  that  their  needs 
might  be  supplied  in  the  proper  order  of  priority; 
as  compared  with  one  another,  with  the  Allied  Gov- 
ernments, and  with  the  needs  of  the  civil  population. 

(3)  Insuring  the  interests  of  the  Government  and 
safeguarding  the  reputation  of  purchasing  officers 
by  giving  advice  upon  the  subject  of  prices,  which 
could  no  longer  be  controlled  by  competition. 

The  wide  acquaintance  of  business  men  with  pri- 
vate establishments,  which  the  Army  and  Navy 
officers  did  not  have,  was  useful,  in  furnishing 
knowledge  of  available  resources  which  the  experi- 
ence of  the  officers  had  necessarily  left  them  with- 
out; but  such  an  establishment  having  been  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  a  supply  department,  the  officers 
of  that  department  were  qualified,  as  no  other  per- 
sons could  be  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  conduct 
negotiations  to  utilize  the  establishment  for  making 
something  for  the  Government,  in  which  negotia- 
tions, design,  specifications,  quantity,  urgency,  and 
the  nature  of  the  inspection  were  essential  consider- 
ations. The  business  with  the  given  establishment, 
with  the  exception  of  advice  in  regard  to  compensa- 
tion, was,  therefore,  left  to  these  officers. 

The  matter  of  allocation  and  priority  involved  an 


OVERHEAD   'ORGANIZATION  45 

understanding  of  the  relative  urgency  of  different 
military  supplies,  of  the  capacity  of  manufacturing 
establishments  and  their  degree  of  occupation,  of 
the  possibility  of  finding  untapped  resources,  and  of 
the  status  and  prospect  of  the  supply  of  raw  ma- 
terials. It  required,  therefore,  both  civilian  and 
military  knowledge  for  its  handling,  and  the  Priority 
Committee  of  the  War  Industries  Board  had  in 
consequence  to  include  both  military  and  civilian 
membership. 

The  prompt  comprehension  of  the  situation  by  Mr. 
Scott,  and  his  guidance  of  the  General  Munitions 
Board  and  of  the  War  Industries  Board  along  the 
above  described  lines  during  the  early  months  of  the 
war,  insured  the  full  utilization  of  the  Government's 
existing  agencies  and  the  supply  to  them  of  neces- 
sary outside  help,  without  the  disruption,  and  the 
long  process  of  finding  itself  by  a  new  organization, 
which  would  necessarily  have  accompanied  the  sub- 
stitution of  new  machinery  for  that  which  had  been 
already  tried  and  was  in  large  part  adequate  for  the 
emergency.  The  Government  owes  a  wonderful  debt 
of  gratitude  to  Mr.  Scott  and  to  the  level-headed  and 
experienced  civilians  who  supported  him  as  members 
of  the  auxiliary  bodies  aiding  in  the  conduct  of  the 
war. 

The  War  Industries  Board  carried  on  its  work 
under  the  presidency  of  Mr.  Scott  through  the  diffi- 
cult formative  period  of  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
1917,  when  his  health  failed  temporarily  under  the 
great  strain,  and  he  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  Daniel 
Willard,  who  resigned  and  resumed  his  duties  as 


46    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

president  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Eailroad  in 
January  of  1918. 

At  the  meeting  of  the  United  States  Congress  in 
the  winter  following  our  entry  into  the  War,  bills 
were  introduced  for  the  creation  of  a  War  Cabinet 
and  a  Department  of  Munitions.  Neither  of  these 
bills  became  a  law ;  but  there  is  probably  difference 
of  opinion  to-day  as  to  whether  they  should  not  have 
been  enacted,  especially  the  one  for  a  Department  of 
Munitions.  The  last  named  department  would  neces- 
sarily have  had  very  close  relations  with  the  Ord- 
nance Department,  both  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy, 
and  would  in  all  probability  have  absorbed  the 
greater  portion  of  these  departments,  if  it  had  been 
created.  The  British  Ministry  of  Munitions  took 
over  at  first  only  the  placing  of  orders  and  contracts 
and  the  following  up  of  the  production  of  munitions ; 
but  it  was  soon  found  that  these  activities  were  so 
closely  connected  with  design  that  it  was  necessary 
to  take  over  also  the  design  of  the  articles  which 
were  procured,  leaving  the  Ordnance  Department 
only  the  custody,  issue  and  maintenance  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  material.  That  is,  the  Ministry  of  Muni- 
tions transferred  to  its  own  organization  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  Ordnance  Department,  which  had  been 
engaged  upon  design. 

On  March  4th,  the  President  made  something  of  a 
change  in  the  character  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
by  assigning  Mr.  Bernard  M.  Baruch  to  the  chair- 
manship, and  directing  that  the  ultimate  decision  of 
all  questions,  except  the  determination  of  prices, 
should  rest  with  him,  the  other  members  acting  in 


OVERHEAD    ORGANIZATION  47 

a  co-operative  and  advisory  capacity.  The  President 
at  the  same  time  outlined  the  formation  of  a  price- 
fixing  committee  to  consist  of  the  chairman  of  the 
board,  the  members  of  the  board  immediately 
charged  with  the  study  of  raw  materials  and  of 
manufactured  products,  the  labor  members  of  the 
board,  the  chairman  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commis- 
sion, the  chairman  of  the  Tariff  Commission,  the 
Fuel  Administrator,  a  representative  of  the  Army, 
a  representative  of  the  Navy,  with  Mr.  Robert  S. 
Brookings  as  chairman.  This  committee  received 
its  instructions  directly  from  the  President  and  made 
its  reports  directly  to  him.  The  President  at  the 
same  time  took  occasion  to  re-define  the  functions  of 
the  War  Industries  Board,  and  stated  among  the 
duties  of  the  chairman  to  be : 

1.  To  act  for  the  joint  and  several  benefit  of  all 
the  supply  departments  of  the  Government. 

2.  To  let  alone  what  is  being  successfully  done 
and  interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  the  present 
normal  processes  of  purchase  and  delivery  in  the 
several  departments. 

3 

4.  To  determine  what  is  to  be  done  when  there  is 
any  competitive  or  other  conflict  of  interest  between 
departments  in  the  matter  of  supplies ;  for  example : 
when  there  is  not  a  sufficient  immediate  supply  for 
all  and  there  must  be  a  decision  as  to  priority  of 
need  or  delivery,  or  when  there  is  competition  for 
the  same  source  of  manufacture  or  supply,  or  when 
contracts  have  not  been  placed  in  such  a  way  as  to 


48    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

get  advantage  of  the  full  productive  capacity  of  the 
country. 

These  instructions  were  in  general  accordance 
with  the  ideas  which  had  governed  since  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  General  Munitions  Board.  They 
indicated  a  policy  different  from  that  which  had 
been  followed  by  the  British  Government  in  the 
formation  of  a  Ministry  of  Munitions,  in  that  they 
crystallized  the  method  of  making  the  greatest  use 
possible  of  the  existing  designing,  purchasing  and 
manufacturing  departments  of  the  Government.  The 
time  which  would  have  been  necessary  for  a  great 
new  department,  spreading  over  all  the  activities 
of  procurement  of  munitions  of  war,  to  find  itself, 
gathering  together  its  personnel  and  installing  its 
methods  of  doing  business,  was  therefore  saved ;  and 
it  appears  that  the  outcome  justified  the  system  fol- 
lowed, since  the  wheels  of  industry  were  set  turning 
for  the  Government's  purposes  with  a  minimum  of 
delay,  and  with  a  promptness  of  delivery  of  output 
comparable  favorably  with  that  in  any  other  coun- 
try. The  only  change  of  agency,  of  any  moment, 
was  the  creation  of  the  Division  of  Purchase,  Storage 
and  Traffic,  of  the  General  Staff,  which  was  to  take 
over  the  purchase,  for  the  Army,  of  the  class  of 
stores  which  could  be  called  commodities  and  were 
made  commercially  instead  of  being  manufactured 
from  designs.  This  division,  however,  did  not  get 
into  operation  until  about  the  end  of  the  War,  and 
did  not  have  opportunity  to  justify  its  existence.  Its 
creation  had  been  inspired  by  the  belief  that  any 


OVERHEAD    ORGANIZATION  49 

commodity,  such  as  blankets,  for  example,  which 
had  been  purchased  for  horses  by  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment and  for  men  by  the  Quartermaster  Depart- 
ment, would  best  be  handled,  from  procurement, 
through  transportation  and  storage,  to  final  issue  to 
the  ocean  transport  service,  by  a  single  agency ;  for 
which  there  was  much  to  be  said.  But  the  field 
which  it  was  attempted  to  cover  wras  very  great,  and 
much  knowledge  had  to  be  acquired  by  the  new  divi- 
sion, which  was  already  in  the  possession  of  the 
regular  departments;  so  that  difference  of  opinion 
as  to  the  success  of  the  undertaking  was  never 
smoothed  out. 

Altogether,  although  the  question  may  always  be 
arguable,  I  think  it  can  be  said  that  the  achievement 
of  putting  in  the  theater  of  war  a  million  and  a  quar- 
ter of  fighting  troops  in  eighteen  months,  with  never 
any  embarrassing  shortage  of  arms  or  ammunition, 
is  a  justification  of  the  policy  of  using  existing  gov- 
ernmental departments,  and  expanding,  aiding  and 
co-ordinating  them,  by  outside  assistance,  instead  of 
replacing  them  by  an  all-absorbing  department  after 
the  emergency  was  upon  us.  The  subject  has  spe- 
cial interest  because  of  the  intense  effort  which  was 
made  to  impose  a  course  more  nearly  resembling 
that  of  the  British  Government,  and  because  of  the 
natural  sympathy  which  was  expressed  for  this 
effort  in  lively  public  discussion. 

In  speaking  thus  I  have  in  mind  the  regularly  con- 
stituted and  already  functioning  military  depart- 
ments, and  refer  to  their  operation  within  their 
••rtive  spheres.  I  have  no  failure  of  apprecia- 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tion  of  the  work  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in 
helping  the  military  departments  in  matters  beyond 
the  scheme  of  their  creation  or  practice,  nor  of  the 
several  other  boards  which  were  set  up  under  the 
Overman  Act  or  under  special  legislation,  to  perform 
tasks  which  either  were  not  tasks  of  normal  times, 
or  were  then  performed  by  private  agencies.  The 
War  Finance  Corporation,  the  War  Trade  Board, 
the  War  Labor  Board,  the  Food  Administration,  the 
Fuel  Administration,  the  Alien  Property  Custodian, 
and  the  Bureau  of  War  Eisk  Insurance  show  how 
large  a  field  there  was  which  could  best  be  occupied 
by  civilian  personnel,  and  indicate  the  abundant 
necessity  for  constructive  organization  of  new  ad- 
ministrative bodies,  without  infringing  upon  or 
duplicating  the  duties  of  the  old  ones. 


IV 

CRITICISMS 

THE  special  session  of  Congress  which  had  been 
called  by  the  President  to  meet  the  emergency  oc- 
casioned by  Germany's  resumption  of  ruthless  sub- 
marine warfare,  in  February,  1917,  came  to  an  end 
on  October  6th,  when  the  Houses  adjourned  after 
the  passage  of  the  appropriations  asked  for,  and  the 
enactment  of  much  other  legislation  for  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war.  The  membership  were  in  rather 
cheerful  mood,  with  an  apparent  consciousness  of 
having  worked  hard  and  done  their  duty.  It  is  true 
that  the  appropriations  had  been  slowly  made,  but 
they  were  altogether  liberal  in  amount;  and,  al- 
though all  the  special  legislation  asked  for  by  the 
executive  departments  had  not  been  granted,  the 
response  had  been  so  much  more  complete  than  in 
normal  times  as  to  produce  a  feeling  almost  of 
generosity  in  the  minds  of  legislators. 

But  when  the  statesmen  had  scattered  to  their 
homes,  and  had  had  opportunity,  many  of  them,  to 
observe  the  great  gap  between  the  making  of  appro- 
priations and  the  fulfillment  of  the  objects  for  which 
the  appropriations  were  made,  as  exemplified  by  the 
shortage  in  arms,  equipment  and  shelter  of  the 
troops  who  had  been  gathered  at  the  mobilization 

51 


52 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


centres,  the  feeling  of  satisfaction  suffered  a  rude 
shock;  and  there  was  realized  the  danger  of  dis- 
satisfaction throughout  constituencies,  which  is  apt 
to  appear  as  unmixed  evil  to  the  sensitive  perception 
of  the  dependent  upon  popular  suffrage.  So,  when 
the  65th  Congress  came  together  again  for  its  first 
regular  session,  in  the  first  week  in  December,  a  dis- 
position was  evident  to  make  searching  inquiry  as  to 
why  troops  were  still  without  guns  and  clothing, 
after  eight  months  of  war  and  billions  of  appropria- 
tions. The  military  committees  of  the  two  Houses 
were  appropriate  bodies  to  examine,  on  behalf  of 
Congress,  into  the  conduct  of  the  war;  but  a  simul- 
taneous examination  by  both  committees  would  have 
involved  duplication  of  effort,  and  double  expendi- 
ture of  time  by  testifying  officers;  so  the  Senate 
Committee  only  took  up  the  task,  and  commenced  its 
" Investigation  of  the  War  Department"  by  calling 
the  Chief  of  Ordnance  before  it  on  December  12, 
1917. 

I  think  that  more  members  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee were  surprised,  and  perhaps  dismayed,  by  the 
shortage  of  equipment  than  could  have  been  found 
in  the  House  Committee.  The  needs  of  the  War 
Department  were  usually  presented,  during  what 
ought  to  have  been  the  years  of  preparation,  in  con- 
nection with  appropriation  bills,  and  these  were 
much  more  thoroughly  considered  by  the  House 
Committees  than  by  the  Senate  Committees;  more 
extended  hearings  were  held,  and  explanations  as  to 
deficiencies  of  supply  and  the  impossibility  of  mak- 
ing them  up  quickly,  upon  emergency,  were  more 


CRITICISMS  53 

extensively  gone  into.  All  of  which  may  have  given 
the  House  membership  a  better  understanding  of 
conditions  than  was  to  be  found  in  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee, and  more  of  a  realization  of  the  time  that 
would  be  required  to  make  up  for  the  years  which 
had  been  lost.  However  this  may  be,  a  number  of 
the  Senate  Military  Committee  members  conducted 
their  part  of  the  examination  of  officer  witnesses  in 
a  manner  to  indicate  their  indignant  astonishment 
at  what  they  considered  inexcusable  failure  to  show 
more  prompt  results  from  the  resources  which  had 
been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  War  Department. 
The  sessions  of  the  Committee  were  usually  public, 
so  that  the  dissatisfaction  of  these  Senators  was 
exhibited  before  press  representatives,  and  found  a 
loud  echo  throughout  the  country.  The  Committee 
did  not  report  any  result  of  investigation  or  conclu- 
sions arrived  at,  at  least  in  respect  to  the  Ordnance 
Department;  but  individual  senators  criticized  and 
condemned  freely,  both  in  speeches  on  the  floor  of 
the  Senate  and  in  other  public  utterances.  They  did 
this  in  such  apparent  disregard  of  the  evidence 
which  had  been  given  before  the  Committee  by  all 
responsible  witnesses  as  to  indicate,  on  the  part  of 
these  critics,  a  refusal  to  attach  weight  to  the  infor- 
mation given  them  by  those  who  were  in  special 
position  to  impart  it,  and  a  disposition  to  give  full 
credence  to  the  small  number  of  faultfinding  wit- 
nesses, even  when  the  latter  had  an  evident  motive 
for  misrepresentation.  Such  widespread  charges  of 
inefficiency  and  incapacity  resulted  from  this  action 
on  the  part  of  a  few  Senators  that  I  think  it  is  worth 


54    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  time  required  to  look  into  the  most  important 
subjects  which  were  dealt  with,  relating  to  the  Ord- 
nance Department,  and  to  show  if  possible  whether 
the  organization  which  the  taxpayers  had  been 
maintaining  was  hopelessly  defective,  both  in  char- 
acter and  in  personnel,  or  whether  it  functioned,  in 
the  emergency,  as  well  as  there  was  any  right  to 
expect,  under  the  handicap  of  long-continued  in- 
adequacy of  support  for  which  some  of  the  most 
severe  legislative  critics  had  not  been  without 
responsibility. 

I  do  not  intend  to  make  a  general  review  of  the 
accomplishment  of  the  Ordnance  Department  in  the 
production  of  war  material.  That  has  been  done  by 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  and  Director  of 
Munitions,  Mr.  Benedict  Crowell,  in  an  interesting 
report  published  by  the  War  Department  under  the 
title  "America's  Munitions— 1917-1918, "  and  by  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance  in  his  annual  reports.  But  there 
were  four  subjects,  viz.:  rifles,  machine  guns,  field 
artillery  and  smokeless  powder,  upon  which  criti- 
cism centered  so  fiercely  and  in  regard  to  which  mis- 
information was  so  rife  that  the  truth  really  ought 
to  be  known  about  them;  especially  as  they  con- 
stitute the  most  important  items  in  the  armament  of 
a  fighting  force.  I  shall  therefore,  in  the  following 
pages,  tell  the  story  of  the  controversial  points  as 
to  these  items,  and  leave  readers  to  judge  whether 
or  not  they  have  heretofore  been  given  a  just  appre- 
hension of  them.  It  would  be  much  pleasanter 
simply  to  state  the  record  of  good  achievement, 
without  attempt  at  defense,  which  is  never  agree- 


CRITICISMS 


55 


able,  and  let  it  go  at  that ;  but  if  the  history  is  to  be 
of  any  use  as  a  guide  for  the  future  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  there  can  be  avoided  an  examination  of  at 
least  the  more  serious  charges  prominently  made. 

The  examination  calls  for  more  extended  quota- 
tion from  public  speeches  and  from  recorded  testi- 
mony than  would  be  appropriate  in  a  story  written 
to  make  interesting  reading;  but  these  constitute 
respectively  the  indictment  and  its  support,  and  are 
nofM'ssary  to  a  real  understanding  of  the  phase  which 
I  am  endeavoring  to  make  plain. 


RIFLES 

THE  most  important  weapon  with  which  nations  go 
to  war  is  the  infantryman's  rifle.  This  remains  a 
fact  notwithstanding  the  greatly  increased  impor- 
tance of  artillery,  the  extensive  use  of  the  machine 
gun,  the  revival  of  such  early  weapons  as  the  hand- 
grenade  and  the  trench  mortar,  and  the  introduction 
of  new  ones  such  as  the  aeroplane  and  asphyxiating 
gas.  The  rifle  was,  therefore,  a  matter  of  very  early 
concern  with  the  Ordnance  Department  upon  enter- 
ing into  the  war,  as,  indeed,  it  had  been  for  a  con- 
siderable time  before. 

The  standard  rifle  of  the  American  service,  popu- 
larly known  as  the  Springfield,  is  believed  to  have  no 
superior ;  but  our  supply  was  entirely  insufficient  for 
the  forces  which  we  were  going  to  have  to  raise.  Our 
manufacturing  capacity  for  the  Springfield  rifle  was 
also  insufficient,  and  could  not  be  expanded  rapidly 
enough  for  the  emergency.  This  capacity  was  avail- 
able at  two  arsenals:  one  at  Springfield,  Massachu- 
setts, capable  of  turning  out  about  a  thousand  rifles 
per  day,  and  one  at  Rock  Island,  Illinois,  which  could 
make  about  five  hundred  per  day.  Until  September 
of  1916  the  Springfield  Armory  had  been,  however, 

56 


RIFLES  57 

running  far  below  its  capacity,  and  the  Rock  Island 
Arsenal,  or  at  least  the  rifle-making  plant,  was 
entirely  shut  down,  due  to  lack  of  appropriation. 
At  the  end  of  August,  1916,  there  had  been  appropri- 
ated $5,000,000  for  the  manufacture  of  small  arms, 
including  rifles.  A  considerable  sum  of  this  ap- 
propriation had  to  be  put  into  pistols,  of  which  we 
were  even  shorter  than  we  were  of  rifles,  but  the 
remainder  was  used  to  reopen  the  rifle  plant  at  Bock 
Island,  and  to  increase  the  output  at  Springfield,  as 
rapidly  as  these  effects  could  be  accomplished  in  the 
stringent  condition  of  the  supply  of  skilled  labor 
occasioned  by  the  demands  of  the  private  factories 
making  rifles  for  European  governments.  The  dis- 
sipated force  could  not  be  quickly  regathered.  For- 
tunately, it  had  been  the  policy  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  to  keep  on  hand  a  considerable  reserve 
of  raw  material,  so  that  little  delay  was  caused  by 
lack  of  this  important  element.  We  had  in  April, 
1917,  about  600,000  Springfield  rifles,  including  those 
in  the  hands  of  troops  and  in  storage ;  and  the  ques- 
tion was  as  to  the  best  method  of  rapidly  increasing 
our  supply  of  rifles,  of  sufficiently  good  model  to 
justify  their  procurement. 

Six  manufacturing  establishments  were  making 
riflos  in  the  United  States  for  foreign  governments, 
and  of  these,  three,  the  Winchester  Repeating  Arms 
pany,  of  New  Haven,  Connecticut,  the  Reming- 
ton Arms  Company  of  Ilion,  New  York,  and  the 
Remington  Arms  Company,  of  Eddystone,  Pennsyl- 
vania, were  making  what  was  known  as  the  Enfield 
rifle,  for  the  British  service.  The  capacity  of  these 


58 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


three  plants  was  sufficient  for  our  purpose,  and  as 
their  contracts  with  the  British  Government  were 
running  out,  and  the  general  type  of  the  rifle  which 
they  were  making  was  a  good  one,  it  was  not  difficult 
to  decide  that  these  plants  should  be  used  to  supple- 
ment those  at  Springfield  and  Eock  Island,  which 
should,  of  course,  be  stimulated  to  their  utmost 
production.  Certain  other  questions,  however,  at 
once  arose.  The  British  type  of  ammunition,  for 
which  the  Enfield  rifles  were  being  made,  was  not  a 
very  good  one,  in  that  the  bullet  was  of  low  velocity 
and  the  cartridges,  having  a  projecting  rim  at  the 
base,  were  likely  to  catch  upon  one  another  in  feed- 
ing from  the  magazine,  and  to  produce  a  jam.  In 
addition,  this  ammunition  was  not  interchangeable 
with  our  own,  and  could  not  be  used  in  the  Spring- 
field rifle.  The  manufacture,  for  ourselves,  of  the 
Enfield  rifle  as  it  was  being  made  would,  therefore, 
have  entailed  the  use  of  two  kinds  of  ammunition 
in  our  service, — and  one  of  these  not  a  very  good 
kind, — or  else  the  abandonment  of  our  Springfield 
rifle  and  the  complete  substitution  of  the  Enfield, 
with  the  corresponding  throwing  out  of  commission 
of  the  Springfield  and  Eock  Island  plants  and  the 
Government  ammunition  factory  at  the  Frankford 
Arsenal. 

There  was  another  difficulty  about  the  Enfield 
rifle.  It  was  being  independently  manufactured  at 
the  three  factories,  and  there  was  not  only  very  poor 
interchangeability  of  parts  in  the  product  of  a  single 
factory,  but  as  between  the  three  factories  the  parts 
were  not  interchangeable  at  all.  Under  these  cir- 


RIFLES  59 

cumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  moderate  supply  of 
Springfields  on  hand  and  the  manufacturing  ca- 
pacity of  the  arsenals,  it  was  decided  that  the  new 
Enfield  rifles  should  be  manufactured  for  use  with 
the  United  States'  ammunition,  and  that  the  manu- 
facture should  be  standardized  so  as  to  effect  prac- 
tical interchangeability  of  parts  throughout. 

It  was  considered  that  the  Springfield  rifle  situa- 
tion justified  taking  the  time  required  for  these 
changes,  of  which  the  first  would  necessarily  appeal 
strongly  to  any  military  man,  and  the  one  involving 
interchangeability  could,  fortunately,  be  considered 
with  the  aid  of  an  officer  who  was  very  familiar  with 
the  Enfield  rifle  as  it  was  being  manufactured  at  the 
three  private  factories.  This  officer  was  Colonel 
John  T.  Thompson,  formerly  of  the  Ordnance 
Department,  who  had  been  retired  from  active 
service  and  was  in  the  employ  of  the  Remington 
Arms  Company  in  connection  with  their  rifle  manu- 
facture for  the  British.  I  called  Colonel  Thompson 
back  into  active  service  and  placed  him  in  charge  of 
small  arms  and  small  arms  ammunition,  and  had  the 
benefit  of  his  expert  and  especially  well-informed 
advice  in  deciding  that  the  interchangeability  wanted 
would  be  worth  its  cost  in  time. 

Action  in  accordance  with  this  decision  raised 
serious  criticism  from  various  sources  with  a 
capacity  for  making  themselves  heard.  That  most 
formally  expressed  was  by  Senator  Chamberlain, 
in  a  speech  on  the  question  of  personal  privilege  in 


60    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Senate,  on  January  24, 1918,  in  which  the  Senator 
spoke  as  follows : 

"Let  us  now  consider  the  question  of  rifles. 

"We  were  furnishing  Lee-Enfield  rifles  to  the 
British  Government  in  large  numbers.  The  fac- 
tories were  prepared  for  them.  It  is  true  that  Great 
Britain  was  trying  to  make  an  improvement  upon 
the  rifles  used  by  her  when  she  became  involved  in 
the  war,  but  when  the  war  came  on  Great  Britain 
said  we  will  not  waste  any  time  improving  our  rifles, 
but  will  get  them  out  just  as  fast  as  we  can,  and  they 
have  been  manufacturing  them  ever  since.  What 
did  America  do?  With  700,000  rifles  in  America  and 
in  our  colonial  possessions,  a  motley  group  of  differ- 
ent kinds  of  guns,  America  was  seeking,  through  the 
Ordnance  Department,  to  improve  the  rifle  that 
Great  Britain  was  manufacturing  here  and  which 
we  could  have  put  out  without  any  trouble  in  the 
factories.  We  went  to  work,  through  the  Ordnance 
Department,  to  improve  the  Enfield  rifle.  I  am 
frank  to  say  it  is  a  great  improvement.  I  believe 
it  is  a  better  gun  than  the  English  gun,  but  here 
while  the  house  was  burning  America  was  determin- 
ing through  its  Ordnance  Department  what  instru- 
mentalities ought  to  be  adopted  to  put  out  the  fire. 
It  took  weeks  and  months  before  they  finally  got  the 
Lee-Enfield  rifle  into  condition  where  the  Ordnance 
Department  thought  it  was  all  right.  And  after  this 
was  agreed  upon  there  were  further  delays  caused 
by  indecision.  Here  were  the  engineers  of  these 
great  arms  companies,  who  got  together  and  finally 
agreed  upon  a  program  for  the  manufacture  of 


RIFLES  61 

these  guns,  and  concluded  that  they  would  manu- 
facture them  with  seven  interchangeable  parts,  and 
they  started  to  manufacture  the  gauges,  the  jigs, 
and  dies,  and  everything  necessary  for  the  manu- 
facture of  guns  with  seven  interchangeable  parts. 
After  the  Ordnance  Department  had  practically 
accepted  the  suggestion,  it  went  to  work  through  a 
distinguished  ordnance  officer  and  changed  the  plan 
from  7  to  40  interchangeable  parts,  and  finally  raised 
it  to  over  50  interchangeable  parts,  with  the  result 
that  everything  had  to  be  stopped  for  awhile  that 
additional  gauges  might  be  made.  This  may  have 
resulted  in  improvement,  but  why  the  delay  in  the 
midst  of  the  smoke  of  battle?" 

Senator  Chamberlain's  position  as  Chairman  of 
the  Military  Committee,  and  the  fact  that  his  speech 
followed  an  extensive  investigation  of  the  War  De- 
partment by  the  Committee,  gave  to  his  utterances 
a  particularly  important  character,  and  caused  them 
to  be  very  widely  published  throughout  the  country, 
undoubtedly  to  the  considerable  impairment  of  the 
public  confidence  in  the  manner  in  which  this  im- 
portant matter  of  rifles  had  been  handled  by  the 
department.  Senator  Weeks,  also  of  the  Commit- 
tee, joined  in  a  criticism  of  the  department,  saying 
in  regard  to  myself,  "He  had  constantly  sought — 
justifiably  so  in  ordinary  times — for  the  best  the 
market  could  produce,  and  in  this  case  he  was  un- 
willing to  modify  that  standard  of  perfection  even 
though  a  modification  would  have  greatly  hastened 
tin1  production  of  a  satisfactory  arm,  and  one  which 
would  have  answcrod  all  purposes."  After  review- 


62    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ing  some  of  the  reasons  which  had  been  advanced  in 
defense  of  the  change,  the  Senator  continued:  "But 
all  of  these  arguments  in  favor  of  the  change  did 
not  commence  to  overcome  the  advantage  of  im- 
mediately providing  the  largest  supply  of  rifles  pos- 
sible— a  rifle  which  has  served  England  satisfac- 
torily during  three  years  of  actual  warfare." 

There  was  very  little  military  support  of  the  posi- 
tion of  these  two  Senators  that  was  ever  brought  to 
my  notice.  I  knew  of  but  one  officer,  General  Leon- 
ard Wood,  then  commanding  the  Department  of  the 
East,  who  held  the  view  that  we  should  have  con- 
tinued the  manufacture  of  the  Enfield  rifle  as  it  was 
being  made  at  the  time  of  our  entry  into  the  war, 
should  have  armed  our  troops  abroad  entirely  with 
it,  and  should  have  used  the  British  ammunition. 
He  gave  these  views  in  an  official  recommendation 
to  the  War  Department,  and  perhaps  based  them  on 
an  exaggerated  estimate  of  the  number  of  rifles  re- 
quired to  make  wastage  good,  which  had  appeared 
in  the  newspapers.  His  recommendation  was  for 
supply  at  the  rate  of  five  rifles  per  man,  while  the 
fact  was,  and  subsequent  history  proved,  that  one- 
half  a  rifle  per  man  was  a  sufficient  allowance  for 
a  year 's  wastage. 

It  was  claimed  by  the  advocates  of  the  exclusive 
use  of  the  British  caliber  and  the  British  ammuni- 
tion that  it  would  diminish  by  one  the  number  of 
different  kinds  of  small  arms  ammunition  in  use 
by  the  Allies,  by  avoiding  our  introduction  of  a  new 
type,  and  would  place  us  in  a  position  to  draw  upon 
the  British  supply  in  case  our  own  should  be  inter- 


RIFLES  63 

rupted.  But  before  the  conclusion  was  reached  that 
we  should  modify  the  Enfield  rifle,  it  had  already 
been  decided  that  our  troops  were  to  operate  with 
the  French,  and  not  with  the  British ;  and,  therefore, 
the  ability  to  draw  upon  the  British  ammunition 
supply  became  of  less  importance.  Besides,  the 
small  arms  ammunition  constituted  such  a  minor 
proportion  of  the  supplies  which  had  to  be  trans- 
ported across  the  ocean  that  interruption  of  trans- 
portation would  have  made  itself  felt  in  other  mat- 
ters long  before  it  would  reach  the  small  arms 
ammunition.  For  example,  the  rifle  ammunition 
supply  would  not  amount  to  a  quarter  of  a  pound 
per  day  for  each  man,  while  his  food  supply,  alone, 
would,  at  the  very  least,  be  four  pounds  per  day, 
that  is,  sixteen  times  as  great.  The  French,  with 
whom  we  were  to  and  did  operate,  made  no  point 
of  our  lack  of  interchangeable  rifle  ammunition  with 
their  troops.  No  tonnage  would  have  been  saved 
by  our  use  of  British  ammunition,  since  the  mate- 
rials for  manufacturing  the  ammunition  would,  in 
any  case,  have  had  to  come  from  this  side.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  few  divisions  of  our  troops  which 
did  for  a  time  operate  with  the  British  were  sup- 
plied during  the  interval  with  British  rifles  and 
ammunition. 

But  great  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  earlier 
equipment  of  our  troops  with  rifles  which  would 
have  resulted  from  adoption,  without  change,  of 
the  Enfield.  This  is  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  the  factories  would  then  have  been  able  to  go 
right  ahead  turning  out  several  thousand  per  day, 


64    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

from  the  time  when  they  should  have  finished  their 
British  orders.  The  testimony  of  the  manufacturers 
themselves  was  not  quite  to  this  effect,  however. 
Mr.  Charles  H.  Schlacks,  the  General  Manager  of 
the  largest  of  the  three  factories,  that  at  Eddystone, 
Pennsylvania,  testified  before  the  Committee,  in 
December,  1917,  as  follows : 

"The  Chairman — In  your  opinion,  was  the  prog- 
ress of  manufacture  delayed  any  by  the  adoption 
of  the  new  model  gun!" 

"Mr.  Schlacks— Very  slightly,  Mr.  Chairman,  if 
any,  and  that  is  certainly  wiped  out  by  the  fact 
that  the  material  manufacturers  have  not  kept  pace 
with  us." 

But  there  is  probably  no  doubt  that  we  could  have 
secured  from  the  British  Government  a  large  num- 
ber of  the  Enfield  rifles  which  had  already  been 
manufactured  for  their  service,  and  therefore  we 
can  admit  that  we  should  have  had  a  somewhat 
earlier  supply  for  all  our  troops  if  we  had  accepted 
the  rifle  as  it  was.  This  promptness,  however,  would 
have  been  accompanied  by  very  grave  disadvan- 
tages. We  would  have  had  three  makes  of  rifle  in 
use,  of  unstandardized  manufacture,  and  with  non- 
interchangeable  parts.  A  soldier  in  the  field,  there- 
fore, losing  or  breaking  a  part  of  his  rifle,  could  not 
make  use  of  a  similar  part  from  another  gun,  and 
his  rifle  would  thus  have  been  made  completely  un- 
serviceable. One  of  the  manufacturers  was  per- 
mitted to  go  ahead  with  his  manufacture  before 
he  had  attained  the  finally  settled  degree  of  inter- 
changeability,  under  instructions  to  attain  that  de- 


RIFLES  65 

gree  gradually.  This  brought  from  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force  in  France  the  following:  "The  mat- 
ter of  spare  parts  and  maintenance  in  our  present 
situation  is  serious  and  must  not  be  complicated  by 
the  addition  of  any  distinctions  in  manufacture." 
The  manufacturers,  themselves,  were  all  favorable 
to  the  change.  Mr.  S.  M.  Vauclain,  a  member  of 
the  Advisory  Committee  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defence,  who  built  the  Eddystone  rifle  factory,  and 
was  one  of  the  most  experienced  business  men  con- 
nected with  the  manufacture  of  rifles  for  the  Allied 
governments,  testified  as  follows  before  the  Senate 
Military  Committee : 

"Mr.  Vauclain — I  consider  that  the  Ordnance 
Department  was  very  wise  in  taking  the  time  to 
perfect  this  rifle.  I  think  it  is  the  finest  rifle  made 
today.  I  think  it  is  even  a  better  rifle  than  the 
Springfield  rifle,  as  it  is  now  made.  I  might  not 
get  everybody  to  agree  with  me  on  that,  but  there 
is  a  longer  distance  between  the  sights,  and  it  is  a 
very  accurately  constructed  rifle  and  should  give 
no  trouble  in  the  field. 

"There  is  a  great  objection  to  using  the  rim  car- 
tridge in  the  field,  on  account  of  jamming  when  you 
are  working  the  shot  in  the  rifle.  These  rifles  now 
have  rimless  cartridges,  the  same  as  used  by  the 
Springfield  rifle,  interchangeable  ammunition,  abso- 
lutely no  possibility  of  jamming  in  service.  Their 
interchangeability  is  such  that  when  we  were  put- 
ting English  rifles  together,  if  a  man  put  twenty 
rifles  a  day  together,  we  thought  he  had  done  a  good 
days'  work.  About  ten  days  ago  one  of  our  fitters 


66    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

put  128  of  these  rifles  together,  and  97  per  cent  of 
them  targeted  first  shot.  If  this  rifle  was  not  of 
perfect  design  and  perfectly  made  as  to  tolerance, 
it  would  be  impossible  for  anybody  to  put  128  rifles 
together  in  ten  hours  out  of  the  miscellaneous  heap 
of  parts;  so  that  I  am  satisfied  that  the  rifles  are 
an  absolutely  interchangeable  piece  of  work.  The 
other  rifle  makers  are  coming  along  in  good  shape. 
The  Government  plants  are  also  turning  out  an  in- 
creased number  of  rifles.  I  do  not  see  anything  to 
worry  about  rifles."  (Hearings,  page  360.) 

Later  experience  and  wider  examination  showed 
the  comparative  figures  of  assembly  of  rifles  to  be 
even  more  striking  than  as  stated  by  Mr.  Vauclain. 
The  best  record  in  the  three  factories  before  our 
entry  into  the  war  was  the  assembly  of  fifty  Enfield 
rifles  in  a  day  by  one  man,  but  of  the  altered  and 
standardized  rifle,  as  it  was  made  for  us,  the  .best 
record  became  280  rifles  a  day,  while  the  average 
record  after  the  work  got  well  going  was  250  rifles  a 
day.  The  influence  of  this  acceleration  of  manu- 
facture, both  upon  the  supply  and  upon  the  cost, 
was  necessarily  very  great.  The  Enfield  rifles  had 
cost  the  British  Government  over  $40  apiece,  while 
the  altered  rifles  cost  the  United  States  Government 
less  than  $30  apiece.  Mr.  Vauclain  ?s  testimony  con- 
tinued: 

66  The  Chairman — There  has  been  some  feeling 
that  that  change  in  the  Lee-Enfield  rifle,  to  mod- 
ernize it,  created  great  delay  in  the  delivery  of  the 
guns,  and  there  is  criticism  of  the  Department  in 
the  tardiness  with  which  they  have  produced  the 


UIFLKS  67 

larger  ordnance.  Do  you  feel  that  there  is  ground 
for  the  criticism .)M 

"Mr.  Vauclain — I  do  not  feel  there  is.  If  any- 
thing, there  is  ground  for  commendation  for  the 
manner  in  which  the  officers  in  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment of  the  Army  and  Navy  have  arisen  to  this 
situation.  It  is  a  tremendous  task.  It  is  only  those 
who  have  lived  with  it  as  I  have  lived  with  it,  day 
and  night,  Sundays  included — I  have  given  my  en- 
tiiv  time  to  it — who  realize  what  a  tremendous 
proposition  it  is."  (Page  367.) 

.Mr.  Henry  S.  Kimball,  President  of  the  company 
which  was  manufacturing  the  Enfield  rifles  at  Bion, 
testified  as  follows : 

"Mr.  Kimball — There  is  one  point  that  I  think, 
perhaps,  might  be  brought  out  for  your  benefit.  The 
manufacture  of  English  ammunition  at  the  time 
war  was  declared  in  the  United  States  was  reduced 
to  a  comparatively  small  figure.  The  English  con- 
tract had  run  out  and  had  been  replaced  by  other 
contracts.  It  would  have  taken  nearly  as  long — I 
think  Mr.  Tyler  will  correct  me  if  it  is  not  correct — 
to  produce  English  ammunition  in  quantities  as  it 
has  taken  us  to  produce  American  ammunition  in 
quantities,  in  the  combined  resources  of  the  car- 
tridge manufacturers  of  this  country.  Therefore,  it 
would  have  been  a  serious  mistake  to  build  for  a 
la  rue  production  of  an  inferior  ammunition  when 
in  comparatively  the  same  time  it  was  possible  to 
build  up  for  a  large  production  of  superior  ammuni- 
t  it  in.  Therefore,  the  ammunition  feature  was  a  very 
large  part  of  the  consideration  of  what  arms  and 


68    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

what  ammunition  should  be  furnished  to  our 
troops." 

"The  Chairman — And  justified  the  modification 
of  the  rifle?" 

66 Mr.  Kimball  —  Absolutely,  in  our  opinion.'' 
(Page  391.) 

Mr.  J.  E.  Otterson,  Vice-President  and  General 
Manager  of  the  Winchester  Repeating  Arms  Com- 
pany, gave  opinions  as  follows : 

"Mr.  Otter  son — From  the  manufacturers'  point 
of  view,  and  to  anyone  familiar  with  the  British 
rifle,  it  was  desirable  to  change."  (Page  406.) 

•  ••••• 

"On  the  cartridge  manufacturing  side,  the  manu- 
facturers could  more  readily  and  easily  and  ex- 
peditiously  manufacture  the  United  States  cartridge 
than  the  British  cartridge."  (Page  407.) 

•  ••••• 

"So,  coupling  the  two  things  together  by  making 
the  change,  you  are  getting  a  superior  cartridge  and 
getting  a  rifle  that  will  function  better,  and  your 
delay  was  but  about  thirty  days,  and  there  seemed 
every  reason  to  change  the  caliber  of  the  rifles." 
(Page  408.) 

Mr.  Otterson,  while  having  no  doubt  as  to  the 
desirability  of  changing  the  rifle  so  as  to  fire-  the 
American  ammunition,  did  not  feel  so  well  qualified 
to  estimate  the  relative  weight  of  the  high  degree  of 
interchangeability  required  by  the  Department  and 
the  time  which  was  required  to  secure  it.  Upon  this 
point  he  said : 

"Mr.  Otterson — My  position  as  a  representative 


RIFLES  69 

of  the  manufacturer  at  the  time  was,  that  while 
I  was  not  qualified  to  pass  on  the  necessity  for 
this  higher  degree  of  interchangeability,  I  could  say 
that  it  would  result  in  delay,  and  the  question  was 
one  purely  as  to  whether  the  exigencies  of  the  situ- 
ation warranted  or  permitted  delay.  (Page  410.) 

"In  the  manufacturing  and  technical  sense  I  was 
opposed  to  it  and  did  not  consider  it  worth  while. 
I  believe,  however,  that  the  necessity  for  it  should 
rest  on  the  judgment  of  a  military  man,  and  not  on 
the  judgment  of  a  manufacturer."  (Page  422.) 

Mr.  Otterson  had  received  a  military  education, 
being  a  graduate  of  the  Naval  Academy,  but  he  did 
not  care  to  trust  his  judgment  as  to  the  military 
value  of  a  high  degree  of  interchangeability  in  the 
rifles ;  differing  in  this  from  certain  gentlemen  who, 
with  very  indifferent  attention  to  military  subjects 
in  the  past,  were  quite  ready  with  a  condemnatory 
judgment. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  these  manufacturers, 
in  testifying  in  favor  of  the  changes  made  in  the 
rifle,  were  testifying  to  their  own  financial  disad- 
vantage; for  it  is  apparent  that  the  earlier  the 
manufacture  and  delivery  of  rifles  for  the  United 
States  should  commence,  the  sooner  would  their 
profits  begin  to  come  in.  Because  of  rather  unfor- 
tunate experience  with  the  manufacture  of  rifles  for 
the  British  Government,  they  were  greatly  in  need 
of  profits. 

A  very  distinct  disadvantage  of  the  adoption  for 
service  of  the  British  rifle,  as  it  stood,  and  the 


70 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


British  ammunition,  would  have  been  that  it  would 
have  left  us  after  the  war  with  several  million  rifles 
and  several  hundred  million  rounds  of  ammunition 
on  our  hands  of  types  which  we  did  not  like,  and 
all  the  plants  fitted  for  the  manufacture  of  this  rifle 
and  ammunition. 

But  even  the  critics  admit  that  the  rifle,  as 
changed,  was  a  much  better  gun,  and  the  substance 
of  their  criticism  is  that  the  change  was  not  worth 
the  delay.  They  do  not  seem  to  have  appreciated 
the  extent  to  which  the  disadvantages  would  have 
involved  the  ammunition  and  the  ammunition  sup- 
ply; but  the  effect  of  the  delay  in  rifle  supply  needs 
a  little  examination.  As  stated  above,  we  had  on 
hand  at  our  entry  into  the  war  about  600,000  Spring- 
field rifles.  Not  all  of  these  were  in  the  United 
States.  Some  were  in  the  Philippine  Islands  and 
some  in  Panama ;  but,  since  in  armies  constituted  as 
were  those  in  the  European  "War  only  about  half  of 
the  men  carry  rifles,  the  number  on  hand  was  insuffi- 
cient for  an  army  of  over  a  million  men.  We  called 
our  men  to  the  colors  so  fast,  however,  that  in  the 
autumn  of  1917  there  were  infantrymen  in  the  camps 
and  cantonments  without  rifles;  but,  in  addition  to 
the  Springfields,  we  had  on  hand  some  160,000  Krag- 
Jorgensen  rifles  which  were  perfectly  good  guns  for 
training,  and  these,  together  with  the  Springfields, 
gave  a  supply  for  training  the  soldiers,  although  not 
enough  to  supply  a  rifle  for  each  man.  The  short- 
age, however,  was  rapidly  diminished  by  the  coming 
on  of  the  modified  Enfield  rifles,  whose  delivery 
commenced  in  August  of  1917  and  progressed  so 


RIFLES  71 

fast  that  tho  shortage  was  wiped  out  in  January  of 
1918. 

A  great  deal  was  made  by  the  critics  of  the 
shortage  of  rifles  in  the  camps  during  the  early 
months  of  mobilization,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether 
the  matter  was  as  seriously  felt  in  the  camps  as  it 
was  by  the  critics.  The  following  letter  received 
from  the  Division  Ordnance  Officer  at  one  of  the 
National  Army  cantonments  throws  some  light  upon 
this  point : 

"0.  0.  file  354.1/477 

DIVISION  HEADQUARTERS, 
December  15,  1917. 

GENERAL  WILLIAM  CROZIER, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Sir: 

In  connection  with  the  Congressional  inquiry  now 
in  progress,  I  believe  some  wrong  impressions  have 
been  created. 

I  submit  some  facts  which  may  be  of  use  to  you 
so  far  as  this  camp  is  concerned.  I  presume  the 
conditions  are  the  same,  or  nearly  the  same,  at  all 
the  other  National  Army  camps. 

1.  There  was  no  delay  in  target  practice  due  to 
lack  of  Enfield  rifles. 

2.  Target  practice  has  been  in  progress  for  over 
a  month  with  plenty  of  Enfield  rifles  and  ammuni- 
tion available. 

3.  Machine    guns    (Colt)    were    received   before 
troops  were  ready  to  use  them. 

4.  Automatic  rifles  (Lewis  and  Chauchat)  were 
received  before  troops  were  ready  to  use  them. 

&  Machine  gun  target  practice  is  being  held  every 
day  the  weather  permits. 


72    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

6.  The  supply,  at  this  camp,  of  all  kinds  of  target 
practice  ammunition  for  both  infantry  and  light  ar- 
tillery is  more  than  ample. 

7.  In  my  opinion  it  is  almost  certain  that  the 
troops  will  be  equipped  and  trained  long  before 
ships  are  available  to  transport  them  overseas. 

8.  After  articles  of  equipment  leave  the  factory 
there  is  delay  in  transportation.    The  average  daily 
run  per  car  of  freight  is  around  40  miles  —  about 
twice  the  rate  of  good  infantry  marching.    This  rate, 
I  believe,  is  high  for  peace  time,  but  seems  low  under 
present  conditions  when  transportation  is  supposed 
to  be  mobilized  for  war. 

Very  respectfully, 


With  regard  to  the  armament  of  our  troops  senl 
abroad,  it  can  be  stated  that  no  soldier  was  delayed 
in  the  slightest  degree  in  sailing  for  Europe  by  lack 
of  a  modern  rifle,  and  that  if  any  were  sent  over 
without  sufficient  training,  it  was  for  other  reasons 
than  the  lack  of  rifles  to  train  them  with.  "We 
neither  needed  nor  received  any  assistance  from 
our  Allies  in  rifle  supply,  and  never  at  any  time  suf- 
fered from  shortage  of  rifles  in  the  theatre  of  war, 
nor  from  any  threat  of  such  shortage.  It  is  a  fact 
that  we  had  on  hand  upon  our  entry  into  the  war 
more  than  twice  as  many  rifles,  of  the  standard 
Springfield  model,  than  were  needed  for  all  the 
troops  which  we  had  in  the  theatre  of  war  a  full 
year  later.  We  had  manufactured,  up  to  the  time 
of  the  armistice,  2,500,000  rifles  of  the  two  service 
models  which,  with  the  600,000  which  we  had  on 
hand  at  the  beginning,  were  enough  for  an  army  of 


RIFLES  73 

6,000,000  men,  a  million  more  than  we  were  con- 
templating for  the  campaign  of  1919. 

No  decision  concerning  the  equipment  of  our 
armies  for  the  great  struggle  was  more  important 
than  tliis  one  in  regard  to  the  rifles.  It  was  arrived 
at  in  a  conference  presided  over  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  at  which  there  were  present  the  Chief  of  Staff, 
the  President  of  the  War  College,  the  Commandant 
of  Marines,  General  Pershing,  who  had  already  been 
designated  to  command  the  expeditionary  force,  and 
myself,  upon  whom  fell  the  task  of  presenting  and 
urging  the  program.  The  event  showed  that  there 
was  no  matter  connected  with  the  prosecution  of 
the  Avar  in  which  our  forces  were  more  adequately 
served  than  in  this  most  important  one  of  all,  and 
this  without  any  offsetting  price,  except  the  evidence 
exhibited  to  the  people  of  the  previous  neglect  of 
proper  provision,  and  the  subsequent  savage  criti- 
cism by  some  of  those  who  might  have  feared  that 
they  would  be  held  responsible. 


VI 

MACHINE  GUNS 

THE  late  war,  so  to  speak,  brought  the  machine 
gun  into  its  own.  This  class  of  weapon  had  been 
developed  to  a  serviceable  stage  at  the  time  of  the 
Spanish- American  War,  but  neither  in  that  war,  nor 
in  the  Boer  War,  nor  in  the  Philippine  insurrection, 
nor  in  the  Pekin  Eelief  Expedition,  nor  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  nor  in  the  Balkan  Wars  had  it 
attracted  anything  like  the  attention  which  has 
resulted  from  its  use  in  the  World  War. 

In  the  matter  of  the  delivery  of  musketry  fire 
proving  ground  performance  shows  the  machine  gun 
to  be  equivalent  to  twenty  or  thirty  infantrymen, 
and  if  its  necessary  crew  be  taken  as,  say,  five  men, 
it  can  be  regarded  as  saving,  in  uses  for  which  it  Ls 
appropriate,  from  three-quarters  to  four-fifths  oJ: 
the  men  who  would  otherwise  be  necessary  to  do  the 
same  work.  It  has  been  employed  universally  in  the 
defense  of  positions ;  either  those  recently  taken  in 
an  advance,  and  in  process  of  "consolidation,"  or 
those  prepared  and  held  against  an  expected  as- 
sault. A  prominent  use,  of  the  latter  class,  was 
by  the  Germans  in  rear  guard  actions,  where 
machine  guns  scattered  along  the  front,  in  "nests" 
or  "pill-boxes,"  that  is,  in  specially  concealed  or 

74 


2 


MACIIINK  c;r\s  75 

iall\  strengthened  emplacements,  constituted 
mutually  supporting  strong  points,  very  difficult 
to  advance  against  or  to  get  between.  In  many 

a  the  crews  were  evidently  instructed  to  fight 
the  last,  with  the  expectation  that  they  would 
then  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  pursuers,  while  the 
main  body  would  get  away.  The  necessity  for 
discouraging  this  practice  undoubtedly  led  in  some 
cases  to  refusal  to  accept  the  surrender  of  the  crews. 
As  was  to  be  expected,  the  extensive  employment  of 
the  weapons  brought  about  a  differentiation  of  func- 
tion, and  the  introduction  of  special  designs  for 
special  uses.  The  normal  design  was  used  for  posi- 
tion holding,  where  weight  was  not  of  importance 
in  comparison  with  prolonged  and  continuous  fire, 
while  a  lighter  design  was  developed  for  carrying 
forward  with  an  advancing  line,  and  holding  a  posi- 
tion gained  until  it  could  be  more  strongly  "consoli- 
dated." This  later  type  was  called,  for  want  of  a 
better  name,  automatic  rifle,  leaving  the  name  ma- 
chine gun  for  the  heavier  type,  although  both  types 

machine  guns  and  both  are  automatic  rifles.  In 
the  automatic  rifle  a  certain  degree  of  endurance  is 
sacrificed  to  lightness.  The  Vickers,  the  heavy 
otchkiss  and  the  heavy  Browning,  weighing  in  the 
ighborhood  of  36  pounds  each,  are  examples  of 
machine  guns;  the  Chauchat  and  the  light  Browning, 

liing  16  to  19  pounds,  are  automatic  rifles;  while 
tin-  Lewis  and  the  Benet-Mercie,  or  light  Hotchkiss, 
of  about  20  pounds  weight,  arc  intermediate  and  not 
favored  for  ground  use  by  the  French,  although  so 
employed  by  the  British.  The  Germans  had  appar- 


76 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


ently  realized  better  than  anyone  else  the  value  of 
machine  guns  in  the  kind  of  fighting  which  they  ex- 
pected to  be  engaged  in,  and  therefore  supplied  them 
to  their  troops  in  greater  numbers  than  did  the 
other  Powers.  We,  in  common  with  many  other 
civilized  nations,  had  before  the  World  War  such  an 
appreciation  of  the  need  for  machine  guns  as  was 
expressed  by  our  establishing  an  allowance  of  about 
four  per  regiment,  with  no  machine  gun  organiza- 
tions outside  the  regiments,  and  a  supply  was  then 
accumulating  at  the  very  low  rate  corresponding  to 
an  annual  appropriation  of  about  $150,000.  The 
present  allowance  is  at  the  rate  of  about  250  per 
regiment. 

An  appropriation  of  the  above  amount  was  made 
in  the  Army  Act  of  1912,  but  before  the  considera- 
tion commenced  of  a  bill  for  the  next  year,  expres- 
sions of  dissatisfaction  with  the  rifle  with  which  the 
service  was  then  principally  armed — the  Benet- 
Mercie,  otherwise  known  as  the  light  Hotchkiss — 
had  reached  the  ears  of  Congress.  This  dissatisfac- 
tion was,  I  believe,  largely  due  to  lack  of  proper 
instruction  in  the  use  of  this  class  of  weapon,  and 
the  belief  upon  the  part  of  numbers  of  officers  in 
the  service  that  there  was  some  other  machine  gun 
of  such  simple  construction  that  no  great  amount  of 
special  instruction  would  be  necessary  for  its  use — 
which  was  a  radical  error. 

No  entirely  satisfactory  machine  gun  has  yet  been 
developed;  that  is,  we  have  never  had  a  machine 
gun  that  is  not  subject  to  stoppage  by  reason  of 
some  kind  of  malfunction.  The  Browning  gun,  as 


MACHINE    GUNS  77 

was  anticipated  by  the  Ordnance  Department,  is  a 
great  advance  in  this  respect ;  but  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  these  weapons  are  machines,  operating 
with  tremendous  pressures  and  tremendous  veloc- 
ity of  moving  parts,  the  Benet-Mercie  giving  out 
about  one  horsepower  for  each  pound  of  its  weight 
— approximately  double  the  output  per  pound  of  the 
Liberty  engine — they  are,  therefore,  subject  to  the 
weaknesses  and  infirmities  of  all  machines.  They 
have  never  reached  the  simplicity  and  perfection  of 
construction  which  would  insure  their  operation  in 
the  hands  of  the  soldier  with  the  same  certainty  that 
attends  that  of  the  ordinary  rifle  or  pistol.  Their 
infirmities  have  been  accepted  because  of  the  large 
effective  output  which  can  be  had  from  them  when 
they  do  work  well.  Our  line  officers  now  understand 
the  intensive  and  laborious  instruction  which  is 
necessary  to  train  a  soldier  in  the  mechanical  ma- 
nipulation and  the  tactical  use  of  a  machine  gun. 

The  Benet-Mercie  automatic  machine  rifle  was 
adopted  for  use  in  the  United  States  Service  in  1909, 
after  exhaustive  trials  by  two  boards,  both  of  which 
reported  that  it  was  the  best  and  most  reliable  ma- 
chine gun  which  had  ever  been  before  the  Govern- 
ment. It  is  still  the  machine  gun  of  the  British 
Government  for  the  armament  of  tanks. 

The   Army   Appropriation   Act    of   June,    1913, 

i use  of  the  dissatisfaction  above  mentioned,  in- 

(1  of  making  an  appropriation  for  machine  guns, 

authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  to  contract  for 

their  manufacture  to  the  extent  of  $150,000,  "if  in 

liis  opinion  it  be  for  the  interest  of  the  service." 


78 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


This  legislation  reflected  doubt  in  the  mind  of  Con- 
gress as  to  a  suitable  service  machine  rifle,  and 
threw  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  a  more  impressive 
burden  than  usual  of  responsibility  for  the  type  of 
machine  rifle  for  which  contracts  might  be  made. 
Before  urging  upon  the  Secretary  of  War,  there- 
fore, the  exercise  of  the  authority  which  had,  with 
some  warning,  been  conferred  upon  him,  the  Ord- 
nance Department  joined  in  arrangements  for  a 
competitive  test  of  automatic  machine  rifles,  which 
was  begun  in  the  autumn  of  1913  and  continued  in 
the  spring  of  1914;  the  guns  now  most  prominent 
among  those  which  were  tested  being  the  Benet- 
Mercie,  the  Vickers,  and  the  Lewis,  which  last  gun 
figured  extensively  in  the  expressions  of  dissatisfac- 
tion which  became  common  at  the  lack  of  sufficient 
equipment  of  machine  guns  upon  our  entry  into  war, 
the  point  being  urged  in  behalf  of  this  gun  that  there 
was  prejudice  against  it  in  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment, and  that  the  Government  was,  therefore, 
unwisely,  if  not  wrongfully,  deprived  of  a  supply 
which  everybody  afterward  would  have  been  very 
glad  to  have.  It  is  appropriate,  therefore,  to  set 
forth  especially  the  experience  of  the  United  States 
Government  with  the  Lewis  gun. 

The  first  offer  of  the  Lewis  gun  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  which  there  is  any  record,  or  of  which  I 
have  any  personal  knowledge,  was  made  to  the 
Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  in  a  letter 
dated  May  2,  1912,  from  the  Automatic  Arms  Com- 
pany, which  controls  the  patent,  by  the  attorney  for 
the  company,  Mr.  R.  M.  Calfee  (proceedings  of  the 


MAC 'HINK    GUNS  79 

"Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortifications,  dated  May  2, 
1912,  signed  by  General  Wood). 

The  Board  considered  this  letter  on  June  6th,  and 
replied  that  it  did  not  care  to  accept  certain  limita- 
tion.- upon  the  test  which  had  been  imposed  in  the 
letter  offering  the  gun  (proceedings  of  the  Board 
of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  dated  June  6,  1912; 
signed  by  General  Crozier). 

On  July  2,  1912,  the  Board  considered  a  letter, 
dated  July  1st,  from  the  Automatic  Arms  Company, 
requesting  reconsideration  of  the  Board's  action  in 
ird  to  the  test  of  the  gun,  and  stated  in  its  reply 
"the  Automatic  Arms  Company  is  informed  that, 
a  ltd-  careful  consideration  of  their  letter,  the  board 
is  of  the  opinion  that  the  usual  procedure  should  be 
followed,  namely,  the  gun  must  be  submitted  to  the 
prescribed  by  the  Ordnance  Department.  Dur- 
ing  this  test  the  representatives  of  the  company  will 
be  permitted  to  be  present,  and,  preliminary  to  the 
.  to  give  such  exhibition  of  the  performance  of 
the  gun  as  they  may  see  fit,  in  the  presence  of  the 
representative  of  the  Ordnance  Department  charged 
witli  technical  examination  of  the  gun.  After  this 
demonstration  is  completed  the  gun  will  then  be  sub- 
mitted to  such  tests  as  the  Ordnance  Department- 
inn  y  deem  necessary.  Ammunition  for  such  tests 
%\ill  be  furnished  by  the  Government. 

4 The  parties  representing  the  gun  may  have  the 
privilege  of  declining  to  subject  it  to  any  portion  of 
flie  test  which  may  be  proposed  to  which  they  mny 
lot  wish  to  have  it  subjected  at  the  time,  but  in  re- 


80    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

specting  their  wishes  in  this  regard  the  report  will, 
of  course,  state  the  facts. 

"In  the  course  of  the  complete  test  the  gun  will 
have  the  kind  of  field  test  which  they  desire,  and 
copies  of  all  reports  in  regard  to  the  test  will  be 
furnished  the  company."  (Proceedings  of  the  Board 
of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  dated  July  2,  1912; 
signed  by  General  Wood.) 

The  matter  rested  at  this  stage  until  March  5, 1913, 
when  the  Automatic  Arms  Company  again  offered 
a  Lewis  machine  gun  for  test,  pursuant  to  which  a 
test  was  ordered  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification.  (Proceedings 
of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  dated 
March  6,  1913;  signed  by  General  Wood.)  A  board 
of  officers  was,  pursuant  to  the  recommendation  of 
the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  appointed 
by  the  War  Department,  to  make  a  competitive  test 
of  all  the  automatic  machine  guns  which  should  be 
submitted  to  it,  the  membership  of  the  board  con- 
sisting of  Colonel  Ernest  Hinds,  U.  S.  A.;  Major 
W.  G.  Penfield,  Ordnance  Department;  Captain 
W.  E.  Smedberg,  Jr.,  Cavalry;  Captain  Frank  8. 
Bowen,  Infantry,  and  Lieutenant  Austin  N.  Hardee, 
Infantry. 

The  board  met  at  the  Springfield  Armory  in  Sep- 
tember, and  tested  seven  different  models  of  auto- 
matic machine  guns.  The  Lewis  gun  submitted  used 
American  ammunition,  but  had  been  manufactured 
in  England.  At  this  test  all  of  the  competing  guns 
were  eliminated  except  the  Benet-Mercie  and  the 
Vickers,  and  of  these  two  a  field  test  was  made  in 


MACHINE    GUNS  81 

the  spring  of  1914,  which  resulted  in  the  selection  of 
the  Vickers  gun.  Of  the  three  guns  that  were  the 
most  prominent,  the  report  of  the  board  states  that 
in  the  endurance  test  there  were  with  the  Lewis  gun 
206  jams  and  malfunctions;  with  the  Vickers  gun, 

and  with  the  Bonet-Mercie,  59;  the  Lewis  gun 
had  35  broken  parts,  while  there  were  none  for  the 
Vickers  and  7  for  the  Benet-Mercie;  and  the  Lewis 
gun  had  15  parts  not  broken  but  requiring  replace- 
ment, as  against  none  for  the  Vickers  gun  and  none 
for  the  Benet-Mercie.  The  board  reported  that, 
"The  Lewis  automatic  machine  rifle,  as  at  present 
designed,  is  not  superior  to  the  service  automatic 
machine  rifle  (Benet-Mercie)  on  account  of  the  fail- 
ure to  maintain  continuous  fire,  the  large  number  of 
parts  which  were  broken,  and  the  large  number  of 
jams,  many  of  the  latter  being  reduced  only  after 
much  difficulty  and  considerable  time."  The  report 
also  stated  that  "The  board  is  of  the  opinion  that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Vickers  gun,  none  of 
the  other  guns  submitted  showed  sufficiently  marked 
superiority  for  the  military  service,  in  comparison 
with  the  service  automatic  machine  rifle  (Benet- 
Mercie)  to  warrant  further  consideration  of  them 
in  a  field  test."  The  instructions  of  the  board  had 
•  i. -(11  to  ascertain  whether  any  gun  had  sufficient 
superiority  over  the  Benet-Mercie  to  warrant  its 
adoption  or  further  test. 

During  the  course  of  the  test  the  Army  bill  of 
1914  was  passed,  and  as  no  conclusion  had  been 

hed,  tin'  bill  made  no  appropriation  for  machine 
guns.  At  thr  time  of  the  passage  of  the  hill  of  the 


82    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


following  year,  1915,  the  Vickers  gun  had  been 
adopted  as  the  approved  type,  and  that  bill  there- 
fore made  an  appropriation  of  $150,000  for  machine 
rifles,  and  in  addition  reappropriated  the  unex- 
pended balance  of  $44,421.00,  which  had  been  left 
over  from  preceding  appropriations  at  the  time 
when  the  question  of  substituting  a  new  machine 
rifle  for  the  Benet-Mercie  was  taken  up.  Funds  thus 
made  available  wrere  used  in  making  a  contract  for 
Vickers  guns,  which  had  been  unanimously  recom- 
mended by  the  testing  board  for  adoption  in  replace- 
ment of  the  Benet-Mercie. 

It  is  apparent  that  at  this  stage,  the  middle  of  the 
year  1915,  there  would  have  been  no  justification  for 
expending  the  slender  means  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Department  for  procuring  Lewis  guns,  in  the  face 
of  the  declaration  of  the  board  that  they  were 
inferior  both  to  the  Benet-Mercie  gun  already  in 
service,  and  to  the  Vickers  gun  which  had  been 
recommended  for  adoption. 

No  Lewis  gun  was  presented  for  a  second  test, 
after  the  first  one  in  1913,  until  April  of  1916.  This 
was  understandable  in  view  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
wrar  in  Europe,  where  the  guns  were  being  made, 
but  in  the  latter  part  of  1915  their  manufacture  in 
this  country  for  the  forces  of  the  British  Empire 
wras  commenced  by  the  Savage  Arms  Company  of 
Utica,  N.  Y.,  and  the  Ordnance  Department  then 
took  the  initiative  in  an  effort  to  secure  a  second 
gun  for  test.  In  reply  to  request  on  the  Savage 
Arms  Company  for  such  a  gun,  its  Vice-President, 


; 


MAC'HINi:    GUNS  83 

Mr.  W.  G.  Greene,  wrote  on  September  30,  1915,  as 
follows : 

"At  the  present  time  we  are  not  able  to  furnish 
your  Department  with  a  gun,  having  only  two  our- 
selves, both  of  which  are  in  constant  use  at  the  fac- 
tory, one  as  a  manufacturing  model,  and  the  other  as 
nn  experimental  model.  These  two  guns  were  botli 
manufactured  by  the  Birmingham  Small  Arms 
Plant.  We  will  gladly  demonstrate  one  of  these 
"•uns  if  you  care  to  send  an  officer."  (0.0.  file 
472.5  :>5.) 

Under  date  of  December  28,  1915,  after  another 
inquiry,  Mr.  Greene  wrote: 

"We  acknowledge  your  letter  of  the  23d,  in  which 
you  ask  if  we  can  furnish  you  with  one  Savage- 
Lewis  machine  gun.  We  are,  of  course,  most  anx- 
ious to  furnish  the  Department  not  only  with  one 
Savage-Lewis  gun,  but  with  a  considerable  quantity, 
but  at  the  present  moment  our  output  is  all  engaged, 
deliveries  just  now  being  due  the  Department  of 
Militia  and  Defense  at  Ottawa,  and  we  do  not  feel 
at  liberty  to  divert  even  one  gun  from  the  contract 
deliveries."  (0.0.  file  472.5/55.) 

In  response  to  another  effort  of  the  Department, 
Mr.  A.  A.  Boric,  president  of  the  Savage  Arms 
Company,  wrote  under  date  of  January  27,  1916: 

"I  regret  to  inform  you  that  such  a  sale  at  the 
•  •lit  time  is  impossible  on  account  of  other  com- 
mitments made  by  this  company.     We  trust,  how- 
.  in  the  near  future  to  be  able  to  deliver  a  Lewis 
machine  gun  to  the  Department  for  the  purpos 
test  by  the  Department,  and  will  notify  you  in  re- 


84    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

gard  to   this   as   soon   as   possible."      (0.0.    file 
472.5/74.) 

A  test  of  the  Lewis  gun  was  finally  held  at  the 
Springfield  Armory  in  April  of  1916.  Two  guns 
were  tested,  one  using  American  and  the  other  Eng- 
lish ammunition.  In  regard  to  the  gun  using  Amer- 
ican, or  service  ammunition,  the  report  of  the  board 
states : 

4 'The  service  gun  was  withdrawn  at  this  time  by 
the  Savage  Arms  Company  (Mr.  Borie  and  Mr. 
Wright,  Colonel  Dooley,  Mr.  Nelson  and  Mr.  Eenew 
being  present),  who  stated  that,  as  the  gun  was  in 
an  experimental  stage,  and  as  it  was  giving  trouble 
both  in  feeding  and  in  rupturing  cartridges,  which 
trouble  it  was  thought  would  be  overcome  in  a  sub- 
sequent gun,  they  considered  it  useless  to  continue 
the  test."  (0.  0.  file  472.5/110.) 

This  statement  of  the  company  in  April,  1916,  that 
the  gun  for  American  ammunition  was  in  an  experi- 
mental stage  at  that  time  ought  to  dispose  of  the 
claim  that  it  was  then,  or  had  been  at  any  time 
previously,  ready  for  purchase  for  the  use  of  the 
American  Army.  The  claim  as  to  its  ability  to  fire 
American  ammunition  was  made  by  Col.  Lewis  in 
his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Military  Commit- 
tee, on  December  22,  1917,  in  the  following  lan- 
guage: "Not  only  does  the  Lewis  gun  fire  ammuni- 
tion, American  ammunition,  successfully,  but  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance  fired  it  many  times  himself  in 
the  tests  in  the  presence  of  the  members  of  the 
Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortifications.  That  was  in 
1912.  There  has  been  no  question  about  firing 


MAC 'HIM-:    T.UNS  85 

American  ammunition.  It  was  made  to  fire  it.  It 
tires  it  better  than  any  other  kind  of  ammunition. 
I  have  now  perfected  it  so  that  it  will  lire  eight 
different  kinds  of  ammunition  of  as  many  different 
countries. 

"I  want,  therefore,  first  of  all  to  settle  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  it  will  use  or  shoot  American  ammu- 
nition. Witness  after  witness  has  come  before  your 
committee  and  deliberately  misrepresented  the  facts 
in  the  case.  It  is  done  intentionally.  I  cannot 
escape  the  conclusion  that  the  misrepresentation  is 
intentional,  because  it  is  so  oft  repeated."  (Hear- 
ings: Part  2;  page  701.) 

The  board  was  composed  of  Captain  W.  K.  Smed- 
berg,  Jr.,  of  the  Cavalry;  Captain  G.  H.  Stewart,  of 
th«i  Ordnance  Department,  and  First  Lieutenant 
Thomas  W.  Brown,  of  the  Infantry.  The  board  was 
created  by  a  War  Department  Order,  and  submitted 
its  report  to  the  Adjutant-General.  It  was  not  a 
board  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  nor  were  any 
of  the  boards  which  dealt  with  the  Lewis  gun.  They 
were  all  War  Department  boards,  which  contained 
only  one  Ordnance  officer,  and  were  not  subject  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

In  regard  to  the  gun  using  British  ammunition, 
the  Board  reported  as  follows: 

"Considering  the  performance  of  the  Lewis  gun 
in  the  test  reported  herein,  and  comparing  that  per- 
formance with  the  performance  of  the  Yickers  gun 
(Automatic  Machine  (Jun.  Model  of  1915)  and  of  the 
Springfield  gun  (Automatic  Machine  Rifle,  caliber 


86    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

.30,  model  of  1919)*  in  the  test  conducted  by  the 
board  convened  by  Special  Orders  No.  191,  War 
Department,  August  16,  1913,  the  board  finds  that 
the  Lewis  gun  in  its  present  state  of  development  is 
not  equal  or  superior  to  either  of  the  above-men- 
tioned guns.  The  Lewis  gun  is  not  as  reliable  or  as 
dependable  as  are  the  other  guns  mentioned.  The 
following  table  shows  in  summary  the  data  upon 
which  this  opinion  is  based : 

ENDURANCE    TEST— 15,000    BOUNDS 

Lewis  Springfield          Vickers 

Time  of  firing,  exclud- 
ing cooling  and  repair- 
ing   2  hrs.  3  min.  2  hrs.  27  min.  1  hr.  24  min. 

Number  of  jams  and 

malfunctions 314  59 

Number  of  broken  parts.  8  7 

Number  of  parts  not 

broken  but  replaced..  5  0 


i 


"The  Lewis  gun,  on  the  other  hand,  is  lighter,  si 
pier  and  has  fewer  number  of  parts  than  the  other 
guns  mentioned;  and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  board, 
the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  it  can  be  developed 
to  a  satisfactory  degree  of  reliability  and  depend- 
ability is  an  open  one. 

"The  board  finds,  therefore,  that  the  results  of  the 
present  test  were  not  such  as  to  justify  the  purchase 
of  four  Lewis  guns  chambered  for  the  service  am- 
munition for  further  test  at  this  time,  but  in  view  of 
the  desirable  features  of  the  gun,  the  board  recom- 
mends that  if  the  Savage  Arms  Company  under- 

*  Otherwise  known  as  the  Benet-Mercie. 


MAC  I II\K    GUNS  87 

to  develop  a  gun  for  the  service  ammunition  a 
further  test  be  made,  upon  their  request,  after  the 
(lexvlopment  shall  have1  been  carried  to  a  satisfac- 
tory stage/'  (0.  0.  file  472.5/110.) 

It  is  thus  seen  that  at  this  second  test  the  board 

d  that  the  Lewis  gun,  even  using  British  am- 
munition, was  not  as  good  as  had  been  shown  at  the 

i»f  1913  to  be  both  the  Benet-Mercie,  which  had 
1,  and  the  Vickers,  which  had  been 
adopted:  and  that  the  gun  using  American  ammuni- 
tion had  not  been  able  to  get  through  the  test  at  all, 
Tin-re  \vould,  therefore,  have  been  no  justification 
at  this  time  for  the  investment  of  funds  in  Lewis 
guns,  with  two  better  types  within  the  knowledge  of 
the  Department,  even  if  there  had  been  funds  avail- 
able for  the  purpose,  which  there  were  not.  In  re- 
gard to  this  test  of  the  month  of  April,  the  President 
ol'  the  Savage  Arms  Company,  which  presented  the 

is  guns,  wrote  the  following  letter,  before  the 

lusion  of  the  board  was  announced: 

EXECUTIVE  OFFICE,  SAVAGE  AKMS  Co., 

50  Church  Street,  New  York,  U.  S.  A. 

April  26, 1916. 

A.  E.  BORIE,  Pres. 

BRAL  "\VILLI.\M   H.  CROZIER,  tine  Chief  of  Ord- 

\Var  Departm> 
Wa*lt  D.  C. 

VTl 

pany  wishes  to  express  its  appreciation 
e    Ordnance    Department    for    the    courtesies 
'•i-ntly  by  the  hoard  appointed  to  inspect 

ration  <>!'  the  Li-wis  machine  gun.     The  com- 


Sir: 

3s 


88    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

pany  feels  that  the  investigation  has  been  entirely 
impartial  and  regards  the  board  as  one  very  capable 
of  judging  the  value  of  the  investigation  to  the  Ord- 
nance Department. 

We  also  appreciate  the  courtesy  shown  us  by 
Colonel  Peirce  and  his  assistants. 
Respectfully, 

SAVAGE  ARMS  COMPANY, 
(0.0.  472.5/124)  A.  E.  Borie,  President. 

The  next  experience  of  the  Ordnance  Department 
with  Lewis  guns  was  in  the  summer  of  the  same  year, 
1916,  when,  pursuant  to  my  recommendation,  353 
of  these  guns  were  purchased,  for  use  on  the  Mexican 
border,  from  the  Savage  Arms  Company,  where  they 
happened  to  be  available  from  a  number  which  had 
been  made  for  the  Canadian  Government.  The  guns 
used  British  ammunition,  a  supply  of  which  had  to 
be  purchased  for  them,  and  were  the  only  machine 
guns  which  could  be  had.  As  funds  were  not  avail- 
able for  the  purchase  of  these  guns,  a  deficit  had  to 
be  created  for  the  purpose ;  that  is,  they  were  pur- 
chased without  authority  of  law.  Unusual  care  was 
taken  in  establishing  schools  and  furnishing  experts 
to  give  instruction  in  the  use  of  the  guns  before  the 
soldiers  were  allowed  to  have  them.  Various  reports 
were  received  as  to  their  performance.  The  follow- 
ing is  from  an  officer  who  was  an  instructor  in  one 
of  the  schools.  It  inclosed  a  letter  which  had  beeil 
written  to  the  editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal 
of  New  York,  but  which  I  did  not  forward  to  thai 
paper.  This  inclosure  I  also  present : 


MACHINE    GI\S  89 

CAMP  COTTON, 
El  Paso,  Texas,  December  11,  1916. 

GENERAL  WILLIAM  CROZIER,  Chief  nf  Ordnance, 
U.  8.  A.: 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Mi/  Dear  General: 

From  the  privilege  extended  me  while  you  were 

observing  the  machine  gun  instruction  at  Fort  Bliss, 

IVxas,  some  time  since,  I  am  addressing  you  in 

ird  to  the  selection  of  the  types  of  machine  guns 

to  be  adopted  and  secured  for  our  service. 

The  enclosed  letter  is  written  not  in  the  nature  of 
an  expression  of  which  type  of -automatic  rifle  is  the 
better,  only  as  the  result  of  the  comparison  of  the 
two  as  we  have  found  them  in  our  daily  work. 

This  letter  was  addressed  to  the  Army  and  Navy 
Journal  requesting  that  it  be  published  with  no 
re  to  get  ourselves  before  the  public,  but  solely 
through  interest  in  this  very  important  subject  and 
with  the  hope  that  it  may  enlighten  some  who  have 
not  had  the  opportunity  to  witness  such  a  com- 
parison and  test  in  field  work. 

It  is  requested  that  you  have  this  article  published 
or  used  in  any  way  that  you  may  deem  advisable  and 
Ix-st,  or  advise  us,  as  we  will  not  forward  a  copy  to 
tin.'  Army  an<l  Navy  Journal  until  advised  by  you. 

\Ve  are  intensely  interested  in  the  subject  of 
machine  guns  and  only  wish  that  we  had  a  chance  to 
I'-arn  more  of  and  work  more  with  the  various  types 
<»f  automatic  rifles  and  machine  guns,  than  can  be 
had  in  our  very  interesting  work  here. 

With  kindest  personal  regards, 
Very  truly  yours, 

T.  N.  GlMPERLTNG, 

Cai>t(tht  .14th  Infantry. 


90    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

EL  PASO,  TEXAS,  December  9,  1916. 
Note:  Not  sent  (Dec.  18,  1916). 

To  the  Editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Sir: 

In  view  of  the  present  controversy  over-  the  selec- 
tion of  automatic  machine  rifle  to  be  adopted  and 
bought  for  the  army;  as  the  machine  gun  board  is 
now  in  session  and  as  various  articles  are  appearing 
in  your  columns  on  this  subject,  we  request  that  you 
publish  the  following  data,  based  on  facts  obtained 
from  over  three  months  of  daily  instruction  in  the 
handling  and  firing  of  these  guns  and  in  problems 
simulating  active  service  conditions  and  require- 
ments as  nearly  as  can  be  obtained  anywhere. 

The  two  types  of  automatic  machine  rifles  used 
were  the  Benet-Mercie  and  the  Lewis  gun.  Factory 
experts  of  each  type  were  present  to  keep  their  guns 
in  the  best  possible  condition. 

The  machine  gun  company  of  the  33rd  Michigan 
Infantry,  95  per  cent  of  whose  personnel  are  general 
mechanical  engineers  and  expert  mechanics,  is 
equipped  with  both  the  Benet-Mercie  and  the  Lewis 
automatic  rifles;  this  company  had  two  Benet  and 
four  Lewis  guns.  The  organization  has  received 
thorough  instruction  in  the  operation  -of  both  types 
of  guns  from  experts  direct  from  the  Savage  Arms 
Company  (Lewis  gun)  and  from  the  Springfield 
Armory  (Benet-Mercie  gun)  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  believe  other  than  that  these  men  are  fully  com- 
petent to  assist  in  giving  both  types  of  gun  a  fair  and 
impartial  test. 

We  therefore  believe  we  are  safe  in  asserting,  as 
both  guns  were  in  use  side  by  side,  that  the  compara- 


MACHINE    GUNS  91 

ti've  merits  of  these  two  types  of  guns,  as  efficient 
pons,  could  be  fairly  judged. 

This  company  has  fired  approximately  forty  thou- 
>and  rounds  of  service  ammunition  with  the  Benet 
a  and  approximately  twenty-five  thousand  rounds 
<»i'  British  .:>03  with  the  Lewis  guns.  These  two 
Benet- Merrie  guns  have  been  in  use  for  a  period  of 
about  six  years  and  have  been  in  use  at  the  School 
of  Instruction  at  Sparta,  Wisconsin.  During  this 
time  they  were  in  use  by  the  machine  gun  companies 
of  the  Michigan  National  Guard  for  a  period  of  three 
while  the  Lewis  guns  were  issued  to  them  in 
August  of  this  year  and  were,  therefore,  new,  as  they 
•  part  of  the  Canadian  shipment  taken  over  by 
the  U.  S.  Government  from  the  Savage  Arms  Com- 
pany. 

In  every  case  in  which  these  guns  have  been  fired 
side  by  side,  the  Benet-Mercie  gun  has  proven  its 
superiority.  Many  examples  could  be  cited  in  sup- 
port of  this,  one  of  which  is  as  follows : 

"  Firing  was  maintained  for  one  and  one -half 
minutes  for  all  six  guns,  with  these  results:  one 
Benet  gun  fired  348  rounds  with  one  jam;  another 
fired  364  rounds  with  two  jams.  One  Lewis  .mm 
fired  117  rounds  with  four  jams;  a  second  fired  87 
shots  with  two  jams;  a  third  fired  44  rounds  with 
.jams;  and  a  fourth  fired  9  rounds  with  one  jam, 
which  put  this  gun  out  of  action." 

This  is  l)ii t  a  fair  example  of  the  general  results 
obtained  by  this  company  in  the  operation  of  the  two 
types  of  irun. 

The  company  has  obtained  as  many  as  f>4f>  rounds 

*om  one  Benet  gun  in  continuous  iirin,^  without  a 
With  the  Lewis  gun  the  hot  that  they  have 


92 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


obtained  is  the  117  rounds  with  two  jams  in  one  and 
one-half  minutes,  cited  above. 

It  is  our  opinion  that  the  parts  of  the  Lewis 
gun  are  not  properly  finished  and  that  they  are 
made  of  a  rather  poor  grade  of  material.  The  gun 
has  a  number  of  steel  stamped  parts,  improperly 
heat-treated,  which  cause  jams  and  a  consequent 
inefficiency  in  the  gun.  As  an  example,  the  magazine 
is  made  of  a  very  thin,  flimsy  steel  stamping,  toggled 
up  with  a  combination  of  soft  aluminum  core  and 
metal  strips  which  are  riveted  on.  This  causes  the 
magazine  to  be  very  vibrant  and  susceptible  to  the 
strain  of  feed  pawl  functioning.  The  ejector  is  made 
of  a  thin  steel  stamping,  improperly  heat-treated, 
and  very  often  it  bends,  nearly  always  batters  on 
the  end,  through  bolt  action,  in  the  course  of  eighty 
to  one  hundred  and  fifty  rounds.  The  feed  pawls, 
stop  pawls  and  rebound  pawls  seem  to  be  made  of  a 
poor  grade  of  steel.  The  gas  cylinder  is  made  of  a 
twenty  gauge  mill  run  steel,  which  has  been  found 
to  be  full  of  scale  pits  and  imperfections.  We  believo 
that  the  gun,  as  at  present  constructed,  could  bo 
made  in  lots  of  a  thousand  or  more,  at  approximately 
fifty  or  fifty-five  dollars  per  gun,  for  material  and 
labor.  It  is  now  sold  to  the  Government  for  a 
thousand  dollars. 

From  the  standpoint  of  mechanics,  the  Benet- 
Mercie  gun  is  a  masterpiece,  inasmuch  as  the  parts 
are  finely  finished  and  are  made  of  excellent  material 
and  are  properly  treated  where  this  is  essential. 
The  price  at  which  the  Government  issues  this  gun 
is  approximately  $412.00,  which,  it  is  believed,  would 
net,  to  a  private  manufacturing  concern,  but  a  fair 
profit  over  the  cost  of  production. 


.MACHINE    GUNS  93 

We  are  wedded  to  no  type  of  gun,  but  are  pre- 
senting these  facts  in  the  interest  of  the  service. 

T.  N.  GIMPERLING, 

Captain,  34th  U.  S.  Infantry, 

Machine  Gun  Director,  llfh  Prov.  Div. 

DAVID  0.  BYARS, 

1st  Lieut.  34th  U.  S.  Infantry, 

On  duty  with  Machine  Gun  Company. 

ARTHUR  C.  GROSSMAN, 

Captain,  33d  Michigan  Infantry,  Comdg.  Machine 
Gun  Company, 

Efficiency  Engineer,  Studebaker  Corp. 

MAXWELL  H.  SPREEN, 

1st  Sergt.  Mach.  Gun  Co.,  33d  Mich.  Inf., 

Asst.  Chief  Engr.  Chevrolet  Motor  Car  Co. 

The  School  of  Musketry  submitted  a  report,  Jan- 
uary 7,  1917  (0.0.  472.5112/129),  on  efficiency  of 
machine  guns,  showing  extensive  firings  and  careful 
consideration.  The  report  stated  as  follows : 

"Thirteen  Lewis  guns  were  used  in  the  firing. 
The  guns  were  new.  Except  for  some  possible  test 
firing  not  a  shot  had  been  fired  from  any  of  them 
prior  to  their  use  by  this  class.  When  they  were 
received  at  the  school  it  was  found  that  several  of 
tin-  parts  did  not  fit  properly.  This  was  true  in 
particular  of  the  joints  between  the  barrel  groups 
and  the  receiver  groups.  The  other  cases  of  misfit 
wore  due  largely  to  poor  workmanship  and  lack  of 
finish. 

"When  the  firing  of  the  guns  began  there  was  very 
little  trouble  with  them  that  could  not  be  accounted 


b    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  by  the  fact  that  the  personnel  of  the  class  was 
inexperienced  and  that  about  3  per  cent  of  the  am- 
munition used  was  found  to  be  faulty.  After  about 
2,000  rounds  had  been  fired  from  each  gun,  jams 
began  to  occur  which  were  due  to  causes  other  than 
untrained  personnel  and  defective  ammunition. 

"By  far  the  greater  portion  of  jams  due  to  defec- 
tive mechanism  were  caused  by  the  wear  of  the  feed 
operating  arms  and  stud,  the  bending  of  the  cartridge 
guide,  and  the  faulty  construction  and  bending  of 
the  magazines ;  and  of  these  about  one-half  were  due 
to  faulty  magazines. 

"The  total  number  of  rounds  fired  from  these  13 
guns  was  166,180.  The  maximum  number  fired  from 
any  one  gun  during  any  particular  day  was  2,992. 

"The  following  list  shows  the  parts  of  these  guns 
that  were  broken,  damaged  or  lost  during  the  course 
of  the  firing  above  noted: 

Broken 57,  including  13  bore  cleaning  rods 

Worn 74,  57  magazines. 

Lost 162 

Total 293 

"In  their  present  condition  these  guns  cannot  be 
depended  upon  to  fire  a  single  magazine  without 
malfunctions.  Whether  or  not  they  would  operate 
with  good  magazines  and  with  serviceable  feed 
operating  arms  and  studs  remains  to  be  seen  when 
they  are  tested  in  this  manner.  At  the  present  writ- 
ing the  spare  parts  with  which  to  make  such  tests 
are  not  on  hand. 


MACHINE    GUNS  95 

"The  Lewis  gun  in  its  present  state  of  develop- 
ment is  not  believed  to  be  a  satisfactory  weapon 
for  issue  to  our  service  as  an  automatic  rifle  or 
4 first  line  gun.'  " 

•          ••••••• 

"The  Lewis  gun,  while  it  is  not  a  dependable 
weapon  at  present,  is  believed  to  possess  great  pos- 
sibilities. Its  lightness,  the  simplicity  of  its  mechan- 
ism, the  efficiency  of  its  cooling  system,  and  the  ease 
with  which  men  learn  to  use  it  (when  it  is  new  and 
working  well),  all  tend  to  indicate  that  if  it  can  be 
made  dependable,  it  will  be  an  excellent  first  line 
gun." 

This  report  was  signed  by  Colonel  E.  M.  Blatch- 
ford,  Infantry,  afterward  a  major-general  in  the 
National  Army. 

A  number  of  reports  were  submitted  by  organiza- 
tion commanders  in  the  Southern  Department  in 
ird  to  these  guns,  of  which  the  general  purport 
is  exhibited  in  the  following  letter  from  the  Depart- 
ment Commander: 

SOUTHERN  DEPARTMENT, 
Fort  Sam  Houston,  Texas, 

March  1,  1917. 
From:    Commanding    General,    Southern    Depart- 
ment. 

To :         The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject :  Keports  covering  tests  made  of  the  Lewis 
machine  gun  and  Benet-Mercie  machine 
gun. 

1.  Herewitli  are  tin-  reports  of  the  commanding: 

officers  of  tlie  machine  »-un  companies  of  the  19th 
Infantry  and  tin1  .'J7th    Infantry  covering  com]>; 


96    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tive  tests  made  of  the  Lewis  machine  gun  and  the 
Benet-Mercie  machine  gun. 

2.  These  reports  are  forwarded  in  connection  with 
the  9th  indorsement  on  A.G.O.  file  2436783. 

3.  These  reports  are  further  evidence  that  in  the 
extensive  tests  made  in  the  Southern  Department, 
the  Lewis  machine  gun  has  failed  to  demonstrate  its 
superiority  over  the  Benet-Mercie  gun  in  so  far  as 
its  suitability  for  use  with  the  machine  gun  organiza- 
tion of  infantry  and  cavalry  regiments  is  concerned. 

(signed)     JOHN  J.  PEKSHING, 

Major  General,  Commanding. 

In  the  meantime,  in  July,  1916,  the  same  War 
Department  board  which  had  tested  the  Lewis  gun 
in  April  tested  a  Colt  gun  submitted  by  the  Colt 
Patent  Fire  Arms  Manufacturing  Company,  and 
reported  as  follows : 

' '  Considering  the  performance  of  the  Colt  gun  in 
this  test  as  compared  with  the  performance  of  the 
Lewis  gun  chambered  for  British  Mark  VII  ammuni- 
tion, reported  on  by  this  board  under  date  of  April 
25,  1916,  the  board  finds  that  the  Colt  gun  as  sub- 
mitted is  superior  to  the  Lewis  gun  for  general 
service  use.  The  Colt  gun  showed  considerably 
greater  reliability  than  the  Lewis  gun.  The  board 
finds,  however,  that  for  the  particular  case  of  use  in 
aeroplanes,  the  Lighter  Lewis  gun,  with  its  self-con- 
tained magazine,  is  superior  to  the  Colt  gun,  in  spite 
of  the  former's  greater  liability  to  malfunction." 

During  all  this  time  appropriations  for  the  pur- 
chase of  machine  guns  had  been  most  meager,  but 
the  Army  Appropriation  Act  approved  August  29, 
1916,  carried  a  large  appropriation  of  $12,000,000, 


MACHINE    GUNS  97 

for  these  guns,  and  its  judicious  expenditure  became 
a  matter  of  great  moment. 

This  was  the  first  appropriation  of  size  sufficient 
to  be  of  any  significance  in  procuring  a  supply  of 
machine  guns  which  was  ever  made.  About  ten  days 
before  the  date  of  the  Appropriation  Act,  and  when 
it  was  evident  that  the  inclusion,  upon  its  passage, 
of  the  sum  for  machine  guns  was  assured,  I  sub- 
mitted to  the  Secretary  of  War  a  recommendation 
as  to  the  disposition  which  should  be  made  of  the 
funds.  The  recommendation  was  made  in  the  light 
of  a  possible  emergency  calling  for  a  hasty  supply 
of  more  machine  guns  for  use  on  the  Mexican  border, 
and  also  in  reply  to  a  recommendation  which  had 
come  from  General  Wood  that  the  Benet-Mercie 
guns  in  the  service  be  discarded  and  replaced  by 
Lewis  guns.  My  recommendation  is  contained  in  the 
following  memorandum : 

WAR    DEPARTMENT, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 

Washington,  August  18,  1916. 
Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  War. 
Subject :    Purchase  of  machine  guns. 

1.  I  recommend  that  the  following  action  be  taken 
upon  the  passage  of  the  pending  Army  appropriation 
bill: 

(a)  That  for  emergency  requirements  in  the 
immediate  future  either  Colt  guns  or  Lewis  guns, 
using  American  ammunition,  be  purchased.  With 
this  authorization  I  shall  probably  purchase  Colt 
guns,  in  accordance  with  the  recommendations  of 
the  testing  board  as  to  their  superiority  over  the 
Lewis  guns  for  general  service,  unless  a  particularly 
favorable  reply  shall  be  received  to  an  inquiry  now 


98    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

pending  as  to  possible  terms  of  purchase  of  Lewis 
guns. 

(b)  That  orders  be  immediately  placed  for  Vick- 
ers  guns,  to  the  extent  of  one-half  of  the  funds 
available. 

(c)  That  orders  for  machine  guns,  of  a  type  to  be 
determined  at  the  time  of  ordering,  to  the  extent  of 
the  remaining  funds  available  be  placed  not  later 
than  November  1st  next. 

(d)  That  a  test  for  the  determination  of  its  suit- 
ability for  purchase  and  use  in  the  service  be  made 
of   any  gun  presented  in   sufficient   time   for   the 
conclusion    and   consideration  of   the    test   before 
November  1st  next. 

(e)  That  thereafter  the  usual  practice  be  followed 
of  testing  any  machine  gun  which  may  be  presented 
for  test,  with  reference  to  its  suitability  for  purchase 
for  use  in  the  service  from  any  sums  made  available 
by  future  appropriations. 

(f )  That  decision  be  definitely  made  not  to  replace 
the  Benet-Mercie  guns  now  in  the  service  with  Lewis 
guns,  or  with  those  of  any  other  type,  unless  further 
developments   shall  indicate  the  desirability  of  a 
review  of  this  decision. 

(g)  That  announcement  of  the  above  be  made  in 
such  manner  as  to  reach  all  interested  parties. 

2.  These  recommendations  are  made  in  the  light 
of  the  following  information :  The  total  number  of 
automatic  machine  guns  required,  in  accordance  with 
the  approved  program,  is  12,000,  of  which  the  fol- 
lowing are  on  hand  or  under  manufacture: 

Maxim 287 

Benet-Mercie   665 

Lewis 353 

Vickers    125 

Total  1,430 


M A("TII\K    GUNS  99 

Of  these  the  Maxims  and  the  Vickers  are  of  a 
heavy  type,  and  the  Benet-Mercie  and  the  Lewis  are 
<>f  a  light  type.  Some  guns  on  hand,  of  older  models, 
are  not  counted.  The  funds  expected  to  be  available 
an*  about  $12,000,000,  which  are  sufficient  to  pur- 
chase about  4,000  guns,  with  necessary  accessories, 
of  the  most  expensive  type.  Additional  funds  ought 
to  1)0  available  not  later  than  March  4th  next,  to  be 
appropriated  at  the  next  session  of  Congress. 

.'5.  Before  the  next  session  of  Congress  the  Ord- 
o  Department  will  bring  to  the  attention  of  the 
War  Department  the  necessity  for  arriving  at  a 
conclusion  as  to  whether  a  heavy  and  a  light  type 
of  automatic  machine  gun  are  needed  in  the  service, 
and  if  so,  their  relative  numbers.  Such  a  conclusion 
is  not  necessary  with  reference  to  the  program  above 
recommended,  for  the  reason  that  the  program  will 
leave  the  supply  such  as  to  render  compliance  pos- 
sil>le  with  any  probable  conclusion  which  may  be 
readied. 

WILLIAM  CROZIER, 

r  General,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  United 
States  Army. 


The  tests  referred  to  under  (d)  and  (e)  of  the 
memorandum  were  designed  to  afford  opportunity 
for  a  perfected  Lewis  gun,  a  Browning  gun,  or  any 
other,  to  establish  its  suitability  for  procurement. 

The  Secretary  of  War  did  not  follow  my  recom- 
inc]i(latioi)>,  but,  on  September  28,  1916,  appointed 
a  board  with  the  following  instructions: 

"Th<>  board  will  consider  and  make  recommenda- 
tions as  to  whether  a  single  type  or  more  than  one 
of  machine  rifle,  using  small  arms  ammunition, 
is  needed  for  the  service,  and  the  type  or  types  which 


100    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

should  be  procured ;  and  if  more  than  one  type,  the 
proportion  of  the  different  types. 

"In  making  its  recommendations  the  board  will 
take  into  consideration  the  present  supply  of  machine 
rifles  of  the  various  types;  all  reports  of  tests  of 
machine  rifles  which  may  be  believed  to  be  service- 
able in  reaching  a  conclusion;  the  amount  of  funds 
now  available  for  the  procurement  of  machine  rifles ; 
the  appropriations  necessary  to  be  made  in  order  to 
complete  the  supply  at  an  appropriate  rate ;  and  any 
records  of  the  War  Department,  or  of  any  branch 
of  it,  which  it  may  desire  to  consult.  If  the  board 
shall  find  that  tests  previously  made  are  insufficient 
to  enable  it  to  reach  a  conclusion  it  will  make  recom- 
mendation as  to  further  tests  which  ought  to  be 
made,  their  character,  time  and  place. 

"The  board  will  recommend  the  type  of  gun  which 
should  be  procured  in  case  of  an  emergency  requiring 
an  earlier  supply  in  possibly  limited  quantity  than 
can  be  had  of  the  gun  which  it  may  consider  as 
eventually  the  most  suitable,  if  there  be  any  of 
which  earlier  delivery  may  be  possible ;  and  whether 
contract  should  be  entered  into  for  a  considerable 
supply  of  a  gun  of  known  type  in  advance  of  any 
test  which  it  may  conclude  to  be  called  for,  and  if  so, 
to  what  extent. 

"The  board  will  submit  its  report  to  the  Adjutant 
General  of  the  Army." 

The  membership  of  the  board  was  selected  with 
great  care,  in  order  to  insure  its  expert  and  judicial 
character,  and  was  as  follows:  Brigadier  General 
Francis  H.  French,  Colonel  Joseph  T.  Dickman,  2d 


MACHIN!      GUNS  101 

Cavalry;  Colonel  Tracy  C.  Dickson,  U.  S.  Army, 
retired;  Lieutenant  Colonel  Henry  D.  Todd,  Jr., 
\  rtillery  Corps ;  Captain  Robert  II.  Willis,  Jr., 
Signal  Corps;  Lieutenant  Steven  C.  Rowan,  U.  S. 
Xavy;  Captain  Edward  B.  Cole,  U.  S.  Marine  Corps; 
Mr.  Bascom  Little,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  and  Mr.  B.  M. 
Hanson,  Hartford,  Conn.  Their  instructions  re- 
quired them  in  effect  to  cover  the  whole  subject  of 
thr  supply  of  mac-nine  guns,  including  types.  Mr. 
Hanson,  an  expert  mechanical  engineer,  had  at  that 
time  no  connection  with  any  machine  gun  interest, 
although  he  subsequently  became  a  member  of  the 
stall  of  the  Colt  Patent  Fire  Arms  Manufacturing 
Company. 

On  October  24,  1916,  the  board  submitted  a  pre- 
liminary report  in  which  it  recommended  among 
other  things — 

"That  tests  heretofore  made  show  that  the  Vick- 
ers  machine  rifle  fulfills  to  a  high  degree  the  require- 
ments of  the  military  service  for  a  machine  rifle  of 
the  heavier  type. 

"That  previous  tests  and  other  information  ob- 
tained by  the  board  do  not  warrant  its  recommend- 
ing at  this  time  a  rifle  of  the  light  type. 

"That  available  funds  be  used  for  immediate  pro- 
inent  of  4,(>00  Vickers  machine  rifles  and  960 
pack  outfits  for  the  same. 

'That  further  and  competitive  tests  of  machine 
rifles  be  conducted  by  the  board  at  the  Springfield 
Armory,  Springfield,  Mass.,  tests  to  begin  May  1, 
1917." 

Tl.  >rt  was  approved   by  the   Secretary   of 


102        ORDNANCE   AND  THE   WORLD 

War  on  October  27, 1916,  but  immediate  action  of  the 
Ordnance  Department  in  regard  to  procuring  4,600 
Vickers  machine  guns  was  suspended  by  the  War 
Department  upon  a  protest  by  Mr.  K.  M.  Calfee,  of 
the  Automatic  Arms  Company,  representing  the 
Lewis  gun;  and  the  machine  gun  board  was  recon- 
vened. It  submitted  an  additional  report  dated 
December  4,  1916,  which  confirmed  its  previous 
recommendations,  with  a  statement  that  if  it  was 
desired  to  retain  a  certain  amount  of  the  funds  then 
on  hand  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  procurement  of 
light  machine  guns  after  a  test  in  May,  such  action 
could  be  had  by  reducing  the  number  of  guns  which 
had  been  allowed  for  wastage. 

The  final  conclusion  reached  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment (contained  in  0.  0.  file  472.5-112/117)  was  that 
4,000  Vickers  machine  guns  with  960  pack  outfits 
therefor,  should  be  immediately  procured;  that 
$1,560,000  should  be  held  in  reserve  for  the  purchase 
of  guns  of  such  other  types  than  the  Vickers  as  the 
Secretary  of  War  might  decide  upon  after  test,  or 
for  such  other  use  as  might  be  decided  by  the 
Secretary. 

The  Adjutant  General's  Office  on  December  15, 
1916,  transmitted  to  the  Ordnance  Office  final  au- 
thority to  proceed  with  the  procurement  of  Vickers 
guns.  On  the  following  day,  December  16th,  the  or- 
der was  placed  and  the  contract  executed  and  signed 
(A.  G.  0.  file  2482640-E).  The  resort  to  a  board 
delayed  action  until  about  the  middle  of  December, 
or  nearly  four  months,  but  the  method  used  was 
through  extreme  solicitude  to  give  every  considera- 


GUNS  103 

tion  to  the  Lewis  gun,  and  prevent  any  reasonable 
ground  for  dissatisfaction  at  its  treatment. 

Such  was  the  situation  at  the  time  when  the 
imminence  of  war  with  Germany  became  apparent. 
All  of  the  funds  at  the  disposal  of  the  Ordnance 
I  >.'partment,  except  about  $1,500,000,  had,  by  author- 

f  the  War  Department,  been  utilized  in  placing 
a  contract  for  machine  guns  of  the  type  which  had 

atedly  been  declared,  by  the  most  expert  agen- 

which  the  War  Department  could  create,  to  be 
the  best  in  existence,  and  which  had  received  em- 
phatic and  continuing  indorsement  in  the  European 
War.  The  remaining  funds  had  been  held  for  util- 
ization in  accordance  with  knowledge  which  might 
subsequently  be  acquired.  If,  up  to  this  time,  any 

iclerable  order  had  been  placed  for  Lewis  guns 
using  American  ammunition,  the  action  would  have 
been  taken  in  the  face  of  the  failure  of  these  guns 
ever  to  perform  satisfactorily  at  a  test  with  Amer- 
i'-an  ammunition;  and  against  the  recommendation 
of  every  body  of  advisers  upon  which  the  War  De- 
partment had  called  for  counsel. 

In  vie\\  of  the  fact  that  Lewis  guns  were  at  this 
time  rendering  such  service  to  the  British  forces 
as  to  justify  their  continuance  as  the  standard 

nine  gun  of  the  li.^lit  type  for  their  army,  the 

question  arises  as  to  why  good  Lewis  guns  were 

in  England,  and  at  the  same  time  poor 

is  --iins  were  being  made  in  this  country  and 
urged  upon  the  Government  with  great  insistence. 
I  do  not  undertake  to  answer  this  question,  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  no  Lewis  gnu  as  made  in 


104        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  W. 


England  for  the  British  service  had  ever  been  avail- 
able for  the  United  States,  even  for  test. 

On  April  9,  1917,  immediately  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  I  recommended  that,  as  soon  as  funds 
should  become  available,  which  was  expected  to  be 
almost  immediately,  orders  should  be  given  for 
4,000  more  Vickers  guns,  and  for  2,500  Colt  guns. 
The  latter  were  recommended  because  it  was  prac- 
ticable to  secure  them  promptly,  and,  although  not 
of  an  adopted  type,  their  immediate  availability 
called  for  their  purchase  as  an  additional  number 
to  those  covered  by  the  machine  gun  program.  The 
Lewis  gun  had,  through  the  winter  and  early  spring, 
in  the  meantime  been  brought  to  a  state  of  prac- 
ticability for  use  with  American  ammunition,  as 
shown  by  a  test  held  under  the  auspices  of  the  Navy 
Department,  and  witnessed  by  one  of  my  officers, 
over  fifteen  important  changes  having  been  made  in 
it ;  and,  therefore,  at  the  same  time,  and  in  anticipa- 
tion of  the  test  to  be  held  in  the  month  of  May,  I 
recommended  that  the  $1,500,000  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Department  be  invested  in  an  order  for  Lewis 
guns,  and  that  further  authority  to  procure  up  to 
5,000  of  these  guns  be  given,  for  utilization  as  soon 
as  additional  funds  should  become  available.  The 
funds  thus  already  available  were  utilized  in  placing 
an  order  for  1,300  Lewis  guns,  which  was  done  on 
April  12th.  The  2,500  Colt  guns  were  ordered  on 
June  2d,  using  funds  which  were  made  available 
by  the  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  May  12,  1917. 
From  the  funds  appropriated  in  the  same  Act,  the 
Ordnance  Department  also  ordered,  on  June  12th, 


M.\(  HINK    GUNS  105 

4,400  Lewis  guns,  at  the  same  time  informing  the 
Savage  Arms  Company  that  additional  orders  might 
be  expected.  Two  thousand  additional  were  ordered 
on  June  18th,  three  days  after  the  passage  of  the 
first  war  appropriation  measure,  the  appropriation 
Act  of  May  12th  having  been  small,  this  act  being 
the  deferred  Army  appropriation  bill  which  failed 
at  the  session  before. 

At  the  tests  which  were  held  in  the  month  of  May 
by  the  War  Department  machine  gun  board,  in  ac- 
cordance with  its  program,  the  Lewis  gun's  per- 
formance was  highly  satisfactory.  In  regard  to  it 
the  board  stated : 

"The  mechanism  of  this  gun  has  been  under  con- 
tinual development  since  it  was  last  tested  by  the 
War  Department.  .  .  .  The  Lewis  machine  rifle, 
caliber  .30,  fully  established  its  character  as  a  first- 
class  machine  gun.  Many  improvements  have  been 
made  in  this  gun  since  it  was  last  tested,  which 
justify  the  delay  of  the  War  Department  in  accord- 
ing complete  recognition  to  this  weapon." 

Following  this  report  orders  for  Lewis  guns  were 
^iven  from  time  to  time  as  funds  became  available, 
up  to  tin*  nunil><ir  of  about  42,000,  ordered  by  the 
autumn  of  1917,  and  subsequently  increased  to 
86,700,  to  produce  which  the  company  was  first  re- 
sted to  incivase  its  plant  capacity  to  2,000  per 
month,  and  afterwards  to  3,750  per  month,  the 
arrangement  providing  for  an  expenditure  of  $1,- 
000,000  in  the  expansion  of  facilities,  to  be  taken 
can-  ot%  properly  in  the  price  of  the  i^uns. 

This  history  shows  that  as  BOOH  Rfl  the  Lewis  1:1111 


106   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  developed  to  the  point  of  ability  to  properly 
perform  with  American  ammunition,  large  orders 
were  given  for  it,  and  the  manufacturers  were  en- 
couraged to  expand  their  plants,  the  commencement 
of  this  action  anticipating  the  report  of  the  War 
Department  board. 

In  the  meantime,  while  the  consideration  of  the 
relative  merits  of  the  Benet-Mercie,  Vickers  and 
Lewis  guns  was  going  on,  Mr.  John  Browning,  of 
Utah,  working  in  connection  with  the  Colt  Patent 
Fire  Arms  Co.,  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  had  undertaken 
the  design  of  a  machine  gun,  and  had  informed  the 
Ordnance  Department  of  his  efforts.  One  or  two 
exhibitions  of  the  gun  had  been  made,  which  showed 
promising  performance  of  both  a  light  and  heavy 
type,  and  justified  a  hope  of  successful  development; 
but  the  exhibitions  were  in  no  sense  conclusive  or 
properly  to  be  regarded  as  tests,  and  had  not  been 
made  as  such.  A  heavy  gun,  water-cooled,  and  a 
light  gun,  air-cooled,  were  finally  completed  and 
presented  to  the  board  for  the  tests  held  in  the 
month  of  May,  1917.  In  regard  to  them  the  report 
of  the  board  stated  as  follows: 

".  .  .  The  board  invites  special  attention  to  the 
tactical  possibilities  of  the  Colt  automatic  machine 
rifle,  air-cooled,  highly  portable,  designated  above 
as  the  Browning  air-cooled  gun.  According  to  re- 
ports received  from  observers,  especially  by  Major 
L.  T.  Hillman,  Ordnance  Department,  the  drift  of 
the  French  Army  is  decidedly  towards  greater  use 
of  automatic  rifles  of  highly  portable  type,  such  as 
the  Chauchat.  In  the  British  Army  the  Lewis  gun 


MACHINE    GUNS  107 

is  used  in  much  the  same  way,  but,  on  account  of  its 
_rht  and  size,  not  with  equal  facility." 

The  report  of  the  machine  gun  board  further 
stated  in  reference  to  the  other  Browning,  the  water- 
cooled  Lcun:  "This  gun  developed  such  remarkable 
reliability  of  function  during  the  firing  of  over 
20,000  shots,  that  a  further  test  of  20,000  shots  was 
fired  by  the  same  gun  for  endurance.  .  .  .  The  only 
break  was  one  scar  after  39,500  shots;  this  caused 
the  only  stoppage  directly  chargeable  to  the  gun." 

The  report  of  the  board  of  May,  1917,  upon  its 
ipt  by  the  War  Department,  was  sent  to  the 
War  College  Division,  General  Staff,  and  eventually 
reached  the  Ordnance  Department  on  June  24, 1917, 
with  instructions,  among  others,  that  as  soon  as 
possible  Browning  light  air-cooled  automatic  rifles 
be  furnished  to  infantry  at  the  rate  of  at  least  eight 
per  company. 

The  program  of  procurement  of  machine  guns 
and  automatic  rifles  was  based  upon  these  instruc- 
tions, upon  considerations  concerning  the  training 
of  troops  in  the  United  States,  and  upon  informa- 
tion from  abroad  as  to  the  possibility  of  obtaining 
a  the  French  Government  an  emergency  supply 
of  t!  Capons  for  the  troops  of  the  American 

Expeditionary  Fon-r  first  sent  over,  as  well  as  on 
the  plans  for  tin-  armament  of  the  various  braiu-ln-s 
of  the  force.  An  item  of  such  information  was 
1  in  a  cal >!<"_: ram  received  from  General 
:iinu:  on  July  17,  lf)17,  an  extract  from  which 

)llov 

.  .  .  Suggest  United  States  make  every  attempt 


108    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


to  secure  greatest  possible  production  Vickers  type 
per  month.  At  least  two  Vickers  guns  on  every 
aeroplane  synchronized  with  engines  and  equal 
number  Lewis  guns  unsynchronized  with  engine. 
We  should  anticipate  use  three  Vickers  synchronized 
guns  and  three  Lewis  unsynchronized  on  every 
aeroplane.  Pershing.  '  ' 

The  use  to  which  it  was  intended  to  put  the  Lewis 
guns  in  the  American  force  in  Europe  was  impor- 
tant in  that  it  would  govern  the  details  of  construc- 
tion of  the  guns.  For  aeroplane  service  the  cooling 
apparatus  would  be  left  off  as  unnecessary.  There- 
fore, in  order  to  avoid  cross  purposes  between  the 
Ordnance  Department  and  the  Expeditionary  Force 
as  to  the  use  of  these  guns,  and  to  ascertain  the 
possibility  of  supply  of  others  by  the  French,  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance,  on  July  28th,  caused  the  follow- 
ing cablegram  to  be  sent  to  General  Pershing  : 


Amexforce,  Paris. 
Number  67. 

Paragraph  4.  About  20,000  Lewis  machine  guns 
chambered  for  United  States  ammunition  as  recom- 
mended by  recent  gun  board  are  being  secured  for 
delivery  before  June  30,  1918.  Deliveries  begin  in 
August.  Will  these  guns  be  wanted?  Deliveries  of 
either  type  of  Browning  gun  cannot  be  expected  in 
less  than  six  to  nine  months.  4,000  Vickers  guns 
should  be  delivered  by  December  31st.  2,500  Colt 
will  be  completed  about  September  15th. 

(Signed) 


MAMIINK    GUNS  109 

In  answer,  General  Pershing  cabled  as  follows 
KG  472.555/910): 

Date,  August  5,  1917. 
Xuinber  9  N.  Y.  0.0.370.22/548. 
From  Paris. 

"To  the  Adjutant  General,  Washington. 
X umber  85. 

With  reference  to  paragraph  4  your  67,  and  in 
connection  with  paragraph  1  my  61,  arrangements 
completed  to  equip  first  two  divisions  with  Hotch- 
maehine  mms  and  Chauchat  automatic  rifles. 
Subsequent  divisions  should  be  equipped  in  same 
manner  until  Vickers  machine  guns  and  a  suc- 
cessful automatic  rifle  is  furnished  by  Ordnance 
Department.  Information  desired  as  to  when  in- 
coming divisions  may  be  expected  to  arrive  with 
machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles  so  furnished,  this 
information  needed  to  determine  what  material 
should  be  obtained  from  French  Government.  Lewis 
machine  gun  more  suitable  as  automatic  rifle,  but 
recommended  as  armament  for  aeroplanes  in  para- 
graph 9  my  44,  July  16th.  Recommended  Lewis 
machine  guns  be  used  for  aeroplanes  accordingly. 

(Signed)  PERSHING." 


The  large  number  of  Lewis  guns  which  were 
li-red  had  been  intended  for  use  either  in  aero- 
planes, or,  in  advance  of  securing  a  supply  of  light 
Browning  guns,  on  the  ground;  but  the  ability  to 
ire  fn>m  France  machine  guns  of  both  light  and 
heavy  type  sufficient  for  the  armament  of  our  forces 
until  such  time  as  li^ht  and  heavy  Browning  or 
Yickers  iruns  could  be  manufactured  in  this  coun- 
try, togrtln-r  with  the  appearance  of  the  insistent 
emand  for  L«-\\is  -uiis  for  the  aviation  service, 


110   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

dictated  instructions  to  the  Savage  Arms  Com- 
pany to  manufacture  all  guns  still  under  order  from 
them  of  the  aviation  type,  except  2,500  for  use  in  the 
instruction  of  troops  in  this  country.  The  event 
showed  these  instructions  to  embody  a  wise  policy, 
which  was  adhered  to  till  the  end,  notwithstanding 
severe  criticism  of  the  department  by  certain  sen- 
ators for  not  using  the  Lewis  guns  on  the  ground. 

The  development  of  the  use  for  Lewis  guns  in 
the  aviation  service,  in  addition  to  the  Vickers  guns, 
called  for  the  continuous  manufacture  of  the  Lewis 
guns,  instead  of  for  the  ultimate  cessation  of  this 
manufacture,  which  had  been  contemplated  for  the 
time  when  a  sufficient  supply  of  light  guns  and  heavy 
guns  for  the  land  service  should  make  the  use  of  an 
intermediate  gun  no  longer  necessary. 

About  180,000  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles 
of  the  Vickers,  Lewis,  Colt-Marlin  and  Browning 
types  were  manufactured  between  the  time  of  our 
entry  into  the  war  and  the  date  of  the  armistice. 
This  number  was  greater  than  the  total  number 
manufactured  by  the  British  during  the  same  period, 
and  somewhat  less  than  the  number  manufactured 
by  the  French.  With  the  providential  assistance  of 
the  French  in  preventnig  an  early  shortage  due  to 
our  poor  initial  supply,  our  rate  of  manufacture 
soon  reached  a  point  such  as  to  remove  all  fear  that 
our  troops  might  lack  a  sufficient  number  of  weapons 
of  this  class.  Our  rate  prior  to  the  armistice  reached 
more  than  25,000  guns  per  month,  which  was  twice 
that  of  the  French  or  the  English,  and  the  quality 
of  the  Browning  guns  proved  in  service  to  be  such 


<;r\S  111 

that  both  the  British  and  the  French  Governments 
applied  for  the  purchase  of  a  supply  for  the  arma- 
ment of  their  own  forces. 

The  only  possible  way  in  which  the  resources  of 
the  department  could  have  been  utilized  to  secure 
a  greater  supply  of  these  guns  at  an  earlier  date 
would  have  been  to  use  a  larger  proportion  of  the 
$12,000,000  appropriated  in  the  Act  of  August  29, 
1916,  for  the  purchase  of  Colt  guns,  instead  of 
putting  the  money  mostly  into  Vickers  guns,  uni- 
versally acknowledged  to  be  a  better  type,  but 
ol'  which  the  delivery  was  slower  than  was  prom- 
and  anticipated ;  which  was  the  experience  both 
of  the  United  States  and  England.  To  meet  the 
demands,,  of  the  aviation  service  23,000  Colt-Marlin 
aircraft  guns,  in  addition  to  Lewis  and  Vickers  guns 
1  manufactured.  The  Colt-Marlin,  a  modification 
of  the  Colt,  had  developed  a  fortunate  adaptability 
for  airplane  use. 

I  believe  that  this  history  shows  that  the  wisest 
possible  use  was  made  of  the  funds  available  and 
the  manufacturing  facilities  of  this  country  and 
the  allies,  in  providing  the  best  available  types  of 
shine  irims.  As  in  the  case  of  field-artillery, 
then*  was  no  way  in  which  the  long  national  neglect 
to  provide  a  proper  supply  of  these  weapons  could 
l>e  immediately  made  good  from  our  own  resources, 
upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war;  but  the  full  supply 
of  our  lighting  troops  with  their  needs,  without 
failure  in  any  instance,  justifies  the  claim  that  the 
opportunity  afforded  by  good  luck  was  seized  upon 
by  good  management. 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAI 


The  charge  that  government  departments  are 
inhospitable  to  inventors;  that  a  cold  reception  is 
often  followed  by  rejection  of  the  device  offered; 
and  that  it  is  only  after  the  discouraged  inventor 
has  taken  his  device  abroad  and  developed  its 
merits  with  foreign  help  that  the  United  States 
has  recognized  it,  and  has  taken  advantage  of  what 
it  might  have  originally  had  with  much  less  delay 
and  expense,  is  heard  with  what  ought  to  be  dis- 
turbing frequency.  The  accusation  has  been  made 
not  only  by  disappointed  inventors  but  by  members 
of  both  houses  of  Congress,  from  the  floor,  and  has 
been  given  wide  publicity  in  the  press,  so  that  the 
public  has  been  educated  to  believe  it.  The  War 
Department,  and  within  it  the  Ordnance  Department 
as  being  the  one  most  closely  concerned  with  the 
field  of  mechanical  invention,  has  been  particularly 
subject  to  this  charge,  of  which  the  general  accep 
tance  affords  evidence  of  the  popular  tendency  to 
regard  the  government  official  as  a  person  of 
wooden-headed  prejudice,  prone  to  disregard  sug 
gestion  from  outside  his  own  class.  The  ten- 
dency is  so  common  that  it  must  have  some 
operating,  though  obscure,  cause.  The  reasoning 
that  there  are  nineteen  useless  inventions  for  one 
good  one;  that  the  disappointed  are  vocal  while 
the  successful  are  quiet ;  that  an  accusation  is  news 
while  a  defense  is  not,  and  the  failure  of  response 
to  the  challenge  to  cite  an  instance  within  the  last 
half  century  in  which  a  device  rejected  by  the  War 
Department  has  afterward  been  shown  to  be  useful 
— though  many  have  been  subsequently  tested  by 


MACHINE    GUNS  113 

special  direction  of  Congress — have  apparently  left 
the  belief  unaffected,  as  has  the  long  list  of  in- 
vent ions  by  others  than  officers  which  have  been 
adopted  and  put  in  use  by  the  War  Department. 
Possibly  the  experience  of  some  inventors  like 
llotrhkiss  and  Maxim,  who  have  not  themselves 
complained  but  have  taken  their  plans  abroad  for 
development  in  the  more  lucrative  markets  of  Eu- 
rope instead  of  trying  to  bring  them  out  under  the 
meager  appropriations  for  military  purposes  in  the 
I'n it ed  States,  has  not  been  understood  here  in 
their  own  country,  and  has  been  taken  as  evidence 
that  they  went  abroad  because  they  were  not  appre- 
ciated by  their  government.  In  such  cases  the 
development  was  usually  made  by  foreign  private 
capital,  stimulated  by  the  prospect  of  good  sales 
which  was  absent  in  the  United  States. 

In  the  case  of  the  Lewis  gun  the  charge  of  preju- 
dice and  unfair  treatment  was  made  by  Col.  Isaac 
N.  Lewis,  an  officer  of  the  army,  on  the  active 
list  at  the  time  when  his  gun  was  first  presented 
to  the  War  Department,  and  subsequently  retired. 
His  status  as  an  army  officer  justifies  an  exami- 
nation of  his  charge  and  of  his  particular  relations 
with  the  Ordnance  Department.  The  country  is  en- 
titled to  know  whether  an  important  department  of 
the  Government  is  so  conducted  that  persons  with 
valuable  suggestions  to  offer,  along  the  lines  which 
the  department  is  specially  created  to  consider,  can- 
not expect  even  fair  treatment  at  its  hands. 

Col.  Lewis'  charges  have  been  made  in  corre- 
spondence and  in  the  press,  but  they  were  made 


114   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

with  the  most  formality  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Military  Committee  of  the  Senate  on  December  22, 
1917.  This  testimony  is  found  on  pages  699  to  742 
of  the  "Hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs,  United  States  Senate,  65th  Congress,  2nd 
Session;  Part  2"  in  the  "Investigation  of  the  War 
Department. ' ?  The  parts  relating  to  the  alleged 
inability  of  Col.  Lewis  to  secure  consideration  of 
his  gun  with  reference  to  its  test  and  adoption  are 
as  follows: 

"The  Chairman.  I  think,  Col.  Lewis,  you  prob- 
ably have  in  your  mind  some  chronological  order  in 
which  you  wish  to  make  your  statement  to  the  com- 
mittee, and  probably  that  is  the  best  way  for  you 
to  do  it. 

Senator  Wadsworth.  There  is  no  necessity  for 
going  back  prior  to  the  completion  of  the  first  model 
of  the  Lewis  machine  gun  and  its  offer  to  the 
Government,  as  I  understand  an  offer  was  made. 

Col.  Lewis.  I  would  prefer,  Senator,  not  to  go 
into  ancient  history.  The  story,  as  I  have  intimated, 
is  not  a  pleasant  one,  because  I  do  not  think 
it  is  a  credit  to  the  present  organization  of  the 
Ordnance  Bureau. 

Before,  however,  I  begin  that  story,  I  would  like 
for  once  and  all  to  settle  the  question  as  to  whether 
Lewis  has  given  his  machine  gun  to  the  Govern- 
ment or  tried  to  give  it  to  the  Government  or  not. 
It  has  been  denied  officially  and  unofficially  so  many 
times. 

As  early  as  1911,  when  the  first  model  of  the 
Lewis  gun  was  built,  I  took  it  myself  to  Washington. 


M.iCHINK    GUNS  115 

I  presented  it  in  person  to  the  Chief  of  Staff. 
I  requested  him  to  examine  it.  It  had  been  devel- 
oped without  one  cent  of  expense  to  the  Govern- 
ment, during  my  odd  time.  I  was  then  on  important 
duty.  I  was  senior  director  of  the  Artillery  School 
at  Fort  Monroe.  I  wanted  to  submit  the  gun  unre- 

.  «'dly  for  the  use  of  my  Government,  giving  up 
all  rights  of  whatever  nature  in  the  invention.  In 
doing  so  I  asked  that  it  be  presented  to  the  Bureau 
of  Ordnance  and  to  the  members  of  the  Bureau 
of  Ordnance  and  Fortifications  as  early  as  1912. 

.re  700.) 
•          ••••••• 

The  Chairman.  On  what  terms  did  yon  offer  to 
let  the  Government  have  the  gun? 

Col.  Lewis.  On  one  condition,  and  I  think  in  view 
of  what  I  had  gone  through,  I  was  justified  in  that. 
It  was  only  on  the  condition  that  the  official  test 
would  not  be  made  at  the  Springfield  Armory. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  You  mean  that  there  was  no 
royalty  to  be  allowed? 

Col.  Lewis.  So  far  as  my  interest  was  concerned. 
This  gun,  Senator,  you  will  understand,  has  been  de- 
veloped under  very  discouraging  circumstances.  I 
not  a  wealthy  man.  I  was  a  poor  man  with  a 
family. 

TJtr  CJiainnati.  What  other  interests  were  in- 
volved besides  yourself? 

Col.  L  The  present  stockholders,  the  owners 

of  the  Automatic  Arms  Company.  They  gave  tho 
•al  to  develop  my  gun  when  I  was  not  able  to 
do  it. 


116        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD 


WAR 


The  Chairman.  Had  they  made  offers  as  to  what 
they  would  charge? 

Col.  Lewis.  They  did  not  get  that  far.  The  offer 
was  not  considered.  The  gun  was  not  accepted  for 
further  test.  It  was  not  considered.  It  was  turned 
down  flat.  (Page  702.) 

•         ••••••• 

Col.  Lewis.  I  retired  from  active  service  five 
years  ago,  discouraged  and  disappointed.  I  went 
to  Europe  and  expected  to  live  in  Europe.  I  played 
a  lone  hand  in  Europe.  I  did  not  have  any  friends. 
I  had  very  little  money  back  of  me.  A  little  group 
of  Belgian  bankers  had  bought  the  rights  of  the 
Lewis  gun  for  Europe.  The  man  at  the  head 
of  that  group  closed  a  deal  by  which  he  purchased 
the  European  rights  after  seeing  a  single  gun  fired 
at  a  target  from  an  aeroplane. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    What  year  was  that? 

Col.  Lewis.  That  was  the  fall  of  1912.  I  think  it 
was  in  November,  1912. 

I  would  like  to  state  at  this  time  what  occurred 
in  Washington  in  August  of  1912,  a  month  or  two 
before  that.  I  left  here  in  January,  1913.  I  did 
not  go  to  Europe  until  I  had  given  up  all  hope 
of  having  any  chance  to  develop  the  Lewis  gun  in 
America.  I  had  four  guns  made  without  expense 
to  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  They 
were  good  guns.  They  fired  American  ammuni- 
tion. They  were  ready  for  any  test.  As  the  events 
afterwards  developed,  they  were  successful  enough 
to  be  adopted  in  the  countries  of  Europe.  Two  of 
those  guns  were  offered  to  the  United  States  Signal 


as 


MACH1M-:    <;r\S  117 

Corps  free  and  without  any  question  of  price.  They 
were  offered  for  test  during  the  time  of  the  maneu- 
vers in  Connecticut  in  that  year.  General  Allen  was 
then  the  Chief  Signal  Officer.  I  was  called  up  by 
a  long-distance  telephone  in  New  York  and  was 
asked  if  I  would  permit  the  Signal  Corps  to  have 
two  guns  for  use  during  the  maneuvers.  I  told 
them  that  I  would  be  glad  to  do  it.  I  would  be  glad 
urnish  even  the  pilot,  as  my  son  had  offered 
>T vices,  if  he  could  be  of  any  service,  in  shooting 
mm  from  an  aeroplane.  The  Lewis  gun  was  the 
first  one  so  used.  It  was  fired  out  here  at  Col- 
lege Park,  near  Washington.  That  was  the  first 
shot  ever  fired  from  an  aeroplane. 

I  came  on  to  Washington.  I  supposed  they  would 
expect  me  over  here. 

In  that  connection,  I  would  like  to  read  a  letter 
from  the  Acting  Chief  Signal  Officer  to  me  a  few 
days  later.  It  was  one  of  the  factors  that  decided 
me  in  going  to  Europe.  This  letter  is  dated  * i  Office 
of  the  Chief  Signal  Officer,  August  12,  1912."  It 
is  addressed  to  "My  dear  Col.  Lewis, "  and  reads 
follows  (reading) : 

August  2,  1912. 
MY  DEAR  COL.  LEWIS: 

I  spent  a  good  part  of  the  morning  a  day  or 
UK<>  endeavoring  to  straighten  out  the  matter 
ot  the  use  of  your  gun  during  the  maneuvers  and 
have  seen  Gen.  Wood  and  Gen.  Crozier  on  the  sub- 
The   latter   has   entered  what  amounts  to  a 
protest  against  the  use  of  the  gun  during  the  ma- 
neuvers by  the  Signal  Corps  of  the  Army. 

Of  course,  these  maneuvers  are  official,  and  it  is 


118   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

presumed  that  this  protest  must  be  considered  as 
final.  The  ordnance  gun  will  be  tried.  I  regret 
that  your  gun  cannot  be  officially  tested  and  used. 

General  Wood,  in  an  official  paper  written  by  me 
after  I  had  my  personal  conversation  with  him,  of 
which  I  wrote  you,  has  put  the  following  indorse- 
ment, as  I  air.  told,  though  the  paper  has  not  yet 
come  into  this  office: 

"The  whole  matter  of  the  test  of  this  gun  is  now 
under  consideration. 

"  Until  the  matter  is  settled,  it  is  not  believed  any 
official  action  should  be  taken." 

This  bars  the  use  of  the  gun  at  the  maneuvers, 
but  I  am  informed  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  that  any 
unofficial  use  of  the  gun  with  the  militia  or  not 
during  actual  maneuvers  or  at  College  Park  will 
probably  not  be  objectionable. 

Very  truly  yours, 

GEOKGE  P.  SCRIVEN. 

The  protest  that  is  referred  to  in  that  letter  took 
the  shape  of  a  declination  on  the  part  of  Gen.  Crozier 
to  furnish  American  ammunition  to  fire  in  the  ?un. 
When  it  was  put  in  that  shape,  I  refused  to  purchase 
the  ammunition.  I  thought  that  if  I  furnished  the 
gun  and  the  aviator  they  might  furnish  the  ammuni- 
tion. I  ask  you,  gentlemen,  if  after  receiving  a 
letter  like  that  in  response  to  your  offer  you  would 
have  urged  it  any  further. 

Senator  New.  What  was  the  indorsement  upon 
that? 

Col.  Lewis.  That  is  a  letter  written  by  Gen. 
Scriven,  who  is  still  living.  He  succeeded  Gen. 
Allen  as  Chief  Signal  Officer.  This  was  in  1912. 
(Page  706.) 


MACHINE    GUNS  ii<) 

Senator  Wadsicortli.  In  the  tests  which  resulted 
in  the  Birmingham  contract,  was  American  ammuni- 
tion used? 

Col.  Lewis.  Yes,  sir;  I  had  the  British  ammuni- 
tion later  because  the  gun  was  going  to  the  British 
We  used  Kussian  ammunition  in  the 
Russian  service  and  Belgian  ammunition  in  the  Bel- 
gian service.  We  have  been  doing  that  for  years. 
We  an-  now  delivering  300  Lewis  guns  every 
week  to  aeroplanes  crossing  the  English  Channel. 

That  brings  me  to  the  point  as  to  this  question  of 
making  all  the  output  of  the  factory  of  the  aeroplane 
type.  I  will  tell  you  what  we  are  doing  in  Birming- 
ham. They  are  making  300  a  week  for  the  aero- 
planes and  1,300  a  week  for  trench  purposes.  Both 
•arried  on  together.  The  reason  it  is  not  done 
here  is  that  they  want  to  kill  the  Lewis  gun. 

Tie  Chairman.    Why  do  they  want  to  do  that? 

Col.  Leu-is.  They  want  to  take  the  label  off  of 
it.  The  Lewis  label  will  stick  to  the  Lewis  gun 
as  long  as  Lewis  is  alive. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  It  has  been  emphasized  here 
that  parts  of  the  Lewis  gun  broke  in  its  test  in  May, 
1913. 

Col  Lcu-i*.  I  am  glad  that  you  touched  upon  that 
point.  I  will  tell  you  why  the  gun  did  not  do  well. 
That  gun  was  made  in  England.  It  was  made  to 
•an  ammunition  by  our  British  company. 
Remember,  T  had  taken  two  guns  over  there.  They 
had  to  be  dismantled.  The  test  at  Springfield,  in 
1913,  was  with  the  last  gun  entered.  In  that  test 
th«-  guns  were  entered  over  my  protest  and  against 


120   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


,, 

sin 


judgment  and  in  spite  of  my  personal  protests. 
I  did  not  want  to  send  the  guns  up  for  the  tests. 
It  was  put  up  to  me  by  my  associates  that  I  should 
do  it. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  I  thought  you  were  anxious 
to  have  the  Government  use  the  gun  and  to  have 
it  tested. 

Col.  Lewis.    Not  at  that  time,  I  was  not. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    Then,  there  was  some 
rant  for  Gen.  Crozier's  statement  that  at  the  tests 
1913  that  individual  gun  did  not  behave  very  well? 

Col.  Lewis.    Do  you  mean  that  the  parts  broke? 

Senator  Hitchcock.    Yes. 

Col.  Lewis.  So  did  every  other  gun  tested  at 
the  same  time.  Every  gun  tested  at  the  same  time 
broke. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Was  there  not  some  admis- 
sion of  that  character  made — some  official  admis- 
sion? 

Col.  Lewis.    I  beg  your  pardon? 

The  Chairman.  You  had  to  confess  that  it  did 
not  meet  the  requirements. 

Col.  Lewis.  There  was  no  confessing  it.  There 
is  no  use  confessing  such  a  thing  when  the  broken 
parts  are  before  you. 

The  Chairman.    That  is  not  the  question. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    I  am  asking  you  whether  you  {] 
know  that  any  one  had  made  that  admission  or  not? 

The  Chairman.  Yes.  The  admission,  in  sub- 
stance, was  that  there  had  been  a  fair  test  and  that 
the  Lewis  gun  did  not  come  up  to  the  test  shown  by 
the  other  guns. 


MACIIINK    GUNS  1*21 

Senator  Hitchcock.    That  was  the  1917  test? 

s.    No,  sir;  that  was  1916. 
nator  Hitchcock.    Let  us  see  the  letter,  if  you 
have  it  there. 

Col.  Lewis.    I  misunderstood  you,  Senator. 
Senator  Hitchcock.    It  has  been  stated  to  this 
committee  that  you  were  given  a  test,  or  several 
tests. 

Col.  Leivis.    At  Springfield,  yes. 
Senator  Hitchcock.    And  that  the  tests  were  not 
-atiM'actory  and  that  your  company,  or  somebody 
connected  with  the  company,  admitted  that  the  guns 

v  not  satisfactory. 

Col.  Lewis.    As  I  told  you,  the  guns  that  we  sent 

for  that  test  in  1913  were  the  first  two  guns 

made  by  the  Birmingham  Small  Arms  Company. 

as  a  time  limit ;  the  guns  had  to  be  here  at 

•md  if  we  did  not  send  them  here  they 

could  not  be  entered  in  official  tests.    We  had  never 

made  an  American  gun  over  there.    We  were  then 

making  the  British  inms. 

Tin'  Chairman.     And  for  British  ammunition! 
Col.  Lririfi.  For  British  ammunition,  yes.   At  that 
time  we  hurried  with  the  two  guns  and  converted 
liicin  so  they  would  l>e  able  to  fire  American  ammu- 
n,  and  tin-  ,iz:uiis  were  sent  over  here  without 
Ticicntly  exhaustive  firing  test  in  England.  We 
admit  that. 

S(  i          .'filchcock.    Who  notified  you  to  come  for 
it  test? 

Col.  Lewis.    My  a-  Mr.  Calfee,  arrai 


.22   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


that  with  Gen.  Crozier,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  very 
much  against  my  judgment. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  So  Gen.  Crozier  did  give  you 
an  opportunity  to  present  your  gun  for  test  in  1913 
and  again  in  1916! 

Col.  Lewis.  Oh,  no.  I  have  been  abroad  since 
then. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  But  Gen.  Crozier  gave  you 
opportunity  to  have  the  Lewis  gun  tested  on  those 
two  occasions? 

Col.  Lewis.  The  first  test.  I  am  not  sure  about 
the  other  test,  because  I  have  not  been  here.  My 
son  represented  me  at  the  test  in  1913,  because  he 
wanted  to  see  the  guns.  I  was  fearful  that  they 
would  not  behave  well,  as  they  had  not  been  tested 
at  home.  My  son  went  before  the  board,  and  he 
had  a  very  hard  time  because  of  the  fact  that  many 
parts  of  the  gun  broke  in  that  test,  but  still  the 
gun  fired  20,000  rounds  of  American  ammunition  in 
a  very  short  length  of  time,  notwithstanding  Ihe 
breaking. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  At  that  time  was  your  fac- 
tory in  Great  Britain  turning  out  any  considerable 
number  of  guns? 

Col.  Lewis.  No ;  we  had  not  then  turned  out  our 
first  British  gun  at  that  time.  These  were  the  first 
two  guns  made — the  first  two  guns  that  the  Birming- 
ham Small  Arms  Company  had  made — and  they 
were  not  properly  made.  The  material  was  not 
properly  tempered. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  When  was  it  that  the  factory 
in  Birmingham  began  the  output  of  the  guns? 


MACIIIM:   GUNS 

Col.  Leici*.  On  a  large  scale  our  first  inter- 
changeable .miiis  were  delivered  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernment under  contract  in  1914.  I  think  it  was 
in  November,  if  I  am  not  mistaken.  I  think  war 
was  declared  on  the  3d  of  August,  and  we  did  not 
get  real  deliveries  of  these  interchangeable  guns 
under  our  contract  with  the  British  Government, 
although  we  had  been  working  eighteen  months  at  it, 
until  November  of  1914.  I  am  quite  sure,  Senator. 
nator  Hitchcock.  Prior  to  1913  you  were  not 
in  shape  to  offer  guns  to  Gen.  Crozier,  were  you? 

Col.  L<  wis.    What  do  you  mean? 

Senator  Hitchcock.  You  had  no  factories  estab- 
lished? 

Col.  Lewis.  No;  certainly  not.  I  had  not  the 
money  to  establish  a  factory. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  And  when  the  test  was  made 
\  our  first  output  of  the  British  factory  it  was 
premature  ? 

Col.  Lewis.  Very  much  so,  and  against  my  judg- 
ment. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  And  it  failed  on  that  occa- 
sion? 

Col  L  Simply  on  account  of  certain  break- 

age of  smaller  parts,  utterly  minor  parts,  which  did 
not  affect  the  design  of  the  gun.  The  design  to-day 
is  just  as  ii  was  then,  no  better  and  no  worse. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Would  you  consider  the  test 
lilure? 

Col.  I.  Certainly  not.  I  have  been  wit- 

nessing government  tests  for  nearly  forty  years, 
Senator. 


124   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


What  other  guns  were  tested 


Senator  Hitchcock. 
in  1913! 

Col.  Lewis.  The  Coventry  gun,  the  Vickers  gun, 
the  Madsden  gun,  and  the  Benet-Mercie,  I  think, 
were  tested  at  that  time.  (Page  710.)  .  .  . 

Senator  Hitchcock.  At  the  time  Gen.  Wood  was 
Chief  of  Staff  did  you  make  an  effort  to  go  over 
the  head  of  Gen.  Crozier  to  the  Chief  of  Staff? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  did.  I  went  personally  to  him  and 
offered  him  my  gun. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    What  was  the  attitude  there? 

Col.  Lewis.  They  had  a  meeting  of  the  board. 
They  were  both  members  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance 
and  Fortifications.  Gen.  Wood,  who  was  the  senior 
member  of  the  board,  was  absent,  and  that  made 
Gen.  Crozier  ex  officio  president  of  the  board  in  his 
absence.  When  the  matter  came  up  Gen.  Wood 
was  detained  on  other  business,  and  Gen.  Cro2,ier, 
being  ex  officio  president  of  the  board,  turned  it 
down. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  And  you  were  unable  to  get 
any  one  to  overrule  Gen.  Crozier? 

Col.  Lewis.  Oh,  no.  He  is  absolutely  autocratic, 
Gen.  Crozier.  You  gentlemen  year  after  year  have 
been  hearing  Gen.  Crozier 's  testimony  in  regard  to 
the  ordnance  conditions  in  the  country,  and  you  can 
judge  better  the  representations  he  has  made  than 
I  can. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  ask  you  in  a  general  way 
what  is  the  trouble  with  the  Ordnance  Department? 
You  are  an  old  Ordnance  officer? 


i] 


MACHINE    GUNS  125 

Col.  Lewis.  No ;  I  am  an  Artillery  man.  I  belong 
to  the  fighting  branch. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  \Ye  have  inferred  that, 
Colonel. 

Col.  Lewis.  I  am  still  fighting.  I  am  sixty  years 
old,  but  I  am  still  in  the  ring. 

Senator  McKellar.    That  is  plainly  evident. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  trouble  there!  If 
there  has  been  a  fall  down  in  this  emergency,  where 
is  the  trouble  and  what  is  the  trouble? 

CoL  Lewis.  It  is  primarily  at  the  present  time 
with  the  man  who  is  Chief  of  Ordnance.  There  has 
not  been  a  new  idea  or  a  new  development  in  ord- 
nance in  America  in  fifteen  years.  We  haven't  a 
new  gun  to-day  in  our  coast  fortifications ;  that  is, 
new  within  fifteen  years. 

The  Chairman.    Are  the  methods  at  fault? 

Col.  L  It  is  not  so  much  Crozier  as  it  is 

Crozierism  that  is  at  fault.    That  is  what  this  coun- 
t  ry  is  suffering  from. 

The  Chairman.  Has  he  developed  the  Ord- 
nance Department  under  this  present  system  and 
method 

CoL  Lewis  (interrupting).  Certainly.  It  is  a 
<me-man  machine,  Senator. 

n*  Chairman.     How  long  has  he  been  connected 
with  it? 

Col.  Li  lei*.  Fiftrcn  yrars — I  think,  sixteen  years. 
I  think  lie  lias  been  ('lin-l'  <>f  Ordnance  sixteen  years. 

Tl  /man.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  is  not  the 

in  about   as  it   was  before  he  went  in? 

<)h,   yes.     It   was    the   same    thing 


126    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


under  his  predecessor.  I  had  the  same  trouble 
under  his  predecessor,  also. 

The  Chairman.    That  is  what  I  am  getting  at. 

Col.  Lewis.    It  is  the  system,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  not  the  man;  it  is  the 
system? 

Col.  Lewis.  In  my  particular  case  it  is  the 
man.  The  head  of  a  great  bureau  has  simply  used 
his  office  as  a  vehicle  for  personal  malice  and  envy 
toward  a  man  who  is  not  in  the  ring.  I  have  been 
invited  to  join  the  ring,  Senator,  so  I  know  there 
is  one. 

Senator  Weeks.  What  do  you  mean  by  the 
"ring,"  Colonel?  Just  a  moment  before  you  an- 
swer that  question.  I  think  you  are  talking  in  a 
very  desultory  way  and  not  accurately.  You  are 
pretty  loquacious.  Get  right  down  to  facts,  and 
answer  the  question  directly,  and  tell  us  what  you 
mean  by  the  ring. 

Col.  Lewis.  If  I  could  tell  you  the  system  that 
has  controlled  the  production  of  ordnance,  the  de- 
sign of  ordnance,  and  the  purchase  of  ordnance, 
and  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition  ever  since  I 
have  been  in  the  service — and  I  have  had  active  con- 
tact with  it  for  nearly  thirty-eight  years 

Senator  Weeks.  Do  you  mean  to  say  there  is  any- 
thing dishonest  about  it? 

Col.  Lewis.  No.  I  am  not  saying  there  is  any 
pecuniary  graft.  There  are  many  kinds  of  graft  in 
this  world  besides  money  graft,  Senator. 

Senator  Weeks.  What  kind  of  graft  do  you 
mean? 


MACHIM:   GUNS 

Is.     Tt   is  tlio  same  thing  as  in  politics, 

A  man  who  is  loyal  to  his  party  at  the  ex- 

:  l he  State  is,  to  my  niindj  exactly  analogous 

he  man  who  is  loyal  to  a  bureau  chief  at  the 

of  his  country.     That  is  what  I  mean  by 

a   ring. 

Senator  Weeks.    Let  us  commence  with  the  bu- 
;  (hid'.     In  ^hat  respect  is  he  at  the  head  of 
a  ring! 

( '"/.  Lfiri.s.     He  is  it. 

>tator  TIVvA-x.     Assuming  that  he  is  it.    Is  not 
he  following  his  judgment! 

Cot.  L'  wis.     Why,  presumably  so;  yes. 
Sena f  <>i    W<  < -Its.     Then  your  charge  reduces  it- 
self to  the  fact  that  he  is  inefficient? 

Col.  Lewis.    Oh,  it  is  hopelessly  inefficient  under 
our  present  bureau  system. 

'or  Weeks.     Anything  else! 

Prejudice,  do  you  mean?    Profes- 
sional prejudice;  yes. 

/    Weeks.    That  would  be  included  in  in- 
efnVi.  ncv. 

s.    Inefficiency,  yes.    I  certainly  do  not 
iih-aii  corruption. 

Sena  for  Week.-.     You  mean  to  say  that  everybody 
in  thr  Ordnance  service  is  ineiTicient? 
Col.  /.<  wis.    No;  I  do  not  say  that. 

Senator  TI  You  said  a  moment  ago 

Col.  /.•  wis.     There  are  still  good  men 

iid  there  had  not  been  an 
!  developed  in  this  country  for  fifteen 
•lit  ago. 


128   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Col.  Lewis.  I  mean  in  the  broad  view  of  ordnance 
that  is  true. 

Senator  Weeks.  You  mean  to  say  there  is  not 
an  efficient  man  in  the  Ordnance  Bureau? 

Col.  Lewis.  A  man  may  be  efficient  in  his  limita- 
tions and  not  be  an  expert,  Senator.  There  are  lots 
of  good,  conscientious  and  efficient  men  that  are  not 
experts.  (Page  711.)  .  .  . 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  Col.  Lewis^  in  August  of 
1912,  who  was  the  Chief  of  Staff! 

Col.  Lewis.  I  think  Gen.  Wood  was  Chief  of 
Staff. 

Senator  FrelingJtuysen.  Did  he  not  practically 
govern  the  policy  of  the  Ordnance  Department  at 
that  time? 

Col.  Lewis.  No.  The  Chief  of  Staff  does  not 
govern  its  policy  now,  Senator. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.    Who  governs  it? 

Col.  Lewis.  The  Secretary  of  War,  if  it  has  any 
government. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  Who  was  the  Secretary 
of  War  in  August,  1912? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  have  been  away  so  many  years  that 
I  do  not  remember ;  but  I  think  it  was  Mr.  Stimson. 
I  can  say  that  Gen.  Wood  has  been  very  favorably 
disposed  toward  the  Lewis  gun  and  has  been  very 
much  in  favor  of  its  adoption,  Senator. 

Senator  FrelingTiuysen.    Was  he  at  that  time? 

Col.  Lewis.    Yes;  very  much  so. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Do  you  attribute  the  failure 
on  the  part  of  the  Army  to  adopt  and  use  your  gun 
to  the  constant  opposition  of  Gen.  Crozier? 


III\i; 

Col.  Lewis.  To  him  and  his  immediate  coterie  in 
the  Ordnance  Department. 

Senator  Hitchcock.     Can  you  name  other  officers? 

Col.  Lewis.  Senator,  I  do  not  want  to  do  any 
injustice  to  any  younger  officers.  That  is  a  one-man 
bureau,  and  1  think  one  man  ought  to  bear  the  brunt 
It  (Tage  733.)  .  .  . 

Senator  Neiv.  Col.  Lewis,  you  feel,  then,  sum- 
ming it  up  here,  that  if  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, through  its  Ordnance  Department,  had  viewed 
the  Lewis  gun  from  the  same  friendly  standpoint 
that  it  did  the  Browning  gun,  when  it  was  originally 
introduced  for  its  inspection,  that  the  Lewis  gun 
would  have  been  accepted  on  its  merits! 

Col.  Lewis.  There  would  have  been  no  Browning 
gun. 

Senator  Neiv.  There  would  not  have  been  any 
Browning  gun! 

Col.  Lewis.    No,  sir. 

Senator  McKdlar.  And  you  also  think  the 
l'n i ted  States  Government  would  be  better  supplied 
with  machine  guns  if  it  had  adopted  your  gun,  of 
course? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  certainly  do,  and  a  very  much 
larger  number  of  them.  I  might  say  among  the  let- 
ached  to  my  letter  inclosed  to  the  Secretary 
on  will  find  a  letter  of  October  16th,  addressed  to 
ident  of  the  Machine  Gun  Board,  in  which 
I  oft  produce  a  light  gun,  such  as  the  Brown- 

ig  is;  I  offered  to  come  back — to  give  up  my  Euro- 

an  work  to  eome  back  to  the  United  States  to  de- 
elop  that  gun  at  my  own  expense — and  I  would 


130    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

present  it  to  the  Government  without  any  compensa- 
tion, direct  or  indirect,  in  any  shape. 

Senator  New.  You  made  such  an  offer  as  that 
in  October,  1916? 

Col.  Lewis.    Yes,  sir;  I  can  read  the  letter. 

Senator  New.  Is  that  letter  in  the  record?  I 
think  it  ought  to  go  in  the  record. 

Col.  Lewis.    Col.  Lewis  had  made  machine  guns, 

and  Mr.  Browning  has  not.  Now,  Mr.  Browning  is 
a  great  inventor,  a  great  pistol  and  rifle  inventor, 
but  he  never  has  made  a  machine  gun.  I  offered  to 
do  it  for  nothing ;  I  would  have  been  glad  to ;  I  think 
it  would  have  been  as  good  a  gun  as  the  Browning, 
perhaps — naturally,  I  think  so — it  certainly  would 
not  have  cost  the  Government  $1,250,000. 

Senator  FrelingJiuysen.  Did  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment inform  you  that  they  would  accept  for  test 
the  Lewis  gun  rechambered  to  Springfield  ammuni- 
tion? 

Col.  Lewis.  They  never  informed  me,  Senator, 
I  was  on  the  other  side.  I  had  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  those  tests ;  I  did  not  even  know  of  them. 

Senator  FrelingJiuysen.  How  was  that  test 
brought  about — the  reopening  of  the  negotiations? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  think  the  Savage  Arms  Company 
— Mr.  Borie,  did  you  not  take  that  up  with  the  Sav- 
age Arms  Company? 

Mr.  Borie.  Yes,  all  those  questions  came  up  with 
us. 

Senator  Frelinghwysen.  What  I  am  trying  to  de- 
velop, Mr.  Borie,  is  this :  That  either  through  preju- 


MACIIIM:   Gl  NS 

•  lice  or  tor  scientific  reasons  the  Ordnance  Depart- 

•  objected  to  tin*  use  of  the  Lewis  gun,  and  there 

itfl  made  from  August,  1912,  until  we  en- 

•  1  this  war,  and  the  Lewis  gun  was  not  in  us*'. 
Mr.  I-inric.     There  was  a  test  made  in  1913,  before 

I  had  anything  to  do  witli  the  gun. 

'////// ui/*'  i'.     Nevertheless  it  was  not 
i it rd  at  that  time? 

Mr.    Hurie.     Xo,   sir;   and   in  1916  there  was  a 
made,  in  which  T  was  interested,  but  then 
the  L;im  was  not  adopted.     Then,  as  I  recited  this 
morning,  tho  Ordnance  Department  bought  350  of 
English  guns,  and  then  the  Secretary  of  Wai- 
took  th»-  matter  of  the  machine-gun  controversy  out 
the  hands  of  the  Ordnance  Department  and  ap- 
pointed  this  machine-gun  board,  consisting  of  nine 
from  all  branches  of  the  service.     That  was 
lather    an    acrimonious    correspondence    be- 
n  ( .'en.  Cro/ier  and  myself,  on  which  we  insisted 
that   the  M-nn  1  i  a   fair  test,  not  an  armory 

or  laboratory  test,  and  suggested  that  a  board  com- 
•d  of  all  branches  of  the  service,  including  the 
Xavy,  should  be  appointed  to  pass  on  the  gun.    The 
machine-trim  board  met  in  the  fall  of  1916  and  re- 

r  hearing  from  Mr.  Han- 

for    instance,    whose    letter    I    quoted    as    to 
10  enormous  capacity  of  the  Colt  works,  they  or- 
lered  '          -  guns,  and  they  set  May  1, 1917, 

11  liirht  machine  guns.    Then  we 
;ir.   and    T  told  you  the  rest  of  the 

'he  Lewis  machine 


132   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

gun  tested  for  the  Springfield  ammunition — our  am- 
munition— by  the  Ordnance  Department? 

Mr.  Borie.  In  1916  we  gave  this  partial  test  at 
Springfield ;  it  was  not  satisfactory. 
Mr.  FrelingJiuysen.  Was  it  accepted? 
Mr.  Borie.  No,  sir;  the  recommendation  of  the 
board  was  that  the  machine  gun — I  think  we  have 
got  the  record  somewhere  here — in  the  opinion  of 
the  board,  it  was  not  satisfactory  for  our  service 
arm,  but  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  board  the  Savage 
Arms  Company  should  continue  to  develop  the  gun, 
in  the  expectation  that  it  would  prove  satisfactory. 
Was  that  not  about  the  gist  of  it,  Mr.  Calf ee ;  was 
not  that  the  gist  of  the  report  of  the  1916  test?  You 
have  got  it  in  your  records  there.  But  the  Lewis 
gun  was  not  accepted  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment as  a  standard  arm  until  after  the  Winthrop 
test  for  the  Navy,  and  then  the  other  test  at  the 
Springfield  Armory. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Then  you  received  an  order 
for  1,300? 

Mr.  Borie.  From  the  Army,  and  3,500  from  the 
Navy. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  And  subsequent  to  that  you 
have  received  an  order  for 

Mr.  Borie.  Well,  those  orders  I  gave  you — 2,000, 
4,400  and  12,000;  then  22,000. 

Senator  FrelingJiuysen.  Has  the  Lewis  gun  ever 
been  officially  adopted  by  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment? 

Mr.  Borie.  It  has  been  adopted  as  the  service 
arm. 


MACIIIM:   (,r\s 

Col.  Lewis.    Yes,  sir ;  it  has  been  since  last  May. 
(Page  740.)   .    .    . 

It  appears  from  this  testimony  and  the  preceding 
narrative  (page  79)  that  when  the  Lewis  gun  was 
first   officially  offered  to  the  Government  for  test 
it   was  offered  with  a  string  to  it;  that  the  test 
should  not  be  of  the  kind  to  which  military  inven- 
tions arc  usually  subjected  by  the  agencies   main- 
tained   by   the   Government  for  the   purpose,  but 
should  be  of  a  particular  kind,  by  another  agency, 
proposal   by   the  commercial  company  presenting 
tin-  gun.    The  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification, 
tatutory  board  for  considering  and  testing  in- 
ventions, composed  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  an  officer 
of  K  n  Lrii  iccrs,  an  officer  of  Ordnance,  three  officers 
of  Artillery  and  a  civilian,  did  not  turn  the  gun 
down  in  the  absence  of  Gen.  "Wood  as  testified  by 
Col.  Lewis,  but  offered  a  test  in  which  the  usual 
procedure    would   be    followed,    and   which   would 
include  the  kind  of  test  which  those  presenting  the 
gun  desired.    The  proceedings  of  the  board  setting 
h   this   action  were  signed  by  Gen.  Wood,  as 
presiding  officer  when  they  were  taken. 
In  the  same  month  in  which  the  test  was  offered 
by  the  board,  July,  1!)li_\  occurred  the  incident  re- 
CoL  L«-wis  of  a  proposed  test  of  the 
run    in    firin-    from   an  aeroplane,   by   the 
Signal  Corps.  nal  Corps  was  not  the  agency 

for  making  tests  of  machine  iruns,  had  no  experts  or 
litiea  For  doinir  so,  and  undoubtedly  wished  only 
to  test   th"  firing  of  a  machine  ^un  from  an  aero- 


134    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

plane.  The  matter  is  explained  by  the  following 
correspondence  between  the  Acting  Chief  Signal 
Officer  and  myself: 

37819/392. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  SIGNAL  OFFICER, 

Washington,  July  17,  1912. 
CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY. 
Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  it  is  contem- 
plated trying  the  Lewis  gun  with  the  aeroplanes 
during  the  coming  maneuvers  to  be  held  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  New  York,  N.  Y.,  in  August  next,  and  it  is 
requested  that  5,000  rounds  of  ammunition  for  the 
service  rifle  be  issued  to  the  Signal  Corps  for  the 
purpose. 

If  it  is  considered  necessary,  reimbursement  can 
be  made  by  transfer  of  funds  from  appropriation 
Signal  Service  of  the  Army,  1913. 
Very  respectfully, 

GEORGE   P.   SCRIVEN, 
Colonel,  Signal  Corps,  U.  S.  Army, 

in  charge  of  Office. 

37819/396 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE, 

Washington,  July  27,  1912. 
THE  CHIEF  SIGNAL  OFFICER,  U.  S.  ARMY. 
Sir: 

1.  Replying  to  letter  from  your  office,  dated 
17th  instant  (0.  0.  37819/392),  in  regard  to  the  sup- 
ply of  five  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition  for  the 
purpose  of  trying  a  Lewis  gun  with  aeroplanes 
during  the  maneuvers  to  be  held  next  month  in  the 


MACHINE    GT\-  135 

vicinity  of  New  York  City,  I  have  the  honor  to  in- 
form you  that  this  Department  would  not  be  author- 
ized to  supply  ammunition  for  the  trial  of  a  gun 
not  under  test  with  reference  to  its  adoption  in 
the  service,  and  that  the  representatives  of  the 
Lewis  gun  have  not  accepted  the  offer  of  the  Board 
of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  to  test  their  gun  with 
reference  to  that  cbject. 

2.  I  will  be  glad,  however,  to  furnish  the  Signal 
Department  with  an  automatic  rifle  of  the  present 
service  type,  which  weighs  about  22  pounds;  to  fit 
it  to  an  aeroplane,  or  to  furnish  the  appliances  for 
doing  so,  and  to  supply  a  suitable  number  of  rounds 
of  ammunition,  without  expense  to  the  appropria- 
tions of  the  Signal  Corps,  for  such  test  as  you  may 
desire  to  make  with  them. 

3.  Of  course,  this  Department  will  be  glad  to  fur- 
nish any  number  of  rounds  to  the  Signal  Depart- 
ment, at  the  expense  of  the  appropriations  of  your 
Department,  without  question  as  to  the  purpose  for 
which  you  may  desire  them. 

Respectfully, 

WILLIAM  CROZIER, 
Brig. -Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  U.  8.  A. 

It  is  seen  from  these  letters  that  I  was  willing  to 
furnish  ammunition  at  the  expense  of  the  Signal 
Corps'  appropriations  for  a  test  of  the  Lewis  or 
any  other  gun,  but  the  Acting  Chief  Signal  Officer 
was  governed  by  the  view  of  the  Chief  of  Staff 
quoted  in  the  former's  letter  to  Col.  Lewis,  that 
"The  whole  matter  of  the  tost  of  this  gun  is  now 
under  consideration.  Until  the  matter  is  settled,  it 
is  not  believed  any  official  action  should  be  taken." 

It  was  after  his  failure  to  secure  this  (fna*i  tost, 
as  a  side  issue  to  a  trial  of  machine  gun  fire  from 


136   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

an  aeroplane,  while  there  was  still  pending  a  definite 
offer  to  give  his  gun  the  usual  test  including  one  of 
his  own  kind,  that  Col.  Lewis  testifies  that  he  retired 
from  active  service,  discouraged  and  disappointed, 
and  went  to  Europe  to  look  after  the  manufacture 
of  his  gun — after  the  European  rights  therein  had 
been  bought  by  a  group  of  Belgian  bankers.  It  is 
evident  that  he  did  not  retire  and  go  abroad  because 
of  refusal  to  consider  and  test  his  gun,  but  in  order 
that  he  might  command  all  of  his  time  to  exploit 
it  for  profit,  while  under  pension  by  his  Govern- 
ment. 

In  the  following  spring,  1913,  the  Automatic  Arms 
Company,  not  having  taken  up  the  offer  of  the  pre- 
ceding July  to  test  a  Lewis  gun,  came  forward  again 
with  a  proposal  that  a  gun  be  tested.  The  proposal 
was  accepted;  the  usual  procedure  of  convening  a 
board  to  conduct  the  test  was  followed,  and  the  gun 
was  tested,  together  with  several  other  types,  in 
the  following  September.  This  was  the  first  test 
made  by  the  United  States  Government  of  a  Lewis 
gun,  and  it  failed  by  malfunction  and  the  breakage 
of  parts.  (See  page  81,  and  the  testimony  of 
Col.  Lewis  quoted  above.)  The  claim  in  behalf  of 
the  gun  that  the  failure  was  due  to  poor  manu- 
facture and  defective  material  may  very  well  have 
been  true.  Neither  the  Ordnance  Department  nor 
the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  ever  found 
any  fault  with  the  principles  of  construction  of  the 
Lewis  gun;  but  from  the  beginning,  and  after  each 
failure,  offered  to  make  further  tests  of  the  gun  if 
and  when  it  should  be  desired. 


MAC  HIM;  GUNS  137 

From  the  preceding  narrative  (page  82)  it  ap- 
pears that  no  i'urther  proposition  to  test  the  gun 
was  made  until  the  Ordnance  Department  itself 
brought  up  the  subject,  in  September,  1915,  by  ask- 
ing the  Savage  Arms  Company  to  present  a  gun  for 
:  that  company  having  taken  up  the  manufacture 
for  the  Canadian  army.  Then  it  was  not  until  April, 
1916,  seven  months  afterward,  that  a  gun  was  pre- 
sented and  a  test  held,  with  the  poor  result  stated. 

This  was  the  last  official  test  under  the  War  De- 
partment before  the  one  of  April,  1917,  under  the 
Navy  Department,  which  was  the  first  at  which 
the  gun  performed  well,  after  many  changes  in  it, 
and  after  which  it  was  accepted  and  large  orders 
were  given  by  the  Ordnance  Department  for  its 
manufacture.  But  in  the  early  part  of  June,  1916, 
a  comparative  test  of  the  Lewis  and  the  Benet- 
]\I<  r  i  mins  was  held  at  Plattsburg  by  a  board  con- 
vened by  verbal  order  of  Gen.  Leonard  Wood  from 
among  his  own  officers.  The  Lewis  gun  used  in  the 
test  was  one  made  by  the  Savage  Arms  Company  to 
use  British  ammunition,  and  was  reported  by  the 
board  to  have  performed  excellently  in  the  test, 
while  the  Benet-Mercie  performed  very  badly. 
Import  of  the  test  was  not  made  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment by  Gen.  Wood  until  over  a  month  afterward, 
in  a  letter  of  July  29th ;  but  a  copy  of  the  report 
of  the  board  was  furnished  the  Savage  Arms  Com- 
pany, and  the  company  sent  a  copy  to  the  Secretary 
of'  \Var  on  June  21Mh.  T  iv^-ived  my  first  informa- 
tion ol'  the  test  Hi  rough  the  com;  nd  in  reply 
said,  among  other  thino-s:  "I  hope  that  this  last 


138   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

performance  indicates  that  progress  has  been  made 
in  overcoming  such  defects  as  previous  tests  have 
shown,  and  that  the  gun  in  which  this  Government 
is  now  investing  a  considerable  sum  has  reached  a 
stage  in  which  it  can  be  relied  upon  to  render  first 
class  service. "  The  immediately  subsequent  per- 
formance of  the  gun  on  the  Mexican  border,  how- 
ever, which  has  been  previously  described  (page 
88),  showed  that  as  made  in  this  country  it  had 
not  yet  reached  a  reliable  stage;  while  the  Platts- 
burg  test  itself  was  inconclusive  in  that  less  than 
2,000  rounds  were  fired  from  the  gun  as  against 
20,000  or  more  required  for  a  proper  test,  which 
should  include  at  least  15,000  rounds  for  endurance. 
Notwithstanding  the  failures  to  get  a  performance 
from  the  Lewis  gun,  with  either  English  or  Ameri- 
can ammunition,  which  would  justify  its  adoption 
for  the  service  I  realized  that  the  continued  use  of 
the  gun  by  the  English  in  the  war,  and  the  absence 
of  effort  on  their  part  to  replace  it  with  another 
model,  raised  a  presumption  that  it  ought  to  te 
possible  to  manufacture  it  to  give  good  service  in 
this  country.  It  was  apparent,  of  course,  that  the 
American  model  was  not  the  same  as  the  English 
one;  and  also  the  English  use  of  the  gun  afforded 
no  comparison  between  it  and  the  Benet-Mercie,  the 
former  service  gun,  which  had  been  declared  to  be 
its  superior  by  every  board,  except  the  Plattsburg 
one,  which  had  considered  both,  and  which  is  still 
the  British  model  for  the  cavalry  and  for  tanks. 
The  Benet-Mercie,  however,  had  been  superseded  in 
the  United  States  by  the  Vickers;  the  manufacture 


MAC  HIM:  GUNS  139 

of  it  here  had  ceased  and  the  manufacturing  equip- 
ment had  been  dissipated;  and,  besides,  the  need  for 
an  additional  type  lighter  than  the  Vickers  had  ap- 
peared. I,  therefore,  as  related  on  page  97,  made 
the  recommendation  designed  to  afford  two  and  a 
half  months  from  the  middle  of  August,  1916,  for 
the  perfection  and  presentation  for  further  test  of 
a  Lewis  gun  or  any  other,  and  reserving  $6,000,000 
for  investment  in  the  light  of  the  test.  The  board 
appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  however,  re- 
served only  $1,500,000,  and  this  sum  was  invested 
in  it  after  the  test  of  April,  1917,  had  shown  it  to 
be  fit  for  purchase. 

Col.  Lewis'  charge  of  prejudice  and  unfair  treat- 
ment for  himself  and  his  gun  is  accentuated  by 
statements  from  him  to  the  effect  that  the  refusal  to 
consider  his  gun  for  test  was  in  the  face  of  an 
offer  on  his  part,  alleged  to  have  been  repeatedly 
made,  to  give  the  free  use  of  the  gun  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, without  any  payment  of  royalty  to  himself 
as  the  inventor.  These  statements  were  spread 
widely  through  the  press,  and  are  repeated  in  his 
testimony  before  the  Senate  Military  Committee,  as 
folio 

Col.  Lcu-is.  I  wanted  to  submit  the  gun  un- 
reservedly for  the  use  of  my  Government,  giving 
up  all  rights  of  whatever  nature  in  the  invention. 
...  I  repeat,  that  I  offered  to  give  my  gun  to  the 
Government.  T  made  the  offer  to  the  Chief  of  Staff 
in  1  Dli2.  Krri  I  made  tin-  offer  in  1D11  and  then 
again  in  191:2.  T  also  told  the  pro-  -retary 

of  War,  in  his  own  office,  in  June,  1916,  when  I 


140   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  over  here  from  Europe  for  a  few  weeks,  that 
I  had  offered  it,  and  then  desired  to  make  him  a 
present  of  my  interest  in  the  gun,  the  Lewis  gun, 
without  any  emolument  whatever.  None  of  my 
offers  has  been  accepted,  and  the  peculiar  thing  is 
that  even  the  fact  of  the  offers  having  been  made 
has  been  denied.  That  is  the  puzzling  thing  to  me. 

Senator  Weeks.  Were  they  ever  made  in  the 
presence  of  witnesses? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  think  there  are  two  or  three  officers 
still  in  the  War  Department  who  know  about  it. 
There  is  an  official  statement  of  the  Chief  of  Staff 
and  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and 
Fortifications  that  I  did  make  the  offer. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Who  was  Chief  of  Staff  when 
you  originally  made  the  offer? 

Col.  Lewis.    Gen.  Wood. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  WTio  was  Chief  of  Ord- 
nance? 

Col.  Lewis.    Gen.  Crozier. 

Senator  Weeks.  Those  offers  were  not  made  in 
writing? 

Col.  Lewis.  The  original  offer  was  not  made  in 
writing. 

Senator  Weeks.  Who  were  present  when  you 
made  these  different  offers? 

Col.  Lewis.  Gen.  Wood,  Gen.  Weaver,  and  Col. 
Kilbourn.  There  were  one  or  two  other  officers  on 
duty.  I  could  probably  verify  my  recollection.  It 
was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  (Page  701.) 

Col.  Lewis.  I  would  like  to  have  permission  to 
read  to  the  committee  a  letter  which  I  have  here, 


MACIIIM-;    GUNS 

in  order  that  this  question  may  never  be  the  subject 
of  controversy  again.  It  is  a  letter  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  under  date  of  December  11,  1917.  I  have 
made  one  final  effort  to  divorce  my  personal  pe- 
cuniary interest  from  the  Lewis  gun. 

December  11,  1917. 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  Washington,  D.  C. 

My  dear  Mr.  Secretary: 

In  accordance  with  the  understanding  reached 
during  our  very  frank  talks  at  your  office  in  Wash- 
ington on  Friday  and  Saturday  last,  I  beg  to  submit 
the  following: 

1.  I  nowr  believe,  and  have  believed  since  our  first 
conference  in  June,  1916,  that  you  have  intended 
to  act  fairly  and  with  exact  justice  toward  me  in 
all  matters  relating  to  the  Lewis  machine-gun  con- 
troversy. It  is  a  fact,  however,  that  acting  upon 
incomplete  information  and  very  complete  misin- 
formation furnished  you  by  others,  you  did  me  seri- 
ous injustice  in  the  authorized  issue  of  the  official 
~ress  Bulletin  Xo.  Ill,  of  October  28,  1916;  in  the 
interviews  relative  to  the  subject-matter  of  that 
bulletin  given  by  you  at  the  time  to  representatives 
of  the  public  press  of  the  country;  and  in  your  tes- 
<;mony  before  the  Military  Committees  of  the  Sen- 
te  and  House  of  Kepresentatives  during  the  official 
Hearings  in  January,  1917. 

I  accept  without  question  your  statement  and  as- 
rance  that  the  injustice  was  not  intentional,  and 
understand  it  to  be  your  intention  at  an  early 
te  to  right  the  wrong  in  some  suitable  public 
manner. 

J.  therefore  rni<-\v  in  the  most  definite  and  posi- 
tive terms  possiMe  under  the  changed  conditions, 
the  offers  I  made  to  the  AYar  Department  in  1911 


142        ORDNANCE   AND  THE   WORLD 

and  again  in  1912,  through  the  Chief  of  Staff  and 
the  president  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Forti- 
fication. 

3.  At    the    present    time    approximately    40,000 
Lewis  machine  guns,  together  with  a  large  number 
of  spare  parts  and  necessaries,  remain  undelivered 
on  the  orders  already  placed  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment.   My  share  of  the  total  royalty  to  be  paid  to 
the  manufacturers  under  the  present  license  agree- 
ments on  these  40,000  guns  and  spare  parts  would 
amount  to  approximately  $2,500,000,  and  the  very 
large  additional  orders  for  Lewis  guns  and  spare 
parts  which  will  undoubtedly  be  placed  by  the  War 
Department  would  still  further  add  to  the  royalty 
payments  legally  and  equitably  due  me  in  the  future. 
I  now  offer  to  turn  over  to  the  Treasury  of  the 
United  States,  as  and  when  due  me  under  existing 
contract  agreements,  all  of  my  part  of  such  royalty 
payments,  and  upon  the  acknowledgment  and  ac- 
ceptance of  this  offer  by  you  I  will  duly  execute  all 
necessary  and  proper  instruments  to  carry  out  this 
offer,  in  order  that  there  may  be  paid  into  the  Treas- 
ury of  the  United  States  instead  of  to  me  all  of  my 
share  of  the  above-mentioned  royalty  payments.    It 
is  definitely  understood  and  intended  by  me  that 
from  and  after  January  1,  1918,  provided  this  offer 
is  accepted  by  that  date,  I  shall  receive  no  compensa- 
tion whatever,  direct  or  indirect,  as  royalty  or  other- 
wise, for  any  Lewis  machine  gun  or  component  part 
or  accessory  thereof,  that  may  thereafter  be  manu- 
factured by,  for,  or  sold  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  for  its  own  use  and  benefit. 

4.  The  Lewis  machine  gun  is  no  longer  a  new  and 
untried  weapon.    It  has  successfully  met  every  mili- 
tary requirement  under  a  grilling  test  of  more  than 
three  years  of  daily  service  on  the  battlefields  of 
Europe  during  this  the  greatest  war  in  history. 


M.\<  HIM;   GUNS 

•  •nty   thousand    Lewis  guns  have  already    < 

siij)])lied  to  the  fighting  forces  of  the  Allies  in  P^ng- 

land,  I'Yanee.  Belgium,  Italy,  and  Kussia,  and  our 

Dries   in    Knidand,  France  and  America  are  at 

the  j>re>ent  time  adding  to  the  number  already  in 

at  the  rate  of  approximately  2,000  guns 

!>:.     In  the  British  tanks  no\v  doing  such  effec- 

k  on  ti  in  front  there  are  more  than 

li'.nnn  Lewis  iruns,  no  other  type  of  machine  gun 

by  the  .British  for  tank  service. 
I  may  also  properly  add  at  this  late  date  that  of 
i  \\elve  Zeppelins  so  far  brought  down  by  the 
British  ten  were  brought  down  by  Lewis  iuins  alone. 
.").   In  connection  with  my  definite  offer  in  para- 
graph L'  above,  I  beg  to  invite  special  attention  to 
the   following  letters  now  of  record  in  the  official 
files  of  the  War  Department,  namely: 

(a)  Lett ei-    to   me    from    the   Adjutant   General, 

led   July  ](),   15)00. 

(b)  Letter  to  the  Adjutant  General,  dated  Octo- 

ber -jo,  1900. 

(c)  Letter  to  Chief  of  Artillery,  dated  November 

.  '  06. 

(d)  !  Military   Secretary,   dated  Febru- 

ry  19,1! 

(••)    Letter     t<>     President,     Machine-^im    Board, 
dated  October  111,  IJMii. 

r  to  Adjutant  (Jem-nil,  dated   February 

:..  1917. 

to  Secretary  of  War,  dated  February 

1C.   1!' 
(h)    Letter   !  v  of  War,  dated    May    1'J, 


\\hieh   !  ;ire  attached   hereto.) 

'•vanf, 
I.  V.  I 
Colour!.  f'Hlfffl  Sfntfs  Ann >i.  /' 


144   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I  would  like  to  state  to  the  committee  that  my 
share  in  this  company  is  forty-three  per  cent.  There- 
fore, any  arrangement  now  made  with  the  Govern- 
ment by  the  Automatic  Arms  Company  will  reduce 
the  amount  paid  by  the  Government  automatically 
by  forty-three  per  cent. 

The  Chairman.  Those  letters  will  go  into  the 
record  with  the  one  that  you  have  read. 

Col.  Lewis.    All  right. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Was  this  $2,500,000  which 
you  offered  to  the  Government  on  existing  contracts 
practically  carrying  out  your  original  offer? 

Col.  Lewis.  Exactly.  I  do  not  want  to  receive, 
directly  or  indirectly,  one  penny  from  any  Lewis 
gun  that  may  be  produced. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  When  did  you  make  the 
original  off  erf 

Col.  Lewis.    First  in  1911,  and  again  in  1912. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  And  you  have  kept  it  eJive 
ever  since? 

Col.  Lewis.    I  beg  your  pardon? 

Senator  Hitchcock.  You  have  kept  at  it  ever 
since  ? 

Col.  Lewis.  If  you  are  interested  in  that  I  would 
like  to  read  you  a  letter  forwarding  a  check  for  my 
royalties  on  the  three  hundred  and  fifty-three  guns 
of  the  British,  to  which  I  was  entitled.  They  were 
made  for  Great  Britain,  and  as  soon  as  I  received 
the  royalties  I  immediately  forwarded  a  check  for 
the  amount  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    When  was  that  done? 

Col.  Lewis.    That  letter  was  sent  on  the  16th  day 


i 
-? 


MAC 'HIM:    (iUNS  145 

of  last  February,  after  I  returned  from  Europe. 
Tho  letter  was  never  acknowledged,  except  that  it 
had  been  referred  to  the  Adjutant  General  to  decide 
if  lie  would  advise  its  acceptance,  General  Crozier 
advised,  in  strong  terms,  that  it  be  not  accepted. 
Chairman.  It  was  sent  back! 

Col.  Lncis.  I  wrote  another  letter  insisting  upon 
the  acceptance.  Tin-  letter  is  here  with  the  corre- 
spondei  pt  the  reply  of  the  Secretary  of  "War. 

Senator  Hitchcock-.     Was  the  check  finally  ac- 

Col.  Lewis.  It  was  accepted,  but  it  was  never 
acknowledged.  No  government  official  ever  acknowl- 
edged receipt  of  it. 

ator  McKellar.    "What  is  the  amount? 
Col.  Lewis.    It  was  made  in  two  parts.    One  was 
for  approximately  $11,000  directly  due  to  the  Gov- 
ernment.   The  other  was  approximately  $6,700  due 
lie  Automatic  Arms  Company,  because  I  wanted 
•fund  the  entire  amount.    In  all,  it  amounts  to 
aln. ut  $17,000. 

nator  Hitchcock.     Does  the  Automatic  Arms 
Company  have  a  forty-eight  per  cent   interest? 
Col.  J.  I  own  forty-three  per  cent. 

7.     The  Automatic  Arms  Com- 
y  owns  fifty-seven  per  cent? 

00  per  cent  :  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Have  you  any  interest  in  the 
Automatic  Arms  Company? 

.     I  have  not.     I  still  own  my  stork,  but 
I  shall  ii'-ver  have  any  interest,  so  far  as  it  relates 


146   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  the  gun.  I  have  fixed  it  up  so  that  it  may  be  paid 
directly  into  the  United  States  Treasury. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  But  you  are  a  stockholder  in 
the  Automatic  Arms  Company? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  am.  I  shall  not  profit  to  the  extent 
of  one  cent,  however — not  one  penny. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  From  this  large  order  that 
has  been  placed  for  the  Lewis  gun,  the  Automatic 
Arms  Company  will  pay  a  part  of  its  dividend  into 
the  Treasury,  in  addition  to  what  you  personally 
pay? 

Col.  Lewis.  All  of  my  share  I  pay  into  the  Treas- 
ury. A  proportionate  part  of  my  stock  holding  will 
be  paid  directly  into  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States. 

Senator  McKellar.  Why  do  you  do  that,  Colonel 
Lewis? 

Col.  Lewis.  Well,  that  is  rather  a  difficult  ques- 
tion to  answer.  I  suppose  it  is  a  psychological  affair. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Perhaps  because  you  do  not 
need  the  money? 

Col.  Lewis.  Senator,  I  do  not  need  the  money. 
I  have  made  every  penny  I  possess.  I  have  never 
had  a  dollar  given  to  me  by  anybody  in  this  world. 

Senator  Weeks.  The  probabilities  are  that  your 
offer  will  be  accepted  after  you  have  paid  the  excess- 
profits  tax. 

Col.  Lewis.  And  I  shall  still  have  to  pay  the  in- 
come tax. 

Senator  McKellar.  I  would  like  to  know  your 
feelings  as  to  why  you  turned  this  over  to  the 
Government. 


MACHINE    GUNS  147 

Col.  Lewis.  Well,  Senator,  I  asked  one  of  my 
closest  personal  friends  what  he  thought  of  it.  He 
told  me  this :  He  said  it  was  a  very  handsome  thing 
to  do ;  that  it  was  a  very  patriotic  thing  to  do.  But 
I  said,  "That  is  not  what  you  think.  You  think  I 

am  a fool,  don't  you?"  That  is  what  he  does 

think  to-day. 

Senator  McKellar.  Your  idea  is  that  you  ought 
to  help  the  Government  along,  having  been  an  officer 
of  the  Government. 

Col.  Lewis.  Absolutely.  I  got  my  education  at 
the  Government's  expense.  I  have  been  persecuted 
by  the  Government  and  therefore  I  want  to  pay  it 
back  in  good  money — give  good  money  in  return 
for  it.  (Page  702.)  .  .  . 

Senator  Hitclicock.  "Was  that  check,  for  some- 
thing over  $300,000  that  you  sent  to  the  War  De- 
partment  

Col.  Lewis.  Pardon  me,  Senator,  I  did  not  have 
$300,000  at  that  time ;  it  was  only  $11,000— the  first 
check — and  there  was  $6,700,  approximately  $17,000 
in  all,  that  I  returned  for  the  three  hundred  and  fifty 
English  caliber  guns  that  were  furnished  our  troops 
last  summer — that  is,  the  summer  of  1916. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Those  were  the  only  remit- 
tances you  have  made  to  return  your  royalty  to  the 
Treasury? 

Col.  Lewis.  Yes,  sir;  I  have  waited  for  a  year 
to  find  out  whether  the  checks  were  accepted. 

Senator  Hitclicock.    They  were  finally  accepted? 

Col.  Lewis.  They  were.  If  they  had  been  accept- 
ed it  was  fully  my  intention  to  have  continued,  and 


148   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

every  penny  of  royalty  I  received  would  have  been 
returned  to  the  United  States  Government. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  I  understood  you  made  a 
written  offer  also  to  the  War  Department  to  return 
a  very  large  sum  of  money? 

Col.  Lewis.  Absolutely,  in  writing.  It  is  before 
the  Secretary  now. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  To  cover  your  share  of  the 
royalty  on  all  the  Lewis  guns  that  had  been  ordered 
already  or  might  be  ordered? 

Col.  Lewis.  No,  sir ;  to  take  effect  on  the  1st  day 
of  January,  because  I  have  felt  I  have  gone  to  the 
extent  of  my  obligation  as  an  officer  and  a  gentle- 
man, to  return  money  to  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, inasmuch  as  I  have  never  had  a  word  of 
acknowledgment;  I  have  never  had  a  word  of  ap- 
preciation from  my  Government  in  the  thirty-eight 
years  of  my  service,  in  any  shape. 

Senator  McKellar.  Do  I  understand  you  to  say 
they  finally  accepted  your  checks,  but  never  wrote 
you  a  letter  saying 

Col.  Lewis.  It  was  just  a  clerical  oversight,  only 
I  did  not  know  the  check  had  been  accepted  until 
within  ten  days. 

Senator  McKellar.  They  never  did  write  you, 
saying  they  had  accepted  the  money? 

Col.  Lewis.  No,  sir;  not  until  the  Secretary  of 
War  told  me  so,  himself.  I  was  very  much  sur- 
prised to  know  that  it  had  been  accepted.  (Page 
736.)  .  .  . 

Senator  Hitchcock.    You  gave  an  estimate  here, 


MACHINE    GUNS  149 

as  I  recall  it,  as  to  the  amount  you  would  return 
to  the  Treasury  if  it  would  be  acceptable  on  the 
present  contract. 

Col.  Lewis.  Contracts,  as  they  actually  exist, 
about  $2,500,000. 

Senator  Hitclicock.  But  that  requires  the  affirma- 
tive action  of  the  Government  to  accept  it? 

Col.  Lewis.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Senator,  I  am 
going  to  give  it  to  them  whether  they  accept  it  or 
not.  That  is  the  point.  I  want  to  have  it  off  my 
conscience  and  my  heart. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  But  you  would  like  to  have 
some  governmental  acknowledgment? 

Col.  Lewis.  Do  you  not  think  a  postage  stamp, 
or,  as  the  Government  can  frank  its  mail,  they  might 
write  me  a  letter  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  it? 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Has  that  letter  been  acknowl- 
edged? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  must  say,  on  behalf  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  he  has  only  had  it  a  very  short  time, 
because  the  only  reason  I  delayed  sending  it  after 
writing  it  on  the  llth  was  because  I  was  not  sure 
whether  the  War  Industries  Board  of  the  Council 
of  National  Defense  would  acknowledge  I  had  any 
rights  of  royalties  at  all,  and  I  thought  if  I  had 
nothing  to  give  I  would  not  give  it. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  They  have  now  acknowledged 
it? 

Col.  Leivis.  Yes,  sir.  All  I  wanted  was  an  ac- 
knowledgment I  had  some  rights.  I  have  forty-three 
per  cent  of  the  royalties  of  the  gun,  and  I  give  it 
unconditionally  and  perpetually  to  tho  "Tinted  States 


150   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Government  without  any  acknowledgment  of  any 
kind. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Have  yon  any  evidence  that 
General  Crozier  objected  to  you  having  the  Gov- 
ernment accept  these  other  checks  you  sent? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  have  a  very  remarkable  indorse- 
ment from  General  Crozier,  sent  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  that  I  do  not  think  was  intended  to  be  sent  to 
me. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    I  should  like  to  see  that. 

Col.  Lewis.  Senator,  I  would  rather  take  out  the 
controversial  matter. 

Mr.  Calfee.  I  will  send  that  to  you,  Senator 
Chamberlain,  because  I  do  not  think  that  was  ever 
intended  for  Colonel  Lewis  to  see. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  What  was  the  substance  of 
it? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  send  it  to 
you  and  let  you  judge  for  yourself.  There  are  state- 
ments in  that  which  are  not  true,  if  you  want  to 
know  the  fact,  over  the  official  signature. 

The  Chairman.    Indorsing  the  Government  gun! 

Col.  Lewis.  No,  sir ;  I  never  got  such  an  indorse- 
ment as  that. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  How  long  was  that  check 
in  the  hands  of  the  War  Department! 

Col.  Lewis.  I  sent  it  the  16th  day  of  February, 
and  I  only  heard  last  week  it  was  accepted. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.    Have  you  the  check? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  think  I  have  the  canceled  check  in 
my  pocketbook  (producing  check). 


MACHIXI:  (irxs  151 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  What  is  the  date  of  the 
indorsement  or  the  depositing? 

Col.  Lewis.  It  is  in  July  some  time,  but  I  have 
never  been  notified.  I  will  give  you  the  canceled 
check,  the  certified  check,  on  the  Corn  Exchange 
Bank,  New  York. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  What  I  wanted  to  get  at  was 
what  evidence  you  had  that  General  Crozier  ever 
really  opposed  accepting  the  check.  You  said  quite 
possibly  ho  did  uphold  it. 

Col.  Leivis.    I  will  send  you  the  indorsement. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  I  want  it  to  go  in  the  record 
here. 

Col.  Leivis.  There  are  other  statements  in  that 
indorsement  I  do  not  think  were  intended  to  come 
to  me,  but  I  am  perfectly  willing  you  shall  see  it  and 
read  it.  I  prefer  that  it  not  be  made  a  part  of  a 
public  record. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  The  purport  of  the  indorse- 
ment was  Crozier 's  opposition  to  accepting  the 
check  ? 

Col.  Lewis.  Undoubtedly;  that  was  the  only  in- 
ference I  could  draw  from  it. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  And  it  was  from  that  in- 
dorsement you  infer  he  opposed  accepting  it. 

Col.  Leivis.    Yes. 

Senator  McK  filar.  You  will  furnish  it  to  the 
stenographer,  so  that  he  can  put  it  in  the  record, 
will  you! 

Col.  Lewis.  I  would  prefer  not  to  put  that  in  the 
record. 


152   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Chairman.  It  came  to  you  through  regular 
channels,  did  it  not  f 

Col.  Lewis.    Yes ;  sent  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Senator  McKellar.    Why  not  put  it  in? 

Senator  FrelingJiuysen.  Will  you  trace,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  committee,  the  routine  that  that  check 
has  gone  through !  I  mean  when  it  was  paid  ? 

Col.  Lewis.  The  last  indorsement,  I  think,  was 
June,  1914.  (Page  738.) 

General  Wood  had  confirmed  Colonel  Lewis'  state- 
ments as  to  the  free  offer  of  his  gun,  in  a  letter  of 
September  19,  1916,  to  the  Adjutant  General,  in  the 
following  words : 

"  Colonel  Lewis  did  offer  the  gun  to  the  United 
States  Government  free  of  all  charge,  not  only 
offered  it  but  said  he  hoped  the  Government  would 
take  it  as  he  believed  it  was  a  good  gun.  He  also 
said  that  he  did  not  want  to  profit  in  any  way  from 
it  as  far  as  the  use  of  it  by  the  United  States  was 
concerned.  This  offer  was  made  to  me  in  my  official 
capacity  as  Chief  of  Staff  and  led  to  an  informal 
test  of  the  gun  at  Fort  Myer.  General  Crozier  was 
present  at  this  test,  as  was  the  then  Secretary  of 
War.  Colonel  Lewis  was  most  anxious  that  the 
United  States  should  have  free  use  of  his  gun." 

The  offer  referred  to  could  not  have  been  any- 
thing more  than  a  statement  of  intention,  which 
was  not  carried  out,  for  it  was  not  made  in  writing, 
was  not  followed  by  any  piece  of  writing  nor  by  any 
other  act  which  would  make  the  offer  binding,  and 
when  the  subject  was  presented  to  the  Board  of 
Ordnance  and  Fortification  it  was  by  a  commercial 
company,  as  a  commercial  matter,  with  no  mention 


MACHINE    GUNS  153 

of  any  concession  to  the  Government  by  reason  of 
the  gun  having  been  invented  by  an  officer  of  the 
Army.  Neither  Colonel  Lewis  nor  General  Wood 
ever  said  anything  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  or  the 
Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  about  a  free 
offer  of  the  gun,  although  General  Wood  afterward 
took  part  in  the  proceedings  of  the  board,  as  presi- 
dent, in  considering  the  gun.  General  Weaver,  men- 
tioned by  Colonel  Lewis  as  a  witness  of  his  offer  to 
General  Wood,  was  also  a  member  of  the  Board  of 
Ordnance  and  Fortification,  and  never  mentioned 
to  the  board  the  free  offer  when  the  subject  of  the 
gun  and  the  terms  for  which  it  was  actually  offered 
to  the  board  were  under  discussion.  If,  therefore, 
the  offer  was  " turned  down  flat,"  as  stated  by 
Colonel  Lewis,  it  must  have  been  turned  down  by 
General  Wood,  the  friend  of  Col.  Lewis  and  of  the 
gun,  for  he  was  the  only  one  in  authority  who  knew 
anything  about  it  and  he  kept  the  knowledge  to 
himself. 

In  an  effort  to  substantiate  the  charge  of  preju- 
dice upon  my  part  against  himself  and  his  inven- 
tions, Colonel  Lewis  gave  the  following  testimony 
before  the  Senate  Military  Committee: 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  Do  you  feel  that  General 
Crozier's  position  is  due  to  prejudice? 

Col.  Lewis.    Oh,  certainly. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  Is  it  personal  or  pro- 
fessional ? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  think  it  is  both  personal  and  pro- 
fessional. 

••ator  Frelinghuysen.    Why  is  it  personal? 


154   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Col.  Lewis.  It  is  personal  simply  because  I,  as 
an  officer  when  I  entered  the  Department  and  since, 
have  made  many  inventions.  Many  of  my  inven- 
tions are  now  in  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
and  in  each  case,  so  far  as  I  recall,  the  introduction 
of  these  things  into  actual  service  has  been  over  the 
opposition  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau. 

Senator  Frelingliuysen.  What  inventions  are 
they? 

Col.  Lewis.  The  one  that  the  Government  is  using 
to  the  greatest  extent  is  the  range  and  position 
finder.  They  have  adopted  the  Lewis  range  and 
position  finder  throughout  the  coast  fortifications, 
and  in  the  number  of  letters  I  submitted  to  you  is 
my  letter  giving  the  development  of  the  instrument, 
its  offer  to  the  Government  without  any  royalty  or 
pay.  It  is  my  presentation  to  the  Government. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  "We;  will  go  into  that 
later.  Has  General  Crozier  invented  anything? 

Col.  Lewis.  Mechanical  devices  for  use  in  the 
Ordnance  Department;  yes,  the  Crozier-Buffington 
disappearing  gun-carriage. 

Senator  Frelingliuysen.    Anything  else? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  think  he  has  been  very  largely  in- 
terested in  the  development  of  a  wire-wound  gun 
system  that  is  now  used.  Outside  of  that,  I  do  not 
know  of  anything. 

Senator  FrelingJiuysen.  He  has  not  invented  any 
class  of  ordnance  similar  to  yours,  has  he? 

Col.  Lewis.    Machine  guns? 

Senator  FrelingTiuysen.     Yes. 

Col.  Lewis.    Not  that  I  know  of. 


MACHINE    GUNS  155 

Senator  FrcUnghuysen.  You  have  only  invented 
the  machine  gun  and  the  range  finder? 

Col.  Lewis.  No.  I  have  a  list  there,  Senator. 
The  letter  I  gave  you  will  show  the  list  of  my  in- 
ventions since  I  have  been  in  the  military  service. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  The  question  I  am  ask- 
ing you  now  is,  whether  Gen.  Crozier  came  in  com- 
petition in  any  invention  in  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment with  you? 

Col.  Lewis.    A  similar  invention  to  mine! 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.    Yes. 

Col.  Lewis.    Not  at  all,  Senator ;  not  the  slightest. 

The  Chairman.    Who  accepted  the  range  finder? 

Col.  Lewis.  It  was  first  recommended  by  the 
Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  the  old  model, 
in  1896.  The  new  model  was  subjected  to  very 
rigorous  tests  in  New  York  Harbor,  covering  a 
period  of  six  weeks,  by  the  special  board  of  range 
finding,  a  board  appointed  by  the  War  Department 
to  test  competitively  range-finding  instruments.  I 
think  that  was  in  1907,  or  possibly  1908.  I  think  the 
letter  will  give  you  the  date. 

Senator  Frelinfjlunjsen.  Then  there  was  no 
prejudice  against  you  in  the  acceptance  of  your 
range  finder? 

Col.  Lewis.  I  do  not  know  whether  the  committee 
wants  to  go  into  that. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    Was  Gen.  Crozier  involved 
in  it? 
Col.  Lewis.    He  opposed  the  introduction  of  my 

finder  to  the  hitter  end. 


156   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Senator  Hitchcock.  He  did  not  control  the  War 
Department  or  the  Ordnance  Department? 

Col.  Lewis.  Not  in  that  case.  That  was  a  special 
board  appointed  by  the  War  Department  over  him, 
and  it  was  adopted  in  spite  of  his  opposition. 

(Page  715.) 

Col.  Lewis  invented  two  range  and  position  finders 
which  were  purchased  and  used  by  the  Govern- 
ment. The  statement  that  I  opposed  the  adoption 
of  either  one  of  them  is  not  true.  The  first  was  de- 
veloped in  1896  and  the  years  preceding,  and  there 
is  no  record  that  he  ever  offered  it  to  the  Govern- 
ment free  of  charge  for  royalty ;  but  there  is  record 
that  he  offered  it  for  a  price.  With  reference  to  a 
free  offer  of  his  inventions  in  general,  there  is  on 
file  in  the  Ordnance  Office  a  letter  relating  to  a 
certain  dial  telegraph,  and  incidentally  to  other  de- 
vices. The  letter  is  Ordnance  Office  file  4613-Enc. 
48,  and  is  as  follows: 

BOAKD  ON  REGULATION  OF  SEACOAST 
ARTILLERY  FIRE,  Fort  Wadsworth,  N.  Y. 

May  4,  1896. 
To  THE  BOARD  OF  ORDNANCE  AND  FORTIFICATION, 

Fort  Monroe,  Va. 
Gentlemen: 


I  would  like  to  state  further,  that  my  only  desire 
in  bringing  this  telegraph  before  you  is  to  aid  in 
securing  for  our  service  the  very  best  of  each  kind 
of  instrument  and  device  that  we  must  necessarily 
use.  In  case  you  accept  it,  it  becomes  the  property 
of  the  War  Department  absolutely  and  without  con- 
dition so  far  as  every  military  use  is  concerned, 


MACIIIN'K    GUNS  157 

and  the  same  is  true  not  only  of  this,  but  of  every 
instrument  or  device  that  I  may  at  any  time  submit 
to  you. 
I  am,  gentlemen, 

Very  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

I.  N.  LEWIS, 
First  Lieut.,  2d  Art. 

The  paragraph  quoted  is  the  only  one  which  is 
here  pertinent.  The  instrument  to  which  the  letter 
relates  never  came  into  extensive  use,  and  was  never 
purchased  in  quantity  by  the  Ordnance  Department ; 
but  the  letter  is  quoted  because  of  the  general  state- 
ment of  intention  at  the  end  of  it,  which  Col.  Lewis 
would  evidently  like  to  have  understood  as  indicat- 
ing his  attitude  toward  the  Government  with  refer- 
ence to  his  inventions.  The  intention,  however,  like 
that  with  reference  to  the  gun,  was  never  carried 
out,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  following.  With  regard 
to  the  first  range  finder,  Col.  Lewis  wrote  this  letter 
to  the  War  Department: 

4613  Enc.  83 

Fort  Wadsworth,  N.  Y.  H., 

Nov.  23,  1896. 
To  THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL,  U.  S.  ARMY, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  respectfully  submit  for  the 
consideration  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  for  such 
action  as  he  may  droin  proper,  the  following  with 
respect  to  my  rani^  and  position  finder: 

The  fact  is  well  known  to  the  Department  that 
during  the  past  eight  years  I  have  developed 


158   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAE 

practically  and  invented  a  range  and  position  finder 
for  seacoast  artillery  use  which,  has  been  subjected 
to  the  most  thorough  service  tests  for  a  period  of 
more  than  three  years,  and  which,  as  the  result  of 
those  tests  has  been  officially  adopted  by  the  Board 
of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  as  the  service  range 
finder  for  TJ.  S.  Artillery  with  the  recommendation 
that  the  necessary  steps  be  taken  to  acquire  the  right 
to  use  this  instrument  upon  such  terms  or  at  such 
a  rate  of  compensation  as  may  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  seem  just  and  equitable. 

The  result  of  the  tests  made  shows  that  not  only 
does  the  instrument  meet  every  requirement  of  a 
modern  artillery  service  in  the  most  satisfactory 
manner,  but  that  it  is  also  the  most  reliable  and 
accurate  of  its  kind  in  the  world  to-day.  There  is, 
in  fact,  no  other  instrument  of  American  origin  that 
even  approximately  fulfills  service  requirements. 

Believing,  as  I  do,  that  it  forms  a  most  important 
element  in  the  artillery  defence  of  our  coast,  I  want 
my  own  Government  to  have  the  first  opportunity  to 
purchase  my  rights  in  the  invention,  and  I  wish  to 
dispose  of  those  rights  on  terms  that  are  fair  and 
equitable. 

I  own  absolutely  in  my  own  name  all  the  rights, 
and  have  never  at  any  time  parted  either  directly 
or  indirectly  with  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  in- 
vention; I  am  therefore  in  a  position  to  assign 
all  patent  and  other  rights,  to  turn  over  all  the 
confidential  data  of  construction,  and  to  furnish 
complete  working  drawings  to  the  Government  in 
case  of  purchase. 

I  would  respectfully  submit  the  following  distinct 
propositions  which  I  believe  to  be  fair  and  reason- 
able, viz.: 

First.  I  will  sell  all  rights  in  the  invention  for 
the  United  States  alone,  leaving  me  free  to  negotiate 


MACHINE    GUNS  159 

for  the  sale  of  the   rights  for  foreign  countries, 
for  the  sum  of  fifty  thousand  dollars  ($50,000). 

Second.  I  will  sell  all  rights  in  the  invention 
absolutely  and  exclusively  for  the  sum  of  seventy- 
five  thousand  dollars  ($75,000). 

Inasmuch  as  I  have  already  waited  long  and  pa- 
tiently for  the  Department  to  take  some  definite 
action  in  regard  to  the  purchase  of  my  inven- 
tion, and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  I  have  already 
had  overtures  from  two  foreign  governments,  and 
a  direct  offer  of  purchase  for  the  rights  from  a  well 
established  and  thoroughly  reputable  American  com- 
pany, I  would  respectfully  ask  to  be  informed  as 
soon  as  possible  of  the  decision  of  the  Secretary 
of  War. 

I  am,  General, 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

I.  N.  LEWIS, 
1st  Lieut.  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

This  offer,  which  it  is  seen  was  made  about  six 
months  after  the  general  statement  of  intention  in 
the  letter  quoted  just  above,  was  not  accepted;  but 
another  effort  was  made  to  secure  payment  from  the 
(iovrniinent  for  the  invention,  through  the  action  of 
Congress.  The  following  letter  was  addressed  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs  of  the  Senate: 

4613  Enc.88 

UNITED  STATES  SENATE, 
Washington,  February  1,  1897. 

Dear  Sir: 

nator  Chandler  offers  an  amoiulment  to  be 
})!•(»])«, .;»M|  i,,  Hi,-  Fortifications  Appropriation  Bill, 
appropriating  $100,000  for  tln>  purchase  of  all 


160   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

rights  in  the  Lewis  range  finder.  The  proposed 
amendment  was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Coast 
Defenses,  of  which  I  am  Acting  Chairman,  in  the 
absence  of  Senator  Squire. 

So  far  as  I  have  canvassed  the  committee  all  are 
in  favor  of  it  except  one,  and  he  makes  a  suggestion 
which  I  submit  to  the  Department.  This  gentleman 
has  visited  Sandy  Hook  and  seen  the  range  finder 
tested  and  admired  it;  but  he  says  that  great  in- 
genuity is  being  exercised  in  that  direction  and  in 
view  of  the  possibility  that  some  better  range  finder 
may  be  found  we  ought  to  authorize  the  War  De- 
partment to  buy  ten,  twenty,  thirty  or  forty  range 
finders,  as  they  may  be  needed,  and  wait  awhile,  and 
ultimately,  if  it  be  necessary  and  nothing  better  is 
discovered,  buy  the  patent. 

I  shall  be  glad  of  some  expression  from  the  War 
Department  or  the  Ordnance  Bureau  on  this  criti- 
cism. I  think  the  Committee  is  disposed  to  report 
the  amendment  favorably. 

Yours  truly, 

J.  E.  HAWLEY. 
HON.  D.  S.  LAMONT,  Secretary  of  War. 

P.  S.  If  a  note  can  be  mailed  to  me  this  afternoon 
I  should  be  glad  to  get  it  in  the  morning. 

The  letter  was  answered  by  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
on  the  following  day.    The  answer  is  below: 
4613.    Enc.  88. 

OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  Feb.  2,  1897. 
HON.  Jos.  E.  HAWLEY,  U.  S.  Senate, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Sir: 

Your  letter  of  the  1st  instant,  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  in  regard  to  the  Lewis  range 
finder,  has  been  referred  to  me  for  reply. 


MACHINE    GUNS  161 

This  department  has  purchased  a  limited  number 
of  the  Lewis  range  finders,  and  in  accordance  with 
the  recommendations  of  boards  that  investigated  the 
matter,  has  issued  these  range  finders  to  posts  for 
actual  trial  in  service.  Unless  an  extraordinary 
emergency  should  arise  it  is  not  the  intention  to 
purchase  more  range  finders  until  those  in  use  have 
been  tried.  In  the  meantime  other  range  finders  are 
under  consideration,  it  is  not  impossible  that  a 
better  range  finder  may  be  obtained,  and  under  all 
the  circumstances  it  would  not,  in  my  judgment,  be 
wise  for  the  United  States  to  incur  the  expense  of 
purchasing  all  rights  in  the  Lewis  range  finder. 
Kespectfully, 

(Signed)  D.  W.  FLAGLEB, 

Brig.-Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

Since  these  letters  were  written  Col.  Lewis  has 
jnanifested  continued  hostility  to  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment, and  has  freely  made  against  it  his  charges 
of  unfair  treatment.  I  had  at  the  time  nothing  to 
do  with  the  subject  in  which  he  was  interested,  being 
a  subordinate  officer  of  the  Ordnance  Department 
engaged  on  other  duties. 

On  March  15th,  following  the  correspondence  with 
Senator  Hawley,  an  order  was  given  for  one  hun- 
dred Lewis  range  finders  at  a  price  of  $1,500  each. 
The  purchase  was  made  from  a  commercial  com- 
pany, and  in  it  there  was  no  proposition  or  mention 
of  reduction  of  price  because  of  relief  from  royalty 
charge.  The  royalty,  if  any,  was  taken  care  of  in 
the  purchase  price.  (0.  0.  file  4613-Enc.  140.) 

The  invention  in  which  the  rights  were  thus 
offered  for  sale  to  the  Government  by  Col.  Lewis 
had  been  developed  with  the  aid  of  public  funds 


162   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

allotted  for  the  purpose  by  the  Board  of  Ordnance 
and  Fortification.  The  various  allotments  were  as 
follows : 

August,  1890,  $2,885  (0.  0.  file  4973/1890). 

September  22,  1890,  $200  (0.  0.  file  6619/01). 

May  3,  1892,  $3,000  (0.  0.  file  2345/92). 

January  24,  1893,  $95  (0.  0.  file  606/93). 

September  6,  1893,  $250  (0.  0.  file  706-B/93). 

On  letter  of  September  29,  1894,  $44.75  (0.  0. 
file  4613-Enc.  83). 

November  20,  1894,  $2,000  (0.  0.  file  4613-Enc. 
88),  increased  later  by  $500  (0.  0.  file  4613-Enc.  2). 

October,  1895,  $550  (0.  0.  file  4613-Encs.  7  and  8). 

The  Lewis  range  and  position  finder  was  later 
superseded  by  another  invention  which  remained 
the  adopted  type  until  about  1908,  when  Col.  Lewis 
submitted  his  second  instrument.  The  second  range 
finder  was  considered  by  the  Board  of  Ordnance 
and  Fortification,  of  which  I  was  then  a  member, 
and  it  was  pursuant  to  action  of  that  board  that  it 
was  subjected  to  a  test  by  a  special  board,  and  was 
adopted  as  a  result  of  the  test.  I  took  part  and 
concurred  in  the  proceedings  leading  to  the  test 
and  to  the  adoption.  The  history  can  be  found  in 
the  record  of  proceedings  of  the  Board. 

Following  its  adoption  something  like  two  hun- 
dred thousand  dollars'  worth  of  the  second  range 
finders  were  bought  by  the  Ordnance  Department. 
Like  the  first  range  finders  they  were  bought  from 
private  parties,  with  no  known  reduction  of  price 
because  of  relief  of  the  Government  from  the  pay- 
ment of  royalty.  What  the  relations  are  between 
Col.  Lewis  and  the  parties  selling  these  inventions 


MACHINE    GUNS  163 

to  the  Government,  and  what  consideration,  if  any, 
was  paid  to  him  for  the  control  of  his  patents  for 
range  finders,  has  never  been  stated  by  Col.  Lewis 
or  otherwise  disclosed,  to  my  knowledge.  He  has 
never  entered  into  a  written  engagement  in  regard 
to  them,  such  as  his  letter  of  December  11,  1917,  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  quoted  in  his  testimony  above 
in  regard  to  his  gun,  nor  has  he  ever  paid  to  the 
Government  any  sums  of  money  representing  re- 
ceipts by  him  for  these  inventions ;  of  which  the  last 
is  still  the  standard  model  of  range  finder,  and  there- 
fore subject  to  further  purchase. 

After  the  adoption  of  his  gun  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, and  after  a  large  number  had  been 
manufactured,  Col.  Lewis  took  the  first  effective 
step  towards  making  good  his  stated  intention  of 
foregoing  profit  from  his  inventions  used  by  the 
United  States  by  enclosing  his  check  for  something 
over  $10,000  in  his  letter  of  February  16,  1917,  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  as  described  in  his  testimony. 
As  he  stated  that  the  check  was  never  acknowledged, 
and  that  I  advised  strongly  against  its  acceptance, 
the  story  of  the  transaction  as  revealed  by  the 
correspondence  may  be  of  some  interest.  Colonel 
Lewis'  letter  is  as  follows: 

072.62-Inc.  3. 

1  Russell  Terrace,  Montclair,  N.  J. 

February  16,  1917. 
Tin:  HONORABLE  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Sir: 

Since  my  return  from  abroad  on  the  1st  instant, 


164   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


I  have  received  a  complete  statement  of  moneys  due 
and  paid  to  me  during  the  year  ended  December  31, 
1916,  by  the  Savage  Arms  Company  of  Utica,  New 
York,  as  royalties  on  the  American  manufacture  of 
Lewis  guns,  spare  parts  and  accessories. 

Included  in  the  statement  referred  to  is  the  sum 
of  ten  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-nine  dol- 
lars and  seventeen  cents  paid  to  me  as  royalties  on 
three  hundred  and  fifty-three  Lewis  guns  (with 
spare  parts),  manufactured  originally  under  con- 
tract with  the  Canadian  Government  but  actually 
delivered  to  and  paid  for  by  the  United  States  War 
Department. 

During  our  personal  interview  in  your  office  in 
June,  1916,  about  the  time  of  the  delivery  of  these 
three  hundred  and  fifty-three  guns,  I  informed  you 
that  I  had  repeatedly  offered  my  interest  in  my 
machine-gun  invention  to  my  own  Government, 
without  thought  of  pecuniary  recompense,  long  be- 
fore undertaking  the  development  and  introduction 
of  the  gun  abroad;  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  I 
had  never  received  the  slightest  assistance  or  en- 
couragement in  the  practical  development  of  my 
inventions  from  anyone  connected  with  the  United 
States  Ordnance  Department. 

I  feel  a  moral  obligation  to  refuse  to  profit  to  the 
extent  of  one  penny  from  the  sale  -of  the  above- 
mentioned  guns  to  the  War  Department,  and  I 
therefore  enclose  herewith  my  certified  check  on  the 
Corn  Exchange  Bank  of  New  York,  payable  to  your 
order,  for  ten  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty- 
nine  dollars  and  seventeen  cents,  with  the  request 
that  you  deposit  the  same  to  the  credit  of  the  United 
States  Government. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

ISAAC  N.  LEWIS, 
U.  S.  Army  (retired). 


MACIIIM;  c;r\s  165 

The  check  was  apparently  sent  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  on  March  2nd,  and  raised  a  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  that  officer  whether  it  should  be  ac- 
cepted. He  therefore  returned  it  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  with  the  following  letter: 

072.4/62  Inc.  2 

TREASURY  DEPARTMENT, 
Washington,  April  14,  1917. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SECRETARY: 

Referring  to  your  letter  of  March  2nd,  with  which 
you  transmit  a  check  of  Isaac  N.  Lewis,  in  the  sum 
of  $10,889.17,  drawn  to  the  order  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  by  you  endorsed  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  it  is  noted  that  Isaac  N.  Lewis,  the 
drawer  of  the  check,  is  a  retired  officer  of  the  United 
States  Army  and  the  inventor  of  a  machine  gun; 
tli at  the  gun  is  manufactured  by  the  Savage  Arms 
Company  and  that  Lewis  receives  a  royalty  there- 
from; that  the  sum  of  $10,889.17  represents  the 
royalty  received  by  Lewis  from  the  said  company 
for  the  sale  of  the  guns  in  question  to  the  War  De- 
partment; and  that  Lewis  feels  a  moral  obliga- 
tion to  refuse  to  profit  to  the  extent  of  one  penny 
from  the  sale  of  the  guns  to  the  Government, 
and  for  that  reason  transmits  the  check  repre- 
senting the  amount  of  the  profit  with  the  request 
that  it  be  deposited  to  the  credit  of  the  United  States 
Government 

The  amount  tendered  and  offered  by  Lewis  ap- 
pears to  be  offered  as  a  gift  or  donation  on  his 
part  to  the  United  States  and  as  it  is  apparently 
rod  without  any  condition  or  qualification  wliat- 
r,  the  same  may  be  loyally  accepted. 

li«»\\«  \«  r,  as  it  appears  from  your  letter  of  March 
2nd  that  the  Savage  Arms  Company,  the  corpora- 
tion which  paid  tlio  royalties  to  Col.  Lewis,  is 


166   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

constantly  competing  for  orders  before  your  De- 
partment, in  the  last  analysis  the  question  of  ac- 
cepting this  donation  would  seem  to  be  a  proper 
one  for  the  War  Department  to  determine. 

The  correspondence  and  certified  check  are  re- 
turned herewith. 

Very  truly  yours, 

W.  G.  McAooo, 
Secretary. 

To  Honorable  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Upon  receiving  the  check  back  the  Secretary  of 
War  sent  the  correspondence  to  me  with  the  memo- 
randum below,  and  I  returned  it  to  him  with  the 
one  which  follows : 


072.4/68 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

April  18,  1917. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Ordnance: 

Subject:  Letter  from  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
April  14,  returning  check  for  $10,889.17  from  Col. 
Isaac  N.  Lewis. 

Will  Gen.  Crozier  kindly  give  me  his  opinion  in 
the  matter  of  the  acceptance  of  the  enclosed  gift? 
I  am  inclined  to  request  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  to  deposit  this  fund  to  the  credit  of  the 
United  States  as  a  gift,  and  yet  I  do  not  want  to 
embarrass  the  Ordnance  Department  in  its  dealings 
with  the  Savage  Arms  Company. 

BAKER, 
Secretary  of  War. 


MACHINE    GUNS  167 

072.4/68 

OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE, 

Washington,  April  24,  1917. 
Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  War: 

Subject:  Acceptance  of  check  from  Col.  Lewis 
covering  royalties  on  machine  guns. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  acceptance  of  this  check 
would  embarrass  the  Ordnance  Department  in  its 
dealings  with  the  Savage  Arms  Company  with  ref- 
erence to  the  Lewis  gun.  If  Col.  Lewis  wishes  to 
treat  further  purchases  made  and  to  be  made  of 
L< -\\is  guns  from  the  Savage  Arms  Company  in  a 
similar  manner  and  shall  notify  the  War  Depart- 
ment of  his  intention,  the  resulting  advantage  in 
cost  to  the  Government  of  the  Lewis  gun  must  be 
considered  when  negotiations  for  machine  guns  of 
like  character  are  under  way.  If  he  shall  not  give 
any  such  notice  of  intention,  nor  transfer  to  the 
United  States  his  right  to  royalties  on  guns  manu- 
factured for  the  United  States,  the  price  at  which 
guns  may  be  offered  by  the  Savage  Arms  Company 
will,  of  course,  be  considered  at  the  figure  which  the 
company  gives. 

There  are,  however,  some  other  features  accom- 
panying the  offer  of  this  check  by  Col.  Lewis  which 
I  think  should  be  taken  into  consideration  in  reach- 
ing a  conclusion  as  to  its  acceptance.  In  his  accom- 
panying letter  dated  February  16,  1917,  he  states 
to  the  Secretary  of  War : 

"I  informed  you  that  I  had  repeatedly  offered  my 
interest  in  my  machine  gun  inventions  to  my  o\vn 
government,  without  thought  of  pecuniary  recom- 
pense, loii£  before  undertaking  the  development  and 
introduction  of  the  gun  abroad." 

Col.  Lewis  never  offered  either  to  this  Depart- 
ment or  to  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortifica- 


168        ORDNANCE 


TIE   WORLD   WAI 


tion,  which  are  the  agencies  established  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  machine  gun  supply  of  the  United 
States,  his  interest  in  his  machine  gun  inventions. 
There  is  no  record  of  any  such  offer  as  he  claims 
to  have  made,  and  the  first  gun  which  he  presented 
to  either  the  Ordnance  Department  or  the  Board  of 
Ordnance  and  Fortification  was  offered  for  consid- 
eration as  a  commercial  matter,  and  had  itself  been 
manufactured  abroad. 

He  further  states  in  his  letter  enclosing  his  check : 

"I  have  never  received  the  slightest  assistance  or 
encouragement  in  the  practical  development  of  my 
inventions  from  any  one  connected  with  the  United 
States  Ordnance  Department." 

Col.  Lewis  never  asked  the  assistance  of  the  Ord- 
nance Department  in  the  development  of  his  inven- 
tions. If  the  inventions  had  been  developed  with  the 
aid  of  the  United  States  Government  Col.  Lewis 
would  have  lost  the  right  to  royalties  for  their  use 
by  the  Government.  The  Government  has  tested 
several  of  his  inventions  quite  extensively,  at  con- 
siderable expense,  and  the  tests  were  probably  use- 
ful in  the  development  of  the  inventions ;  but  it  has 
done  as  much  for  many  other  inventors.  The  Act 
of  June  25,  1910,  giving  additional  protection  to 
owners  of  patents  of  the  United  States,  grants  the 
right  of  suit  against  the  United  States  for  compen- 
sation for  the  use  of  inventions,  and  provides  fur- 
ther— 

"That  the  benefits  of  this  Act  shall  not  inure  to 
anybody  who,  when  he  makes  such  claim,  is  in  the 
employment  or  service  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  or  the  assignee  of  any  such  patent; 
nor  shall  this  Act  apply  to  any  device  discovered  or 
invented  by  such  employee  during  the  time  of  his 
employment  or  service." 


MACHIM;  GUNS  169 

Col.  Lewis  further  state 

"I  feel  a  moral  obligation  to  refuse  to  profit  to 
the  extent  of  one  penny  from  the  sale  of  the  above- 
mentioned  guns  to  the  War  Department. " 

The  Ordnance  Department  has  made  considerable 
purchases  of  two  other  articles  invented  by  Col. 
Lewis,  namely,  range  finders,  aggregating  in  cost 
something  like  $350,000.  These  articles,  like  the 
machine  gun,  were  invented  by  Col.  Lewis  while  in 
active  service  in  the  Coast  Artillery.  His  range 
finders  have  been  purchased  from  private  parties, 
and  the  Government  has  been  given  no  advantage, 
in  purchase  price  or  otherwise,  by  reason  of  the 
range  finders  having  been  invented  and  patented  by 
Col.  Lewis.  In  connection  with  the  development  of 
the  first  there  were  allotted  by  the  Board  of  Ord- 
nance and  Fortification  sums  aggregating  approxi- 
mately $10,000. 

I  think  that  the  effect  of  the  acceptance  of  Col. 
is'  check  in  operating  as  an  endorsement  of  his 
statements  and  position  in  regard  to  the  use  of  his 
inventions  by  the  Government  should  be  taken  into 
consideration  in  determining  whether  or  not  it 
should  be  accepted,  if  any  discretion  exists  in  the 
matter. 

(Signed)  WILLIAM  CROZIER, 

Brig. -Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  A. 

The  last  paragraph  of  my  memorandum  was  in- 
tended to  induce  reflection  before  accepting  the 
chock,  for  the  reason  stated.  It  was  this  memoran- 
dum which  Col.  Lewis,  as  stated  in  his  testimony, 
BO  averse  from  having  appeal-  in  the  record.  I 
can  understand  why  he  \v.»iil«I  not  like  to  have  it 
appeal-,  but  I  put  it  in  ord  myself  a  few  days 

afterward. 


170   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Shortly  after  the  receipt  of  my  memorandum 
the  Secretary  of  War  sent  it  to  Col.  Lewis  with 
the  following  letter: 

072.4/70 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  April  29,  1917. 
MY  DEAR  COLONEL  LEWIS  : 

On  February  16th  you  wrote  me  a  letter  and  sent 
me  a  certified  check  on  the  Corn  Exchange  Bank  of 
New  York  for  $10,889.17,  with  request  that  I  deposit 
same  to  the  credit  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

In  your  letter  you  state  that  this  sum  was  thje 
amount  received  by  you  from  royalties  on  three 
hundred  and  fifty-three  Lewis  machine  guns  with 
spare  parts  manufactured  largely  under  contract 
with  the  Canadian  Government  but  actually  deliv- 
ered to,  and  paid  for  by,  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment through  the  War  Department.  In  my  office  in 
June,  1916,  you  informed  me  that  you  had  repeat- 
edly offered  your  interest  in  your  machine  gun 
inventions  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
without  thought  of  pecuniary  recompense,  and  that 
you  felt  a  moral  obligation  to  refuse  to  profit  to  the 
extent  of  one  penny  on  the  sale  of  such  guns  to 
the  War  Department. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  your  letter  contains  sev- 
eral statements  which  have  from  time  to  time  been 
the  basis  of  controversy  I  deem  it  wise  to  hand  you 
herewith  copy  of  memorandum  from  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  to  whom  I  referred  the  question  of  ac- 
cepting this  check,  and  also  as  to  whether  its 
acceptance  would  embarrass  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment in  subsequent  dealings  with  the  Savage  Arms 
Company  in  purchasing  further  supplies  of  the 
Lewis  gun. 


MACHIM;  GUNS  171 

I  do  not  send  you  the  attached  memorandum  to 
invite  further  comment  on  the  controversial  por- 
tions either  of  your  letter  or  that  of  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  but  merely  to  have  it  understood  that  the 
acceptance  of  this  check  by  the  Government  is  not 
to  be  considered  as  a  determination  by  me  of  any 
of  these  ancient  matters  of  controversy. 

If  you  do  not  care  to  have  this  money  deposited 
in  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  simply  on  the 
ground  stated  in  your  original  letter  and  without 
understanding  that  I  am  now  examining  or  under- 
taking to  determine  any  controversial  question  as 
to  the  breach  of  relations  between  you  and  the  War 
Department,  or  any  branch  or  division  of  it,  I  shall 
of  course  be  glad  to  accept  the  check  on  behalf  of 
the  Government. 

I  shall  hold  the  check  until  I  have  your  reply. 

I  ask  your  particular  attention  to  the  suggestion 
made  by  Gen.  Crozier  with  regard  to  the  purchase 
of  certain  Lewis  guns  from  the  Savage  Arms  Com- 
pany, in  order  that  this  department  may  be  advised 
in  undertaking  future  purchases. 

Very  sincerely  yours, 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

COL.  ISAAC  N.  LEWIS, 

1  Bus.-"!!  Terrace, 
Montclair,  N.  J. 

In  view  of  the  frequent  reference  in  this  letter  to 
my  memorandum  to  the  Secretary  of  "War.  enclosed 
with  it,  it  is  not  easy  to  und<  rsfand  the  statement 
of  Col.  Lewis  and  Mr.  Calfee  that  they  did  not  think 
it  was  intended  to  bo  seen  by  Col.  Lewis.  (Page 
1 .")(».)  Pol.  Lewis'  reply  to  the  Secretary  came 
U>  *\  ;  T  returned  it  with  a  memorandum  that 


172        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAI 

I  saw  no  objection  to  the  acceptance  of  the  check; 
which  was  then  sent  to  the  Treasury  Department 
and  deposited  as  a  donation  to  the  Government. 
Col.  Lewis'  reply,  my  memorandum  and  the  letter  of 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  telling  of 
the  final  disposition  of  the  check  are  below: 

072.4/73 

No.  1  Eussell  Terrace, 
Montclair,  N.  J., 

May  12, 1917. 
THE  HONORABLE  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SECRETARY: 

Your  letter  of  April  29th,  with  its  enclosed 
memorandum  from  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  has  been 
received  and  very  carefully  considered. 

I  do  care  to  have  the  money  represented  by  the 
check  sent  you  in  my  letter  of  February  16,  1917, 
deposited  in  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States 
simply  on  the  ground  stated  in  my  original  letter, 
without  any  understanding  that  you  are  now  exam- 
ining or  undertaking  to  determine  any  controversial 
question  as  to  the  breach  of  relations  between  me 
and  the  War  Department,  or  any  branch  or  division 
of  it,  and  I  now  have  the  honor  to  request  again 
that  you  so  accept  and  deposit  it. 

My  letter  of  February  16,  1917,  was  sent  you 
solely  for  the  reason  stated  therein,  and  for  no 
other. 

I  can  see  no  possible  embarrassment  to  the  War 
Department  nor  to  the  Ordnance  Department,  in  the 
acceptance  of  my  check.  It  is  possible,  however,  that 
your  acceptance  and  deposit  of  the  check  may  em- 
barrass the  present  Chief  of  Ordnance  personally. 

The  memorandum  from  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  to 


MACHINE    GINS  173 

which  you  invited  my  attention  is  so  widely  at  vari- 
ance w"ith  what  I  know  from  personal  knowledge  to 
be  the  facts  in  the  case,  that  I  cannot  fairly  consider 
any  of  the  questions  raised  by  Gen.  Crozier  therein 
without  controversy,  and  I  understand  it  to  be  your 
wish  and  direction  that  there  be  no  further  con- 
troversy. 

In  the  present  very  grave  national  emergency,  I 
am  directly  instrumental  in  supplying,  delivering 
and  putting  on  the  actual  firing  lines  against  the 
fighting  enemies  of  my  country  more  machine  guns 
each  week  than  the  present  Chief  of  Ordnance  has 
supplied  for  the  use  of  our  own  army  of  defence 
during  the  whole  of  the  fourteen  years  that  he  has 
been  in  office.  I  have  done,  and  am  doing,  this  with- 
out one  penny  of  assistance  and  without  one  word 
of  encouragement  or  acknowledgment  from  any  one 
connected  with  the  Ordnance  Department,  and  in 
spite  of  the  long  continued  and  active  opposition  of 
that  Department. 

I  am  therefore  content  to  now  rest  the  matter  with 
you  simply  as  a  personal  appeal  for  justice. 
Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  I.  N.  LEWIS, 

Colonel,  U.  S.  Army,  Retired. 

072.4/86 

OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE, 

War  Department,  June  4,  1917. 
Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  War: 

Subject :  Acceptance  and  deposit  of  check  from 
Col.  Lewis  returning  myaltie<. 

I  do  not  sec  any  objection  to  the  acceptance  and 
deposit  of  Col.  Lewis'  check  I'm*  $10,889.17  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  letter  of  May  12,  1917  (0.  0.  file 
i>7_.4/73),  in  reply  to  one  from  the  Secretary  of  War 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  April  29th  (0.  0.  file  072.4/70),  in  view  of  the 
reservations  made  in  the  last-mentioned  letter  con- 
cerning the  determination  of  the  matters  in  con- 
troversy. 

(Signed)  WILLIAM  CROZIER, 

Brig.-Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  A. 

072.4/92 

TREASURY  DEPARTMENT, 

Washington,  June  18,  1917. 
MY  DEAR  MR.  SECRETARY: 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  letter  dated  7th  instant,  with  its  enclosures, 
including  check  No.  Special  692,  drawn  February  16, 
1917,  by  Isaac  N.  Lewis,  on  the  Corn  Exchange 
Bank,  New  York,  in  your  favor  for  $10,889.17,  en- 
dorsed by  you  to  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury. 

The  check  has  been  collected  and,  as  requested,  its 
amount  has  been  deposited  in  the  United  States 
Treasury  in  the  name  of  Isaac  N.  Lewis,  Colonel 
U.  S.  Army,  retired,  on  account  of  "Donation  to 
the  Government,"  as  shown  by  enclosed  duplicate 
certificate  of  deposit  No.  6802  issued,  therefor  on 
June  15th  by  the  Treasurer  of  the  United  States. 

The  correspondence  which  accompanied  yonr 
letter  is  herewith  returned  for  the  files  of  your 
Department. 

Respectfully, 
(Signed)  OSCAR  T.  CROSBY, 

Assistant  Secretary. 
The  Honorable  the  Secretary  of  War. 

A  reason  seems  needed  for  Col.  Lewis'  change  of 
procedure,  and  his  final  determination  to  carry  out 
his  intention  of  release  of  the  Government  from  pay- 
ment for  his  inventions,  which  he  had  been  express- 


MACHINK    GUNS  175 

ing  for  so  many  years  without  carrying  them  out. 
Perhaps  the  reason  may  be  found  in  his  changed 
circumstances.  He  testified  before  the  Senate  Mili- 
tary Committee  that  at  that  time,  in  December,  1917, 
over  70,000  of  his  machine  guns  had  been  manu- 
factured for  the  European  armies.  I  do  not  know 
what  royalty  he  received  on  these  guns,  but  if  the 
rate  was  the  same  as  stated  for  -the  40,000  machine 
guns,  ordered  by  the  United  States,  in  his  letter 
of  December  11,  1917,  quoted  on  page  141,  and 
if  the  proportion  of  spare  parts  to  guns  was  the 
same,  the  total  of  the  royalty  must  have  been  a 
large  sum.  He  further  testified  that,  at  the  same 
time,  the  manufacture  of  his  gun  was  going  on  at 
the  rate  of  over  2,000  per  week,  of  which  less  than 
500  could  have  been  for  the  United  States.  He  was, 
therefore,  receiving  royalty,  apparently,  for  1,500 
or  more  per  week.  At  the  rate  indicated  in  his  above 
1  letter,  his  continuing  income  from  the  manu- 
facture of  guns  must  also  have  been  very  large.  I 
do  not  see  any  objection  to  the  receipt  by  Col. 
Lewis  of  these  large  sums;  but  I  do  see  objection 
to  his  effort  to  accentuate  his  unfounded  charge  of 
unfair  treatment  by  the  Ordnance  Department  and 
its  head  with  the  allegation  that  the  treatment  was 
in  face  of  his  desire  to  spare  the  Government 
pense,  which  lie  never  took  any  steps  to  carry  out 
until  he  could  well  afford  to  do  so. 
Tn  the  early  autumn  of  1916  a  particularly  ener- 
newspaper  assault  was  made  upon  the  Ord- 
Department  and  myself  for  the  unfairness 
which  v ..  to  have  exhibited  toward  Col. 


176        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WA] 


Lewis  and  the  Lewis  gun.  A  great  metropolitan 
daily  considered  the  matter  of  enough  importance 
to  devote  a  column  of  the  first  page  and  all  the 
reading  matter  of  the  fourth  page  of  one  issue, 
and  an  editorial,  to  its  presentation ;  and  the  charges 
made  were  widely  printed  in  other  journals  through- 
out the  country.  I  made  a  short  reply  in  the  first 
mentioned  paper,  which  manifested  a  fair  disposi- 
tion to  print  both  sides,  and  in  addition  I  took  up 
the  subject  with  the  Secretary  of  War,  urging  that 
the  matter  was  not  simply  one  of  a  controversy  be- 
tween two  officers,  but  was  another  instance  of  a 
long  series  of  charges  against  an  executive  depart- 
ment of  the  Government  and  its  subordinate  bureau, 
made  now,  however,  by  an  officer  whose  status  on 
the  retired  list  of  the  army  rendered  him  subject 
to  call  to  account  through  the  processes  of  military 
discipline.  I  represented  that  we  who  were  tem- 
porarily at  the  head  of  these  departments  had  not 
only  our  own  reputations  to  look  after,  but  had  the 
good  name  of  the  departments  in  our  custody,  and 
that  it  was  our  duty  to  vindicate  the  latter  when  it 
was  assailed  by  persons  who  could  be  made  respon- 
sible, particularly  when,  as  in  the  present  instance, 
the  assault  was  against  both  ourselves  and  our  pred- 
ecessors in  office. 

Gen.  Leonard  Wood,  on  the  other  side,  also 
brought  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  in  a  letter  objecting  to  the  manner  in  which 
my  reply  in  the  metropolitan  daily  had  spoken  of 
his  machine  gun  test  at  Plattsburg,  which  was  not 


MACHINE    GUNS  177 

complimentary,  and  requested  action  in  accordance 
with  his  views. 

The   Secretary  referred  the  matter  to  the  In- 

tor  General  for  examination  and  report,  and 

that  officer  handed  his  report  to  the  Chief  of  Staff 

on  October  12,  1916.    After  reviewing  the  case  his 

conclusions  were  as  follows : 

"56.  The  essential  questions  of  fact  raised  by 
this  correspondence  are: 

(a)  Whether  the  test  at  Plattsburg  was  an  in- 
formal OIK'. 

By  the  Inspector  General:  In  my  opinion  the  test 
was  informal. 

(b)  Whether  the  Benet-Mercie  guns  submitted 
to  the  test  were  in  fit  condition. 

By  the  Inspector  General:  The  proceedings  of 
the  Board  do  not  show  that  it,  as  a  Board,  made 
any  examination  of  the  Benet-Mercie  gun,  but  do 
show  that  Lieut.  Gordon,  commanding  the  Machine 
(inn  Troop  from  which  the  guns  were  received  to 
•ted  that  they  were  in  the  best  possible  con- 
dition. 

Gen,  \Voo<l  states  in  his  letter:  .  .  .  "Lieut. 
Gordon  is  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  Benet- 
]\Iei-cir  min,  skilled  in  its  use,  and  reported  his 
^•iiiis  in  perfect  condition."  .  .  . 

In  n-ply  to  this,  (ien.  Crozier  states:  .  .  .  "The 
parties  interested  in  one  of  the  competing  guns, 
only,  received  notification  and  were  represented  at 
the  test.  They  presented  their  guns  with  all  the 
irance  of  proper  condition  to  enter  the  test  and 
of  !  handling  dnrin-  the  test  which  would 

naturally  result  from  the  presentation  of  a  gun 
l>\  its  manufacturers.  The  Benet-Mercie  gun  was 
pivx-nted  and  looked  after  by  the  class  of  personnel 
which  has,  in  the  service.  80  often  failed  to  get 


178   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

good  results  from  the  gun  by  reason  of  unskillful 
care  and  handling,  whose  statement  therefore  that 
the  guns  were  in  the  best  possible  condition  natu- 
rally would  not  be  accepted  by  any  one  interested  in 
the  guns."  .  .  . 

By  the  Inspector  General:  In  my  opinion  this  is 
a  fair  statement  of  the  case. 

Note:  On  July  5,  1916,  the  United  States  Ord- 
nance Company,  as  attorney  and  agent  for  Messrs. 
Benet  and  Mercie,  requested  information  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  as  to  the  comparative  tests  as  re- 
ported in  the  public  press  to  have  been  conducted 
at  the  Plattsburg  camp  with  the  Benet-Mercie  au- 
tomatic rifle,  stating  that  they  had  no  knowledge 
that  such  tests  were  contemplated  and  requesting 
information  as  to  whether  they  were  conducted 
under  official  authority  of  the  War  Department. 

57.  On  September  18,  1916,  Gen.  Crozier  wrote 
a  letter  to  the  New  York  Times,  in  reply  to  a  long 
article  and  editorial  published  in  that  paper  on  that 
date,  on  the  subject  of  the  Lewis  gun  and  its  rela- 
tion with  the  Ordnance  Department,  in  which  ha 
used  the  following  language :  .  .  .  "  In  the  so-called 
Plattsburg  test  none  of  the  safeguards  of  thorough- 
ness or  fairness  was  present.    A -small  number  of 
rounds,  only,  was  fired,  which  did  not  include  the 
essential   endurance    test.      No   responsible    officer 
would  have  been  justified  in  basing  conclusions  upon 
its  results."   .    .    . 

58.  On  September  19,  1916,  Major-Gen.  Leonard 
Wood  inclosed  this  extract  to  the  Adjutant-General 
of  the  Army  and  raised  questions  of  fact  as  to  the 
statement  that  none  of  the  safeguards  of  thorough- 
ness or  fairness  was  present  in  the  test  referred  to, 
alleging  the  statement  to  be  contrary  to  fact,  wholly 
unwarranted  and  tending  to  misrepresent  the  test. 

59.  By  the  Inspector  General:    The  Inspector 


MACHINE    GUNS  179 

thinks  that  the  difference  of  opinion  between  Gen. 

•<1  and  Gen.  Crozier  with  respect  to  the  character 
of  the  test  of  the  Lewis  gun  at  Plattsburg  Barracks 

is  from  a  difference  of  point  of  view  rather  than 
involving  questions  of  fact. 
As  above  stated,  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Forti- 

ion  had  determined  a  program  of  tests  to  which 
this  Lewis  gun  should  be  subjected,  which  program, 
by  the  way,  had  been  approved  by  Gen.  Wood  as 

^ident  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortifica- 
tion, and  also  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Undoubtedly,  Gen.  Crozier  had  such  a  test  in 
mind  when  interpreting  the  test  at  Plattsburg,  while 
Gen.  Wood,  now  commanding  the  Eastern  Depart- 
ment, had  abandoned  the  program  prescribed  by  the 
Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  and  substi- 
tuted one  of  his  own. 

While  I  think  Gen.  Crozier  made  a  mistake  in 
entering  the  controversy  over  the  Lewis  gun  in  the 

s,  I  must  admit  that  there  was  strong  provoca- 
tion  in  the  article  and  editorial  thereon  published 
in  the  New  York  Times  of  September  18,  1916,  prin- 
cipally in  that  it  placed  the  responsibility  for  the 
;i  of  the  Lewis  gun  upon  Gen.  Crozier  and 
the  Ordnance  Department,  whereas,  every  action 
with  respect  to  this  gun  and  its  rejection  had  been 
conducted  under  the  direction  of  the  Board  of  Ord- 
nance and  Fortification,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Secretary  of  War;  and  all  tests  of  the  gun  had  been 
made  by  a  board  convened  by  direction  of  the  Sec- 

ry  of  War,  on  which  there  was  only  one  ord- 
nance officer. 

oNS. 

60.  My  u-eneral  conclusions,  as  developed  from  an 
examination  of  the  Is,  are: 

)     There  is  no  official  record  that  Col.  Lewis 
ever  offered  a  gun  of  his   invention,  through   any 


180        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAI 


individual  or  through  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and 
Fortification,  to  the  United  States  Government,  free 
or  at  a  price. 

(b)  The  first  and  only  offer  of  the  gun  to  the 
Government,  of  record,  was  made  by  a  representa- 
tive of  the  Automatic  Arms  Company,  on  September 
2,  1913,  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance— One  hundred 
guns,  complete,  at  not  to  exceed  $1,000  each,  and  to 
license  the  Ordnance  Department  to  manufacture, 
use  and  sell  such  guns  in  the  United  States  for  a 
royalty  of  not  to  exceed  $150  per  gun. 

(c)  Such  tests  as  the  Lewis  gun  has  been  sub- 
jected to,  have  been  under  a  program  authorized 
by  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification  and  ap- 
proved by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  were  made  by 
boards  of  officers  named  in  orders  from  the  Adju- 
tant-General's Office — one  officer  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  on  each  board. 

(d)  The   Savage   Arms   Company,  through  its 
President,  in  a  letter  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  with 
reference    to   the    test   conducted   in   April,    1916, 
stated:  "The  Company  feels  that  the  investigation 
has  been  entirely  impartial  and  regards  the  Board 
as  one  very  capable  of  judging  the  value  of  the 
investigation  to  the  Ordnance  Department.  We  also 
appreciate  the  courtesy  shown  us  by  Col.  Peirce 
and  his  assistants. " 

(e)  The  proceedings  of  the  boards  which  tested 
the  rifle  have  been,  in  each  case,  duly  approved  by 
the  Secretary  of  War. 

(f)  Whatever  responsibility  attaches  to  the  con- 
demnation of  this  gun  as  a  service  gun  belongs  to 
the  War  Department  and  not  to  the  Chief  of  Ord- 
nance nor  to  the  Ordnance  Department. 

(g)  The  test  ordered  by  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, Eastern  Department,  at  Plattsburg,  N.  Y.,  in 
June,  1916,  was  unauthorized  and  improper. 


MACHINE    GUNS  181 

(h)     The  controversy  over  the  Plattsburg  test 

arose  through  the  tact  that  the  owners  of  the  Lewis 

gun  had  previously  submitted  it  for  two  tests  to 

boards  convened  by  tin4  War  Department,  under  a 

program  approved  by  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and 

Fortification  and  it  had  failed  to  pass  what  is  known 

lie  Arsenal  or  endurance  test,  thereby  losing 

ight  to  the  field  test  proposed  by  the  program  of 

the  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  or  to  any 

not  authorized  by  the  War  Department. 

(i)  The  records  do  not  show  any  hostility  on  the 
part  of  Gen.  Crozier  or  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment to  the  Lewis  gun,  but  do  show  that  the  Depart- 
ment, by  direction  of  its  Chief,  afforded  the  owners 
of  this  gun  every  reasonable  facility  in  placing  it 
before  the  testing  board  at  the  Springfield  Armory. 

(j)  The  Secretary  of  War  should  direct  each  of 
the  officers  concerned  in  this  controversy  to  drop 
it,  as  no  good  purpose  can  be  subserved  by  con- 
tinuing such  a  controversy,  which  really  does  not 
involve  questions  of  fact,  but  the  value  of  opinion 
as  to  the  character  of  test  to  which  this  gun  was  sub- 
jected at  Plattsburg. 

E.  A.  GARLINGTOIT, 
Inspector  General. 

In  the  body  of  the  report  there  had  occurred  the 
following : 


. . 


'Note:  It  will  be  observed  that  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment furnished  the  Automatic  Arms  Company 
every  facility  with  respect  to  the  manufacture  of 
this  gun  for  t» 

After  the  submission  of  the  Inspector  General's 

•  rt,  the  Secretary  of  War  issued  a  press  bulletin 

in  which,  after  summarizing  the  subject,  lie  stated: 


182   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"The  Inspector  General  of  the  Army  was  ordered 
to  investigate  the  other  aspects  of  the  case.  He  has 
now  done  so,  and  his  general  conclusions  are  as 
follows:  The  "General  Conclusions"  were  then 
given,  except  that  conclusion  (g)  was  omitted,  and 
for  conclusion  (j)  was  substituted  the  following: 
' '  The  controversy  which  has  arisen  does  not  involve 
questions  of  fact,  merely  the  value  of  opinion  as 
to  the  character  of  test  to  which  this  gun  was  sub- 
jected at  Plattsburg.  The  Secretary  of  War  has 
approved  these  conclusions  of  the  Inspector  General 
and,  in  accordance  with  the  latter  ?s  recommendation, 
has  directed  the  controversy  to  cease." 

It  can  be  noted  that  in  thus  disposing  of  the  case 
the  Secretary  of  War  found  that  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment had  acted  without  hostility  and  in  accord- 
ance with  its  duty  toward  the  Lewis  gun,  but  he 
failed  to  take  any  disciplinary  or  otherwise  remedial 
action  against  the  officer  who  had  published  the  con- 
trary, and  he  placed  all  concerned  on  an  equality 
in  directing  that  the  controversy  should  cease.  I 
felt  that  this  action  did  not  conclusively  dispose  of 
the  matter,  principally  in  that  it  did  not  follow 
formal  proceedings  in  which  both  sides  would  ap- 
pear together,  such  as  are  held  by  a  court,  preceding 
announced  conclusions,  and  I  urged  upon  the  Secre- 
tary that  the  matter  had  reached  such  a  stage  that 
nothing  less  than  such  proceedings  would  serve  to 
set  it  at  rest,  and  meet  the  sentiment  of  angry  criti- 
cism of  the  Ordnance  Department  which  had  been 
aroused  in  the  public  mind.  He  replied  that  Col. 
Lewis  was  not  satisfied  either,  and  had  made  the 


MACHINE    GUNS  183 

complaint  appearing  in  his  letter  of  December  11, 
1917,  quoted  in  his  testimony  on  page  141,  and 
added  that  he  intended  to  offer  him  a  court  of  in- 
quiry in  order  to  afford  full  opportunity  for  the 
presentation  and  examination  of  his  grievance.  The 
offer  of  a  court  of  inquiry  was  made  to  Col.  Lewis, 
and  was  declined  by  him;  whereupon  I  myself  ap- 
plied for  such  a  court  in  the  following  letter: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE  OF  THE  WAR  COUNCIL, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  January  6,  1918. 

From:  Major-Gen.  William  Crozier,  Chief  of 
Ordnance. 

To:  The  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army. 

Subject:  Eequest  for  appointment  of  a  court  of 
inquiry. 

1.  Charge  having  been  publicly  made  by  Col.  I.  N. 
Lewis,  U.  S.  A.  (retired),  to  the  effect  that  the  Ord- 
nance Department,  and  I  as  Chief  of  Ordnance,  have 
failed  to  accord  proper  consideration  to  his  inven- 
tion of  a  machine  gun,  and  that  the  service  has 
thereby  been  deprived  of  a  much-needed  supply  of 
'nine  .mins,  and  this  charge  having  been  repeated 
in  the  testimony  of  Col.  L<-\\is  before  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  on  December  22, 
11)17.  together  with  the  further  charge  that  I  op- 
doption  for  use  in  the  service  of  certain 
range  Cinders  invented  by  Col.  Lewis,  and  these 
charges  having  been  made  to  appear  more  serious 
throu.ii'li  the  allegation  that  the  use  of  the  inven- 
nti <>ne(l  had  been  offered  to  the  United 
Stat-  of  charge  for  compensation  to  the  in- 

ventor, and  the  eh.  >^in£  received  wide  circu- 

lation, with  danger  of  impairment  of  the  confidence 


ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  the  Country  in  the  manner  in  which  the  opera- 
tions confided  to  the  Ordnance  Department  have 
been  carried  on,  I  request  that  a  Court  of  Inquiry 
be  appointed  to  examine  into  the  nature  of  all  of 
the  transactions  referred  to  in  the  above-mentioned 
charges,  and  into  all  the  relations  between  the  said 
Col.  Lewis  and  the  Ordnance  Department  or  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance  in  so  far  as  they  concern  these 
charges  and  the  interests  of  the  service,  and  that 
the  Court  be  directed  to  state,  in  addition  to  its 
conclusions  of  fact,  its  opinion  concerning  the  trans- 
actions inquired  into  and  the  conduct  of  the  officers 
involved  in  them,  and  to  recommend  what  further 
steps  should  be  taken  in  the  premises. 

WILLIAM  CROZIER. 

The  Secretary  of  War  had  a  conversation  with 
Senator  Chamberlain,  Chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Military  Affairs,  on  the  subject  of  this  applica- 
tion for  a  court,  as  a  result  of  which  he  sent  tie 
Senator  the  following  letter: 

January  7, 1918. 
MY  DEAR  SENATOR  CHAMBERLAIN  : 

I  enclose  you  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Crozier, 
which  I  found  on  my  desk  to-day  after  my  return 
from  the  Capitol.  The  General  had  suggested  to  me 
his  purpose,  but  I  did  not  know  that  he  intended  to 
follow  it  up  with  a  formal  request. 

This  request  is  made  under  the  provision  of 
Article  97  of  the  Articles  of  War,  which  reads  as 
follows : 

A  Court  of  Inquiry  to  examine  into  the  na- 
ture of  any  transaction  of  or  accusation  or  im- 
putation against  any  officer  or  soldier  may  be 
ordered  by  the  President  or  by  any  command- 
ing officer;  but  a  Court  of  Inquiry  shall  not 


MACHINE    GUNS  185 

be  ordered  by  any  commanding  officer  except 
upon  the  request  of  the  officer  or  soldier  whose 
conduct  is  to  be  inquired  into. 

As  I  stated  to  you  to-day  in  our  conversation,  Gen. 
Crozier  feels  that  by  reason  of  the  Lewis  machine 
#un  controversy  his  life-long  service  to  the  country 
and  his  reputation  as  an  officer  and  as  a  man  have 
i  brought  into  discredit.  As  he  stated  to  you  and 
to  me,  he  feels  that  one  side  of  this  controversy  has 
had  access  to  widespread  newspaper  publicity  while 
the  other  was  restrained  by  those  considerations  of 
discipline  and  propriety  which  prevent  Army  offi- 
from  indulging  in  newspaper  controversies 
with  regard  to  the  business  of  the  service.  As  a 
consequence,  he  feels  that  the  country  has  reached 
an  opinion  on  this  subject  to  the  effect  that  he  has 
been  unjust  to  Col.  Lewis  and  to  his  invention,  slow 
in  recognizing  the  merits  of  a  good  weapon,  and 
prejudiced  in  his  treatment  of  the  weapon  and  its 
inventor,  all  of  which  he  earnestly  denies  and  yet 
feels  himself  unable  to  effectively  follow  the  ac- 
tion with  his  denial  or  by  any  act  which  is 
within  his  power  to  change  an  erroneous  public 
opinion  against  him.  T  am  deeply  impressed  with 
(I'-n.  Crozi«  .  His  confirmation  is  now 

pending  before  the-  Senate.   He  is  nearly  sixty-three 
B  "I<1  and  has  been  in  the  Army  since  his  grad- 
uation from   \Ves1    Point  in  187(5,  in  all  forty-one 
•  s.   Whatever  ivputation  lie  lias  lie  has  made  as 
•iticer  in  the  Army,  and  T  can  testify  that  at  least 
for  the  two  years  during  which  lie  has  been  under 
my  observation  his  industry  lias  been  indefatigable 
;  nd  his  xeal  tVnvnf  and  sinirh'-niinded  for  the  irood 
of  the  service.     Ind.    d,  T  think  T  know  of  no  public 
ant    who   spends    nmre   hours    in   or  has    fewer 
interests  apart  from  the  service  than  fion.  Crozier. 


186   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I  have  myself  endeavored  twice  to  examine  this  ma- 
chine gun  controversy,  feeling  that  I  was  without 
any  other  interest  than  that  which  a  judge  ought 
properly  to  have  in  determining  a  controversy,  and 
each  time  I  have  come  away  with  the  feeling  that 
Gen.  Crozier  had  acted  not  only  upon  the  best  mo- 
tives, but  upon  a  sound  discretion  and  reasoned 
judgment.  I  am  not  saying  this  to  affect  in  the  least 
the  ultimate  determination  of  the  question  now  pre- 
sented, but  only  because  it  seems  to  me  that  in 
justice  an  officer  of  such  service  and  such  present 
loyalty  and  zeal  is  entitled  to  any  protection  for  his 
reputation  which  the  rules  of  his  profession  accord 
him. 

I  have  tA\ro  embarrassments  about  the  request 
which  Gen.  Crozier  has  presented.  One  arises  from 
the  fact  that  the  Government  needs  at  this  time  its 
capable  officers  in  other  service,  and  I  should  hesi- 
tate to  detail  three  or  five  officers  of  sufficient  expe- 
rience and  judgment  to  constitute  this  Court.  This 
difficulty,  however,  I  can  meet  by  asking  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  American  Bar  Association  to  name  a 
competent  number  of  the  most  distinguished  law- 
yers in  the  country  who  would  be  willing  to  accept 
National  Army  Commissions  and  thus  become  of- 
ficers long  enough  to  be  constituted  into  this  Court, 
make  the  necessary  inquiry  and  report  their  findings, 
and  this  I  should  undoubtedly  do  were  it  not  for 
the  fact  that  this  controversy  is  at  least  a  part  ot? 
the  subject-matter  which  the  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  of  the  Senate  is  now  considering,  and  I 
realize  that  there  might  be  some  embarrassment 
to  the  Committee  if  such  a  Court  were  appointed  to 
prosecute  this  inquiry  while  the  Committee  itself 
is  considering  the  matter. 

If  I  could  make  a  suggestion  in  the  matter,  it 
would  be  that  the  Committee  hold  Gen.  Crozier 's 


MArilINK    (HTNS  187 

nomination  in  abeyance  until  after  the  report  of 
the  Court  of  Inquiry,  which  T  would  in  every  pos- 
sible way  urge  to  speedy  deliverance.  I  do  not 
think  this  action  would  necessarily  affect  any  rec- 
ommendations which  the  Committee  may  desire  to 
make  growing  out  of  its  present  inquiry,  and  so 
there  would  be  avoided  the  appearance  of  an 
attempt  either  to  influence  or  anticipate  the  action 
of  the  Committee  by  the  appointment  of  the  Court. 
You  were  good  enough  to  say  to-day  that  you  would 
lav  this  matter  before  your  associates  on  the  Com- 
mittee in  executive  session  and  give  me  the  benefit 
of  their  views.  I  will  be  very  grateful  if  you  would 
do  so  at  your  early  convenience. 
Cordially  yours, 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 
HON.  GEO.  E.  CHAMBERLAIN, 
United  States  Senate. 

On  the  next  day  he  sent  me  a  copy  of  this  letter 
with  a  note  as  follows: 

THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 
Washington,  D.  C. 
January  8,  1918. 
MY  DEAR  GEN.  CROZIER: 

I  had  a  talk  yesterday  with  Senator  Chamberlain 
and,  as  a  result,  sent  him  a  letter  of  which  the 
enclosed  is  a  copy. 

Tli  it^gestion  with  regard  to  the  pos- 

sibility of  onr  olTriidiii.ir  the  Committee  by  appear- 
ing to 'disr.  nurd  their  conclusions  was  a  new  thought 
to  me.    I  do  not  want  to  make  matters  worse,  to 
the  least.  Cordially  yours, 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER. 

I  do  not  know  what  response  the  Secretary's  letter 
to  Senator  Chamberlain  met  with,  but  a  few  days 


18        ORDNANCE   AND  THE   WORLD  WAR 

after  the  receipt  of  Ms  note  I  said  to  the  Secretary 
that  I  still  thought  that  the  court  should  be  held 
and  earnestly  requested  him  to  appoint  it.  I  found 
him  then  very  averse  from  taking  such  action,  on 
the  ground  that  it  would  be  unwise  because  of  its 
possible  effect  upon  the  Committee;  and  was  ad- 
vised by  him  to  leave  the  matter  in  his  hands,  when 
he  would  see  that  justice  should  be  done  both  to 
the  Ordnance  Department  and  to  myself,  and  that 
the  subject  should  be  made  to  appear  in  the  proper 
light.  I  had  in  the  meantime  been  relieved  from  my 
duties  as  Chief  of  Ordnance  and  assigned  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  newly  formed  War  Council,  and  was 
under  orders  to  make  a  visit  to  Europe  to  secure 
information  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  the  war. 
I  had  not  wanted  to  be  relieved  as  Chief  of  Ord- 
nance; first  because  I  wished  to  carry  through  the 
great  war  the  department  which  a  devoted  personnel 
had  brought  to  its  existing  stage  of  efficiency  during 
my  sixteen  years'  service  as  its  head,  and  second 
because  I  felt  that  my  relief  would  imply  the  ad- 
mission by  the  War  Department  of  justification  for 
the  criticism  which  had  been  directed  against  the 
Ordnance  Department,  when  the  unpreparedness 
which  the  department  had  for  years  been  warning 
against  began  to  be  appreciated  by  Congress  and 
the  country.  But  I  was  assured  by  the  Secretary 
that  the  sole  reason  for  my  relief  was  that  my 
services  might  be  availed  of  on  the  highly  impor- 
tant Council  which  had  been  formed,  and  I  accepted 
the  assurance,  though  with  reluctance  at  leaving  my 
department;  and  was  then  very  anxious  to  get  into 


MACHINE    GUNS  189 

the  theater  of  war.  I  therefore  acted  upon  the  Sec- 
retary's advice  that  I  should  not  press  the  matter 
of  the  court  of  inquiry,  with  its  resultant  delay,  and 
sailed  for  Europe, 

When  the  war  was  over,  and  most  of  the  troops 
had  returned  from  Europe,  so  that  there  were 
plenty  of  officers  of  suitable  rank  available  for  duty 
upon  a  court  of  inquiry,  I  renewed  my  effort  to 
obtain  such  a  court,  and  upon  August  16,  1919,  ad- 
dressed a  letter  to  the  Adjutant-General.  In  this 
letter  I  gave  quotations  from  the  testimony  of  Col. 
Lewis  before  the  Senate  Military  Committee,  which 
contained  erroneous  presentation  of  facts,  and  were 
also  aspersions  upon  the  Chief  of  Ordnance.  I 
added  that  I  wished  to  avail  myself  of  the  method 
provided  by  the  military  code  for  securing  a  judicial 
examination  of  the  charges  made  and  expression 
of  opinion  upon  the  conduct  of  all  officers  concerned. 

I  received  from  the  Adjutant-General  the  reply 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  September  10,  1919, 
as  follows : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT 

THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE 

Washington,  Sept.  10,  1919. 

om:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
To:  Major  (H-nrral  William  Cro/ier,  U.  S.  Army, 
Retired,  J735  Massachusetts  Ave.,  Washington, 
B.C. 
Subj' «  i  :   lu  quest  for  appointment  of  a  Court  of 

[iiiry. 

Your  eonmmnioation  of  August  16,  1919,  reqnest- 
tlie  appoint  incut  of  a  Court  of  Inquiry  was  offi- 


190   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cially  considered  by  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the 
6th  of  September,  1919,  and  was  refused  by  him 
for  the  following  reasons : 

"1.  During  the  progress  of  the  war,  on  January 
6,  1918,  a  prior  request  of  like  nature  was  made  by 
General  Crozier,  but  at  that  time  not  pressed  by 
him  for  the  reason  that  the  good  of  the  service  did 
not  permit  the  withdrawal  from  active  operations  of 
the  requisite  number  of  officers  of  rank  and  experi- 
ence to  constitute  such  a  Court.  The  same  situation 
now  exists;  the  Army  is  being  demobilized,  tem- 
porary officers  are  being  discharged,  and  the  heavy 
burden  of  closing  up  the  business  of  the  great  war 
and  reorganizing  the  military  establishment  rests 
upon  the  limited  number  of  regular  officers  availa- 
ble to  the  department.  Such  an  inquiry  as  General 
Crozier  desires  would  necessarily  have  to  be  con- 
ducted by  officers  of  rank  and  authority. 

2.  In  October  of  1916,  the  entire  subject  covered 
by  the  allegations  attributed  to  Colonel  I.  W.  Lewis 
was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  department,  and 
the  Secretary  of  War  directed  an  investigation  to  be 
made  by  General  E.  A.  Garlington,  Inspector  Gen- 
eral.  The  result  of  that  investigation  was  a  complete 
exoneration  of  General  Crozier  as  Chief  of  Ordnance 
and  of  the  Ordnance  Department  in  all  matters  relat- 
ing to  the  so-called  *  Lewis  Machine  Gun  Contro- 
versy.'   The  Secretary  of  War  approved  the  find- 
ings and  conclusions  of  the  Inspector  General,  so 
that  both  by  the  Inspector  General's  report  and  by 
the  action  of  the  Secretary  of  War  the  War  Depart- 
ment has  become  responsible  for  all  action  taken 
with  regard  to  the  Lewis  Machine  Gun,  and  General 
Crozier 's  actions  and  those  of  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment are  vindicated  and  approved. 

3.  The  Secretary  of  War  has  repeatedly,  in  tes- 
timony before  Congress  and  in  public  statements, 


MACHINE    GUNS  191 

stated  as  the  result  of  careful  investigation  and  in- 
quiry on  his  part,  aided  and  informed  by  official  in- 
vestigations and  by  examinations  of  department  rec- 
ords, that  General  Crozier  's  action  with  regard  to  the 
Machine  Gun  Controversy  was  in  every  respect  jus- 
tified  and  had  the  full  approval  of  the  Secretary  of 
War.  The  subject  has  therefore  been  investigated 
and  final  definite  action  taken  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  which  General  Crozier,  of  course,  does  not  seek 
to  have  reversed,  but  rather  reaffirmed. 

4.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  teachings  of  me- 
chanical science,  the  results  of  shop  and  field  tests, 
and  the  logic  of  the  Machine  Gun  Controversy  be- 
the  war,  the  war  itself  has  completely  demon- 
strated the  correctness  of  the  position  taken  by 
General  Crozier.  There  is,  therefore,  nothing  left 
uninvestigated,  and  in  denying  the  request  for  the 
Court  of  Inquiry  the  Secretary  of  War  is  happy  to 
•rt,  as  a  part  of  the  record  of  General  Crozier, 
his  confident  approval  of  his  entire  course  in  the 
matter. 

JOHN  B.  SHURMAN, 
Adjutant  General." 

I  replied  on  September  26th  that  while  I  appre- 
ions  of  exoneration  and  approval 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  they  left  me  in  the  same 
position  as  had  his  former  approval,  which  not  only 
failed  to  arrest  the  attention  of  Congress  and  the 
public,  luit  did  not  stop  the  attacks  of  Col.  Lewis 
which  had  made  the  vindication  necessary.  T  stated 
that  a  material  element  which  had  been  lacking  from 
my  vindication  by  the  \Var  Department,  and  whose 
nee  could  account  I'm-  the  failure  of  effect,  was 
sonic  expression  of  condemnation  of  Col.  Lewis  for 


192        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAI 


his  false  charges,  or  some  disciplinary  action  toward 
that  officer,  and  I  renewed  my  request  for  a  court 
of  inquiry  or,  in  default  of  that,  for  an  expression 
of  opinion  by  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  conduct 
of  all  officers  concerned  in  the  machine  gun  con- 
troversy and  range-finder  matter,  which  I  had  re- 
quested that  a  court  should  be  instructed  to  give. 

My  request  was  again  denied,  in  the  following 
letter : 

October  2,  1919. 

From:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
To:  Major  General  William  Crozier,  U.  S.  Army, 

Eetired,  1735  Massachusetts  Avenue,  Washington, 

D.  C. 

Subject:  Eequest  for  appointment  of  a  Court  of 
Inquiry. 

You  are  informed  that  your  application  of  Sep- 
tember 26,  1919,  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  action 
heretofore  taken  upon  your  request  for  a  Court  of 
Inquiry  has  been  considered  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  who  directs  that  you  be  informed  as  follows : 

General  Crozier  himself  appeared  before  the  same 
Committee  of  the  Senate  which  heard  Colonel  Lewis. 
The  whole  question  of  the  adequacy  of  our  armament 
and  the  history  of  the  action  taken  by  the  Ordnance 
Department  and  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  from  time 
to  time  was  thoroughly  surveyed,  and  to  the  extent 
that  there  is  any  allegation  of  fact  in  the  statements 
made  by  Colonel  Lewis,  General  Crozier  ?s  state- 
ments were  placed  in  juxtaposition  to  them  and  the 
records  of  the  War  Department  cited  fully.  So  far 
as  the  statements  attributed  to  Colonel  Lewis  ex- 
press the  opinion  entertained  by  him  as  to  the  ade- 
quacy of  General  Crozier  ?s  action  as  Chief  of  Ord- 
nance, the  Secretary  of  War  disagrees  entirely  with 


MACHINE    GUNS  19.'* 

Colonel  Lewis,  hut  does  not  feel  that  he  has  any 
er  to  discipline  him  for  such  an  opinion.     No 
action  which  the  War  Department  could  take  would 
iter  publicity  than  the  action  which  it  has 
idy  taken.    The  Secretary  of  War  does  not  be- 
lieve that  well-informed  persons  entertain  any  other 
idea  upon  this  subject  than  that  expressed  as  the 
<  •  f  oi'the  Secretary  of  War  in  the  previous  memo- 
randum.   The  hope  of  reaching  and  correcting  the 
opinions  of  uninformed  persons  on  this  subject  seems 
too  remote  to  be  entertained.    In  any  case,  the  con- 
troversy is  ancient  and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  has  been  adequately  disposed  of. 

JOHN  B.  SHURMAN, 

Adjutant  General. 

I  had  not  asked  for  the  discipline  of  Col.  Lewis 
for  his  opinion,  but  for  his  unfounded  statements  of 
-  and  for  his  improper  imputations  of  motive  in 
speaking,  as  an  officer,  of  a  bureau  of  the  War  De- 
partment ;  but  having  failed  to  secure  from  the  War 
Department  the  action  provided  for  in  the  articles 
of  war  for  an  officer  who  considers  himself  im- 
properly assailed  by  another,  and  in  tfce  absence  of 
any  < xpression  from  the  War  Department  even 
admonitory  of  Col.  Lewis,  I  have  no  other  re- 
course than  to  make  the  matter  public. 

I  have  dealt  with  the  subject  of  machine  guns  and 
witli  the  testimony  of  Col.  Lewis  at  considerable 
"h,  because  they  afford  a  good  illustration  of 
the  kind  of  criticism  which  was  leveled  against 
Ordnance  Department  in  the  early  months  of 

6  war,  and  of  tin-  character  of  information  upon 

ich  the  criticism  was  based. 


194   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Col.  Lewis'  status  as  an  officer  of  the  army,  and 
as  a  well  known  inventor  of  an  important  weapon 
which  had  met  with  a  pronounced  success  in  the 
British  service,  gave  to  his  testimony  a  standing 
which  could  very  well  be  relied  upon  by  any  one  dis- 
posed to  criticise.  Its  effect  upon  the  minds  of  some 
of  the  members  of  the  Senate  Military  Committee 
may  be  seen  from  the  following  quotation  from  a 
speech  of  Senator  Chamberlain,  Chairman  of  the 
Committee,  made  in  the  Senate  on  January  24, 1918 : 

Take  the  question  of  machine  guns.  I  am  not 
going  into  the  merits  of  any  particular  gun.  This 
has  been  an  old  controversy  here  for  years.  There 
are  things  that  can  be  said  on  both  sides  of  it.  Here 
was  the  Lewis  gun,  that  was  being  manufactured  in 
America  for  Great  Britain.  She  had  70,000  of  them 
on  the  battle  front,  and  the  testimony  of  every  Brit- 
ish soldier  that  I  have  seen  is  as  to  the  excellent 
character  of  the  gun.  There  are  several  kinds  of 
machine  guns.  America  was  manufacturing  in  large 
numbers  and  on  large  contract  the  Lewis  gun  for 
export  to  the  allies  and  was  prepared  to  turn  them 
out  in  large  quantities.  And  yet,  while  we  stood 
along  the  edge  of  a  seething  volcano,  we  were  tri- 
fling along  with  the  Ordnance  Department,  trying  to 
find  a  machine  gun.  With  this  war  on,  and  America 
in  it,  we  did  not  even  adopt  a  machine  gun  until 
along  in  May  sometime,  and  it  was  not  finally 
adopted,  I  believe,  until  sometime  in  June.  Then 
they  adopted  another  gun — not  the  Lewis  gun,  that 
was  being  used  on  the  battle  front  in  Europe,  but  a 
gun  that  was  still  a  gun  on  paper,  and  it  is  a  gun 
on  paper  to-day — I  do  not  care  what  anybody  says 
about  it — because  it  has  never  been  given  a  field 
test.  It  has  been  developed,  Mr.  President,  that  all 


MAC  HIM:   GUNS  195 

of  those  guns  liave  to  1>  rimeutcd  with  and  de- 

veloped and  changed  and  modified  in  one  form  or 
another  before  they  can  finally  become  an  imple- 
ment of  warfaiv  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word. 

It  may  be  that -the  Browning  gun,  the  one  adopted, 
is  the  best  gun.  It  is  an  automatic  rifle.  There  are 
two  classes  of  the  Lewis  gun,  one  light  and  one 
y.  \\V  are  manufacturing  the  Lewis  gun,  and 
manufacturing  it  for  aircraft.  If  they  are  good  for 
that,  why  could  we  not  have  adopted  the  plans  then 
in  vogue,  and  have  manufactured  the  Lewis  gun, 
even  if  it  was  not  the  best  gun,  until  final  tests  had 
discovered  the  best?  They  are  the  modern  imple- 
ments of  war  with  heavy  artillery,  Mr.  President, 
and  without  them  America  could  not  get  anywhere. 
We  are  going  to  use  them  on  the  aircraft.  The  reply 
to  the  criticism  of  the  tardiness  in  adopting  a  ma- 
chine gun  is:  "Well,  we  have  thirty  or  forty  thou- 
sand of  them  for  aircraft,  the  lighter  kind."  But, 
Mr.  President,  what  I  complain  of  is  that  they  were 
not  manufactured  in  large  quantities  in  factories 
that  were  then  manufacturing  them  for  the  British 
Government  and  for  other  countries. 

I  think  the  Secretary  testified  in  regard  to  the 
coni  •  >r  the  Browning  gun.   Contracts  are  out, 

and  the  trims  are  to  be  delivered  sometime  at  vary- 
ing dales  in  -the  future.  T  ask  you  to  read  Gen. 
-limony.  T  do  not  want  to  go  into  that, 
do  not  think  it  would  be  proper  to  go  into  it; 
t  \\e  are  advised  that  we  have  got  some  manu- 
ctured.  '  t i fied  sometime  during 

e   middle   <.f  January   that    we   had   nine  guns  at 
t   time — nine  Browning  guns — nine  guns  to  go 
'ist    tlie  thonsa  the  machine  guns  of 

lany.      It    may  !)••  that   havinir  nine  shows  that 
then-  is  now  an  opportunity  for  quantity  production, 
the  gaii ire <  may  be  ready:  but  we  have  ! 


,USe   1 


196   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

in  the  war  ten  months,  and  nothing  has  been  accom- 
plished in  the  way  of  securing  these  guns. 

From  this  extract  it  might  be  inferred  that  it  was 
the  American-made  Lewis  gun  which  had  been  sup- 
plied in  such  large  numbers  to  the  British  service 
and  had  done  so  well  in  the  war,  whereas  the  great 
bulk  of  the  guns  for  the  British  had  been  made  in 
England,  by  the  Birmingham  Small  Arms  Company. 
The  Lewis  gun  of  the  kind  manufactured  in  America 
up  to  the  time  of  our  entry  into  the  war  had  made 
the  record  on  the  Mexican  border  which  has  been 
already  described.  Notwithstanding  that  the  guns 
which  we  purchased  had  been  manufactured  under 
contract  for  the  troops  of  the  British  Empire,  the 
right  to  them  was  willingly  waived,  and  we  were 
allowed  to  have  them  for  our  much  less  important 
use  than  that  which  was  pressing  hard  upon  the 
allied  forces. 

The  wording  of  the  speech  enables  the  part  quoted 
to  be  connected  very  directly  with  Col.  Lewis'  tes- 
timony, especially  with  the  following : 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Have  you  seen  the  Browning 
gun  at  all? 

Col.  Lewis.  No,  sir;  but  my  associate  here  has 
seen  it.  The  story  of  the  Browning  gun  is  not  a 
pleasant  one,  either.  When  I  look  upon  our  National 
Army  at  the  sixteen  different  camps  over  this  coun- 
try, it  makes  me  sick  at  heart.  We  have  no  machine 
guns  except  a  few  Lewis  guns  that  are  sent  them. 
Their  machine-gun  commanders  have  been  officially 
informed  by  the  War  Department  that  no  Lewis  gun 
will  go  to  France. 


MACHIM:  c;i  ID: 

Now,  I  have  had  experience  in  making  the  Lewis 
gnus,  and  I  know  how  long  it  takes  and  what  expense 
ttached  to  making  an  interchangeable  machine 
gun. 

Senator  Weeks.  Even  if  that  statement  had  been 
made,  it  is  not  true,  because  the  previous  witness 
has  testified  that  he  is  making  40,000  guns  that  are 
going  to  France. 

.    I  beg  your  pardon. 

Senator  Weeks.  The  previous  witness  testified 
that  he  was  making  40,000  guns  to  go  to  France. 

Col.  Lewis.  Oh,  you  mean  aeroplane  guns.  Those 
a  iv  being  manufactured.  I  am  speaking  of  machine 
guns  for  troops  in  the  National  Army  encampments. 
Tli«-y  have  been  officially  informed  that  only  Brown- 
ing guns  will  be  used  by  the  National  Army  in 
France  for  ground  work. 

Senator  Hitchcock.  Yon  say  the  story  of  the 
Browning  gun  is  a  bad  one.  What  do  you  mean  by 
thatf 

Col.  Lewis.  You  cannot  get  a  definite  idea  by  just 
taking  a  picture  or  a  working  drawing.  I  say  that 
no  such  tliinir  as  a  Browning  gun,  and  it  will 
not  be  developed  in  ten  months.*  They  will  not  turn 
out  an  interchangeable  Browning  gun  from  any 
factory  in  America  in  ten  months  from  to-day. 

iHtchrncl-.    How  long  did  it  take  yon  to 
do  that  with  your  own  gun? 

1   landed  in  "Birmingham  in  March, 
•'.     This   was    fifteen   months   before    the   war 

thin  ten  months  there  were  enough   Drowning  guns  in   Fr .•! 
to  arm  the  entire  American   force. 


198   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

started.  I  had  six  hundred  men  employed  eighteen 
months,  working  extra  hours,  before  we  turned  out 
the  first  interchangeable  gun  in  England  at  a  cost 
of  nearly  $2,000,000.  It  was  done  in  approximately 
peace  times,  because  it  preceded  the  war.  It  would 
be  much  harder  to  do  it  now.  There  were  no  inter- 
changeable guns  made  in  America  up  to  the  time 
of  this  war. 

Senator  Hitchcock.    Is  the  Browning  gun  a  sim- 
pler gun  than  yours? 

Col.  Lewis.  Not  as  a  manufacturing  proposition. 
I  think,  in  fact,  that  the  machine-gun  operations  are 
practically  the  same.  I  have  not  studied  it.  The 
Browning  gun  will  not  do  what  the  Lewis  gun  will. 
It  has  twenty  cartridges  in  the  clip.  It  will  get  red 
hot  after  you  have  fired  a  hundred  or  so  rounds. 
I  can  fire  2,000  rounds  from  the  Lewis  gun  in  f  ve 
minutes  and  pick  the  gun  up  from  this  table  and 
carry  it  out.  ,  Of  course,  that  would  be  a  physi- 
cal impossibility  for  any  gun  like  the  Browning 
gun.  You  cannot  fire  500  rounds  in  ten  minutes— 
(Page  707.) 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.   You  have  stated  that  the 
Browning  gun  is  a  gun  on  paper. 

Col.  Lewis.    That  is  my  opinion;  yes,  at  this  mo- 
ment. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  You  say  no  gun  not  tested 
can  be  effective? 

Col.  Lewis.    Certainly  not  for  the  armament  of 
troops  in  war. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.    Has  not  a  model  of  the 


MAUIIM-:    (;iTNS  199 

Browning  gun  been  built,  and  is  it  not  under  test 
now? 

Col.  Lewis.  A  model  was  built,  and  that  model 
was  subjected  to  a  very  severe  firing  test;  yes.  I 
do  not  know  whether  they  are  under  test  now  or  not. 

Senator  FreliHgliuysen.  Why  did  you  say  the 
Browning-  u-im  is  only  a  gun  on  paper! 

Col.  Lewis.  Because  an  arsenal  test  is  not  a  test 
for  any  gun  or  any  weapon  of  war.  There  is  only 
one  test. 

Senator  Frettnglmysen.  It  is  not  entirely  a  gun 
on  paper,  because  a  model  of  the  gun  has  been  built 
and  tested. 

Col  Lewis.  Yes,  but  that  model  has  already  been 
altered.  The  gun  that  they  are  going  to  make  to 
issue  to  the  troops  is  a  modified  Browning,  different 
from  the  one  accepted  by  the  board  and  recom- 
mended by  the  board. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  But  more  has  been  ac- 
complished than  simply  paper  specifications.  A 
model  has  been  built  and  is  now  under  test. 

Col.  Lrwi*.  Yes:  but  the  final  specifications,  as  I 
understand  it,  are  not  yet  completed. 

t/ator  Frilhtf/huysen.     Then  it  is  not  really  a 
paper  #1111,  because  a  gun  has  been  built. 

Col.  Lewi.-.  There  has  been  a  gun  built.  I  did 
not  mean  to  say  that— 

Senator    FrrJhinlntji  Then    your    statement 

that   the  gun   is   on    paper   is   incorrect,  because  a 
model  has  been  built. 

Col.  Leivis.    I  do  not  see  the  incorrectness  of  my 


200    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

statement,  because  the  final  Browning  gun  that  the 
Army  has  contracted  for  has  not  yet  been  built. 

Senator  "Frelinghuysen.  Would  you  have  consid- 
ered that  the  Lewis  gun,  of  which  specifications  had 
been  drawn  and  two  models  had  been  made  and 
tested,  a  gun  on  paper? 

Col.  Lewis.  It  was  a  gun  under  development.  It 
was  not  a  service  model  absolutely.  In  the  condition 
it  was  submitted,  it  was  not  a  gun  suitable  for  mili- 
tary purposes,  a  gun  for  the  armament  of  troops. 
No  gun  in  the  development  stage  is  suitable  for  the 
armament  of  troops  in  quantities. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  The  Lewis  gun  was  not 
satisfactory. 

Col.  Lewis.  Not  in  1913 ;  no.  I  cannot  claim  that 
it  was,  Senator. 

Senator  Frelinghuysen.  Then  your  criticism  that 
the  Browning  gun  is  a  gun  on  paper  is  equally  ap- 
plicable to  the  Lewis  gun? 

Col.  Lewis.  It  is  a  gun  under  development. 
(Page  714.) 

Not  all  of  the  members  of  the  Committee  were 
similarly  affected  as  Senator  Chamberlain  by  Col. 
Lewis'  testimony,  but  that  some  of  them  were  is  in- 
dicated by  the  following  quotation  from  an  inter- 
view with  Senator  Wadsworth,  published  in  the 
New  York  Times  of  September  22d : 

"The  committee  has  never  questioned  the  excel- 
lence of  the  Browning  gun,  but  it  did  urge  that  our 
army  should  be  furnished  with  Lewis  guns,  easily 
obtainable  in  this  country,  until  the  Browning  gun 
had  been  thoroughly  tested  and  put  into  quantity 


MACHI.M:  (;UNS  201 

production.  The  Ordnanc--  Department  failed  to 
take  the  Lewis  gun  for  ground  use,  although  it  had 
given  eminent  B  -lion  to  the  British.  While  we 

.tiling  for  nearly  a  year  for  the  Browning 
gun  to  come  through,  the  devoted  French  had  to 
supply  our  troops  in  !  \vith  machine  guns  of 

their  own  manufacture,  as  they  have  also  done  with 
guns  of  larger  caliber." 

The  pi  g  narrative  shows  that  the  Ordnance 

trtment  did  not  wait  for  the  Browning  gun  to 
come  through,  but  did  exactly  as  the  Senator  says 

iould  have  done;  that  is,  it  gave  orders  for  the 
Lewis  gun  as  soon  as  it  readied  a  state  of  develop- 
ment in  which  its  own  producers  claimed  a  suc- 

:  ul  test  of  it  with  our  ammunition,  and  it  then 
•upied  the  factory  to  capacity  while  making  other 
ctories  ready  to  turn  out  the  Browning  gun.  Criti- 
cism of  this  course  can  only  be  understood  as  a 
claim  that  the  Department  should  have  given  orders 
for  Lewis  guns  before  the  test  of  April,  1917;  that 

•imediaiely  upon  the  appropriation  of  funds  for 
guns  in  191  fi,  notwithstanding  that  such  action 
would  have  used  up  our  money  for  a  gun  which  the 
that  we  could  get  had  declared  to  be 
unsatisfactory,  instead  of  for  the  well  known  and 
thoroughly  indorsed  Yickers  gun,  and  would  have 
meant  turning  down  the  carefully  formed  con- 
clusions of  tin-  n  advisory  agei 
which  the  War  Department  had  known  how  to 

The  French  Govcrmn  -tly  eapabl.- 

supplying   the   American    I  ;!h    machine  guns. 


202   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  was  very  anxious  to  do  so.  The  French  capacity 
was  more  than  sufficient  to  supply  the  needs  of  the 
French  troops,  and  it  was  to  the  distinct  advantage 
of  that  Government  to  employ  this  capacity  for  the 
benefit  of  the  United  States,  with  the  resultant  off- 
set to  a  portion  of  the  indebtedness  of  France.  The 
attitude  of  the  French  Government  is  indicated  by 
the  following  quotation  from  a  letter  from  the 
French  High  Commissioner  in  Washington  to  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance,  dated  September  7,  1917  (CMG- 
472.  583/3). 

My  Government  has  also  proposed  to  Gen. 
Pershing  for  the  next  ten  divisions  sent  to  France, 
2,600  machine  guns,  thus  making  a  total  of  3,340 
Hotchkiss  machine  guns  firing  the  French  ammuni- 
tion. 

Of  these  3,340  machine  guns,  2,600,  about,  are  to 
be  delivered  before  the  1st  of  January,  1918. 

As  you  can  see,  the  French  Government  is  in  a 
position  to  fulfil  all  requirements  of  the  United 
States  Expeditionary  Forces  abroad,  so  far  as  heavy 
machine  guns  are  concerned. 

And  from  another  letter  dated  December  5,  1917 
(CMG-472.  574/8),  in  regard  to  the  manufacture  of 
the  light  type  of  machine  gun  and  automatic  rifle: 

I  beg  to  state  that  I  am  informed  by  my  Govern- 
ment that  the  factory  manufacturing  the  25,000 
Chauchat  rifles  for  the  American  Army  expects  to 
have  the  whole  lot  completed  about  March,  1918. 

Under  these  conditions,  I  am  directed  to  ask  you 
whether  you  will  be  prepared  to  place  a  further 


MAC  HIM;  GUNS  203 

i-nler  ami  what  will  be  the  importance  of  this  order. 
This  information  is  necessary  to  plan  out  the  out- 
put of  the  factories  concerned  for  1918. 

The   French    had  no   difficulty  in  supplying  our 

ns  in  Franc  -  with  lloiclikiss  machine  guns  and 

I'hauchat   automatic    rifles   as   long   as   they   were 

led,   which   was  until  the  end  of  April,   1918. 

divisions  which  went  over  in  May  and  June  of 

i hat  year  were  all  armed  with  Chauchat  automatic 

riiles,  but  they  had  American-made  Vickers  machine 

.u:uns.    The  divisions  which   went  over  after  June 

all  armed  with  Browning  machine  guns  and 

Urowning  automatic  rifles,  made  of  course  in  the 

Tinted    States.      By    the    time    the   Armistice   was 

signed,  enough  Browning  guns  of  both  classes  had 

arrived  in  France  to  equip  all  the  American  forces, 

but  the  change  was  not  completely  made  from  the 

guns   which  they  were  using,  because  of  the  ex- 

ly  active  operations  which  were  going  on. 


vn 


FIELD  ARTILLERY 

THERE  is  probably  no  one  in  the  United  States  who 
is  not  aware  of  the  fact  that  we  entered  the  Great 
War  with  a  very  inadequate  supply  of  field  artil- 
lery. When  the  Senate  Military  Committee  com- 
menced its  investigation  of  the  War  Department, 
in  December,  1917,  this  shortage  was  naturally 
a  very  prominent  subject  of  inquiry  and  criticism. 
The  criticism  was  divided  under  four  principal 
heads:  the  inadequacy  of  original  supply;  the  strain 
put  upon  our  Allies  in  the  effort  to  meet  the  short- 
age ;  the  slowness  of  production  of  American  artil- 
lery after  our  entrance  into  the  war;  and  certain 
special  allegations  concerning  the  reasons  for  this 
slowness.  An  important  arraignment  of  the  Ord- 
nance Department  was  contained  in  the  New  York 
speech  of  Senator  Chamberlain,  which  has  been  pre- 
viously referred  to,  and  is  expressed  in  the  follow- 
ing quotation  from  his  speech  of  January  24,  1918, 
in  the  Senate; 

"Mr.  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  gen- 
eral statement  to  the  country — which  was  carefully 
written  and  prepared — tells  us  that  $3,200,000,000 
have  been  appropriated  for  the  Ordnance  Depart- 

204 


TIKLl)    AHTILLKKV  205 

ment,  and  contracts  have  been  let  for  $1,677,000,000; 
all  of  which  is  true.  But  the  Secretary  i'ails  to  tell 

Mr.  President,  in  his  statement  to  the  country, 
and  it  only  comes  out  in  the  course  of  a  cross-exam- 
ination, that  America  stands  to-day  unprepared  so 

as  ordnance  is  concerned.  I  challenge  anybody 
to  read  the  testimony  and  come  to  any  other  con- 
clusion. Poor,  bleeding  France,  my  friends — bled 
white,  not  only  for  her  own  life  and  for  the  liberty 
of  her  own  citizens  but  for  America  as  well — is  to- 
day furnishing  our  troops  as  they  arrive  in  France 
the  necessary  heavy  ordnance  and  machine  guns  for 
aircraft  and  for  ground  service.  Why,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, it'  we  relied  upon  the  Ordnance  Department 
in  this  emergency  to  furnish  our  troops  with  the 
heavy  ordnance — and  this  is  largely  a  war  of  artil- 
lery to-day — the  war  would  be  over  before  we  ever 
got  to  the  front. 

Why,  tin •!  timouy,  if  I  correctly  remember 

it,  before  the  Military  Affairs  Committee  that  along 
some  of  these  fronts  the  cannon — and  heavy  can- 
non, if  you  pl.-ase — are  located  five  yards  apart  for 
a  distance  <>f  six  miles:  and  yet  America,  this  great 
and  magnil  »untry,  is  dependent  upon  poor 

France  to  deliver  our  ordnance!    Did  France  agree 
in  order  to  win  ovor  reluctant  America? 
Did  she  agree  to  furnish  it  in  order  to  oncour 
and    hearten    America?      What    would    happen    to 
France  with  the  d.-lwle  in  Italy,  Senators,  wl 

s  are  and  where  the  troops  of  her 
Allies  ir  to  furnish  ordnance  to  America? 

What    is    France   to   do    for    them    in    case   of   an 


206   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

emergency  and  a  desperate  battle  for  the  life  of  one 
of  her  Allies? 

I  will  not  go  into  details,  I  do  not  think  it  would 
be  proper  to  go  into  details,  but  I  call  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Senate  the  confidential  evidence  of  Gen. 
Crozier  himself  as  to  the  amount  of  contracts  which 
the  Secretary  speaks  of  as  having  been  let,  and  as 
to  the  progress  of  the  work.  If  the  Administration 
wanted  to  be  fair  with  the  American  people — and 
they  are  entitled  to  fair  treatment,  and  to  know 
these  things — why  did  not  the  distinguished  Sec- 
retary, whom  I  hold  in  the  very  highest  regard  as 
an  able  and  intellectual  gentleman,  tell  the  Ameri- 
can people  how  long  it  would  take  to  make  deliveries 
under  these  contracts  and  let  them  assist  in  getting 
ready  for  this  terrible  cataclysm  that  not  only  con- 
fronts America  but  confronts  the  world!" 

The  Senator's  charges  were  undoubtedly  based 
partly  upon  his  general  information  in  regard  to  the 
situation  acquired  from  the  discussions  which  had 
taken  place,  and  partly  upon  the  testimony  which 
had  been  given  before  his  committee.  The  testi- 
mony which  appeared  most  directly  to  support  his 
charges  was  that  of  Col.  Lewis,  which,  upon  this 
particular  point,  was  partially  as  follows,  on  Decem- 
ber 22,  1917: 

"The  equipment  of  our  troops  in  France,  the  piti- 
ful handful  of  men,  hardly  equal  to  the  casualty 
lists  of  the  British  that  we  get  week  by  week — the 
equipment  of  those  men  is  an  outrage  and  a  disgrace 
to  this  country. 


FIELD    AKTII.I.KKY  207 

They  have  neither  machine  guns  nor  a  suitable 
supply  of  rifles;  they  have-  no  field  artillery  except 
what  we  are  begging  and  borrowing  from  France, 
which  is  stripped  to  the  skin.  AVe  are  not  going 
to  get  armament  to  them  in  ten  months  from  to-day 
nor  one  year  from  to-day.  We  will  not  have  1,000,000 
armed  men  in  the  field,  because  America  will  be  abso- 
!y  unable  to  supply  the  arms  and  ammunition 
required.  Somebody  is  responsible  for  that;  some- 
thing is  responsible;  some  system  is  responsible  for 
it.  Can  you  fix  the  responsibility? 

I  can  tell  you  a  part  of  it.  As  to  this  particular 
question  of  guns  and  ammunition,  the  responsibility 
primarily  rests  upon  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  of 
the  \Var  Department.  There  is  no  escape  from  that 
conclusion.  Gen.  Crozier  to-day  is  more  responsible 
for  the  obsolete  and  inadequate  equipment  that  the 
United  States  forces  have  than  any  other  living 
man."  (  05.) 

1  am  not  excusing  or  trying  in  any  manner  to 
explain  away  the  unfortunate  shortage  in  artillery  or 
in  any  other  class  of  war  material,  which  the  coun- 
appaivntly  awoke  to  only  after  we  got  well  into 
the  war,  but  which  T  had  been  well  aware  of  for  a 
long  time.  The  condition  ought  not  to  have  exi 
but  T  claim  freedom  of  responsibility  for  it  upon 
the  part  of  the  Ordnance  Department.  In  common 
with  all  other  officers  who  were  in  a  position  to  make 
recommend-  !  had  in  my  annual  reportfl  and  in 

my  hearings  before  committees  of  Congress  persis- 
•ly  urged   that  bigger  appropriations  be  made, 


208   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

especially  for  field  artillery  and  field  artillery  am- 
munition. I  could  fill  a  volume  with,  quotations,  but 
the  following  will  serve  sufficiently  for  illustration. 
In  my  hearing  on  the  Fortification  Bill  before  the 
proper  sub-committee  of  the  Committee  on  Appro- 
priations of  the  House  of  Bepresentatives,  on  Janu- 
ary 25,  1906,  I  stated  as  follows: 

"Let  me  explain  to  you  what  this  appropriation 
will  do,  if  you  decide  to  make  it.  I  am  hoping  to 
supply  for  use  in  war  250  batteries  of  guns  of  this 
class.  .  .  .  That  will  be  at  the  rate  of  two  guns  per 
1,000  men  for  an  army  of  500,000,  which  is  a  very 
moderate  estimate.  .  .  .  Thus  far  there  has  been 
provided  by  appropriations  .  .  .  sixty-nine  of  these 
batteries.  .  .  .  That  will  leave  such  a  number  to 
be  provided  that  at  the  rate  at  which  they  are  esti- 
mated for  in  this  item,  a  supply  will  be  completed 
in  the  year  1919.  .  .  . 

I  would  like  to  say,  in  connection  with  this  item, 
that  it  is  a  very  important  one,  because  this  material 
is  of  a  class  that  cannot  be  procured  on  short  notice. 
It  takes  a  great  while  to  build  these  guns  and  to 
build  the  carriages  and  to  get  the  ammunition  for 
them." 

And  in  my  hearing  before  the  Senate  Committee 
upon  the  same  bill,  on  February  27,  1906,  there  oc- 
curred the  following: 

The  Chairman:  .  .  .  The  subcommittee  had 
thought  it  unnecessary  to  have  any  hearings  on  the 
pending  bill  until  they  received  your  communication 
dealing  mostly  with  the  necessity  for  a  reserve  sup- 


FIELD    ARTILLERY 


209 


ply  of  ammunition.   . 
ferred  to  is  as  follows: 


The  communication  re- 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  ORDNANCE, 

Washington,  February  23,  1906. 

THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 
Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  request  that  the  attention  of 
the  Senate  be  invited  to  the  following  matters  with 
reference  to  the  bill  (H.  R.  14171)  making  appro- 
priations for  fortifications,  etc.,  now  pending  before 
that  body. 

FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

This  department  is  endeavoring  to  bring  into 
existence  a  supply  of  250  batteries,  which  is  in  the 
very  moderate  proportion  of  two  guns  per  1,000  men 
for  an  army  of  500,000.  The  appropriation  carried 
by  lines  1  to  5  of  the  bill,  added  to  an  appropriation 
carried  in  the  pending  Army  bill  for  batteries  for 
the  militia,  will  permit  the  construction  of  eleven 
batteries.  At  this  rate  the  procurement  of  the  sup- 
ply needed  will  be  delayed  until  the  year  1923,  sev- 
enty batteries  having  been  previously  provided  for. 

Ammunition  and  mobile  artillery  are  the  items  of 
material  in  which  military  preparation  of  the  United 
States  is  now  most  behind. 

Very  respectfully, 

«  WILLIAM  CROZIER, 

Brig.-Gen.,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  U.  8.  A. 
stiov:  Kindly  explain  to  us,  General,  the  field 
artillery;  whore  it  is  manufactured,  and  your  recom- 
mendation therefor;  why  tho  appropriation  was  so 


210    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

largely  reduced  in  the  House ;  what  motive  influen 
them  there,  and  also  your  views  relative  not  only  to 
the  necessity,  but  the  policy  of  the  Government  con- 
tinuing this  work  in  the  expectation  of  completing 
these  guns  and  carriages. 

Gen.  Crozier  .  .  .  The  estimate  which  I  submitted 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  for  this  purpose  called  for 
about  $1,200,000.  With  that  amount  and  with  money 
amounting  to  about  $550,000,  which  is  carried  by 
the  Army  appropriation  bill  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
curing batteries  for  issue  to  the  militia,  I  expected 
to  procure  this  field  artillery  at  such  a  rate  that  the 
250  batteries,  which  I  think  are  necessary,  would 
have  been  .supplied  by  the  year  1916.  By  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  I  reduced  the  estimate 
from  $1,200,000  to  $600,000.  That  so  increased  the 
time  necessary  that  the  earliest  date  at  which  we 
would  under  it  have  been  able  to  get  our  entire 
reserve  would  have  been  1919.  Now  this  estimate  of 
$600,000  has  been  further  reduced  by  the  bill,  as 
it  has  passed  the  House  of  Eepresentatives,  to 
$310,000.  With  this  amount  I  shall  be  able  to  get 
only  three  batteries  of  field  artillery,  it  not  all  being 
available  for  the  purchase  of  field  artillery,  but  the 
remainder  going  for  other  items  which  are  men- 
tioned in  the  bill.  These  three  batteries,  added  to 
the  eight  which  are  provided  for  in  the  Army  Appro- 
priation Bill,  will  make  eleven  batteries,  which  are 
all  I  can  manufacture  during  the  coming  year  unless 
the  appropriation  is  increased.  Now,  seventy  bat- 
teries have  already  been  provided  for.  Two  hundred 
and  fifty  being  required,  one  hundred  and  eighty  are 


F1KLD    ARTILLERY  211 

left.  One  hundred  and  eighty  batteries  at  eleven 
batteries  a  year  would  require  a  time  until  about  the 
year  1923  for  their  procurement.  This  is  a  plain 
statement  of  the  case,  gentlemen,  and  when  I  have 
made  it  you  know  as  much  about  the  subject  as  I  do." 

In  my  annual  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1910,  I  stated  the 
following  in  regard  to  the  supply  of  field  or  mobile 
artillery: 

' '  The  supply  of  this  material  provided  for  to  date 
is  less  adequate  than  that  of  any  other  class  of 
fighting  equipment.  The  types  needed  have  been 
developed  and  some  of  each  are  under  manufacture, 
but  the  appropriations  do  not  permit  of  production 
in  any  considerable  quantity.  It  is  considered  that 
in  case  of  an  emergency  of  any  importance  the  field 
artillery  equipment  would  be  found  to  be  insufficient, 
and  it  is  consequently  thought  that  the  financial  con- 
ditions which  have  rendered  impossible  the  acquisi- 
tion of  a  much  larger  reserve  are  unfortunate. " 

The  following  extracts  are  from  my  hearings  on 
the  Fortification  Bill  and  the  Army  Bill  at  various 
subsequent  times: 

From  my  hearing  on  the  Fortification  Bill,  Jan- 
uary 12,  1911: 

"Nothing  is,  perhaps,  more  striking  than  that  as 
i  lake  some  progress  it  is  impressed  upon  us  how 
very  slowly  we  are  going,  and  how  far  we  have  yet 
to  go.  I  think  I  have  called  it  to  the  attention  of 
the  committee  for  several  years  past  that  as  regards 
our  preparation  for  war,  we  are  worse  off  in  this 
matter  of  field  artillery  than  we  are  in  anything  else 


212    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

that  we  have,  connected  with  the  materiel.  We  are 
better  off  with  reference  to  the  seacoast  armament; 
we  are  better  off  with  reference  to  small  arms;  we 
are  better  off  with  reference  to  small  arms  ammuni- 
tion; we  are  better  off  with  reference  to  personal 
equipment  of  the  soldier  and  with  reference  to  horse 
equipment  for  the  cavalry,  than  we  are  with  refer- 
ence to  this  item  of  field  artillery." 

From  my  hearing  on  the  Army  bill,  March  11, 
1912: 

"Question.  It  takes  a  long  time  to  manufacture 
these  field  guns? 

Gen.  Crosier.    Yes. 

Question.  How  long  does  it  take  ? 

Gen.  Crozier.  I  do  not  think  that  we  could  count 
on  getting  a  battery  delivered  in  less  than  a  year 
from  the  time  the  order  was  given.  I  do  not  mean 
to  say  that  it  would  take  a  year  for  each  battery, 
but  deliveries  would  not  begin  until  a  year  after 
the  order  was  given. 

Question.  Is  it  very  important  to  have  them  on 
hand? 

Gen.  Crozier.  Yes ;  it  is  the  slowest  manufacture 
of  any  of  the  fighting  materiel  which  we  need." 

From  my  hearing  on  the  Fortification  Bill,  Janu- 
ary 15,  1912: 

"Question.  What  I  am  trying  to  get  at  is  this :  At 
what  period  of  time  would  it  be  desirable,  assuming 
that  the  army  had  to  be  recruited  up  to  its  strength 
for  purposes  of  war,  to  have  the  guns  to  deliver? 

Gen.  Crozier.  I  should  think  that  we  ought  to 
have  them  within  a  couple  of  months,  under  the 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  213 

present  circumstances,  of  the  time  at  which  it  is 
decided  to  put  the  army  on  its  war  footing.  How- 
ever, I  think  the  circumstances  ought  to  be  such, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  have  them 
such,  that  materiel  would  be  needed  in  a  fortnight. 

Question.  I  appreciate  that ;  but  in  the  absence  of 
that  condition  existing,  is  there  any  particular  need 
of  our  advancing  so  rapidly  in  the  supply  of  this  ma- 
teriel? You  now  have  all  the  batteries  that  are 
needed  by  the  Regular  Army,  with  some  reserve; 
you  now  have  all  the  batteries  and  more  than  can 
be  distributed  among  the  militia,  and  the  question 
necessarily  arises,  in  connection  with  as  large  an 
item  as  this,  as  to  the  present  need  of  supplying 
batteries  in  the  amount  requested. 

Gen.  Crozier.  The  Regular  Army,  of  course,  is 
such  a  small  force  that  the  fact  of  its  being  com- 
pletely equipped  with  everything  that  it  requires  is 
one  of  no  great  moment,  when  you  consider  the  force 
that  ought  to  be  equipped.  The  whole  idea  of  prep- 
aration for  war  in  this  country  is  and  ought  to  be 
the  maintenance  of  a  small  force  continually  in 
the  service  and  the  rapid  expansion  of  that  force 
in  time  of  war,  which  rapid  expansion  ought  to  be 
possible  to  be  made  with  men  who  will  already  have 
had  some  training.  Now,  if  we  should  ever  arrive 
at  that  state,  as  I  say,  we  would  need  this  materiel. 
If  there  should  be  a  state  of  confusion,  lack  of  prep- 
aration, or  absence  of  method  by  which  the  Army 
could  be  increased  in  size  rapidly  and  effectively, 
I  should  not  like  to  say  how  much  we  might  be  slack 
in  one  element  to  meet  the  slackness  in  others. 


214    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Question.  The  present  army  is  more  than  sufficient 
in  size  for  any  offensive  movement  that  we  would 
ever  contemplate! 

Gen.  Crosier.  I  do  not  think  so,  Mr.  Chairman, 
by  any  means. 

Question.  Your  idea  of  an  army  of  450,000  men 
is  a  defensive  army  of  that  size,  is  it  not? 

Gen.  Crozier.  Yes.  But  the  number  of  troops  that 
we  could  use  offensively  is  very  different  from  the 
army  that  we  have  now.  Of  course,  I  might  go  on 
and  amplify  that,  but  I  could  not  tell  you  anything 
that  you  are  probably  not  as  well  aware  of  as  I  am 
with  regard  to  the  possibility  and  necessity  of  using 
a  larger  force  in  any  of  the  problems  that  may  con- 
front the  country. 

•         ••••••• 

I  might  refer  to  the  fact  that  I  have  been  asking 
for  a  good  deal  more  than  I  have  gotten,  because  I 
have  been  trying  to  impress  upon  the  committee 
that  this  class  of  material  is  that  in  regard  to  which 
our  straits  are  greatest.  We  are  better  prepared 
to  enter  upon  a  war  with  respect  to  everything 
else  that  is  to  be  supplied  in  the  way  of  materiel  than 
field  artillery  and  field  artillery  ammunition.  It  is 
sometimes  stated  —  irresponsibly,  of  course  —  that 
we  never  get  through  asking  and  that  we  always 
represent  ourselves  as  in  a  deplorable  condition." 

Again  in  my  annual  report  for  the  year  ending 
June  30,  1913,  which  was  made  in  October  of  that 
year,  less  than  a  year  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War,  I  said  in  regard  to  the  supply  of 
mobile  artillery: 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  215 

"As  stated  in  my  last  annual  report,  the  supply 
of  this  class  of  equipment  is  less  satisfactory  than 
that  of  any  other  furnished  by  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment, except  the  ammunition  for  field  artillery. 
The  appropriations  for  the  last  two  years  for  this 
purpose  have  been  somewhat  larger  than  for  several 
years  prior  to  that  time,  but  it  is  hoped  that  still 
larger  annual  appropriations  may  be  made,  as  even 
the  present  rate  is  not  such  as  to  provide  a  sufficient 
amount  within  a  reasonable  time." 

Notwithstanding  these  appeals,  no  appropriation 
as  large  as  $3,000,000  was  made  for  field  artillery 
within  the  years  since  the  Spanish- American  War, 
and,  as  appears  from  the  extracts,  the  annual  appro- 
priation was  often  very  much  less  than  that  sum, 
until  after  the  passage  of  the  National  Defense  Act, 
on  June  3,  1916,  when  the  sums  appropriated  in 
the  Fortification  Bill  and  in  the  Army  Bill,  passed 
respectively  in  July  and  August  of  that  year,  for 
field  artillery  aggregated  $16,321,000.  While  this 
indicated  a  significant  advance  in  congressional 
ideas  with  reference  to  military  preparation,  and 
provided  a  sum  which,  it  it  had  been  annually  sup- 
plied from  the  period  when  I  had  commenced 
pleading,  would  have  brought  us  to  the  war  in  much 
better  condition  of  accumulated  supply  and  usefully 
equipped  plants,  the  adequacy  of  the  sum  for  the 
•  '((uipment  in  field  artillery  of  an  army  of  1,000,000 
men  may  be  judged  from  the  amount  which  was 
asked  for  and  appropriated  for  this  purpose  during 
the  first  three  months  following  our  declaration  of 
war  with  Germany  on  April  6,  1917,  which  was 


216       ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD 

$171,900,000;  and  the  still  further  inadequacy  of 
the  sum  for  providing  artillery  for  the  larger  army 
which  we  soon  saw  we  w^ould  have  to  raise,  can  be 
understood  from  the  appropriation  made  in  the  Act 
of  October  6,  1917,  for  the  purpose,  which  was 
$225,000,000. 

The  information  contained  in  the  above  extracts 
had  been  brought  by  me  to  Senator  Chamberlain's 
attention  before  he  made  his  New  York  speech,  in 
my  hearings  before  his  committee,  but  perhaps  the 
attitude  of  his  mind  toward  the  source  of  this  infor- 
mation can  be  grasped  from  the  following  quotation 
from  his  speech  in  the  Senate : 

"Whenever  you  get  a  soldier  who  has  not  any 
other  ambition  than  an  ambition  to  serve  his  coun- 
try, you  will  invariably  get  the  truth.  It  is  not 
always  so  with  one  of  these  swivel-chair  artists  who 
wants  to  go  higher  and  from  whom  you  cannot  ascer- 
tain what  the  truth  is." 

The  passage  referred  to  testimony  of  Gen.  E.  St. 
J.  Greble,  before  the  Senate  Military  Committee, 
in  regard  to  the  equipment  and  the  sanitary  and 
other  conditions  in  the  division  which  he  was  com- 
manding. Gen.  Greble  is  a  capable  officer  whose 
testimony  is  worthy  of  all  credence,  but  in  regard 
to  ordnance  equipment  he  simply  stated  his  short- 
ages, indicating  his  belief  that  they  occurred  through 
necessity  for  utilizing  the  limited  military  sup- 
plies in  equipping  the  first  divisions  to  sail  for 
France,  and  did  not  indicate  any  blame  for  the  limi- 
tations of  the  supply.  The  passage  apparently  indi- 
cates the  initial  handicap  of  a  staff  officer  in  laying 


FIELD  ARTILLERY;  217 

the  condition  of  his  department  before  Senator 
Chamberlain,  as  compared  with  those  whose  infor- 
mation was  necessarily  less  complete. 

When  the  subject  of  responsibility  for  shortages 
was  brought  up  in  the  Senate  Military  Committee 
hearings,  I  did  not  charge  the  responsibility  against 
Congress ;  but  I  stated  that  it  should  be  placed  upon 
the  whole  people  of  the  United  States.  The  people 
had  taken  no  interest  in  the  matter  of  military  prep- 
aration, during  the  series  of  years  following,  as  well 
as  preceding,  the  Spanish- American  War.  They  had 
concerned  themselves,  after  the  manner  which  they 
well  know  how  to  make  effective,  with  the  senti- 
ments of  their  representatives  upon  the  tariff,  the 
currency,  the  control  of  the  trusts,  and  the  regula- 
tion of  the  railroads,  but  they  had  displayed  no  curi- 
osity nor  imposed  any  instructions  in  regard  to  mili- 
tary matters,  and  there  was  no  constituency  in  the 
country  in  which  the  return  of  the  member  depended 
in  the  slightest  degree  upon  his  attitude  on  any 
military  question.  At  as  late  a  period  as  that  of 
thr  political  campaign  of  1916  a  leading  member  of 
Congress  told  me  that  he  found  that  an  attempt 
to  talk  upon  the  subject  of  military  preparation  in 
the  great  Middle  West  speedily  emptied  the  hall, 
and  that  he  had  to  make  hasty  study  to  prepare  him- 
self upon  other  subjects,  when  he  had  considered 
himself  well  prepared  for  the  campaign  by  reason 
of  the  knowledge  which  his  special  committee  service 
in  Congress  had  given  him  on  the  subject  of  arma- 
ment and  organization.  His  audiences  had  an  in- 
terest in  the  European  War,  and  would  listen  to 


218        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WA] 


information  about  it;  but  they  apparently  had  no 
interest  in  getting  ready  for  a  possible  part  in  it. 

The  scheme  of  the  National  Defence  Act  did  not 
contemplate  preparation  for  entering  the  European 
War,  for  it  provided  a  plan  of  military  organiza- 
tion, and  supply  of  the  resulting  forces,  to  extend 
over  a  period  of  five  years.  While  many  thought 
that  the  war  would  not  be  of  short  duration,  it  is 
evident  that  a  five  year  plan,  entered  upon  in  the 
summer  of  1916,  was  not  made  with  relation  to  it. 

While  the  responsibility  for  military  shortages 
must,  therefore,  be  borne  by  the  whole  people,  ulti- 
mately, the  theory  of  representative  government 
places  the  immediate  charge  upon  the  Administra- 
tion and  upon  Congress;  at  least  to  the  extent  to 
which  these  agencies  of  the  people  are  expected  ts 
be  leaders  in  policy,  instead  of  followers  of  the  mul- 
titude. All  through  the  period  of  preparation  the 
estimates  for  funds  of  such  military  agencies  as  the 
Ordnance  Department  were  repeatedly  reduced  in 
the  War  Department,  by  direction  of  the  Adminis- 
tration; and  after  the  European  War  was  in  full 
progress  the  Administration  discouraged  warnings 
of  military  unpreparedness  as  being  hysterical,  and, 
through  the  mouth  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  op- 
posed even  reasonable  defensive  measures,  on  the 
ground  that  they  might  be  taken  as  an  indication  of 
our  intention  to  take  part  in  the  war.  Under  these 
long-continued  conditions,  it  would  appear  that,  if 
any  element  of  the  Republic  ought  to  escape  criti- 
cism for  failure  to  exercise  proper  foresight,  it 
should  be  the  military  element ;  perhaps  because  its 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  219 

personnel  were  paid  to  concern  themselves  with  the 
subject. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  it  is  hard  to  understand 
the  object  or  the  bearing  of  the  criticisms  of  the 
War  Department  for  accepting  assistance  from  the 
French  and  English  governments  in  the  supply  of 
artillery  and  machine  guns.  While  we  all  deplore 
the  necessity  for  this  assistance  the  necessity  was 
upon  us,  and  criticism  for  yielding  to  it  and  making 
the  best  of  the  situation  is  inexplicable.  The  will- 
ingness, and  more,  of  the  French  and  English  allies 
to  render  this  aid  is  exhibited  by  certain  expressions 
from  them  which  accompanied  the  negotiations  for 
the  supply  of  artillery  for  the  American  forces. 
Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  first  arrangement  for 
the  purchase  of  75  mm.  field  guns  and  155  mm. 
howitzers — the  two  most  important  pieces  of  artil- 
lery— from  the  French  Government,  the  High  Com- 
missioner of  that  Kepublic,  Mr.  Andre  Tardieu,  pre- 
pared a  notice  for  publication  in  the  French  press 
in  order  to  furnish  the  French  citizens  with  infor- 
mation in  regard  to  our  transaction,  of  which  his 
own  estimate  was  shown  by  his  expressions.  The 
notice  was  as  follows: 

Washington,  14  Juillet,  1917. 
PRESIDEXCE  CONSEII,, 

Copie  a  Guerre-Annninont, 

(Note  for  ihe  French  Press) 
Translation. 

An  important  agreement  has  boon  concluded  be- 
tween the  United  States  Government  and  the  French 
High  Commissioner,  ^Innsicur  Andre  Tardieu. 


220        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR, 

According  to  said  agreement  the  American  Gov- 
ernment adopts  the  two  principal  pieces  of  materiel 
of  French  artillery,  the  75  millimeter  field  gun  and 
the  155  millimeter  rapid-fire  howitzer. 

The  Expeditionary  Corps  of  Gen.  Pershing  has 
received  from  the  French  authorities,  on  arrival,  its 
field  artillery,  its  rapid-fire  heavy  artillery  and  its 
trench  artillery,  which,  of  course,  will  accelerate 
its  taking  place  in  the  line. 

At  the  same  time  the  artillery  production  in 
France  and  in  America  has  been  organized  so  that 
the  American  Army  of  1,000,000  men  which  is  about 
to  be  recruited,  will  receive  without  delay,  as  the 
units  are  formed,  the  necessary  heavy  and  light  guns. 

The  negotiations  taken  up  for  the  first  time  at 
the  end  of  May  between  Monsieur  Andre  Tardieu, 
French  High  Commissioner,  Monsieur  Ganne,  Chief 
of  War  Munitions  of  the  High  Commission,  and 
Brig.-Gen.  Crozier,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  were  char- 
acterized by  two  ideas. 

On  one  hand  the  American  Government  wished  to 
adopt  the  quickest  solution,  in  order  to  realize  in 
the  shortest  time  the  complete  armament  of  its 
forces. 

On  the  other  hand,  with  great  foresight  they 
attached  particular  importance  to  realizing,  for  the 
American  and  French  armies,  called  to  fight  on  the 
same  battlefields,  uniformity  of  munitions,  of  such 
capital  importance  from  a  tactical  point  of  view. 

In  view  of  these  two  desired  aims,  the  French 
High  Commissioner  was  able,  thanks  to  the  develop- 
ment since  1916  of  the  machine  equipment  of  our 
war  munitions  factories,  to  furnish  Gen.  Crozier 
with  a  detailed  plan  of  industrial  collaboration 
which  by  the  united  efforts  of  the  French  and  Ameri- 
can industries,  will  assure  the  complete  realization 
of  the  American  program. 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  221 

The  double  certainty  of  rapid  production  and 
uniformity  of  munitions,  decided  the  United  States 
Government,  despite  the  incontestable  value  of  its 
own  materiel,  especially  that  of  the  three-inch  field 
gun,  of  which  the  superior  qualities  are  universally 
recognized,  to  adopt  our  75  and  our  short  155. 

The  negotiations  on  these  lines  were  rapidly  com- 
pleted at  the  end  of  somewhat  over  one  month ;  they 
were  concluded  this  week  by  a  complete  under- 
standing fixing  the  quantity  and  the  price  of  the 
materiel  to  be  furnished. 

This  understanding  susceptible  of  important  fur- 
ther developments,  is  a  precious  proof  of  the  esteem 
in  which  the  most  powerful  industrial  country  of 
the  world  holds  our  engineers  and  our  mechanical 
constructors.  It  has  also  a  practical  bearing  of  great 
value. 

From  the  military  point  of  view  it  is  evident  that 
uniformity  of  type  of  guns  and  munitions  for  armies 
fighting  on  the  same  battle-fields,  is  an  appreciable 
guarantee  of  safety  and  efficiency.  The  supply  and 
volume  of  fire  are  thereby  equally  facilitated.  Unity 
results  spontaneously  from  identity  of  weapons. 
Finally,  all  tactical  results,  obtained  by  the  experi- 
ence of  three  years  of  war,  are  without  previous 
adaptation,  assimilated  by  the  American  Army. 

From  the  industrial  viewpoint,  the  unity  of  effort 
created  between  the  manufacturing  plants  of  the 
two  countries,  will  produce  happy  results  without 
precedent,  not  only  during  the  war,  but  also  subse- 
quently. Common  action  provides  the  best  means 
of  mutual  acquaintance  and  for  preparation  of  the 
close  co-operation  which  it  is  desired  to  organize  for 
thr  t'u1un>. 

From  the  financial  standpoint  it  is  possible  to 
hope  that  the  purchase  by  the  United  States  of 
French  artillery  materiel  will  create  an  improve- 


222    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

inent  in  exchange,  which  under  the  existing  relations 
of  America  and  her  European  allies,  is  as  much  to 
be  desired  by  the  United  States  as  by  France. 

It  is  also  likely  that  the  adoption  of  the  metric 
system,  which  has  been  officially  requested  by  the 
American  Bureau  of  Standards  and  which  is  much 
to  be  desired  from  the  point  of  view  of  future 
Franco-American  interests,  may  be  thereby  facili- 
tated. 

These  are,  briefly  stated,  some  of  the  results,  cer- 
tain or  probable,  of  the  agreement  between  the 
French  High  Commissioner  and  the  American  Gov- 
ernment. 

The  dominant  note  of  the  agreement  lies  in  the 
proof  it  gives  of  the  unshakable  resolution  of  the 
American  Government  to  achieve  in  the  shortest 
time  the  maximum  of  military  strength,  and  on  the 
other  hand  it  proves  the  intimate  and  active  co-oper- 
ation existing  between  the  United  States  and 
France. 

Mr.  Baker,  Secretary  of  War,  and  Gen.  Crozier, 
Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the  American  Government, 
have  given  proof  in  this  case  of  the  broadest  spirit 
of  comprehension  and  decision  and  have  succeeded 
in  a  few  weeks  in  securing  for  the  American  troops 
artillery  of  the  first  order. 

Our  High  Commissioner  at  Washington  speaks  in 
unbounded  praise  of  their  cooperation  with  him. 

We  may  add  that  the  first  French  guns  arrived 
last  week  in  the  United  States  and  that  the  Artillery 
School  of  Saumur  has  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
the  American  Army  for  training  purposes. 

Later,  the  French  Government  proposed  to  fur- 
nish a  supply  of  more  powerful  pieces  of  artillery,, 
namely,  155  mm.  guns,  following  negotiations  which 
had  already  been  opened  in  France  with  Gen.  Persh- 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  223 

ing.  The  letter  from  the  French  High  Commissioner 
in  Washington  conveying  this  proposal  was  as  fol- 
lows: 

Washington,  D.  C., 
August  22,  1917. 

THE  HIGH  COMMISSIONER  OF  THE  FRENCH 
REPUBLIC  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

To   Brigadier-General    William   Crozier,   Chief   of 
Ordnance,  War  Department,  New  York  City. 

My  dear  General: 

Confirming  the  conversation  you  had  yesterday 
with  Col.  Remond  and  Capt.  de  Jarny,  I  beg  to 
inform  you  that  I  have  received  a  cable  from  my 
Government  stating  that,  at  the  request  of  Gen. 
Pershing,  the  French  Government  have  proposed 
the  sale  of  forty-eight  155  mm.  guns  of  Filloux  type. 

These  guns  will  be  delivered  at  the  rate  of  one 
battalion  (twelve  guns)  per  month  for  each  month 
from  September  to  December. 

It  will  be  possible  -to  continue  deliveries  at  the 
same  rate  after  January  1,  1918,  and  probably  to 
increase  this  proportion. 

It  should  be  noted  that  it  will  be  difficult  for  the 
French  Government  to  supply  the' necessary  tractors 
and  other  motor  vehicles  entering  into  the  composi- 
tion of  one  battery  of  155  mm.  guns. 

I  note  from  verbal  information  received  that  your 
( lovermnent  will  be  in  a  position  to  supply  the  neces- 
Bary  tractors  in  December.  I  am  therefore  cabling 
my  Government,  asking  whether  they  ran  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  to  provide  caterpillar  trac- 
tors and  trucks  corresponding  to  the  batteries  due 
in  September,  October  and  November. 

T  would  greatly  appreciate,  my  dear  General,  if 
you  could  let  me  know  whether  the  United  States 


224   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Government  is  prepared  to  give  me  an  order  for  the 
guns  in  question  and  under  which  conditions. 
I  beg  to  remain,  my  dear  General, 

Yours  faithfully, 
ANDRE  TARDIEU. 

An  order  for  the  155  mm.  guns  was  given,  and 
certain  of  these  pieces  were  immediately  turned  over 
to  our  forces  in  France  while  a  larger  supply  was 
put  in  manufacture.  The  supply  of  155  mm.  howit- 
zers by  the  French  proceeded  more  rapidly  than 
had  been  anticipated  when  negotiations  were  first 
entered  into ;  that  is,  the  French  Government  found 
itself  better  able  than  it  had  promised  to  make 
prompt  deliveries ;  of  which  I  was  informed  by  the 
following  letter  from  the  High  Commissioner: 

Washington,  D.  C., 
September  26,  1917. 
THE  HIGH  COMMISSIONER  OF  THE  FRENCH  REPUBLIC 

IN  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

To  the  Carriage  Division,  Office  of  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance,  U.  8.  A.,  1703  New  YorJc  Ave.,  N.  W., 
Washington. 

Sir: 

2.  I  wish  also  to  confirm  that,  as  per  your  request, 
48  Schneider  Howitzers  will  be  ready  for  the  15th 
of  October  instead  of  30,  as  originally  provided. 
Yours  faithfully, 

ANDRE  TARDIEU. 

When  the  Commission  headed  by  Col.  House  was 
sent  to  Europe  to  confer  with  the  highest  British 
and  French  authorities  in  regard  to  the  scheme  of 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  225 

cooperation  of  the  allies,  in  the  autumn  of  1917, 
the  supply  of  the  American  forces  with  artillery 
was  carefully  considered,  and  the  decision  as  to 
the  part  to  be  played  by  European  factories  in  a 
coordinated  effort  to  utilize  the  productive  capacity 
of  the  allies  was  expressed  in  a  cablegram  from  Gen. 
Tasker  H.  Bliss,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  United  States 
Army,  who  accompanied  the  Commission.  Extracts 
from  this  cablegram  are  as  follows : 

Received  at  the  War  Department  December  5, 
1917,  7 :17  A.  M.  1,  CO.  London. 

THE  ADJUTANT-GENERAL, 
Washington. 

..*••••• 

...  in  order  to  insure  the  equipment  with  artillery 
and  ammunition  of  the  American  troops  as  fast  as 
they  arrive  in  France,  the  Ministers  of  Munitions  of 
France  and  England,  and  Perkins,  representing  the 
United  States,  have  exhaustively  examined  the  situ- 
ation and  adopted  the  following  resolutions  for 
their  respective  governments : 

"The  representatives  of  Great  Britain  and 
France  state  that  their  production  of  artillery  (field, 
medium  and  heavy),  is  now  established  on  so  large 
a  scale  that  they  (are)  able  to  equip  completely  all 
American  divisions  as  they  arrive  in  France  during 
the  year  1918  with  the  best  makes  of  British  and 
French  guns  and  howitzers.  .  .  .  With  a  view 
therefore  first  to  expedite  and  facilitate  the  equip- 
ment of  the  American  armies  in  France  and  second 
to  securing  the  maximum  ultimate  development  of 
the  ammunition  supply  with  the  minimum  strain 
upon  available  tonnage,  the  representatives  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  propose  that  the  Amer- 


, 


226   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

lean  field,  medium  and  heavy  artillery  be  supplied 
during  1918  and  as  long  after  as  may  be  found  con- 
venient from  British  and  French  gun  factories. "... 

(Signed)  BLISS. 

These  exhibits  are  conclusive  as  to  the  attitude 
of  the  French  and  English  governments  toward 
the  task  of  supplying  our  troops  with  artillery. 
There  was,  of  course,  perfectly  good  reason  why, 
notwithstanding  their  three  years'  expenditure  of 
effort,  they  were  in  position  to  give  us  such  effec- 
tive and  much-needed  assistance.  Their  own  manu- 
facturing capacity  had  been  much  enlarged  in  order 
to  provide  the  initial  equipment  in  artillery  of  their 
own  greatly  increased  forces,  and  to  supply  the  fur- 
ther demand  occasioned  by  the  augmentation  of  the 
proportion  of  artillery  to  other  branches  of  the 
service  which  experience  in  the  war  had  shown  to  be 
necessary.  By  the  time  of  our  entrance  into  the  war 
their  factories  had  filled  this  program,  and  their 
capacity  was  much  greater  than  was  necessary  to 
make  good  the  current  wastage  and  was,  therefore, 
available  for  arming  our  troops. 

As  to  our  own  program,  both  for  artillery  and 
machine  guns,  and  the  question  whether  it  ought  not 
to  have  been  smaller  in  order  to  insure  earlier  fruit 
from  it,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  experience 
of  our  Allies,  and  especially  of  the  British,  in  failing 
to  see  large  enough  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and 
to  inaugurate  means  for  an  ample  supply,  had  been 
somewhat  bitter;  and  with  this  experience  before 
us  the  American  military  authorities  could  not  have 
escaped  just  criticism  if  we  had  made  the  same 


FIELD    ARTILLERY 


227 


mistake.  The  event  bore  out  the  judgment  exercised ; 
for  while  the  great  flow  of  American-made  artillery 
to  Europe  did  not  commence  before  the  conclusion 
of  the  fighting,  a  certain  flow  had  commenced,  the 
evidence  of  which  is  the  2,000  complete  artillery 
units — gun,  carriage,  limber,  etc.,  which  were  pro- 
duced here  for  ourselves  and  our  Allies  between  our 
declaration  of  war  and  the  signing  of  the  Armis- 
tice. This  output  of  finished  artillery^  coupled  with 
the  supply  of  over  14,000  gun  forgings  and  a  large 
number  of  other  partially  finished  artillery  com- 
ponents to  our  allies,  and  the  delivery  of  finished 
artillery  furnished  by  them  to  the  American  forces, 
prevented  any  shortage  for  the  troops  on  the  firing 
line  during  the  continuance  of  hostilities.  The  abun- 
dant provision  for  further  hostilities  was  thus  not 
secured  at  the  price  of  any  skimping  of  the  fighters 
during  the  active  operations;  while  the  2,000  com- 
pleted American  guns  were  over  85  per  cent  of 
the  total  number  of  guns  in  action  in  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force  during  the  war,  although  only 
800  of  the  2,000  were  shipped  abroad. 

Senator  Chamberlain  also  charged  the  Ordnance 
Di-purtnu'iit  with  great  inertia  after  the  outbreak  of 
ihr  European  War.  The  following  quotation  is  a 
further  illustration  of  his  state  of  mind: 

"What  has  th<>  Ordnance  Department  been  doing 

ice  1914!  Was  there  even  a  half-witted  American 
•itizen  who  at  the  very  outset  did  not  know  and 

•ali/e  that  tin  a  chance  that  America  might 

become  involved?  There  were  omens  in  the  sky, 
colleagues,  that  indicated  that  America  would 


228   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

become  involved,  notwithstanding  her  desire  to  keep 
out.  She  could  not  keep  out.  What  was  the  Ord- 
nance Department  doing!  Nothing.  Here  we  were 
from  August,  1914,  until  the  declaration  of  war  in 
April,  1917,  with  the  Ordnance  Department  lying 
supinely  upon  its  back,  making  no  plans,  construct- 
ing no  gauges,  manufacturing  no  dies,  doing  abso- 
lutely nothing  to  ascertain  what  were  the  possi- 
bilities in  raw  material  and  the  possibilities  of 
manufacture.  It  would  not  have  taken  any  time,  it 
would  not  have  cost  much,  if  anything,  to  have  done 
that.  Congress  appropriated  quite  a  large  sum  in 
two  or  three  appropriation  bills  for  the  purpose  of 
manufacturing  dies,  jigs,  and  gauges  to  be  used 
in  the  construction  of  all  of  these  implements  of 
artillery  warfare.  That  money  has  not  been  ex- 
pended; and  yet  every  business  man  and  every 
sensible  man  in  this  country  knows  that  for  quantify 
production  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  have  the 
gauges  and  the  jigs  and  the  dies,  so  that  when  you 
are  ready  to  manufacture  all  you  have  to  do  is 
to  send  them  out,  so  that  guns  may  be  manuf  actured 
along  those  lines.  What  was  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment doing?  Nothing." 

Testimony  in  regard  to  the  plan  for  the  manu- 
facture and  supply  of  gauges,  templates  and  other 
like  auxiliaries  is  found  on  pages  243-245  of  the 
hearings  before  the  Senate  Military  Committee. 
The  testimony  shows  that  of  the  sum  of  $2,050,000 
which  had  been  appropriated  for  gauges,  jigs,  fix- 
tures, etc.,  $1,728,000  had  been  allotted  in  manufac- 
turing orders  at  the  time  of  the  hearing.  When  the 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  229 

first  appropriations  became  available,  negotiations 
were  opened  with  the  tool  and  gauge  manufacturers 
of  the  United  States  for  carrying  out  their  object, 
and  earnest  attention  was  given  to  this  highly  spe- 
cialized subject.  The  first  appropriation,  however, 
had  been  made  as  late  as  the  summer  of  1916,  and 
the  whole  plan  was  necessarily  of  a  character  to  re- 
quire looking  to  the  future  for  results  of  any  very 
groat  importance.  Every  person  with  any  knowl- 
edge of  manufacturing  methods  understands  that 
tin*  tool,  gauge  and  fixture  equipment  for  an  exten- 
sive output  by  the  methods  of  quantity  production 
is  a  proposition  of  a  long  time  of  execution,  and  it 
should  require  nothing  more  than  a  statement  of 
dates  to  see  at  once  that  the  contingency  for  which 
the  appropriations  were  intended  to  provide  some 
preparation  was  upon  us  before  there  was  any  pos- 
sibility of  effective  results  from  the  plan.  The 
gauge  project  of  the  Ordnance  Department  included 
the  early  loan  of  Dr.  Fisher  by  the  United  States 
Bureau  of  Standards,  and  his  commission  as  a  ma- 
jor in  the  department  for  taking  charge  of  this  very 
extensive  matter.  The  close  attention  given  to  it 
and  the  value  of  the  cooperation  of  the  great  gauge 
makers  of  the  country  are  evidenced  by  the  fine  de- 
LTI •••»>  of  Intel-changeability  which  was  secured  in  all 
tin-  manufacture  of  standardized  materiel  during 
tin1  war. 

The  criticism  of  the  Ordnance  Department  for 

delay  in  the  manufacture  of  artillery  was  joined  in 

Senator  Wadsworth  in  an  interview  which  was 

printed  in  the  New  York  Times  on  September  22, 


230   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

1918.  In  this  interview  the  Senator  was  reported  as 
saying : 

6 'Knowing  that  our  troops  in  the  field  have  been 
obliged  to  call  upon  the  French  for  practically  all 
their  artillery;  knowing,  for  instance,  that  at  the 
first  independent  operation  of  the  American  Army, 
that  of  the  reduction  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  a  very 
few  American-made  guns  were  in  operation,  we 
have  felt  it  our  imperative  duty  to  inquire  into 
the  conditions  that  produced  this  situation.  Why 
should  it  exist  when  the  United  States  had  been 
at  war  for  seventeen  months  and  after  we  have 
appropriated  over  a  billion  dollars  for  the  construc- 
tion of  ordnance?" 

This  statement  might  produce  the  impression  that 
as  late  as  September,  1918,  our  army  had  had  no 
field  artillery,  and  that  the  portion  of  the  arny  in  I 
France  had  been  obliged  to  turn  to  the  French  Gov- 
ernment or  do  without  altogether ;  while  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  as  heretofore  stated  in  this  account,  the' 
supply  by  the  French  Government  had  been  carefully  j 
arranged  by  the  Ordnance  Department  from  the  be-  j 
ginning,  with  the  cordial  approval  of  that  Govern-  i 
ment  which  was  anxious  to  furnish  the  artillery^ 
while  the  American  initial  supply  and  that  which  had ; 
been  manufactured  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,, 
which  would  have  been  much  more  than  enough  for 
our  troops  engaged  at  St.  Mihiel,  had  been  kept  in 
the  United  States  for  the  training  of  new  regiments. 

The  Senator,  in  the  continuation  of  his  interview 
stated  the  reason  for  the  delay  in  the  manufacture 
of  American  artillery  as  follows : 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  231 

"Upon  investigation  we  encountered  these  facts: 
It  seems  that  in  July,  1917,  the  French  Government 
offered  us  the  use  of  its  priceless  secret  of  the 
famous  French  75s.  You  will  realize  its  peculiar 
and  inestimable  value  if  you  recall  the  well-known 
fact  that  it  is  often  said  that  these  75s  saved  Paris 
in  1914,  while  they  have  at  all  times  been  the  back- 
bone of  the  French  artillery  service.  The  secret 
of  their  mechanism  lies  in  their  recuperator,  which 
is  assembled  in  the  French  factories  with  every 
safeguard  for  secrecy.  Although  the  Germans  have 
captured  hundreds  of  these  guns  and  have  many 
times  pulled  them  apart  in  efforts  to  discover  the 
secret  of  their  construction,  they  have  never  yet 
been  able  to  make  a  gun  the  equal  of  or  in  any  way 
similar  to  those  French  75s.  The  exquisitely  deli- 
it  e  mechanism  of  the  recuperator  has  always  defied 
teir  analysis.  However,  this  offer  apparently  did 
lot  appeal  to  the  War  Department,  which  failed  to 
ike  advantage  of  it.  Instead,  the  American  Ord- 
ince  Department  decided  to  develop  and  perfect 
design  of  gun  carriage  and  recuperator  which, 
it  was  confidently  believed,  would  be  superior  to 
French  and  all  other  models.  Orders  were  given 
'or  several  thousands  of  these  American  75s." 
This  statement  would  be  calculated  to  lead  any 
to  suppose  that  there  was  some  definite  secret 
>f  manufacture  of  the  French  75  mm.  gun  which 
)iild  be  imparted  directly  as  a  piece  of  informa- 
tion to  the  Ordnance  Department,  and  would  enable 
it,  and  manufacturers  informed  by  it,  to  proceed 
it  once  with  the  production  of  this  weapon  in  quan- 


232   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

titles.  This  is  so  far  from  being  the  case  that,  at 
the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  arrangements 
with  reference  to  the  supply  of  French  artillery  to  us, 
the  representative  of  the  French  Government  as- 
sured the  Ordnance  Department  that  the  department 
would  not  be  able  to  make  the  recuperator  of  the 
French  75  mm.  gun  carriage  until  after  a  long 
course  of  practice  under  instruction,  and  cited  in 
support  of  this  advice  the  inability  of  the  Germans, 
which  the  Senator  mentions,  to  manufacture  these 
recuperators,  even  with  the  assistance  of  captured 
French  guns,  which,  of  course,  they  were  able  to 
minutely  examine.  With  this  warning  the  Ordnance 
Department,  while  giving  orders  for  the  manufac- 
ture in  France  of  a  large  number  of  French  guns, 
and  arranging  for  the  continuance  of  the  manufac- 
ture in  the  United  States  of  guns  of  its  own  models 
and  of  British  models  which  was  already  under  way, 
proceeded  to  take  all  possible  steps  for  learning  how 
to  manufacture  the  French  recuperator,  so  that  it 
might  have  this  knowledge  upon  need  for  its  use. 
To  this  end,  it  sent  experts  to  French  factories, 
secured  the  visit  to  this  country  of  French  experts 
and  procured  samples  of  the  French  75  mm.  guns 
for  examination  and  tryout,  as  well  as  making  close 
study  of  the  French  drawings  of  the  recuperator  of 
the  75  mm.  gun  carriage,  which  were  not  received 
in  detail  until  as  late  as  December,  1917,  and  were 
then  found  to  be  incomplete.  All  this  constituted 
the  most  earnest  effort  which  it  was  known  how  to 
make  to  master  this  particular  piece  of  manufacture 
which  the  Department  had  been  assured  was  so  dif- 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  233 

ficult  to  learn,  even  with  the  best  instruction.  We 
speedily  learned  that  the  so-called  secret  was  a  very 
small  part  of  the  matter,  but  that  the  real  difficulty 
lay  in  the  time  required  to  train  a  great  body  of 
workmen  in  the  special  and  peculiar  skill  necessary 
for  manufacturing,  fitting  together  and  adjusting  to 
its  work  this  nice  mechanism.  We  learned  to  under- 
stand why  it  had  taken  the  French,  as  they  had  told 
us,  years  to  accomplish  this. 

In  the  meantime,  among  other  means  for  securing 
a  supply  of  American-made  artillery  of  this  caliber, 
the  Ordnance  Department  gave  orders  for  the  con- 
tinued manufacture  of  American  75s,  known  as  the 
model  of  1916,  which  had  already  been  experimented 
with  and  were  in  course  of  further  production  at 
the  time.  The  American  orders  were  not  for  a  car- 
riage of  a  design  to  be  developed  and  perfected,  but 
for  one  which  had  already  been  under  development 
during  the  course  of  three  years  of  experimentation, 
and  was  under  orders  for  manufacture  in  the  limited 
quantities  which  the  appropriations  before  the  war 

1>ermitted.     Further  improvement  in  it  was  con- 
cmplated,  but  this  was  to  come  on  at  a  later  period, 
o  be  applied  if  it  should  prove  successful. 
In  support  of  the  reasons  which  he  had  advanced 
or  the  delay  in  the  manufacture  in  America  of  75 
mm.  gun  carriages,  the  Senator  proceeded  in  his 
interview  as  follows: 

"  After  months  of  effort  and  the  failure  to  pro- 
duce the  carriages  and  recuperators,  manufacturers 
who  had  undertaken  these  contracts  protested  to  the 
Ordnance  Department  that  the  carriages  and  recu- 


234   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

perators  could  not  be  turned  out  in  quantity  produc- 
tion. They  were  too  complicated. 

Toward  the  end  of  February,  1918,  the  Ordnance 
Department  was  forced  to  the  same  conclusion,  can- 
celled contracts  for  four-fifths  of  the  American  de- 
signed carriages  and  recuperators  and  decided  to 
adopt  and  put  into  production  the  French  models. 
Thus  there  occurred  a  delay  of  many  months." 

Perhaps  a  short  statement  of  the  pronounced 
characteristics  of  the  French  model  of  75  mm.  gun 
carriage  and  of  the  American  model  known  as  that 
of  1916  may  be  of  interest,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  major  part  of  the  criticism  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, for  its  alleged  failure  to  supply  our  troops 
with  field  artillery  as  promptly  as  the  critics  as- 
serted that  it  might  have  been  done,  centers  upon 
the  treatment  of  this  question  between  the  two 
types  of  75  mm.  carriage. 

Both  models  are  of  what  is  known  as  the  long 
recoil  type.  That  is,  the  gun,  upon  firing,  recoils 
between  three  and  four  feet  upon  the  carriage,  and 
is  automatically  returned  to  the  firing  position. 
This  long  recoil  so  softens  the  action  of  the  gun  upon 
the  carriage  that  the  latter  is  not  displaced  by  the 
recoil,  and  the  gunner  sits  upon  a  seat  attached 
to  the  trail  v.ithout  moving  his  eye  from  the  sight, 
which,  of  course,  is  attached  to  a  non-recoiling  part 
of  the  carriage,  and  continues  to  fire  the  piece  as 
rapidly  as  it  can  be  reloaded.  No  time  is  required 
for  re-aim  at  the  target,  since  the  carriage  remains 
fixed  in  its  position.  This  long  recoil  feature  is  a 
device  of  the  French,  of  about  the  end  of  the  last 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  235 

century,  and  is  now  employed  in  all  modern  field 
artillery.  Its  use  increased  the  rate  of  firing  for 
the  75  mm.  gun  from  about  one  ronnd  per  minute 
to  more  than  twenty  rounds.  The  peculiar  feature 
of  the  French  carriage  is  the  recuperator,  which 
returns  the  gun  to  the  firing  position  after  recoil. 
The  returning  force  is  a  spring  of  compressed  air, 
which  is  further  compressed  on  recoil,  and  by  its 
expansion  forces  the  gun  back  to  position.  The 
advantage  of  compressed  air  springs  as  compared 
with  steel  springs  is  that  they  do  not  wear  out  nor 
break  in  use.  The  difficulty  about  them  is  the  leak- 
age of  the  air.  The  recoil  of  the  gun  is  checked,  in 
both  models,  by  the  forcing  of  liquid,  usually  oil, 
through  a  small  orifice.  In  the  French  model,  a 
piston  drawn  through  a  steel  cylinder  under  the  gun 
by  the  recoil  forces  the  oil  with  which  the  cylinder 
is  filled  through  a  small  opening  into  another  cylin- 
der alongside,  in  wThich  is  the  compressed  air,  fur- 
ther compressing  the  air ;  and  the  difficulty  in  regard 
to  leakage  is  not  only  the  prevention  of  the  escape 
of  compressed  air  from  the  cylinder,  but  preventing 
the  mixture  of  the  air  with  the  oil  in  a  kind  of 
froth,  which  would  alter  the  weight  of  the  oil  and 
diminish  the  pressure  required  to  force  it  through 
1h«>  orifice,  and  hence  would  promote  an  over-recoil, 
with  resultant  damage  to  the  mechanism.  The 
mixture  of  the  compressed  air  with  the  oil  is  pre- 
vented by  a  movable  diaphragm  called  the  floating 
piston,  separating  them  in  the  air  cylinder,  and  slid- 
ing back  and  forth  on  recoil  and  counter  recoil. 
The  preservation  of  the  tightness  and  at  the  same 


236    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

time  of  the  freedom  of  motion  in  this  piston,  so  that 
the  air  will  not  leak  past  it,  is  the  peculiar  feature 
of  the  French  model.  It  is  accomplished  by  extreme 
nicety  of  workmanship. 

In  all  other  services  than  the  French,  including 
the  American  service,  a  steel  recoil  spring  has  been 
used  instead  of  a  compressed  air  spring.  It  is 
subject  to  the  disadvantage  that,  unless  made  with 
great  metallurgical  skill,  the  springs  lose  their  elas- 
ticity or  even  break.  Early  in  the  war  we  received 
reports  as  to  the  great  mortality  of  these  steel 
springs  in  the  British  service,  which  induced  anxiety 
and  disposition  to  substitute  an  air  spring.  Later 
information  indicated,  however,  that  the  mortality 
was  due  to  the  lack  of  experience  of  the  large  num- 
ber of  new  artillery  officers  necessarily  brought  into 
the  service,  who  had  not  understood  the  necessity 
for  keeping  the  recoil  cylinders  filled  with  oil,  and 
had  therefore  produced  breakages  by  permitting 
them  to  become  partially  empty.  Disaster  would 
equally  have  occurred  under  similar  conditions 
with  the  French  model.  When  its  cause  was  prop- 
erly understood,  therefore,  the  British  experience 
showed  no  indication  that  our  steel  springs  would 
not  do  as  well  under  the  test  of  war  as  they  had 
done  under  conditions  of  peace. 

But  the  difficulty  of  manufacturing  the  French 
air  recoil  spring  was  not  the  only  reason  for  dis- 
satisfaction with  the  French  model  of  carriage. 
Everybody  is  familiar  with  the  general  appearance 
of  a  field  gun  carriage,  in  which  the  member  called 
the  trail  is  attached  to  the  axle  under  the  gun  and 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  237 

rests  upon  the  ground  by  its  rear  end.  In  elevating 
the  gun  to  obtain  greater  range,  a  limit  is  soon 
reached  by  the  contact  of  the  descending  breech 
with  this  trail,  so  that  the  angle  of  elevation  cannot 
pass  about  twenty  degrees,  which  corresponds  to 
little  more  than  half  of  the  range  which  the  gun  is 
capable  of  at  full  elevation. 

The  only  way  to  realize  upon  the  value  of  the 
gun  is  to  dig  a  hole  for  the  end  of  the  trail,  or  to 
raise  the  wheels  of  the  carriage  upon  a  kind  of 
platform.  In  the  American  model  of  1916  carriage 
this  shortcoming  is  met  by  splitting  the  trail  into 
two  parts,  lengthwise,  hinged  at  the  axle,  and  sepa- 
rating the  rear  ends  into  a  V  when  the  gun  is  pre- 
pared for  firing.  In  this  device  the  breech  of  the 
gun  is  allowed  to  descend  between  the  two  parts 
of  the  trail,  and  the  elevation  can  be  increased  to 
some  forty  degrees,  corresponding  to  about  the 
maximum  range  which  the  gun  is  capable  of  giving. 
As  an  additional  advantage,  though  not  so  im- 
portant, in  the  American  model  the  gun  can  be 
fired  much  more  obliquely  laterally  than  with  the 
French  model  without  causing  the  line  of  recoil  of 
the  gun  to  pass  so  much  outside  the  point  of  sup- 
port of  the  trail  as  to  cause  the  carriage  to  slue 
about  sideways  when  the  gun  is  fired.  Although 
we  have  been  speaking  of  it  as  the  American  model, 
the  split  trail  is  also  a  French  invention,  of  Gen. 
Deport,  and  is  used  in  the  Italian  service,  although 
it  came  out  too  recently  to  be  adopted  in  the  French 
service,  where  its  installation  would  have  involved 
the  replacement  of  a  very  large  number  of  carriages 


238   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

already  constructed,  and  the  setting  up  a  new  manu- 
facturing equipment.  The  American  model  em- 
bodies certain  other  improvements,  particularly 
in  the  method  of  controlling  recoil.  It  is  a  significant 
fact  that  in  July  of  1918  the  French  Government 
recommended  the  substitution  in  manufacture  in  the 
United  States  of  the  American  model,  with  a  recu- 
perator which  the  Ordnance  Department  had  had 
designed  for  it  in  France  the  year  before,  for  the 
French  75. 

No  other  idea  could  be  conveyed  by  the  words  of 
Senator  Wadsworth  than  that  the  factories  of  the 
country  were  kept  employed  for  months  by  the  Ord- 
nance Department  in  an  effort  to  produce  something 
which  could  not  be  manufactured  rapidly  in  large 
numbers;  while  the  fact  is  that  these  manufac- 
turers were  not  so  occupied,  for  the  reason  that  the 
factories  were  not  ready  to  manufacture  carriages 
in  accordance  with  the  designs  of  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment, or  with  any  other  designs.  The  time  was 
occupied  in  the  erection  and  equipment  of  plants, 
which  had  not  theretofore  existed,  for  the  manufac- 
ture of  carriages  of  some  model,  and  in  the  examina- 
tion of  details  and  the  preparation  of  shop  pro- 
grams, which  are  always  the  slow  preliminaries  in 
preparation  for  the  output  of  large  numbers  of  a 
new  thing.  During  the  course  of  this  preparation 
objection  was  made  to  a  certain  part  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  gun  carriage — not  the  recuperator— 
that  it  would  be  difficult  to  turn  out  by  the  rapid 
methods  quantity  production;  whereupon  orders 
were  changed  so  as  to  call  for  a  considerable  ma- 


FIELD    ARTILLERY  239 

jority  of  the  carriages  to  be  of  the  French  design 
instead  of  the  American  design,  and  work  proceeded 
along  the  corresponding  lines;  the  manufacture  of 
a  large  number  of  American  carriages  going  along 
as  it  had  been  ordered. 

The  Senator  found  encouragement  in  the  course 
of  the  Ordnance  Department  under  my  more  fortu- 
nate successor,  which  he  expressed  as  follows: 

"The  error  of  judgment  committed  in  the  early 
summer  of  1917  caused  many  months'  delay,  but 
tin*  Ordnance  Department,  now  reorganized  from 
top  to  bottom,  is  bending  every  effort  to  catch  up 
in  the  production  of  75 's  with  carriages  and  recu- 
perators made  after  the  French  model. " 

The  reorganization  referred  to  seems  to  be  that 
described  on  page  15,  which  was  the  only  one 
of  any  moment  made  in  the  department,  and  was 
changed  back  to  the  old  form  shortly  after  the 
Senator's  interview. 

This  statement  of  facts,  even  if  it  were  all  there 
is  to  be  said,  makes  a  very  different  story  from 
that  conveyed  by  the  Senator's  interview,  in  which 
it  is  made  to  appear  that  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment either  allowed  manufacturing  plants  which 
might  have  been  employed  to  stand  idle  while  it 
was  perfecting  a  new  design,  or  occupied  such  plants 
in  work  whose  product  had  afterwards  to  be  dis- 
carded, wl).  might  from  the  beginning  have 
been  making  things  of  proved  value.  The  Ordnance 
Department  took  steps  to  follow  out  the  course 
which  would  give  the  earliest  assurance  of  suitable 


240   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

artillery,  and  the  definite  ultimate  assurance  of  the 
best  artillery;  which  is  further  illustrated  by  the 
continuance  of  the  manufacture  of  the  eighteen- 
pounder  field  gun  which  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Com- 
pany was  carrying  on  for  the  British  Government, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  model  was  not  one 
which  either  the  British  or  ourselves  thought  right 
up  to  date.  The  Ordnance  Department  continued  its 
manufacture  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  a  going 
production,  while  preparing  to  make  something 
better.  The  only  change  was  in  the  caliber  of  the 
gun,  which  was  made  75  mm.  in  order  to  agree  with 
the  others. 

But  in  view  of  subsequent  experience  there  is 
more  to  be  said  in  regard  to  this  change  of  manu- 
facturing orders  from  the  American  model  to  the 
French  model.  The  change  had  been  pressed  hard 
upon  the  Ordnance  Department,  which  appreciated 
the  difficulty  of  manufacturing  the  French  recu- 
perator, and  the  difficulty  proved  so  real  that  by  the 
end  of  the  year  1918  only  a  single  French  recupera- 
tor had  been  completed  and  accepted  in  the  United 
States ;  while  at  the  same  date  two  hundred  and  fifty- 
one  American  75  mm.  carriages,  recuperators  and 
all,  had  been  completed  and  accepted,  206  of  which 
had  been  completed  at  the  signing  of  the  Armistice, 
and  thirty-four  shipped  across  the  sea ;  although  the 
latter  did  not  get  onto  the  firing  line.  The  difficul- 
ties of  manufacture  of  the  French  recuperator  were 
not  surmounted  till  April  of  1919,  by  the  end  of 
which  month  it  was  considered  that  quantity  pro- 
duction had  been  established  and  that  the  flow  of  the 


FIELD    ARTILLERY 

output  would  continue ;  but  this  conclusion  was  based 
upon  the  production  of  only  some  sixty  satisfactory 
recuperators.  Of  the  sixty,  however,  twenty-three 
had  been  produced  in  April  and  twenty  in  March, 
so  that  there  was  reasonable  justification  for  the 
conclusion. 

Such  a  small  number  of  French  75  mm.  units  hav- 
ing been  completed  in  the  United  States  by  the  end 
of  the  second  month  of  spring,  it  is  evident  that  the 
supply  of  this  unit  would  not  have  been  available 
for  the  campaign  of  1919,  if  it  had  taken-  place ;  but 
since  the  monthly  output  of  American  75  's  reached 
sixty  in  August  of  1918  and  continued  at  forty  in 
September  and  fifty  in  October,  it  is  a  reasonable 
inference  that  there  would  have  been  a  good  supply 
for  the  1919  campaign  if  we  had  continued  to  press 
the  manufacture,  wrhile  treating  the  French  model 
somewhat  experimentally  until  after  its  difficulties 
had  been  conquered.  A  strong  probability  appears, 
therefore,  that  the  change  of  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment's original  program  of  pressing  the  manufac- 
ture of  the  American  model  was  a  mistake. 

A  deliberate  survey  of  the  whole  subject  indi- 
cates that  there  might  have  been  another  mistake. 
The  American  three-inch  gun  carriage  of  the  model 
of  1902,  with  which  our  artillery  was  armed  and 
of  which  we  had  some  five  hundred  when  we  entered 
the  war,  was  an  excellent  carriage.  Professional 
opinion  has  come  from  the  Field  Artillery  School  of 
fire  to  the  effect  that  it  had  some  important  points 
of  superiority  over  the  French  75,  which  had  been 


242   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

established  by  the  daily  use  of  the  two  side  by 
side;  and  it  has  been  recommended  by  the  school 
that  the  American  model  and  not  the  French  should 
be  made  the  standard.  The  American  1902  had 
been  in  production  for  some  years,  and  the  manu- 
facturing details  had  all  been  worked  out;  the 
expansion  of  output  would  therefore  have  been  a 
straightforward  task.  Under  these  conditions  the 
earliest  supply  from  the  United  States  would  un- 
doubtedly have  been  had  by  pushing  the  1902 
instead  of  the  French  75;  while  preparations  for 
realizing  the  advantages  of  the  1916  could  have  been 
made  by  going  ahead,  in  the  meantime,  with  its 
manufacturing  development.  If  this  course  had 
been  followed  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  prog- 
ress with  the  model  of  1916  would  have  been  about 
as  it  actually  was,  while  we  would  have  had  a  much 
larger  number  of  1902 's  than  we  got  of  the  French 
75  's.  But  we  were  too  modest  about  the  Ordnance 
Department's  model  of  1902. 

American  manufacturers  are  to  be  congratulated 
upon  having  been  able  to  apply  the  methods  of 
standardization  and  quantity  production  to  the 
French  recuperator,  which  had  not  been  so  produced 
in  France,  and  also  upon  having  promptly  overcome 
the  anticipated  difficulty  which  had  led  some  of  them 
to  object  to  a  part  of  the  American  carriage  as 
being  difficult  to  turn  out  in  mass.  Their  success 
gave  assurance  of  an  abundant  ultimate  supply  of 
the  French  model  and  of  an  earlier  supply  of  the 
superior  American  model.  It  is  indicative  of  the 


FIELD    ARTILLERY 

rapid  advance  in  war  material  which  was  stimulated 
by  the  war,  that  both  models  are  now  obsolete,  being 
destined  to  disappear,  together  with  their  motive 
power,  the  horse;  to  be  replaced  by  a  mechanically 
driven  carriage  and  a  heavier  gun. 


VIII 

SMOKELESS  POWDER 

THE  smokeless  powder  in  use  by  the  Army  and 
Navy  of  the  United  States  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War,  and  for  some  years  before,  was  of 
such  excellent  quality  that  no  experiments  of  any 
moment  for  its  improvement  were  undertaken  be- 
fore the  close  of  hostilities.  The  powder  is  known 
as  the  Nitro-Cellulose  type,  and  is  made  by  treating 
ordinary  cotton  with  nitric  acid  and  dissolving  the 
resulting  guncotton,  or  Pyro-Cellulose,  in  a  mixture 
of  alcohol  and  ether,  in  which  it  is  soluble.  The 
gelatinous  mass  thus  produced  is  then  formed  into 
grains  of  suitable  size  and  shape,  and  the  ether 
and  alcohol  afterwards  expelled  by  drying,  leaving 
almost  pure  guncotton,  in  hard,  horny  pieces  or 
grains. 

When  the  war  broke  out  in  Europe  the  total  pow- 
der making  capacity  in  the  United  States  was  about 
50,000  pounds  per  day,  of  which  about  1,100  pounds 
was  at  the  Army  plant  at  Picatinny  Arsenal,  N.  J., 
and  something  like  three  times  this  capacity  at  the 
Naval  factory  at  Indian  Head,  Md.  The  European 
Governments,  however,  had  placed  such  large  or- 
ders for  powder  in  the  United  States  that  by  the 
time  we  came  into  the  war  the  manufacturing  ca- 

244 


SMOKKI.1'.S>     POWDER  245 

pacity  of  the  country  had  been  increased  to  about 
1,250,000  pounds  per  day,  of  which  the  prepon- 
derating majority  was  with  the  plants  of  E.  I.  du 
Pont  de  Nemours  £  Co.,  Inc.  Notwithstanding  this 
large  capacity  it  was  evident  to  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment that  more  manufacturing  plants  would  be 
ncrded.  An  expenditure  of  $500,000  had  been  au- 
thorized by  Congress  for  increasing  the  capacity  of 
the  Army  plant,  either  by  additions  at  the  Picatinny 
rial  or  by  the  construction  of  a  new  plant;  but 
the  amount  was  too  small  to  be  of  any  significance 
in  the  emergency,  and  it  was  never  used.  The  De- 
partment therefore  in  the  first  month  of  the  war, 
April,  1917,  requested  the  du  Pont  de  Nemours 
Company  to  consider  the  subject  of  expanding  the 
powder  manufacturing  capacity  of  the  country,  and 
to  commence  at  once  the  search  for  a  suitable  site 
for  a  new  plant.  Certain  expansions  of  existing 
plants,  which  were  practicable,  were  made  to  meet 
orders  for  powder  by  the  department,  and  by  Octo- 
ber, 1917,  the  consideration  of  the  subject  had 
reached  the  point  of  embodiment  in  a  proposition 
by  the  company,  pursuant  to  which,  on  the  eleventh 
of  that  month,  I  submitted  a  statement  of  the  situa- 
tion in  a  memorandum  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
At  the  time  of  submission  of  this  statement  a  few 
orders  for  Army  powder  had  already  been  placed, 
and  accepted  by  the  manufacturers,  and  there  was 

nail  supply  on  hand. 

In  accordance  with  the  military  program  there 
was  called  for  in  addition,  as  a  manufacturing  pro- 
gram, the  production  of  500,000,000  pounds  of 


'AR 


246    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

smokeless  powder  in  the  calendar  year  1918  for 
the  forces  of  the  United  States  Army ;  but  although 
a  certain  increase  had  been  provided  for  since  we 
entered  the  war,  the  full  capacity  of  the  country, 
if  operated  every  day  in  the  year,  would  turn  out 
only  480,000,000  pounds;  not  enough  for  the  Army 
alone,  without  considering  either  the  Navy  or  the 
Allies.  The  allocation  of  capacity  between  the 
Army,  the  Navy  and  the  Allies  was  made  by  the 
War  Industries  Board,  and  this  had  been  done  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  leave  available  for  the  Army 
only  168,000,000  pounds  of  the 'unobligated  capacity, 
to  meet  the  requirement  of  500,000,000  pounds,  a 
shortage  for  1918  of  332,000,000  pounds. 

For  the  year  1919  it  was  estimated  that  the  Army 
requirements  would  be  600,000,000  pounds  of  pow- 
der, which  was  120,000,000  pounds  in  excess  of  the 
country's  capacity,  even  if  this  were  all  to  be  avail- 
able for  the  Army's  use,  which  it  was  not,  by  a 
great  deal.  So  that  by  the  end  of  1919  there  would 
have  been  a  shortage  of  332,000,000  pounds  plus 
120,000,000  pounds,  or  452,000,000  pounds,  without 
considering  the  Navy  and  the  Allies  for  1919.  (For 
a  larger  force  than  was  then  contemplated  the  esti- 
mate for  1919  afterwards  went  up  to  1,000,000,000 
pounds.)  All  this  related  for  the  United  States  to 
cannon  powder  alone,  without  reference  to  the  pow- 
der needed  for  small  arms. 

At  this  time  the  appeals  and  statements  of  posi- 
tion of  the  Allies  with  reference  to  the  supply  by 
the  United  States  of  powder  and  other  explosives 
for  their  uses  had  become  most  impressive.  Their 


SMOKKLKSS    POWDER  24-7 

situation  arose  from  their  necessity  for  importing 
the  bulk  of  the  raw  materials  for  the  manufacture 
of  powder  and  explosives,  and  from  the  great  weight 
of  these  materials  as  compared  with  that  of  the 
finished  product.  For  the  manufacture  of  one  ton 
of  hi^h  explosive  from  eight  to  twelve  tons  of  raw 
material  are  required,  depending  upon  whether  coal 
i<  included;  and  for  one  ton  of  smokeless  powder 
there  are  used  from  fifteen  to  twenty  tons  of  raw 
materials.  France,  for  one,. although  having  plenty 
of  manufacturing  capacity,  was  not  able  to  produce 

-elf  more  than  one-third  of  her  requirements  in 
raw  materials,  and  the  rest  had  to  come  from 
abroad.  The  highly  important  nitrate  of  soda  came 
i'mm  Chile  by  a  long  and  dangerous  voyage  on 
which  the  submarine  was  a  dreadful  menace,  which 
not  only  took  its  toll  of  the  nitrate  ships  but  by  its 
alarming  destruction  of  other  shipping  reduced  the 
tonnage  available  for  nitrate  importation.  The 
measure  of  the  rate  of  prosecution  of  the  war  was 
pretty  nearly  the  amount  of  ocean  transport  which 
available  for  all  imperative  purposes,  and  at 
that  time  the  question  as  to  whether  this  amount 
could  be  kept  at  a  figure  sufficient  to  sustain  the 
armies  in  the  theater  of  war  and  the  civil  popula- 
ii  spite  of  the  submarine  campaign,  had  not 
yet  been  answered. 

A  body  entitled  the  Technical  Franco- American 
Commission  on  Explosives  had  been  organized  in 
France  and  had  held  several  meetings  in  the  month 
ist,  1H17.  Tt  had  made  an  extended  report 

its  proceedings  and  conclusions  in  which  it  set 


248   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

forth  the  condition  of  France,  stating  that  "the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  should  be  invited  to 
take  into  its  own  hands  the  supplying  of  the  entire 
amount  of  powder  and  explosives  necessary  not  only 
for  the  American  contingents  in  France,  but  as  well 
(and  in  the  proportion  of  about  two-thirds),  the 
powder  and  explosives  necessary  for  the  consump- 
tion of  the  French  Armies."  It  urged  that  the  "de- 
cision must  not  be  delayed,  in  consequence  of  the 
critical  situation  of  the  stocks  and  reserves  of 
nitrate  of  soda ' ' ;  and  added  that  ' '  This  indispensa- 
ble component  in  the  manufacture  of  powder  and  in 
the  greater  number  of  explosives  will  soon  be  want- 
ing, and  it  must  be  foreseen  that  by  the  beginning 
of  the  month  of  December  next  the  production  of 
powder  and  explosives  in  France  will  be  reduced  to 
one-tenth  of  the  present  amount ";  also  that  it  vill 
"follow  that  by  December  31st  the  stock  will  be 
completely  exhausted,  and  consequently  the  solution 
heretofore  set  forth  (of  American  manufacture), 
becomes  imperative,  and  it  must  not  be  delayed 
under  any  pretext  under  pain  of  incurring  disaster. " 
Gen.  Pershing  transmitted  these  conclusions  to  the 
War  Department  in  a  cablegram  dated  August  23, 
1917,  and  added:  To  avoid  calamity  the  United 
States  must  not  only  furnish  powder  and  explosives 
for  all  of  its  own  forces  but  must  supply  about  half 
of  the  French  requirements.  It  is  therefore  recom- 
mended: (a)  That  the  United  States  Government 
furnish  all  powders  and  explosives  needed  for 
present  contracts  with  the  French  Government,  (b) 
That  the  United  States  Government  prepare  to  fur- 


SMOKKLKSS    POWDER  249 

nish  by  December  :>()()  ions  per  day  of  explosives 
and  200  tuns  per  day  of  powder  for  French  con- 
sumption. 

Such  was  the  situation  which,  in  the  autumn  of 
1;'17,  presented  itself  to  rae  as  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
responsible  for  the  supply  to  our  own  forces  and 
to  a  large  extent  to  the  forces  of  our  Allies,  of 
powder,  perhaps  the  best  single  measure  of  strength 
which  is  afforded  by  all  the  materials  of  war.  It  is 
profitless  to  discuss  the  relative  importance  of  indis- 
pensables;  but  the  amount  of  our  contribution  to 
victory  would  be  more  nearly  proportional  to  the 
quantity  of  powder  which  we  furnished  and  caused 
to  be  fired  at  the  enemy  than  to  any  other  one  item 
of  military  power.  We  were  not  sending  troops 
to  Europe  to  beat  the  Germans  with  their  fists,  nor, 
in  any  great  degree,  to  stick  them  with  bayonets  or 
slash  them  with  sabers,  but  to  pound  them  with 
missiles  sent  from  rifles,  machine  guns  and  artillery 
by  powder,  powder,  powder.  Even  the  toxic  gases, 
which  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war  caused  thirty 
per  cent  of  the  casualties,  were  usually  delivered 
among  the  onemy  in  shells  propelled  by  powder, 
which  was  everywhere  demanded  and  in  widespread 
necessity  was  next  to  food  itself.  The  requirements 
and  the  threat  of  shortage  had  been  made  strikingly 
apparent,  and  the  subject  was  not  to  be  trifled  with. 

Tlu-  du   Pont   Company   had    such    incomparably 

greater  experience  than  any  other  agency  in  Amer- 

.!i  the  coiistruciion  aini  operation  of  plants  for 

manufacture  of  smokeless  powder,  and  was  so 

well  provided  with  plans  of  construction  and  ad- 


250   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ministrative  and  technical  staff,  in  a  going  organiza- 
tion, that  I  had  no  hesitation  in  recommending  that 
the  company  be  empowered  to  erect  and  operate  a 
plant  for  the  Government,  in  accordance  with  the 
proposition  which  it  submitted.  The  output  for 
which  the  plant  was  to  be  constructed  was  1,000,000 
pounds  per  day,  which  would  have  failed  by  a  con- 
siderable amount  to  meet  the  requirements  up  to  the 
end  of  the  year  1919;  but  the  enterprise  was  con- 
sidered as  great  as  it  was  prudent  to  undertake  at 
that  time.  Subsequent  enlargement  should  have 
come  after  it  was  well  in  hand.  The  total  estimated 
cost  of  the  plant  was  $90,000,000,  which  was  to  be 
borne  entirely  by  the  Government,  the  Company 
acting  as  agent  both  for  construction  and  operation, 
with  a  percentage  compensation  for  construction, 
and  a  fixed  sum  per  pound  plus  a  premium  for 
economy  as  compensation  for  manufacture.  The 
plant  was  to  be  in  ten  units,  or  lines,  with  a  capacity 
of  100,000  pounds  each,  per  day,  and  the  first  unit 
was  expected  to  be  in  operation  after  about  eight 
months,  the  whole  plant  after  about  eighteen 
months. 

The  War  Department  did  not  approve  my  recom- 
mendation, and  held  up  the  proposition  on  the 
ground  of  excessive  compensation  to  the  Company. 
It  is  of  interest,  therefore,  to  examine  in  some  detail 
the  nature  of  the  compensation  contemplated  and 
the  estimated  cost  to  the  Government  of  the  project, 
including  that  of  the  powder  which  it  was  expected 
to  procure. 

As  stated  above,  the  estimated  cost  of  construe- 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  251 

tion  of  the  plant — which  was  expected  to  be  on  two 
sites— was  $90,000,000,  which  included  fifteen  per 
cent  of  the  actual  expenditures  to  be  paid  to  the 
Company  to  cover  its  services  in  connection  with 
the  following: 

Preparation  of  plans. 

Selection  of  sites. 

Optioning  land. 

Survey  of  land. 

Making  of  contour  maps. 

Supervision  of  construction. 

Supervision  of  manufacture  of  machinery  and 
apparatus. 

Premiums  to  employees  for  extra  efforts. 

Expense  of  making  purchases. 

Expense  of  following  up  and  expediting  deliv- 
eries. 

Expense  of  Washington  office. 

Administrative  expense  away  from  the  plants. 

Depreciation  of  a  machine  shop  to  be  purchased 
at  the  expense  of  the  Company. 

Profits  on  construction. 

The  headquarters  of  the  Company  were  at  Wil- 
mington, Del.,  where  the  administrative  offices  and 
the  engineering  force  were  located,  and  it  was  in- 
tended that  the  work  should  be  directed  from  this 
office,  as  listed  above,  leaving  to  be  charged  to  the 
work  only  local  supervision  and  administration  at 
the  plants. 

For  the  operation  of  the  plant  the  Company  was 
to  receive  five  cents  per  pound  of  manufactured 
powder;  and  if  the  cost  of  manufacturing  should 
have  been  less  than  forty-four  and  a  half  cents  per 
pound  of  manufactured  powder,  excluding  the  five 


252    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cents,  the  Company  was  to  receive  in  addition  one- 
half  the  amount  by  which  the  cost  fell  short  of  forty- 
four  and  a  half  cents.  The  five  cents  per  pound 
was  intended  to  cover  engineering  direction  and 
supervision  of  operations,  other  than  local  super- 
vision at  the  plant;  purchasing  and  expediting  the 
delivery  of  materials  for  operation;  premiums  to 
employees ;  administration  of  operations  other  than 
local  administration  at  the  plant,  and  profit. 

Under  this  proposition  the  Company  would  have 
received  a  large  sum,  about  $11,758,000,  as  a  per- 
centage of  the  construction  cost,  and  would  also 
have  received  a  liberal  percentage,  about  eleven  per 
cent,  of  the  estimated  base  cost  of  manufacture  of 
powder,  for  operation;  but  these  figures  were  to 
cover,  in  addition  to  compensation,  very  consider- 
able services  of  the  Company  to  be  rendered  by  the 
organization,  from  the  headquarter  offices  at  Wil- 
mington. Any  saving  below  the  estimated  cost  of 
forty-four  and  a  half  cents  a  pound  was  to  have 
been  shared  by  the  Government  and  the  Company. 
It  was  estimated  that  the  cost  of  the  plant  itself, 
when  spread  over  a  year's  output  for  each  of  the 
units,  would  amount  to  about  thirty  cents  per 
pound  of  powder  manufactured,  and  assuming  the 
cost  of  manufacturing  to  be  what  the  Government 
was  at  the  time  paying  the  Company  on  orders 
for  powder  already  given  it,  forty-nine  and  a  half 
cents  per  pound,  the  output  of  the  plant  would 
have  cost  seventy-nine  and  a  half  cents  per  pound 
of  powder,  including  the  amortization  of  the  plant 
in  one  year.  The  European  Allies  had  paid  $1.00 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  253 

per  pound  for  the  output  required  to  amortize 
the  plant  required  to  meet  their  needs,  and  the 
Company  had  thereafter  charged  both  them  and  us 
forty-nine  and  a  half  cents  per  pound,  without  any 
further  charge  for  interest  or  amortization. 

A  good  deal  of  interest  had  been  taken  in  the  cost 
of  smokeless  powder  since  its  introduction  into  use 
in  our  Artillery  Service  at  the  time  of  the  Spanish 
AVar.  Private  manufacturers  were  at  that  time  and 
for  some  years  thereafter  the  only  reliance  of  the 
Government  for  the  supply  of  powder,  and  they  were 
soon  consolidated  under  the  du  Pont  Company.  The 
price  almost  immediately  after  that  war  was  $1.00 
per  pound,  and  then  commenced  to  somewhat  slowly 
decline.  The  Government,  however,  stepped  in  and 
accelerated  this  process  by  imposing  statutory  limi- 
tations upon  the  price  to  be  paid,  which,  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  War,  had  come  down  to 
fifty-three  cents  per  pound.  The  Navy  Department 
had  during  the  interval  established  a  small  factory 
at  Newport,  B.  I.,  which  was  afterward  moved  to 
Iii'lian  Ih'iid,  Md.,  and  somewhat  enlarged.  In  the 
year  1908  the  army  factory  at  the  Picatinny  Arsenal 
was  built,  and  the  knowledge  afforded  by  its  opera- 
tion permitted  the  exercise  of  intelligence  in  the 
control  of  the  price  paid  to  private  manufacturers. 
The  cost  of  manufacture  at  the  Arsenal  had  at  one 
time  gotten  down  as  low  as  thirty-eight  cents  per 
pound,  including  all  the  overheads  which  a  private 
manufacturer  has  to  charge,  except  selling  costs, 
costs  of  financing  and  profits,  which  an  arsenal  is  not 
subject  to.  Before  our  entry  into  lh<>  v  ar,  however, 


2.54        ORD.VANCE   AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

material  and  labor  had  so  advanced  that  the  cost  of 
the  powder  at  the  Arsenal  had  reached  about  fifty 
cents  per  pound 

Under  the  circumstances  I  considered  the  proposi- 
tion of  the  du  Pont  Company  to  be  suitable  for  ac- 
ceptance. The  estimated  cost,  including  amortiza- 
tion, was  to  be  about  twenty  per  cent  less  than  had 
already  been  paid  by  the  Allies,  and  the  reasonable 
disposition  of  the  Company  was  evidenced  by  the 
price  at  which  they  were  currently  selling  us  pow- 
der, which  was  less  than  our  own  cost  of  manufac- 
ture and  less  than  had  ever  before  been  charged — 
being  three  and  a  half  cents  per  pound  less  than  the 
statutory  price  which  had  been  paid  before  the  war; 
a  rise  of  ten  cents  per  pound  of  powder  in  the  cost 
of  raw  materials  notwithstanding.  Although  the 
snms  to  go  to  the  Company  in  percentages  and  com- 
pensation were  large,  I  had  no  means  of  knowing 
what  proportion  of  these  snms  would  be  profit,  and 
in  the  compelling  emergency  in  which  the  country 
stood  I  felt  both  justified  and  bound  to  meet  it  by  the 
only  agency  which  could  enable  us  to  do  so,  at  a  cost 
which  not  only  did  not  itself  appear  to  be  unreason- 
able, but  compared  favorably  with  every  other  cost 
of  which  I  had  knowledge. 

When  my  recommendation  was  not  approved  by 
the  War  Department  I  invited  a  conference  with  the 
officers  of  the  du  Pont  Company  in  an  effort  to 
secure  a  modification  of  the  terms  of  their  proposi- 
tion, and  several  weeks  were  spent  in  negotiations, 
and  in  consultations  with  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
the  War  Industries  Board,  trying  to  reach  a  con- 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  255 

elusion  under  which  the  much-needed  work  could 
proceed.  The  Company  consented  to  certain  modi- 
fications ;  but,  as  no  ground  of  agreement  as  to  con- 
ditions which  the  War  Department  would  accept 
had  been  arrived  at  after  a  month  of  discussion,  I, 
on  November  23,  1917,  submitted  a  new  memoran- 
dum to  the  Secretary  of  "War,  in  which  I  recom- 
mended that  the  modified  terms  which  I  had  arrived 
at  with  the  Company  be  accepted  for  the  erection  of 
a  factory  of  400,000  pounds  per  day  capacity,  and 
for  its  operation  for  some  eighteen  months — unless 
the  need  for  the  powder  should  in  the  meantime  have 
ceased  to  exist.  I  renewed  my  expression  of  view 
that  plants  with  1,000,000  pounds  per  day  capacity 
should  be  commenced  at  once ;  but  urged  the  smaller 
plant,  as  one  which  would  cover  such  construction 
as  could  be  had  upon  a  single  site,  and  of  which  the 
commencement  would  afford  a  short  time  for  a 
further  survey  of  the  situation,  and  a  search  for 
some  other  agency  to  construct  an  additional  plant. 
The  principal  changes  in  the  terms  were  the  divi- 
sion of  the  fifteen  per  cent  which  was  to  have  been 
paid  for  overhead  services  and  compensation  for 
construction  into  two  parts,  of  eight  per  cent 
for  overhead  services  and  six  and  a  half  per  cent 
for  compensation  for  construction ;  but  the  compen- 
sation for  construction  was  to  be  paid  back  to  the 
Government  in  accordance  with  a  sliding  scale,  as 
compensation  was  paid  for  operation,  at  such  a  rate 
that  the  whole  six  and  a  half  per  cent  should  have 
been  paid  back  and  tlio  compensation  reduced  In 
that  for  operation  only,  upon  the  completion  of 


256        ORDNANCE   AND   THE  WORLD   WAR 

about  180,000,000  pounds  of  powder ;  which  was  ex- 
pected to  be  after  about  eighteen  months  of  opera- 
tion. The  sum  to  be  paid  as  compensation  for  oper- 
ation was  changed  from  five  cents  a  pound  for 
overhead  services  and  profit  to  three  and  a  half  cents 
a  pound ;  and  to  offset  this  reduction  in  compensation 
the  base  cost  below  which  a  premium  of  the  half 
saving  was  allowed  for  economy  was  changed  from 
forty-four  and  a  half  cents  a  pound  to  forty-six  cents 
a  pound,  and  the  Company  safeguarded  itself  in  the 
matter  of  the  minimum  by  stipulating  that  the  base 
cost  should  go  up  or  down  with  the  price  of  sodium 
nitrate.  In  my  memorandum  I  said:  "It  must  be 
remembered  that  all  other  powder-making  agencies 
than  the  du  Pont  Company,  including  the  Ordnance 
Department,  are  already  strained  to  the  limit,  either 
in  powder  manufacture  or  in  other  duties  connected 
with  the  preparation  of  our  forces,  and  that  the 
personnel  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  in  particu- 
lar, is  no  more  than  sufficient  to  set  in  motion  and 
overlook,  in  the  interest  of  the  Government,  the 
performance  of  agencies  outside  itself;  also  that 
there  is  no  such  margin  of  resource  for  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  as  would  justify  failure  to  use  one 
of  the  first  importance,  in  the  hope,  and  taking  the 
risk,  of  finding  a  possible  substitute." 

This  recommendation  also  was  not  approved  by 
the  Secretary  of  War. 

As  the  lapse  of  time  was  making  the  subject  more 
and  more  pressing,  I  made  a  visit  in  the  early  part 
of  December  to  Wilmington  for  a  conference  with 
the  officers  of  the  du  Pont  Company,  with  the  hope  of 


SMOKELESS    POWDER 

further  modification  of  their  terms.  At  this  inter- 
view I  assured  them  that  I  considered  their  assist- 
ance imperative  for  meeting  the  necessities  of  the 
Government,  and  informed  them  of  my  understand- 
ing and  belief  that  the  question  of  compensation  \vas 
the  only  one  standing  in  the  way  of  their  employ- 
ment. The  Company  then  agreed  that  they  would 
construct  and  operate  the  plants  of  1,000,000  pounds 
per  day  capacity,  as  previously  proposed,  and  that 
questions  of  compensation  for  the  services  of  the 
Company,  both  in  construction  and  operation,  should 
be  referred  to  a  Board  of  Arbitration  of  three 
members  to  be  selected ;  and  it  afterward  presented 
this  agreement  in  a  memorandum  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  dated  December  10,  1917,  at  an  interview 
for  which  I  made  appointment  for  them  with  the 
Secretary.  In  the  meantime  a  proposition  had  been 
made  to  the  Company,  drawn  up  by  the  War  In- 
dustries Board  under  whose  advice  the  Secretary  of 
War  had  been  acting  when  he  rejected  my  own,  and 
the  Company  had  declined  to  accept  this  proposi- 
tion. Referring  to  this  incident,  the  Secretary  of 
War  declined  the  proposition  including  arbitration 
as  to  compensation  of  the  du  Pont  Company,  and 
embodied  his  declination  in  a  memorandum  dated 
December  12,  1917,  stating  that  the  department  had 
proceeded  to  work  out  a  plan  for  the  direct  creation 
of  this  capacity  by  the  Government  itself. 

The  War  Industries  Board,  however,  took  a  dif- 
ferent view  of  this  last  offer  of  the  Company,  and, 
by  resolution  dated  December  13,  1917,  stated  that 
the  offer  fully  covered  all  objections  that  they  had 


258    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

raised;  that  the  emergency  had  become  accentu- 
ated during  the  delay  to  an  extent  that  made  it 
vitally  important  not  to  lose  a  single  day  in  push- 
ing the  powder  project,  and  urged  upon  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  the  vital  importance  of  avoiding  any 
further  delay,  or  of  assuming  the  risk  incident  to 
the  Government  undertaking,  either  the  construc- 
tion or  operation  of  the  plant.  The  Board  thus 
joined  in  the  effort  to  make  use  of  the  du  Pont 
Company. 

But,  pursuing  the  idea  of  the  construction  and 
operation  of  a  plant  by  the  Government  itself,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  on  December  15,  1917,  ap- 
pointed Mr.  D.  C.  Jackling,  without  compensation, 
to  build  and  operate  the  new  Government  plants, 
giving  him  an  entirely  free  hand  and  full  authority. 
Mr.  Jackling  had  had  no  experience  in  the  manu- 
facture of  powder,  but  had  been  prominently  con- 
nected with  large  and  successful  mining  enterprises 
in  a  controlling  capacity.  He  decided  to  commence 
construction  at  Nitro,  the  site  which  had  been  se- 
lected near  Charleston,  W.  Va.,  and  ground  was 
broken  on  February  1,  1918.  The  plant  was  in- 
tended to  have  a  capacity  of  625,000  pounds  per 
day,  and  was  about  eighty-three  per  cent  complete 
at  the  time  of  the  Armistice,  when  4,533,000  pounds 
of  powder  had  been  manufactured  by  the  parts 
which  had  been  gotten  into  operation. 

In  the  meantime  Mr.  Jackling  had  himself  con- 
cluded that  the  services  of  the  du  Pont  Company  as 
an  organization,  in  addition  to  the  help  which  he  had 
received  from  it  in  the  matter  of  plans  and  prelim- 


SMOKKLKSS     I'OWDER  259 

inary  work  (the  blue  prints  of  the  plans  covered 
some  thirty-five  acres  of  surface),  were  necessary  for 
the  Government,  and  on  January  29, 1918,  a  contract 
\s  as  concluded  with  the  Company  for  the  construc- 
tion and  erection  of  a  plant  of  five  units,  each  of 
100,000  pounds  per  day  estimated  capacity,  at  the 
site  which  had  been  selected  near  Nashville,  Tenn., 
and  called  Old  Hickory.  A  railroad  spur  about  nine 
miles  in  length  had  to  be  built  to  the  site  of  the 
plant  before  construction  could  commence,  but 
ground  was  broken  on  March  8th,  and  the  first  unit 
was  in  operation  the  1st  of  July,  some  months  ahead 
of  the  date  called  for  in  the  contract.  In  the  mean- 
time the  project  was  enlarged,  and  it  was  decided 
to  make  the  Old  Hickory  plant  one  of  nine  units 
instead  of  five  units.  The  plant  was  about  ninety- 
three  per  cent  complete  when  the  Armistice  was 
signed  and  at  that  time  had  manufactured  25,620,000 
pounds  of  powder.  It  covered  about  eight  square 
miles  of  ground,  and  included  a  town  of  some  twenty 
thousand  people.  It  thus  appears  that  although 
ground  was  broken  for  the  Nashville  plant  over  one 
month  later  than  for  the  Nitro  plant,  and  the  plant 
was  to  be  of  fifty  per  cent  greater  capacity,  it  was 
ton  per  cent  nearer  completion  at  the  time  of  the 
Armistice,  and  had  then  turned  out  more  than  five 
times  as  much  powder  as  the  other  plant.  So  much 
for  the  experienced  organization,  which  some  of  us 
'onsible  had  not  been  willing  to  contemplate  the 
failure  to  make  use  of,  in  the  compelling  emergency. 
As  the  refusal  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  permit 
the  employment  of  the  du  Pont  Company  had  per- 


260   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

sisted,  after  the  offer  of  the  Company  to  go  ahead 
with  the  work  and  leave  the  matter  of  compensation 
to  subsequent  adjustment  by  arbitration  was  made,  a 
question  is  raised  as  to  whether  compensation  was 
the  controlling  consideration  in  his  decision.  How- 
ever it  was  the  only  one  which  was  objected  to 
during  the  negotiations;  and  therefore,  although  I 
have  not  the  figures  with  which  to  make  an  analysis 
of  the  expense  of  the  rejected  projects  as  compared 
with  that  which  was  incurred  under  the  method  which 
was  actually  carried  out,  it  is  worth  while  to  consider 
certain  broad  statements  that  can  be  made  from 
which  may  be  deduced  the  relative  financial  advan- 
tage of  the  course  covered  by  my  recommendations, 
and  that  which  was  finally  pursued. 

Experience  with  the  construction  and  operation 
of  the  plants  which  were  built,  and  especially  the 
one  which  was  built  by  the  du  Pont  Company  at  Old 
Hickory,  indicates  that  the  plant  originally  proposed 
could  have  been  constructed  for  about  the  sum  esti- 
mated, viz. :  $90,000,000,  and  would  have  produced  by 
the  date  of  the  Armistice  about  110,000,000  pounds 
of  powder.  The  cost  of  manufacture  was  found  to 
be  about  forty  cents  a  pound,  to  which,  under  the 
original  proposition,  would  have  been  added  five 
cents  a  pound  as  compensation  to  the  manufactur- 
ers and  two  and  a  quarter  cents  a  pound  as  premium 
for  reducing  the  cost  of  manufacturing  below  forty- 
four  and  a  half  cents.  The  total  cost  of  manufac- 
ture, therefore,  to  the  Government,  would  have  been 
forty-seven  and  a  quarter  cents  a  pound,  two  and  a 
quarter  cents  less  than  it  had  been  paying  to  the 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  261 

manufacturers  for  powder  made  in  their  own  plants. 
i !'  to  the  cost  of  manufacturing  is  added  the  amount 
necessary  to  amortize  the  $90,000,000  plant  by  the 
1 10,000,000  pounds  of  powder  which  could  have  been 
manufactured  by  the  date  of  the  Armistice,  the  cost 
of  the  powder  becomes  $1.29  a  pound.  That  is,  if 
the  first  course  recommended  had  been  followed  the 
United  States  would,  at  the  time  of  the  Armistice, 
have  had  from  its  plant  110,000,000  pounds  of  pow- 
der which  would  have  cost  it,  in  total,  $1.29  a  pound. 
At  the  Nitro  and  Old  Hickory  plants  there  had 
been  expended  for  construction  and  for  powder  man- 
ufactured, at  the  time  of  the  Armistice,  $153,770,400, 
and  there  had  been  manufactured  30,153,000  pounds 
of  powder.  The  total  expenditure,  per  pound  of 
powder,  at  these  two  plants  had  therefore  been  $5.10, 
as  against  $1.29,  above,  and  we  had  some  30,000,000 
pounds  of  powder  instead  of  110,000,000  pounds. 
Put  differently,  the  course  first  recommended  would 
have  furnished  us  with  110,000,000  pounds  of  pow- 
der, at  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  for  an  expendi- 
ture of  about  $142,000,000,  while  the  course  actually 
followed  gave  us  about  30,000,000  pounds  for  an  ex- 
penditure of  $153,770,000.  Of  course  this  compari- 
son is  not  absolutely  fair  to  the  method  which  was 
followed  for  providing  powder,  since  hostilities 
ceased  sooner  than  was  anticipated,  and  the  Govern- 
ment was  left  with  large  plants  on  its  hands  from 
which  there  had  been  time  to  get  but  a  small  pro- 
duction over  which  to  spread  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion. But  there  is  substantial  justice  in  the  com- 
parison, nevertheless,  for  the  reason  for  the  small 


262    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


output  by  the  Armistice  date  was  the  long  delay  in 
making  the  effort  to  avoid  utilizing  the  du  Pont 
Company,  and  the  attempt  first  made  to  get  on  with- 
out its  help.  The  late  start  had  rendered  necessary 
the  building  of  larger  plants  in  order  to  accelerate 
the  supply,  and  the  investment  charge  was  thus 
increased.  It  is  true  that  no  shortage  of  powder 
arose  from  the  delay  in  getting  a  flow  of  increased 
production,  but  this  was  due  to  the  later  date 
than  was  anticipated  at  which  any  large  body  of 
American  troops  got  into  action;  and  also  it  can- 
not be  stated  that  there  would  not  have  been  a 
shortage  for  such  a  campaign  as  was  expected  for 
1919,  if  it  had  taken  place.  There  were  some 
200,000,000  pounds  of  powder  on  hand  in  the  United 
States,  from  all  sources  of  supply,  at  the  Armistice ; 
but  the  conclusion  in  the  spring  of  1918  to  build  for 
a  daily  capacity  of  1,500,000  pounds,  and  the  serious 
consideration  given  in  the  early  summer  to  an  ad- 
ditional project  for  600,000  pounds  capacity,  show 
that  my  anxiety  to  get  immediately  at  work  upon  a 
capacity  of  1,000,000  pounds  in  the  autumn  of  1917 
was  not  unwarranted.  In  the  light  of  half  a  year's 
later  knowledge  than  I  had  the  matter  of  a  larger 
project  than  mine  had  been  was  considered  most 
urgent. 

Mr.  Jackling  and  the  agencies  employed  by  him  in 
constructing  the  plant  at  Nitro  were  commendably 
efficient  in  getting  into  partial  operation  a  well  built 
plant  in  time  to  turn  out  4,533,000  pounds  of  powder 
by  the  date  of  the  Armistice ;  but  the  handicap  which 
they  suffered  as  compared  with  the  Company  having 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  263 

experience  and  previous  organization  for  the  work, 
both  of  which  they  lacked,  is  shown  by  the  results 
at  the  two  plants.  The  earlier  readiness  for  opera- 
tion of  the  Old  Hickory  plant  and  the  greater  out- 
put from  it  have  been  already  mentioned.  The  total 
cost  for  construction  and  operation  at  Old  Hickory 
was  $95,221,150,  which,  distributed  over  the  $25,- 
620,000  pounds  of  powder  produced,  gave  $3.71  a 
pound.  The  expenditure  for  construction  and  op- 
oration  at  Nitro  was  $58,549,250,  and  the  quantity 
of  powder  produced  was  4,533,000  pounds,  making 
the  total  cost  per  pound  $12.95. 

The  Old  Hickory  plant  was  built  by  the  du  Pont 
Company  for  a  compensation  for  construction  of  one 
dollar.  The  contract  of  January  29,  1918,  with  this 
Company  had  called  for  the  payment  of  $500,000  for 
construction  plans,  and  for  a  sum  equal  to  three  per 
cent  of  expenditures  made,  for  services,  with  a  limit 
for  services  of  $1,500,000.  But  this  was  for  a  plant 
of  only  500,000  pounds  a  day ;  and  when,  in  March, 
it  was  decided  to  build  the  plant  to  have  900,000 
pounds  capacity  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  an 
extension  of  the  limit  of  compensation  for  construc- 
tion would  have  been  allowed.  However,  the  Com- 
pany desired  a  somewhat  freer  hand  in  making  ex- 
penditures, especially  for  stimulating  the  personnel, 
than  was  comfortably  practicable  with  an  arrange- 
ment under  which  its  compensation  increased  with 
xpenditures  of  Government  money,  and  so,  when 
a  supplementary  agreement  was  made  to  cover  the 
enlargement  of  plant,  it  considered  it  advantageous 
to  forego  compensation  for  constrnr-tion  altogether, 


264   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


hoping  to  make  it  up  by  an  earlier  commencement  of 
compensation  for  operation. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  original  project, 
of  October,  1917,  called  for  the  payment  to  the  Com- 
pany of  fifteen  per  cent  of  expenditures  for  con- 
struction, to  cover  certain  overhead  expenses  of  the 
Company  and  profit.  Both  the  contract  of  January, 
1918,  and  the  supplementary  agreement  of  the  March 
following,  abandoned  this  method  of  lumping  the 
overheads  and  the  profit,  and  required  these  over- 
head expenses  to  be  kept  account  of,  and  paid.  I 
have  not  just  now  access  to  the  accounts,  and  so 
do  not  know  how  much  the  particular  overheads 
amounted  to,  and  therefore,  I  am  unable  to  say  how 
much  of  the  $11,758,000,  which  constituted  fifteen  per 
cent  of  the  estimated  expenditures,  would  have  been 
profit,  which  was  saved  to  the  United  States  by  :he 
final  arrangement.  In  the  original  project  the  direct 
compensation  for  operation  was  to  be  five  cents  per 
pound  of  manufactured  powder;  but  the  Company 
would  have  taken  all  the  risk  of  an  increase  in  the 
price  of  materials  and  labor,  which  would  have  af- 
fected its  expected  premium  of  one-half  the  savings 
in  cost  of  manufacture  below  forty-four  and  a  half 
cents  a  pound.  In  the  second  proposition,  of  No- 
vember, 1917,  the  five  cents  was  changed  to  three 
and  a  half  cents,  but  the  base  cost  of  manufacture, 
below  which  premium  should  commence,  was  fixed 
at  forty-six  cents  a  pound  instead  of  forty-four  and 
a  half  cents ;  and  also  the  Company  safeguarded  the 
premium,  in  so  far  as  it  would  have  been  affected 
by  the  important  ingredient  of  sodium  nitrate,  by 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  265 

stipulating  that  the  base  cost  should  change  in  ac- 
cordance with  any  change  in  price  of  this  substance. 
In  the  contracts  of  January  and  March  the  compen- 
sation was  left  at  three  and  a  half  cents  per  pound 
while  the  base  price  was  brought  back  to  forty-four 
and  a  half  cents,  but  the  contracts  further  safe- 
guarded the  premium  by  providing  that  the  base 
cost  should  vary  in  accordance  with  the  price  of 
any  of  the  principal  materials,  viz. :  sodium  nitrate, 
cotton,  shavings,  alcohol  or  sulphur.  In  the  period 
of  rapidly  rising  prices  these  were  important  stipu- 
lations, greatly  increasing  the  Company's  chances 
of  securing  a  premium.  On  the  whole  it  is  difficult 
to  say,  without  close  analysis  of  the  accounts,  what 
advantage,  if  any,  could  be  claimed  for  the  Govern- 
ment through  the  change  from  the  terms  of  the  first 
proposition  which  was  rejected,  in  October,  to  those 
o!'  the  first  contract  which  was  made,  in  January, 
when  it  was  decided  to  use  the  du  Pont  Company 
after  all;  but  it  must  have  been  insignificant  in 
comparison  with  the  financial  disadvantage,  not  to 
speak  of  the  risk,  which  resulted  from  the  delay. 

The  figures  upon  which  the  above  statement  as  to 
accomplishment  are  based  are  not  exact,  but  they 
arc  as  accurate  as  could  be  arrived  at  as  late  as  two 
months  after  hostilities  had  ceased.  That  is,  two 
months  after  the  transactions  to  which  they  relate 
had  ended.  Any  inaccuracies  must  therefore  be  of 
little  moment  in  comparison  with  the  general  facts 
bed, 

I  have  never  been  able  to  understand  the  reluc- 
tance of  the  AVar  Department  to  make  use  of  the 


. 


266    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

du  Pont  Company.  It  is  true  that  the  payments 
which  were  to  be  made  to  it,  over  and  above  the 
direct  costs,  under  my  first  recommendation,  were 
large,  and  there  would  be  a  natural  indisposition  to 
pay  large  profits  to  a  notoriously  rich  corporation 
for  a  war  service ;  but  the  payments  would  not  have 
been  all  profit;  they  covered  various  overhead  ex- 
penses and  certain  very  real  risks,  and  they  were 
for  an  immense  service,  of  which  the  desperate  need 
had  been  urged  upon  us,  and  which  no  one  else  could 
render.  That  the  profit  was  not  considered  of  the 
first  importance  by  the  Company  is  indicated  by 
its  offer  of  December  to  do  the  work  and  leave  the 
subject  of  compensation  to  arbitration,  and  by  its 
final  voluntary  agreement  to  forego  compensation 
for  construction  altogether,  after  having  already 
made  a  contract  which  included  it.  The  way  in 
which  the  Company  risked  its  profit  is  further 
shown  by  the  actual  outcome  of  the  transaction. 
Owing  to  the  early  termination  of  the  war  only 
31,000,000  pounds  of  powder  were  manufactured  at 
the  Old  Hickory  plant  at  the  cessation  of  operations, 
some  time  after  the  Armistice.  The  cost  of  manu- 
facture added  to  the  cost  of  construction  of  the  plant 
amounted  to  something  over  one  hundred  million 
dollars;  and  the  compensation  for  manufacture, 
which  was  all  the  profit  the  Company  got  out  of  the 
whole  matter,  was  only  about  one  and  three-quarters 
per  cent  of  the  sum  which  it  handled  for  the  Gov- 
ernment. Presumably  its  war  taxes  had  to  be  paid 
on  this  profit. 
When  I  first  presented  the  October  proposition  to 


SMOKELESS    POWDER  267 

the  Secretary  of  War,  on  the  llth  of  that  month, 
he  approved  it  verbally,  but  afterwards  withdrew 
his  approval  by  a  telegram  directly  to  the  Company, 
in  which  he  gave  instructions  to  stay  all  action  until 
he  could  acquaint  himself  thoroughly  with  all  the 
features  of  the  matter.  Then  followed  two  months 
of  discussion,  in  which  I  tried  to  secure  from  the 
du  Pont  Company  concessions  which  would  be  satis- 
factory to  the  Secretary  and  the  War  Industries 
Board,  and  tried  to  convince  both  that  neither  the 
Ordnance  Department  nor  any  other  agency  of  the 
Government  could  be  relied  upon  to  build  a  powder 
plant  of  the  magnitude  required  in  any  such  time  as 
this  Company  could  do  it.  I  knew  that  the  Ordnance 
Department  could  build  a  small  plant  and  could 
make  good  powder  in  it,  cheaply,  for  wre  had  done 
this ;  and  I  believed  we  could  build  a  large  plant  if 
given  time  to  study  it  out  and  to  proceed  deliber- 
ately; but  for  building  an  immense  plant,  under 
pressure  of  the  greatest  haste,  our  much-strained 
organization  could  not  compare  in  efficiency  with  the 
highly  specialized  company  which  had  just  done  that 
very  thing.  After  one  month  of  discussion  I  con- 
sidered it  necessary,  in  justice  to  myself,  to  again 
call  attention  formally  to  the  urgency  of  the  sub- 
ject and  the  danger  of  further  delay,  which  I  did 
in  the  memorandum  of  November  23rd,  mentioned 
on  page  255.  I  had  no  success  with  the  Secretary  of 
War,  but  I  had  some  measure  thereof  with  the  War 
Industries  Board,  which  joined  me,  after  the  Com- 
pany's offer  of  December  10th  to  arbitrate  its  com- 
pensation, in  urging  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  the 


.. 


268   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

employment  of  the  du  Pont  Company.  A  week  after 
my  final  unsuccessful  effort  to  get  a  powder  plant 
started  through  this  Company  I  was  relieved  from 
the  charge  of  the  Ordnance  Department. 

Notwithstanding  the  importance  of  smokeless 
powder  the  War  Department  was  subjected  to  less 
savage  public  and  congressional  criticism  with  ref- 
erence to  the  slowness  of  its  supply  than  in  regard 
to  any  other  prime  matter  of  armament.  Artillery, 
machine  guns  and  rifles  were  abundantly  noticed, 
and  many  harsh  things  were  said  of  those  who  were 
closest  to  the  responsibility  for  their  production; 
but  powder  did  not  receive  much  attention.  It  did 
not  escape  altogether,  however,  for  Senator  Hitch- 
cock, of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  said  on 
February  4,  1918,  in  the  course  of  a  speech  in  the 
Senate  in  which  he  was  advocating  the  creation  oi 
a  director  of  munitions  and  a  war  cabinet,  and  with 
reference  to  the  committee's  investigation  of  the 
War  Department :  "We  found  that  we  are  only  now, 
nine  months  after  entering  the  war,  just  beginning 
to  work  on  two  great  powder  plants,  costing  $90,- 
000,000,  the  powder  from  which  will  not  be  available 
until  next  August.  We  found  that  we  need  a  million 
pounds  of  powder  a  day  more  than  America  is  pro- 
ducing. We  found  that  the  need  of  this  powder 
was  known  last  spring,  and  that  now  for  the  first 
time  we  are  beginning  to  build  the  factories  in  which 
the  powder  is  to  be  made." 

"All's  well  that  ends  well";  and  neither  we  nor 
the  Allies  suffered  for  lack  of  powder  before  the 
end  of  hostilities. 


IX 

RESPONSIBILITY 

BESIDES  the  specific  criticisms  which  have  been  dealt 
with  at  some  length  in  the  preceding  chapters  there 

e  others  made  in  the  first  winter  of  the  war 
which  were  of  more  general  character,  and  were 
so  all-inclusive  in  their  condemnation  of  the  govern- 
mental organizations  with  which  the  United  States 
was  endeavoring  to  prosecute  the  war  as  to  justify 
a  doubt,  if  they  were  accepted,  as  to  whether  a 
republic  like  ours  is  fitted  to  carry  on  hostilities 
requiring  preparation  on  the  scale  to  which  we  were 
committed  in  the  World  War.  It  is  probably  true 
that  an  autocracy  is  the  best  form  of  government 
with  which  to  wage  war.  The  full  power  of  such 
an  organization  as  a  community  of  people  can  best 
be  used  against  an  enemy,  or  indeed  for  any  pur- 
pose for  which  it  must  bring  to  bear  its  entire 

ngth,  acting  as  a  whole,  when  it  is  subject  to 
the  control  of  a  single  will,  which  can  direct  all  the 
energies  toward  a  specific  object,  in  accordance  witli 
a  consistent  policy  of  preparation  and  execution. 
Essayists  have  told  us  that  in  the  earlier  days  of 
man  the  despotic  rule  of  a  chief  was  the  usual  form 
of  tribal  government,  for  tin-  very  good  reason  that 
it  was.  the  only  form  whicli  could  survive,  in  a  social 

269 


270   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

state  in  which  every  tribe  was  at  war  with  all  its 
neighbors,  and  must  have  its  collective  power 
wielded  most  efficiently,  or  must  have  gone  out  of 
existence  before  a  community  handled  under  a  bet- 
ter system.  This  might  augur  badly  for  the  ulti- 
mate survival  of  democracy  in  a  world  of  struggle, 
but  as  time  goes  on  democracy  seems  to  attract  more 
people  of  the  intelligent  races  to  its  methods  than 
does  autocracy,  and  can  thus  offset  military  effi- 
ciency with  superior  numbers.  This  is  what  ap- 
peared in  the  World  War,  in  which  the  combined 
population  of  the  Entente  Allies  greatly  exceeded 
that  of  the  Central  European  powers ;  and  even  with- 
out autocratic  Russia  had  the  preponderance  of 
numbers.  After  America  had  come  in  and  Russia 
had  gone  out,  the  numerical  advantage  still  contin- 
ued very  great.  When  the  United  States  was  drawr. 
into  the  struggle  autocratic  war  powers  were  con- 
ferred upon  the  President,  for  the  duration  of  the 
emergency,  and  our  Government  was  thus  brought 
more  nearly  to  a  state  of  equality  in  efficiency  with 
that  of  Germany;  but  the  handicap  of  neglect  in 
preparation,  so  characteristic  of  governments  of  the 
people,  was  still  upon  us. 

I  have  endeavored  to  show  some  of  the  ways  in 
which  our  source  of  power,  the  people,  acting 
through  their  very  obedient  servants  both  in  the 
Executive  Government  and  in  Congress,  failed  to 
pursue  any  adequate  policy  of  military  preparation, 
and  even  blocked  and  hampered  the  military  depart- 
ment by  statutory  hindrances  of  whose  effect  they 
were  careless  in  their  concern  over  the  suppression 


RESPONSIBILITY  271 

of  various  abuses  elsewhere.  But  this  location  of 
responsibility  was  not  accepted  by  all  who  might 
be  considered  to  be  involved  in  accountability,  and 
a  vigorous  effort  was  made  to  shift  it  to  other  shoul- 
ders. The  most  notable  charge,  in  this  effort, 
against  the  executive  departments  concerned  with 
the  prosecution  of  the  war,  was  made  by  Senator 
Chamberlain,  Chairman  of  the  Military  Committee, 
whose  office  ought  to  have  insured  his  being  well 
informed  and  who  spoke  from  a  position  of  great 
authority,  in  a  speech  before  the  National  Security 
League,  at  New  York,  on  January  19, 1918,  in  which 
he  said: 

"The  military  establishments  of  America  have 
fallen  down.  There  is  no  use  to  be  optimistic  about 
a  thing  that  does  not  exist.  It  has  almost  stopped 
functioning,  my  friends.  Why?  Because  of  ineffi- 
ciency in  every  bureau  and  in  every  department  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States. " 

This  speech  was  made  after  a  large  part  of  the 
testimony  had  been  taken  by  Senator  Chamberlain's 
committee  in  its  investigation  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, and  must  therefore  represent  the  Senator's 
conclusion  from  the  testimony.  Whether  the  con- 
clusion was  justified  by  the  evidence  could  be  defi- 
nitely <1<  •t«-rmiiu'(l  only  after  a  complete  study  of 
tlic  l}, .*)()()  pages  which  have  been  printed,  but  some- 
thing of  an  opinion  might  be  gained  from  the  quota- 
tions which  are  given  in  this  text  in  regard  to  the 
most  important  items  of  armament.  The  conclusion 
was  characterized  by  the  President  as  an  astonish- 
ing and  absolutely  unjustifiable  distortion  of  the 


272   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

truth.  The  New  York  speech  was  followed  by  one 
delivered  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  the  Senate  on 
January  24,  1918,  in  which  he  defended  himself 
against  the  reproof  of  the  President,  and  made 
his  most  serious  and  extended  charges  against  the 
War  Department.  I  have  made  several  quotations 
from  the  references  in  this  speech  to  the  Ordnance 
Department,  in  the  chapters  which  deal  with  cer- 
tain special  subjects  of  criticism,  and  these  I  think, 
are  sufficient  to  show  its  purport.  It  was  carefully 
analyzed  in  the  light  of  the  published  evidence, 
and  answered,  by  the  Hon.  Carter  Glass  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  on  February  7,  1918. 
Mr.  Glass  had  no  previous  relations  with  the 
Ordnance  Department,  was  not  a  member  of  any 
committee  having  to  do  with  legislation  for  that 
department,  and  was  personally  unacquainted  with 
the  Chief  of  Ordnance.  His  appreciation  of  the 
evidence,  therefore,  was  such  as  might  have  been 
had  by  anybody  who  would  take  the  trouble  to  in- 
form himself  in  regard  to  it.  For  these  reasons  I 
give  several  quotations  from  his  speech: 

"If,  with  good  reason,  it  may  be  charged  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  with  their  constitu- 
tional freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press,  have  been 
so  indifferent  to  their  liberties  and  so  insensible 
of  their  own  security  as  to  commit  *  every  bureau 
and  department  of  Government'  to  incompetent 
hands,  would  we  not  better  welcome,  rather  than 
resist,  the  invasion  of  Teutonic  Kultur?" 

"Mr.  Chairman,  when  an  earnest  quest  for  the 
truth  carried  me  painstakingly  to  the  end  of  nearly 


RESPONSIBILITY 

2,000  pages  of  responsible  testimony  only  to  find 
revealed  the  utter  insufficiency  of  proof  to  sustain 
the  astounding  censure,  distress  gave  place  to 
amazement. ' ' 

4 'Wo  have  been  asked  to  search  the  record,  Mr. 
Chairman,  and  it  is  to  the  record  that  I  appeal.  I 
have  seen  it  with  mine  own  eyes  and  with  mine  own 
ears  have  heard  it  expounded.  From  the  testimony 
I  have  turned  away,  not  with  tears  nor  with  trem- 
bling apprehension  for  the  well-being  of  my  own 
sons  or  the  sons  of  other  fathers,  but  with  a  firmer 
faith  in  my  country,  praising  God  for  the  quiet 
courage  of  the  men  and  the  ineffable  fortitude  of 
the  women  of  America  who  are  to  win  this  war. 
And  for  those  who  impeach  their  fidelity  and  deride 
their  capabilities  and  seek  to  decry  or  obscure  their 
achievements  we  should  invoke  the  imprecations  of 
every  loyal  citizen." 

"What  member  of  Congress  does  not  very  defi- 
nitely know  that  France  is  furnishing  the  American 
Army  with  guns,  not  because  we  sought  to  deplete 
her  *  meager  stores'  but  because  her  chosen  ambas- 
sadors and  picked  experts  asked  the  privilege  of 
arming  our  expeditionary  force  from  her  over- 
supplied  arsenals.  It  was  the  wise  thing  for  France 
to  have  proposed  and  the  only  effective  thing  for 
America  to  have  done." 

"It  is  because  of  gross  ignorance  of  the  truth  that 

critics  bemoan  a  condition  which,  in  the  circum- 
stances, any  discerning  man  must  see  is  of  tremen- 
dous advantage  to  France  as  \\vll  as  to  America?" 

"From  it  all  we  may  deduce  the  comforting  assur- 


. 


274   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ance  that  the  War  Department  is  more  concerned 
to  furnish  the  American  Army  in  France  with 
modern  guns  with  which  to  train  and  fight  than  it 
is  to  haggle  with  ambitious  statesmen  over  the 
source  of  supply." 


Under  the  heading  "Machine-gun  Squabble"  Mr. 
Glass  made  the  following  statements : 

"Mr.  Chairman,  in  support  of  the  intemperate 
charge  that  the  *  Military  Establishment  of  the 
United  States  Government  is  a  myth — that  it  has 
no  existence — a  charge  contemptuously  echoed  only 
the  other  day  by  a  German  military  expert  in  a 
German  newspaper,  the  controversy  over  the  Lewis 
machine  gun  and  the  Browning  gun  is  revived^  and 
in  the  very  obvious  attempt  to  discredit  the  Govern- 
ment and  to  'get  Baker'  the  critics  try  desperately 
to  convict  the  Ordnance  Department  of  incapacity 
and  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  personal  venom.  I 
addressed  myself  to  an  examination  of  the  evidence 
deeply  prejudiced  against  Gen.  Crozier;  but  there 
is  not  one  particle  of  disinterested  testimony  in 
the  hearings  which  does  not  abundantly  acquit  the 
Chief  of  Ordnance  of  blame." 

"The  whole  point  of  what  I  am  saying  goes  to 
establishing  the  fact  that  the  Ordnance  Bureau  of 
the  Government  cannot  be  discredited,  even  in  this 
single  detail,  when  we  balance  the  testimony  of 
experts  against  the  self-interest  of  disappointed 
persons  and  the  miserable  bias  of  fretful  politicians 
with  a  case  to  make  out." 

"It  is  absolutely  convincing  that  delay,  if  any, 
occasioned  by  the  retrial  of  machine  guns  and  the 


RESPONSIBILITY  275 

selection  of  the  Browning  is  much  more  than  made 
up  by  the  vastly  superior  qualities  of  the  gun  ac- 
cepted. Talk  to  the  contrary  is  mere  inference, 
amateur  inference. " 

It  is  not  astonishing  that  before  his  examina- 
tion of  the  evidence  Mr.  Glass  should  have  been 
prejudiced  against  me.  Considering  the  interested 
charges  which  had  been  made,  and  the  public  en- 
dorsement of  them  by  certain  prominent  Senators, 
it  would  have  been  astonishing  if  he  had  not  been 
prejudiced.  Addressing  himself  to  the  outcry  over 
the  changes  made  in  the  Enfield  rifle  before  manu- 
facturing it  for  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  he 
made  the  following  comments: 

"And  they  bring  up  the  old  rifle  dispute,  Mr. 
Chairman,  and  hang  a  complaint  on  that  peg  by 
seeking  to  have  it  appear  that  the  Army  experts 
did  not  know  their  business.  Men  like  Scott,  Chief 
of  Staff  at  the  time;  Bliss,  next  in  rank;  Crozier, 
Chief  of  Ordnance;  Kuhn,  of  the  War  College; 
Pershing  on  his  way  to  France,  were  unsafe  advisers 
to  the  Secretary  of  War!" 

"It  seems  to  be  the  idea  of  some  distinguished 
gentlemen  that  we  should  have  grabbed  up  any  old 
instruments  of  warfare  and  sent  a  ragamuffin  army 
across  the  Atlantic  instantly  to  break  the  Hinden- 
burg  lino.  They  <li<l  not  want  us  to  have  modern 
rifles,  nor  did  they  want  us  to  have  the  best  machine 
gun  in  the  world.  Their  impatience  ran  away  with 
their  discretion." 

"Frustrated  in  the  obvious  desire  to  prove  the 
inadvisability  of  the  change  from  the  technical 


276   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

viewpoint,  and  'hell  bent'  on  making  out  a  case 
of  disastrous  delay,  one  of  the  hostile  critics  of  the 
War  Department  asked  Mr.  Vauclain  how  many 
rifles  would  have  been  produced  had  there  been  no 
change  of  model,  to  which  the  witness  made  the 
heartbreaking  response,  'Not  one  more  than  we  have 
to-day.'  And  again  and  again  this  great  captain 
of  industry,  this  'driving  power'  of  the  Govern- 
ment's artillery  and  munitions  force,  vindicated  the 
efficiency  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau  and  confounded 
his  inquisitors." 

"What  the  American  people  will  desire  to  know, 
and  what  these  hostile  critics  of  the  Government 
have  been  unwilling  to  tell  them,  but  what  the  testi- 
mony itself  abundantly  reveals,  is  that  no  appreci- 
able time,  after  our  declaration  of  war,  was  lost  in 
turning  out  rifles  for  the  American  Army." 

Addressing  himself  to  the  question  of  responsi- 
bility for  the  lack  of  munitions  of  war  with  which 
this  great,  rich  country  entered  the  most  formidable 
conflict  of  all  time,  Mr.  Glass  gave  his  conclusions 
from  the  evidence  recently  adduced,  and  from  his 
knowledge  as  a  public  man  of  the  national  course 
throughout  the  preceding  decades : 

"But  Mr.  Chairman,  I  earnestly  invite  the  atten- 
tion of  the  House  to  this  point:  Backed  by  an  in- 
controvertible record  of  events,  I  assert  that  if  there 
was  a  shortage  of  modern  rifles,  or  even  of  danger- 
ously defective  weapons,  the  responsibility  is  not 
with  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance." 

•  •••••• 

"Why  did  not  the  Ordnance  Bureau  function? 
Let  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  tell  the  story  of  how  the 


RESPONSIBILITY  277 

Ordnance  Department  of  the  Government  did  func- 
tion to  the  fullest  extent  of  lawful  permissibility. 
I  shall  put  into  the  record — for  it  can  do  no  harm — 
extracts  from  Gen.  Crozier's  testimony  bearing  on 
the  subject.  But  in  contemplating  the  sweeping 
indictment  of  his  Government  by  Mr.  Chamberlain 
the  astounding  thing  to  which  I  invite  your  atten- 
tion right  now  is  the  fact  that,  with  all  his  pre- 
cognition,  Mr.  Chamberlain  did  not  function.  He 
was  and  is  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  of  the  United  States  Senate,  with  access  to 
every  particle  of  available  information.  In  a  large 
sense  he  held  the  purse-strings  upon  military  ex- 
penditures, because  the  Senate  always  increases  and 
rarely  decreases  appropriations.  For  a  long  time 
this  Government  has  owned  two  arsenals,  one  at 
Rock  Island  and  the  other  at  Springfield.  Ten  years 
before  the  war  the  appropriation  for  small  arms 
in  these  establishments  aggregated  $1,700,000;  a 
year  later,  $1,778,000;  a  year  later,  $1,700,000— at  a 
time  when  nobody  in  America  could  have  dreamed 
of  war.  And  yet  in  1915,  practically  two  years  after 
Mr.  Chamberlain  had  assumed  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Senate  Military  Committee,  when  for  seven 
months  war  had  raged  in  Europe,  the  appropriation 
for  small  arms  had  gone  down  to  the  pitiful  mark 
of  $250,000,  and  that,  Mr.  Chairman,  so  far  as  the 
record  discloses,  without  one  word  of  protest  or 
even  admonition  from  these  adversary  critics  and 
calamity  shriekers.  Furthermore,  the  fires  at  the 
Rock  Island  Arsenal  had  long  been  out;  how  long 
I  do  not  know.  The  arsenal  at  Springfield,  where 
the  best  rifle  in  the  world  is  made,  was  running 
at  one-eighth  of  its  capacity.  The  war  had  reached 
its  trench-fighting  stage,  furnishing  a  fair  infer- 
ence <>f  a  protracted  struggle.  Kitchener  had  pre- 
dicted that  it  would  last  three  years.  Notwith- 


. 


278   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

standing  these  things,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  men  who 
now  affect  preknowledge  of  future  events  did  not 
increase  by  one  dollar  the  trifling  appropriations 
for  small  arms,  but  reduced  it  from  the  preceding 
year  by  nearly  fifty  per  cent.  The  expert  foremen 
and  skilled  artisans  at  the  Government  armories  had 
been  scattered  and  the  forces  disorganized  and 
demoralized,  so  that  later,  when  operations  were 
resumed,  the  Ordnance  Bureau  had  to  get  these 
people  back  by  bidding  high  against  private  estab- 
lishments engaged  on  munitions  for  foreign  govern- 
ments. Was  Crozier  to  blame  for  that?  Is  this 
soldier  to  be  assailed  and  his  reputation  destroyed 
by  the  cruel  imputation  of  inefficiency  levelled  by 
the  Oregon  Senator  at  this  New  York  meeting 
against  every  bureau  and  department  of  his  Govern- 
ment? I  protest,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  not  just;  for 
Gen.  Crozier,  we  are  told,  did  not  know  the  truth. 
The  President  did  not  know  the  truth.  Secretary 
of  War  Garrison  did  not  know  the  truth.  Tardicu 
and  Lloyd-George,  great  ministers  of  munitions  of 
foreign  governments,  Scott  and  Bliss,  Pershing  and 
Kuhn — none  of  these  knew  the  truth.  Only  this 
world- wise  Oregon  critic  knew  the  truth,  and  at  the 
critical  moment  he  failed  to  function !  With  a  mov- 
ing picture  of  America  at  war  before  his  eyes,  with 
strong  conviction  in  his  mind,  distressed  by  his  very 
contemplation  of  our  utter  inefficiency,  he  permitted 
the  small-arms  appropriation  of  the  American  Con- 
gress in  the  very  year  that  the  Lusitania  was  sunk 
to  go  down  to  the  contemptible  figure  of  $250,000 !" 

"Oh,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  utter  proneness  of  poor 
human  nature  to  evade  just  responsibility  and  to 
reprehend  in  others  the  ugly  things  that  most  afflict 
our  own  records  and  dispositions!  Why  not  be 
strictly  honest  with  ourselves  and  brutally  frank 


RESPONSIBILITY  279 

with  the  country!  Let  us  tell  the  unhappy  truth, 
which  is  that  for  a  century  and  a  half,  we  have  em- 
phasized the  single  warning  of  Washington  against 
*  entangling  alliances  abroad'  and  sadly  neglected 
his  admonition  about  a  sane  preparation  against 
war.  We  have  hated  militarism  with  such  a  holy 
hate  that  now  we  constrain  Heaven  and  earth  to 
avoid  becoming  its  victim.  Our  aversion  to  a  large 
standing  army  is  traditional  and  constitutional- 
bred  in  the  blood  and  bone  of  successive  generations. 
The  whole  policy  of  the  Nation  for  all  these  years 
has  been  antagonistic  to  preparation.  No  one  group 
of  men  is  to  blame.  No  one  political  party  above 
another  is  to  be  censured.  If  anything,  some  of  the 
most  frantic  protestants  against  our  plight  share 
tremendously  the  responsibility  for  our  condition, 
and  conspicuous  among  these  culpable  critics  are  the 
distinguished  gentleman  who  made  that  New  York 
speech  and  the  distinguished  gentleman  who  led  the 
applause  of  the  unbridled  indictment.  But  because 
we  were  unprepared  is  no  reason  to  infer  that  we 
are  not  being  prepared;  and  being  prepared,  Mr. 
Chairman,  at  a  pace  that  has  amazed  the  European 
nations  in  arms.  Gen.  Crozier's  testimony,  and  that 
of  other  witnesses,  shows  conclusively  that  there  is 
no  particle  of  excuse  for  the  charge  that  the  Ord- 
nance Bureau  was  indifferent  to  passing  events, 
that  it  was  supine,  that  it  did  nothing  to  anticipate 
trouble,  that  it  fell  down  and  has  ceased  to  function. 
The  testimony  is  to  the  contrary,  the  facts  are  the 
very  reverse  ;  and  the  evidence  and  ascertained  facts 
together  would  warrant  a  characterization  of  the 
as  wanton." 


.  Orozier,  as  far  back  as  1906,  warned  the 
Congn-s  and  th<>  country  of  our  utter  lack  of  prep- 
aration, and  for  years  successively  repeated  the 


280   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

warning.  In  January,  1911,  he  pointed  out  that  we 
were  '  worse  off  in  this  matter  of  field  artillery  than 
in  anything  else/  and  warned  that  'in  case  of  an 
emergency  of  any  importance,  the  field  artillery  of 
the  United  States  would  be  found  positively  insuffi- 
cient.' The  emergency  has  come,  and  not  even  an 
appropriation  of  $16,000,000  immediately  before 
going  to  war  nor  of  $396,000,000  immediately  after 
going  to  war  can  provide  all  the  guns  we  need 
as  we  need  them.  The  Congress  cannot  evade  its 
responsibility,  and  to  attempt  to  shift  it  to  the  War 
Department  and  thus  to  discredit  by  a  charge  of  in- 
efficiency every  branch  and  bureau  of  the  Military 
Establishment  is  an  unspeakable  injustice." 

These  speeches  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Mr.  Glass 
constitute  respectively  the  most  sweeping  indictment 
and  the  most  general  defense  of  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment which  appeared  in  the  contemporary  utter- 
ances of  responsible  public  men.  Both  speakers 
were  of  the  same  political  party  as  the  Administra- 
tion. Both  men  were  informed  as  to  the  evidence ; 
one  through  his  official  connection  with  its  elucida- 
tion, the  other  through  special  study  of  it  for 
information.  I  have  therefore  felt  justified  in  quot- 
ing rather  fully  from  their  speeches  in  order  to 
give  the  most  representative  views  of  a  subject  in 
which  the  public  was  at  one  time  keenly  and  patri- 
otically interested,  but  which  few  have  time  to 
examine  for  themselves. 

There  were  other  public  men  of  long  experience 
and  intimate  knowledge  of  governmental  methods 
who,  without  making  any  special  review  of  the  in- 
cidents attending  our  early  struggles  in  the  war, 


RESPONSIBILITY  281 

knew  from  personal  observation  where  the  respon- 
sibility for  our  unprepared  state  definitely  rested. 
Mr.  Tilson,  of  the  Military  Committee  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  in  an  address  before  the  Hard- 
ware Manufactuiers'  Organization  for  War  Service 
at  Atlantic  City,  on  May  27, 1918,  which  was  printed 
in  the  Congressional  Eecord  of  January  8,  1918, 
said  upon  this  point : 

"One  of  the  reasons  we  were  caught  unprepared 
was  that  as  a  people  we  were  not  genuinely  inter- 
ested in  things  military.  You  gentlemen  under- 
stand this.  Apply  it  to  yourselves  five  years  ago. 
How  many  thought  seriously  about  the  military 
situation  or  of  national  defense!  We  might  just 
as  well  own  up  and  be  honest  with  one  another  and 
with  ourselves,  especially.  Very  few  men  in  the 
country  were  interested  in  the  military  situation  at 
all.  If  you  and  all  the  other  men  over  the  country 
had  been  alive  and  awake  on  this  subject,  which  we 
were  not,  you  would  have  seen  to  it  that  somebody 
else  was  interested.  Your  interest  would  have  been 
communicated  from  one  to  another  until  after  a 
while  we  should  have  had  general  interest  and  all 
of  these  tilings  would  have  been  done.  We  were 
.-igod  in  something  else,  however,  and  were  too 
busy  to  bother  with  little  things  like  national  de- 
<  ;  hence  we  tailed  to  be  prepared  to  defend  our 
own  national  existence. " 

Mr.  Sherley,  of  the  Appropriations  Committee 
of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives,  as  chairman  of 
the  sub-committee  which  deals  with  appropriations 
for  artillery,  had  had  close  experience  with  the  way 
in  which  the  subject  had  been  handled  legislatively 
through  a  number  of  preceding  years,  and  said  in  a 


282   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 


speech  in  the  House  on  February  15,  1918,  which 
was  printed  in  the  Congressional  Eecord  of  Feb- 
ruary 19th: 

"What  has  been  the  result?  When  the  great  war 
broke  there  happened  just  what  I  prophesied  three 
years  ago  would  happen,  namely,  a  breakdown  at 
the  desk  of  these  administrative  officers,  not  because 
they  were  inefficient,  not  because  the  Government 
was  not  efficient  in  the  sense  that  term  is  used  ordi- 
narily, but  because  Congress  had  refused  for  years 
to  give  a  sufficient  corps  capable  of  expanding 
quickly  and  dealing  with  a  great  matter  such  as 
was  thrust  upon  it.  A.nd  every  man  who  wants  to 
be  honest  must  admit  it.  And  yet  there  is  always 
a  tendency  here  to  blame  the  other  man  for  failures 
and  never  to  look  into  our  own  hearts  to  see  how 
far  we  are  to  blame  for  these  things." 

In  the  Senate  also,  where  most  of  the  criticism 
was  made,  there  was  appreciation  by  well-informed 
members  of  the  reason  for  the  shortages  which 
brought  forth  the  criticisms.  On  February  8,  1918, 
Mr.  Thomas,  of  the  Military  Committee,  said  in  an 
extended  address  printed  in  the  Congressional 
Eecord  of  February  llth : 

"I  am  not  surprised,  Mr.  President,  that  we  are 
not  yet  able  to  produce  heavy  artillery.  I  am  not 
surprised  that  we  are  not  yet  ready  to  produce 
powder  to  the  capacity  which  may  be  demanded  in 
the  war.  These  are  patent  facts,  but  who  is  pri- 
marily to  blame  for  it  1  As  far  back  as  1913,  when, 
as  a  member  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs, 
I  first  attended  its  sessions,  as  I  have  for  every  year 
since,  we  have  been  warned  by  the  experts  of  the 
"War  Department  not  only  of  its  inability  to  produce 


RESPONSIBILITY  283 

these  very  needed  articles  of  equipment  immediately 
but  that  it  would  take  a  very  long  time  to  do  so  after 
its  orders  were  placed. 

"Gen.  Crozier  has  told  us  time  and  again  that 
from  the  time  of  the  placing  of  an  order  for  heavy 
artillery  to  the  time  of  its  completion  and  delivery 
would  require  from  twelve  to  eighteen  months.  Now 
we — and  I  accept  my  share  of  the  blame,  if  blame 
there  be — should  have  heeded  that  and  similar  warn- 
ings, and  should  long  ago  have  provided  the  means 
and  enacted  the  legislation  empowering  the  War 
Department  to  obtain  this  artillery  and  to  place  the 
orders  for  it.  If  we  had  done  so,  we  should  have 
had  it  in  due  season. 

"Bed  tape  is  due  in  large  part  to  our  methods 
of  legislation  and  in  large  part,  perhaps,  to  the 
genius  of  our  Government.  Our  methods  of  appro- 
priations, Mr.  President,  are  specific;  they  are  not 
general.  A  general  appropriation  bill,  an  appro- 
priation bill  relating  to  the  departments,  contains 
from  175  to  200  pages,  and  specific  appropriations 
are  made  for  everything,  even  for  the  clerks  and  the 
employees.  In  the  administration  of  that  sort  of  a 
law,  with  responsibility  necessarily  fixed  for  expen- 
ditures in  the  way  which  it  provides,  red  tape  will 
ensue  as  naturally  as  maggots  from  a  decaying 
carcass." 


CONCLUSION 

IT  would  be  an  ambitious  hope  that  this  writing 
could  have  much  direct  effect  in  stimulating  the 
American  people  to  the  kind  of  active  concern  in 
matters  of  military  preparation  which  they  exhibit 
in  regard  to  other  issues,  upon  which  they  rest  their 
choice  of  representatives  in  the  national  Legisla- 
ture. Today's  questions  press  hard;  and  the  neces- 
sity for  the  use  of  military  force  is  always  thought 
to  be  remote.  Economy  is  a  good  cry,  and  military 
preparation  is  expensive.  There  is  temptation 
therefore  to  put  the  legislator  to  the  strain  of  de- 
fending his  action  in  favor  of  appropriations  for 
this  kind  of  purpose.  Above  all,  an  understanding 
of  military  matters  is  difficult,  and  popular  exposi- 
tions are  very  little  set  forth  by  military  men,  the 
natural  experts  in  the  subject.  Eailroad  people 
write  and  speak  abundantly  about  their  business 
when  legislation  in  regard  to  it  is  pending;  and 
participants  in  industrial  activity,  both  on  the  side 
of  employer  and  employee,  spread  abroad  a  great 
deal  of  information  about  labor  questions.  But 
army  officers  do  not  take  free  part  in  the  kind  of 
public  discussion  which  brings  forward  and  clarifies 
the  issues  upon  which  a  free  people  expresses  its 

284 


CONCLUSION  285 

demands.  There  is  a  class  of  people,  however,  who 
make  it  their  business  to  study  and  present  to  the 
attention  of  the  voting  public  the  important  ques- 
tions of  policy;  the  magazine  and  editorial  writers, 
the  college  presidents,  the  men  who  have  rendered 
prominent  service;  all  these  are  public  instructors 
who  have  a  necessary  function  in  the  formation  of 
opinion,  and  who  are  therefore  indispensable  agents 
of  popular  government.  These  writers  and  speak- 
ers would  be  particularly  handicapped  in  an  at- 
tempt to  place  before  the  public  the  labors  and 
difficulties  of  a  technical  military  supply  depart 
ment,  both  by  unfamiliarity  with  the  professional 
considerations,  different  from  those  of  civil  life 
and  by  the  obscurity  of  the  laws  and  rules  under 
which  these  departments  operate;  and  I  therefore 
venture  to  hope  that,  in  gathering  together  from 
the  body  of  the  laws  and  from  the  experience  of 
the  Ordnance  Department  certain  illustrative  ex- 
amples both  of  real  difficulties  and  of  unfounded 
accusations,  I  may  be  making  it  easier  for  these 
public  teachers  to  secure  the  data  for  lessons  which 
their  responsibility  of  occupation  should  remind 
them  are  due  from  them.  In  presenting  these 
examples  I  realize  that  I  have  quoted  from  original 
sources  of  information  at  length  too  tedious  for 
popular  reading,  but  I  have  done  this  with  the  view 
of  enabling  any  one  wishing  to  use  this  book  as  a 
reference  to  be  sure  of  his  ground  without  having 
to  resort  to  a  deterrent  search  for  evidence.  I  read, 
in  the  early  winter  of  1917,  an  editorial  in  a  great 
daily  newspaper  which  commented  on  a  visit  of  two 


286    ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

distinguished  Senators  to  some  of  the  Army  Can- 
tonments. The  Senators  had  found  the  inevitable, 
in  that  there  was  a  shortage  of  military  supplies  of 
more  than  one  kind,  and  the  editorial  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  individuals  responsible  might  be  com- 
pelled to  retire  and  make  way  for  others  more  effi- 
cient. This  typical  editorial  failed  to  realize  that 
the  people  responsible  were  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  their  responsibility  related 
back  to  the  years  when  they  were  permitting  the 
accumulation  of  an  impossible  task  for  performance 
by  an  always  insufficient  personnel.  The  intelligent 
but  uninformed  writer  represented  a  large  class, 
upon  which  the  reading  public  was  dependent  for 
its  information  as  to  the  progress  of  the  country 
in  making  ready  for  war.  It  is  my  hope  that  the 
facts  in  this  book  may  render  it  easier  for  such 
writers  to  make  a  sound  analysis  of  our  national 
situation  in  the  early  wartime. 

There  is  another  purpose  which  I  think  not  inap- 
propriate for  attempt  by  one  who  can  write  of  events 
with  the  intimate  knowledge  which  comes  only  from 
participation  in  them.  The  purpose  concerns  the 
investigation  of  the  War  Department  by  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  which  was  com- 
menced upon  the  opening  of  the  session  of  Congress 
in  December,  1917.  An  investigation  by  this  body 
was  entirely  appropriate.  Although  our  form  of 
government  does  not  involve  direct  responsibility 
of  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments  to  the 
legislative  branch,  there  is  nevertheless  an  acknowl- 
edged duty  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  who 


CONCLUSION  287 

compose  this  branch  to  scrutinize  the  performance 
of  the  executive  government,  in  the  interest  of  effi- 
cient administration.  Whenever  any  matter  of 
extraordinary  interest  has  transpired  in  an  exec- 
utive department,  and  particularly  when  there  has 
been  a  charge  or  a  suspicion  of  mismanagement  or 
wrongdoing,  investigation  by  one  of  the  regularly 
constituted  committees  of  the  Senate  or  the  House 
of  Eepresentatives,  or  by  a  specially  appointed 
committee,  has  followed  .as  a  matter  of  course. 
There  can  be  no  sound  objection  to  the  practice. 

But  investigation  should  be  made  with  considera- 
tion for  the  task  which  is  laid  upon  the  executive 
officials,  and  should  not  be  conducted  in  such  spirit 
of  hostility  to  the  department  under  investigation, 
or  to  any  of  its  important  officials,  as  to  require  the 
latter  to  neglect  supremely  important  duties  in 
order  to  defend  themselves  against  attack,  unless 
there  is  strong  presumption  that  they  have  failed 
in  the  performance  of  their  office.  Although  the 
Senate  Military  Committee  displayed  no  indisposi- 
tion to  accept  what  the  evidence  soon  brought  out, 
namely,  that  the  backward  conditions  were  the  result 
of  long  acting  causes,  a  few  members  so  persistently 
refused  to  accept  the  statements  of  responsible  offi- 
cials, and  by  their  utterances  gave  such  force  and 
notoriety  to  the  biassed  complaints  of  interested 
parties,  as  to  require  busy  officers  to  suspend  their 
work  of  making  ready  the  Army,  and  devote  time 
which  they  did  not  have  to  spare  to  the  preparation 
of  replies  to  attacks.  In  the  month  of  December, 
1917,  the  two  officers  of  the  Ordnance  Department 


288   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

who  had  most  to  do  with  the  procurement  of  machine 
guns  were  obliged  to  shut  themselves  up  and  deny 
interviews  to  designers  and  manufacturers,  as  well 
as  to  their  own  subordinates,  for  five  days,  in  order 
that  they  might  gather  from  the  records  the  data 
for  refuting  the  misinformation  which  had  found 
lodgment  in  certain  minds;  and  my  own  testimony 
before  the  investigating  committee,  in  the  same 
month,  occupied  over  two  hundred  printed  pages, 
and  naturally  took  much  more  time  for  its  prepara- 
tion than  for  its  delivery.  This  and  other  like  inci- 
dents interfered  with  war  preparation,  but  the  offi- 
cers '  time  was  necessaryun  order  to  forestall  radical 
action  based  upon  misapprehension.  No  critic  ever 
came  to  my  office  during  the  investigation  for  the 
purpose  of  seeing  what  was  wrong  at  the  nerve  cen- 
ter of  ordnance  supply,  and  whether  he  could  help 
by  the  exercise  of  his  own  powers ;  but  they  formed 
judgment  without  the  assistance  of  such  easily  made 
examination,  and  proposed  readjustments  based 
upon  assumed  defects  in  the  Department's  organi- 
zation. The  organization  was  good ;  and  the  critics 
never  learned  that  the  inadequacy  was  due  to  in- 
sufficiency of  resource  which  might  have  been 
remedied  in  the  years  preceding,  but  in  the  emer- 
gency was  being  met  by  extraordinary  expansion, 
requiring  time.  Although  the  committee  took  no 
action  in  disapproval  of  the  Ordnance  Department, 
and  made  no  report  of  the  part  of  its  investigation 
which  related  to  that  Department,  the  individual 
members  above  spoken  of  claimed  to  voice  the  senti- 
ments of  the  committee  in  expressing  their  own 


CONCLUSION  289 

harsh  criticisms;  and  in  the  absence  of  a  report 
their  claim  could  not  be  fully  controverted.  I  have 
quoted  dissenting  views  expressed  by  some  members 
of  the  committee,  but  I  think  the  Department  was 
entitled  to  a  report. 

The  great  achievements  of  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment have  been  described  in  other  publications,  both 
of  permanent  character  and  appearing  in  periodical 
literature,  but  these  have  not  undertaken  to  state 
whether  the  Department  had  to  be  recreated  for  its 
purpose,  or  whether  it  performed  its  task  with  no 
essential  change  other  than  tremendous  enlarge- 
ment; nor  have  they  attempted  to  reply  to  the 
charges  of  basic  errors  of  the  Department  when  it 
was  going  its  own  way,  and  that  they  were  only  cor- 
rected after  they  were  revealed  by  the  efforts  of  the 
hostile  members  of  the  investigating  committee.  I 
have  therefore  endeavored  to  recite  herein  the  facts 
and  the  evidence  which  show  that  the  Ordnance 
Department  was  adequate  for  its  proper  functions, 
in  so  far  as  it  could  be  with  insufficient  numbers 
and  resources;  that  its  officers  labored  devotedly 
and  successfully,  and  with  proper  methods,  in  mak- 
ing use  of  the  facilities  of  our  own  and  our  allied 
countries  and  the  auxiliary  agencies  created  to 
supplement  the  regular  departments,  to  supply  our 
armies  with  fighting  material ;  and  that  it  increased 
its  numbers  by  personnel  of  a  high  type  which  it 
secured,  assigned  to  duties  appropriate  to  its  apti- 
tudes, and  assimilated.  I  think  the  record  also 
shows  that  the  investigation  of  the  Senate  Military 
Committee,  in  so  far  as  it  was  conducted  by  its  se- 


290        ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

vere  critics  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  consumed 
uselessly  the  time  of  busy  officers;  slowed  up  prep- 
aration at  a  time  when  the  work  of  the  Department 
was  most  pressing;  brought  us  nothing  that  was  in- 
forming or  helpful,  and  stirred  up  the  country  on 
wrong  lines.  The  only  effect  which  it  could  have  on 
a  real  effort  at  reform  would  be  to  direct  it  astray. 
The  professional  department  had  realized  the  right 
thing  when  it  saw  it  to  be  done;  but  the  newly  in- 
spired critics,  uninformed  through  inattention,  did 
not  recognize  the  right  even  when  they  saw  it 
already  accomplished. 

Undoubtedly  the  Ordnance  Department  can  be 
improved  in  its  organization  in  the  light  of  the  ex- 
perience of  the  World  War.  It  can  be  given  some 
method  of  utilizing  the  services  of  civilians  of 
scientific  attainments,  for  at  least  a  part  of  their 
time,  in  dealing  with  the  problems  which  it  is  always 
having  to  handle ;  and  the  method  can  be  made  such 
as  to  cause  these  gentlemen  to  take  a  pride  in  ren- 
dering the  service.  The  relations  between  the  de- 
partment and  the  industries  of  the  country  which 
would  be  utilized  by  it  in  time  of  war  can  be  made 
closer  in  time  of  peace.  Machinery  can  be  devised 
for  the  coordination  of  the  ordnance  and  other  de- 
partments in  time  of  war  which  is  not  needed  in  time 
of  peace,  and  can  be  given  such  artificial  practice  in 
peace  time  as  to  make  it  readily  available  and 
expansible  in  war,  instead  of  having  to  be  newly 
created,  as  in  the  late  war.  But  it  would  be  a  mis- 
take to  conclude  from  our  experience  that  the 
functions  of  the  Ordnance  Department  should  be 


CONCLUSION  291 

assigned  to  a  different  kind  of  personnel,  in  a 
different  kind  of  organization,  such  as  was  pro- 
posed, for  example,  in  the  early  part  of  the  war 
when  it  was  urged  that  the  procurement  of  muni- 
tions of  war  should  be  taken  over  by  an  organization 
of  civilians,  on  the  ground  that  as  business  men 
they  could  handle  it  better  than  ordnance  officers 
with  training  supposed  to  have  been  military  only. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  the  department  was  enlarged 
by  the  recruitment,  among  others,  of  business 
men,  who  did  their  work  within  the  organization, 
instead  of  setting  up  a  new  one,  and  did  it  with 
great  satisfaction  and  success.  The  procurement 
itself,  meaning  the  placing  of  contracts  and  orders 
for  manufacture,  was  put  under  the  coordinating 
direction  of  a  very  eminent  business  man,  whose 
selection  of  the  Ordnance  Department  as  the  organi- 
zation in  which  he  volunteered  his  services  to  help 
see  the  war  through  was  a  testimonial  to  the  stand- 
ing of  the  department  in  the  business  community. 

The  proper  committees  of  Congress  will  work 
assiduously  at  the  preparation  of  an  Army  reorgani- 
zation measure  for  presentation  to  their  respective 
houses,  and  they  will  have  the  carefully  studied  as- 
sistance of  all  the  branches  of  the  War  Department, 
as  well  as  the  results  of  observation  of  officers  who 
served  in  the  theater  of  war.  No  doubt  the  measure 
will  embody  the  best  wisdom  which  is  available. 
But  whatever  it  may  be  it  will  fall  short  of  success 
unless  the  idea  which  is  behind  it,  the  military  prep- 
aration of  the  country,  shall  inspire  the  people  to 
better  support  than  they  have  ever  given  in  the 


292   ORDNANCE  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

past.  It  is  an  ungracious  part  to  tell  the  people 
that  they  are  wrong.  They  are  not  accustomed  to 
hear  it.  Public  men,  from  whom  they  hear  most 
about  themselves,  are  given  to  assuring  them  that 
they,  ultimately,  are  always  right,  and  that  their 
collective  judgment  should  invariably  be  accepted. 
Their  collective  judgment  must  be  accepted  because 
they  have  the  power  to  enforce  it ;  but  that  it  is  not 
always  right  is  evidenced  by  all  the  expense  and 
bloodshed  which  took  place  in  the  World  War,  after 
the  date  at  which  a  prepared  America  might  have 
brought  it  to  an  end.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  citizen 
to  have  an  opinion  about  matters  of  national  de- 
fense, and  although  this  does  not  mean  that  he 
should  make  himself  an  expert  in  the  subject,  it 
does  mean  that  he  should  require  attention  to  it 
upon  the  part  of  the  men  whom  he  supports  with 
his  franchise,  and  that  he  should  encourage  and  sus- 
tain them  in  forwarding  it,  in  accordance  with  views 
which  the  citizen  should  take  the  trouble  to  ascertain 
while  the  public  servant  is  in  the  candidate  stage. 
If  this  book  shall  make  any  contribution  to  public 
interest  in  the  labors  and  trials  of  those  who  toil  to 
prepare  the  nation  to  meet  its  enemies  it  will 
accomplish  its  purpose. 


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